Collusion and reciprocity in infinitely repeated games

This paper extends the standard industrial organization models of repeated interaction between firms by incorporating preferences for reciprocity. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (destructive reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (constructive reciprocity). The main finding of the paper is that, for plausible perceptions of fairness, preferences for reciprocity facilitate collusion in infinitely repeated market games, that is, the critical discount rate at wish collusion can be sustained tends to be lower when firms have preferences for reciprocity than when firms are selfish. The paper also finds that the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with reciprocal firms is worse for consumers than the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with selfish firms.

The spin-off of Sonae Capital

The purpose of this project is to study the spin-off of Sonae Capital, which took place in January 2008. Taking the form of a case study, this project is divided between the case narrative and a teaching note. I study the background and motivation of the transaction, along with its outcome. With the available information at the time of the case, I value Sonae Capital at the date of the spin-off and describe a possible trading strategy involving both the spun-off and the demerged companies. Finally, I conclude that the transaction was more beneficial for the parent company, Sonae SGPS, and that it did not follow the typical outperformance pattern observed in other spin-offs.

Tracking error of exchange-traded funds: Evidence from the UK

This paper is mainly concerned with the tracking accuracy of Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) but also evaluates their performance and pricing efficiency. The findings show that ETFs offer virtually the same return but exhibit higher volatility than their benchmark. It seems that the pricing efficiency, which should come from the creation and redemption process, does not fully hold as equity ETFs show consistent price premiums. The tracking error of the funds is generally small and is decreasing over time. The risk of the ETF, daily price volatility and the total expense ratio explain a large part of the tracking error. Trading volume, fund size, bid-ask spread and average price premium or discount did not have an impact on the tracking error. Finally, it is concluded that market volatility and the tracking error are positively correlated.

Observações sôbre a anestesia geral pelo hidrato de cloral na prática da cirurgia veterinária

In this paper the A. A. report the observations about the general anesthesia by chloral hydrate on the veterinary surgery. The observations were made on emasculation practices of horses, mules and hogs. It was possible to establish the following conclusions: 1) The choral hydrate presents low cost, it harmless, and is of easy application. 2) The more recommendable dosis for equine and swine were : 12-13 g per 100 k of body weight, in destilled water solution at 30 and 20%, respectively. 3) The anaethestic was injected by intravenous way with good results; in horses and mules the applications were made in the jugular; in swine, in the anterior vena cava, as was described by Carle and Dewhirst, because it was impracticable in the ear vein. 4) The dosis applied produced deep narcosis not lasting to long and with no danger to the animal's life. 5) In the case of fattening hogs, it must be made a discount of about 40% on the body weight, to calculate dosis to be employed. 6) The tables A and B show the results, that may be considered as good.

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor

Repeated games played in a network

Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by letting the players form a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. This and the bilateral communication structure allow for limited results under strategic communication only. As a by-product this model produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network's diameter, and not on its clustering coefficient as in other models.

The Appraisal of projects with environmental impacts. Efficiency and Sustainability

It is usually assumed that the appraisal of the impacts experienced by present generations does not entail any difficulty. However, this is not true. Moreover, there is not a widely accepted methodology for taking these impacts into account. Some of the controversial issues are: the appropriate value for the discount rate, the choice of the units for expressing the impacts, physical or monetary units -income, consumption or investment- and the valuation of tangible and intangible goods. When approaching the problem of very long term impacts, there is also the problem of valuing the impacts experienced by future generations, through e.g., the use of an intergenerational discount rate. However, if this were the case, the present generation perspective would prevail, as if all the property rights on the resources were owned by them. Therefore, the sustainability requirement should also be incorporated into the analysis. We will analyze these problems in this article and show some possible solutions.

Three essays on the psychology of investment and financial markets

Préface My thesis consists of three essays where I consider equilibrium asset prices and investment strategies when the market is likely to experience crashes and possibly sharp windfalls. Although each part is written as an independent and self contained article, the papers share a common behavioral approach in representing investors preferences regarding to extremal returns. Investors utility is defined over their relative performance rather than over their final wealth position, a method first proposed by Markowitz (1952b) and by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), that I extend to incorporate preferences over extremal outcomes. With the failure of the traditional expected utility models in reproducing the observed stylized features of financial markets, the Prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) offered the first significant alternative to the expected utility paradigm by considering that people focus on gains and losses rather than on final positions. Under this setting, Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2000) and McQueen and Vorkink (2004) were able to build a representative agent optimization model which solution reproduced some of the observed risk premium and excess volatility. The research in behavioral finance is relatively new and its potential still to explore. The three essays composing my thesis propose to use and extend this setting to study investors behavior and investment strategies in a market where crashes and sharp windfalls are likely to occur. In the first paper, the preferences of a representative agent, relative to time varying positive and negative extremal thresholds are modelled and estimated. A new utility function that conciliates between expected utility maximization and tail-related performance measures is proposed. The model estimation shows that the representative agent preferences reveals a significant level of crash aversion and lottery-pursuit. Assuming a single risky asset economy the proposed specification is able to reproduce some of the distributional features exhibited by financial return series. The second part proposes and illustrates a preference-based asset allocation model taking into account investors crash aversion. Using the skewed t distribution, optimal allocations are characterized as a resulting tradeoff between the distribution four moments. The specification highlights the preference for odd moments and the aversion for even moments. Qualitatively, optimal portfolios are analyzed in terms of firm characteristics and in a setting that reflects real-time asset allocation, a systematic over-performance is obtained compared to the aggregate stock market. Finally, in my third article, dynamic option-based investment strategies are derived and illustrated for investors presenting downside loss aversion. The problem is solved in closed form when the stock market exhibits stochastic volatility and jumps. The specification of downside loss averse utility functions allows corresponding terminal wealth profiles to be expressed as options on the stochastic discount factor contingent on the loss aversion level. Therefore dynamic strategies reduce to the replicating portfolio using exchange traded and well selected options, and the risky stock.

A Case of Framing Effects: The Elicitation of Time Preferences.

We compare three methods for the elicitation of time preferences in an experimental setting: the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure (BDM); the second price auction; and the multiple price list format. The first two methods have been used rarely to elicit time preferences. All methods used are perfectly equivalent from a decision theoretic point of view, and they should induce the same ‘truthful’ revelation i dominant strategies. In spite of this, we find that framing does matter: the money discount rates elicited with the multiple price list tend to be higher than those elicited with the other two methods. In addition, our results shed some light on attitudes towards time, and they permit a broad classification of subjects depending on how the size of the elicited values varies with the time horizon.

The Design and efficiency of loyalty rewards

The goal of this paper is to reexamine the optimal design and efficiency of loyalty rewards in markets for final consumption goods. While the literature has emphasized the role of loyalty rewards as endogenous switching costs (which distort the efficient allocation of consumers), in this paper I analyze the ability of alternative designs to foster consumer participation and increase total surplus. First, the efficiency of loyalty rewards depend on their specific design. A commitment to the price of repeat purchases can involve substantial efficiency gains by reducing price-cost margins. However, discount policies imply higher future regular prices and are likely to reduce total surplus. Second, firms may prefer to set up inefficient rewards (discounts), especially in those circumstances where a commitment to the price of repeat purchases triggers Coasian dynamics.

Orthogonal higher order structure and confirmatory factor analysis of the French Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III).

According to the most widely accepted Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) model of intelligence measurement, each subtest score of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Adults (3rd ed.; WAIS-III) should reflect both 1st- and 2nd-order factors (i.e., 4 or 5 broad abilities and 1 general factor). To disentangle the contribution of each factor, we applied a Schmid-Leiman orthogonalization transformation (SLT) to the standardization data published in the French technical manual for the WAIS-III. Results showed that the general factor accounted for 63% of the common variance and that the specific contributions of the 1st-order factors were weak (4.7%-15.9%). We also addressed this issue by using confirmatory factor analysis. Results indicated that the bifactor model (with 1st-order group and general factors) better fit the data than did the traditional higher order structure. Models based on the CHC framework were also tested. Results indicated that a higher order CHC model showed a better fit than did the classical 4-factor model; however, the WAIS bifactor structure was the most adequate. We recommend that users do not discount the Full Scale IQ when interpreting the index scores of the WAIS-III because the general factor accounts for the bulk of the common variance in the French WAIS-III. The 4 index scores cannot be considered to reflect only broad ability because they include a strong contribution of the general factor.

Community Education Needs to be Supported by Strong Public Policy to Tackle Food Poverty

Community education needs to be supported by strong public policy if it is to be fully effective at tackling food poverty and obesity, a project evaluation by the Institute of Public Health in Ireland (IPH) has found. In its evaluation of Decent Food for All (DFfA) - a major project to improve community diet and health - IPH found that where people live and shop had a greater impact on their diet than their own individual awareness and attitudes. Access Tackling Food Poverty: lessons from the Decent Food for All intervention at www.publichealth.ie DFfA was funded by safefood (the Food Safety Promotion Board) and the Food Standards Agency Northern Ireland. The project lasted four years and included hundreds of community education activities designed to improve diet in poorer parts of Armagh and South Tyrone. safefood commissioned IPH to undertake the evaluation of DFfA. Dr. Kevin Balanda, IPH Associate Director, said 'The aim of the project was to reduce food poverty (this is defined as not being able to consume adequate healthy food) and improve health in the target communities. DFfA delivered over 370 core activities to 3,100 residents including local education talks on diet, cookery workshops, fresh fruit in schools, healthy food tastings and information stands. One in eight residents in the target areas participated in at least one of these activities.' The evaluation found that over 1 in 5 adults in the target areas reported they had cut their weekly food spending in the last six months to pay other household bills such as rent, electricity and gas. During the four years of the DFfA activities, this percentage had not changed significantly. There were mixed changes in the nature of food in local stores. While the overall availability and price of food increased, both ﾓhealthierﾔ food and ﾓunhealthierﾔ food were included in that increase. It was only in the larger ﾓmultiple/discount freezerﾔ type of shops that the overall price of food had decreased.

Public Monitoring with Uncertainty in the Time Repetitions

This paper study repeated games where the time repetitions of the stage game are not known or controlled by the players. We call this feature random monitoring. Kawamori's (2004) shows that perfect random monitoring is always better than the canonical case. Surprisingly, when the monitoring is public, the result is less clear-cut and does not generalize in a straightforward way. Unless the public signals are sufficiently informative about player's actions and/or players are patient enough. In addition to a discount effect, that tends to consistently favor the provision of incentives, we found an information effect, associated with the time uncertainty on the distribution of public signals. Whether payoff improvements are or not possible, depends crucially on the direction and strength of these effects. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Random Public Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Stochastic Processes.

Cost-effectiveness of pharmacotherapies for nicotine dependence in primary care settings: a multinational comparison.

OBJECTIVE: To estimate the incremental cost-effectiveness of the first-line pharmacotherapies (nicotine gum, patch, spray, inhaler, and bupropion) for smoking cessation across six Western countries-Canada, France, Spain, Switzerland, the United States, and the United Kingdom. DESIGN AND STUDY POPULATION: A Markov-chain cohort model to simulate two cohorts of smokers: (1) a reference cohort given brief cessation counselling by a general practitioner (GP); (2) a treatment cohort given counselling plus pharmacotherapy. Effectiveness expressed as odds ratios for quitting associated with pharmacotherapies. Costs based on the additional physician time required and retail prices of the medications. INTERVENTIONS: Addition of each first-line pharmacotherapy to GP cessation counselling. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Cost per life-year saved associated with pharmacotherapies. RESULTS: The cost per life-year saved for counselling only ranged from US190 dollars in Spain to 773 dollars in the UK for men, and from 288 dollars in Spain to 1168 dollars in the UK for women. The incremental cost per life-year saved for gum ranged from 2230 dollars for men in Spain to 7643 dollars for women in the US; for patch from 1758 dollars for men in Spain to 5131 dollars for women in the UK; for spray from 1935 dollars for men in Spain to 7969 dollars for women in the US; for inhaler from 3480 dollars for men in Switzerland to 8700 dollars for women in France; and for bupropion from 792 dollars for men in Canada to 2922 dollars for women in the US. In sensitivity analysis, changes in discount rate, treatment effectiveness, and natural quit rate had the strongest influences on cost-effectiveness. CONCLUSIONS: The cost-effectiveness of the pharmacotherapies varied significantly across the six study countries, however, in each case, the results would be considered favourable as compared to other common preventive pharmacotherapies.

The Limits of Discrete Time Repeated Games:Some Notes and Comments

This paper studies the limits of discrete time repeated games with public monitoring. We solve and characterize the Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) problem. We found that for the "bad" ("good") news model the lower (higher) magnitude events suggest cooperation, i.e., zero punishment probability, while the highrt (lower) magnitude events suggest defection, i.e., punishment with probability one. Public correlation is used to connect these two sets of signals and to make the enforceability to bind. The dynamic and limit behavior of the punishment probabilities for variations in ... (the discount rate) and ... (the time interval) are characterized, as well as the limit payo¤s for all these scenarios (We also introduce uncertainty in the time domain). The obtained ... limits are to the best of my knowledge, new. The obtained ... limits coincide with Fudenberg and Levine (2007) and Fudenberg and Olszewski (2011), with the exception that we clearly state the precise informational conditions that cause the limit to converge from above, to converge from below or to degenerate. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Random Pub- lic Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Stochastic Processes.