Contracts for the Sale of Land: Understanding the Impecuniosity Defence

Where either the seller or buyer of landed property fails to complete a contract to sell land the non-breaching party has a right to seek specific performance of the contract. This remedy would compel the party in default to perform the contract on pain of being held in contempt of court if the court's order is not obeyed. The defaulting party would not be able to satisfy its obligations under the law by paying a sum of money as damages for breach of contract. This paper considers the impecuniosity defence to specific performance as recognised by courts in Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, Australia and New Zealand. Where the buyer demonstrates that he or she simply cannot raise the funds to buy the property specific performance will not be decreed and the court will make an award of damages for breach of contract measured by the difference between the contract price and the market price of the property at the time of default. The paper considers the nature and parameters of this defence and how it differs (if at all) from the alternative defence of extreme hardship. The paper addresses the question of whether it might be better to move to a position where sellers of land in all cases no longer enjoy a presumption of specific performance but have to demonstrate that the alternative remedy of damages is clearly inadequate. If this should be so the paper goes on to consider whether abolition of the presumption in favour of specific performance for sellers should lead to abolition of the presumption of specific performance for buyers, as is the position in Canada following the Supreme Court's decision in Semelhago v Paramadevan [1996] 2 SCR 415.

In Protection of Whose “Wellbeing”? Considerations of “Clauses and A/Effects” in Athlete Contracts

Contractual agreements have become an accepted part of participation processes for athletes in a variety of sport contexts. Closer readings of these contracts,however, pose several questions regarding organizational intentions and motivations,the conceptualization of athletes as “workers,” and representation parity. In this article, we draw on four types of athlete contractual documents from both select international “amateur” and “professional” sport settings. Our key considerations include athletes’ ownership over their image and identities; medical and health disclosures; lifestyle, behavioral and body choices, and restrictions beyond sport; adherence to organizational philosophy and commitments; and social media and publicity constraints. Our exegesis here encourages sport researchers to deliberate whose “wellbeing” matters most when signing that seductive dotted line.

What hides behind the fixed-term contracts wage gap?

In Portugal, about 20% of full-time workers are employed under a fixed-term contract. Using a rich longitudinal matched employer-employee dataset for Portugal, with more than 20 million observations and covering the 2002-2012 period, we confirm the common idea that fixed-term contracts are not desirable when compared to permanent ones, by estimating a conditional wage gap of -1.7 log points. Then, we evaluate the sources of that wage penalty by combining a three way high-dimensional fixed effects model with the decomposition of Gelbach (2014), in which the three dimensions considered are the worker’s unobserved ability, the firm’s compensation wage policy and the job title effect. It is shown that the average worker with a fixed-term contract is less productive than his/her permanent counterparts, explaining -3.92 log points of the FTC wage penalty. Additionally, the sorting of workers into lower-paid job titles is also responsible for -0.59 log points of the wage gap. Surprisingly, we found that the allocation of workers among firms mitigates the existing wage penalty (in 4.23 log points), as fixed-term workers are concentrated into firms with a more generous compensation policy. Finally, following Figueiredo et al. (2014), we further control for the worker-firm match characteristics and reach the conclusion that fixed-term employment relationships have an overrepresentation of low quality worker-firm matches, explaining 0.65 log points of the FTC wage penalty.

Contingent contracts

International businesses bring with them additional negotiation complexities and extra risks, thus calling for negotiation integrative solutions and additional legal protection. The recent economic crisis forced, companies, including SMEs, to look for international markets and face these additional complexities and issues. In the search for a practical and simplified solution, to serve less sophisticated companies, this paper brings insights from the negotiation literature to a specific legal issue. Specifically, I investigate the negotiation and use of contingent agreements as a tool for facilitating the negotiation process and managing risk in international deals. Looking into an international sale of goods from Portugal to Brazil, this paper proposes the structuring of two contingent contracts related to two category of products in order to demonstrate the potential benefits of some of its relevant features, specifically the creation of incentives and identification and allocation of future risks. In general, the structuring of contingent agreements is likely to provide positive results in mitigating the issues of lack of trust and dealing with the additional risks derived from international deals, therefore facilitating and improving the overall quality of the deal.

Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition - Behavioral Effects of the Fundamental Transformation

In this paper we study the role of incomplete ex ante contracts for ex post trade. Previous experimental evidence indicates that a contract provides a reference point for entitlements when the terms are negotiated in a competitive market. We show that this finding no longer holds when the terms are determined in a non-competitive way. Our results imply that the presence of a "fundamental transformation" (i.e., the transition from a competitive market to a bilateral relationship) is important for a contract to become a reference point. To the best of our knowledge this behavioral aspect of the fundamental transformation has not been shown before.

Indenture of Release of All Existing Contracts and Agreements with Woodstock and Lake Erie Railway Co.

Indenture of release stating that all existing contracts and agreements made by the Woodstock and Lake Erie Railway Co. are cancelled. This release was between the executors of Samuel Zimmerman's will and the Woodstock and Lake Erie Railway Co. February 10, 1858.

Prices of John Brown’s contracts for Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway from Geneva Street to Thorold Station

Prices of John Brown’s contracts for Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway from Geneva Street to Thorold Station (1 page, handwritten), n.d.

Report by Jacob Misner on setting contracts for deepening and clearing ditches and estimates of quantities and costs of marsh drainage

Report by Jacob Misner on setting contracts for deepening and clearing ditches and estimates of quantities and costs of marsh drainage (3 ½ pages, handwritten). This is marked as a copy, July 14, 1855.

Non-Commitment and Savings in Dynamic Risk-Sharing Contracts

We characterize the solution to a model of consumption smoothing using financing under non-commitment and savings. We show that, under certain conditions, these two different instruments complement each other perfectly. If the rate of time preference is equal to the interest rate on savings, perfect smoothing can be achieved in finite time. We also show that, when random revenues are generated by periodic investments in capital through a concave production function, the level of smoothing achieved through financial contracts can influence the productive investment efficiency. As long as financial contracts cannot achieve perfect smoothing, productive investment will be used as a complementary smoothing device.

Contentious Contracts

This paper offers an explanation of rationally contracts where incompeteness refers to unforeseen contingencies. Agents enter a relationship with two-sided moral hazard in which a commitment to discard parts of the joint resources may be ex ante efficient.