The K-Th derivatives of the immanant and the X-symmetric power of an operator

In recent papers, formulas are obtained for directional derivatives, of all orders, of the determinant, the permanent, the m-th compound map and the m-th induced power map. This paper generalizes these results for immanants and for other symmetric powers of a matrix.

The norm of the K- Th derivative of the X-symmetric power of an operator

In this paper, the exact value for the norm of directional derivatives, of all orders, for symmetric tensor powers of operators on finite dimensional vector spaces is presented. Using this result, an upper bound for the norm of all directional derivatives of immanants is obtained.

Factorization by invariant embedding of elliptic problems: circular and star-shaped domains

Dissertação apresentada para obtenção do grau de Doutor em Matemática na especialidade de Equações Diferenciais, pela Universidade Nova de Lisboa,Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia

Practical software improve design and performance of a randomly packed air stripping column for removing volatile organic compounds from water

STRIPPING is a software application developed for the automatic design of a randomly packing column where the transfer of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) from water to air can be performed and to simulate it’s behaviour in a steady-state. This software completely purges any need of experimental work for the selection of diameter of the column, and allows a choice, a priori, of the most convenient hydraulic regime for this type of operation. It also allows the operator to choose the model used for the calculation of some parameters, namely between the Eckert/Robbins model and the Billet model for estimating the pressure drop of the gaseous phase, and between the Billet and Onda/Djebbar’s models for the mass transfer. Illustrations of the graphical interface offered are presented.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

A sixth-order finite volume method for the 1D biharmonic operator: application to intramedullary nail simulation

A new very high-order finite volume method to solve problems with harmonic and biharmonic operators for one- dimensional geometries is proposed. The main ingredient is polynomial reconstruction based on local interpolations of mean values providing accurate approximations of the solution up to the sixth-order accuracy. First developed with the harmonic operator, an extension for the biharmonic operator is obtained, which allows designing a very high-order finite volume scheme where the solution is obtained by solving a matrix-free problem. An application in elasticity coupling the two operators is presented. We consider a beam subject to a combination of tensile and bending loads, where the main goal is the stress critical point determination for an intramedullary nail.

The Barcelonnettes: an example of network-entrepreneurs in XIX century Mexico. An explanation based on a theory of bounded rational choice with social embeddedness

A theory of network-entrepreneurs or "spin-off system" is presented in this paper for the creation of firms based on the community’s social governance. It is argued that firm’s capacity for accumulation depends on the presence of employees belonging to the same social/ethnic group with expectations of "inheriting" the firm and becoming entrepreneurs once they have been selected for their merits and loyalty towards their patrons. Such accumulation is possible because of the credibility of the patrons’ promises of supporting newcomers due to high social cohesion and specific social norms prevailing in the community. This theory is exemplified through the case of the Barcelonnettes, a group of immigrants from the Alps in the South of France (Provence) who came to Mexico in the XIX Century.

Does bounded rationality lead to individual heterogeneity? The impact of the experimentation process and of memory constraints

In this paper we explore the effect of bounded rationality on the convergence of individual behavior toward equilibrium. In the context of a Cournot game with a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm. Computational experiments show that (1) there is remarkable heterogeneity across identical but boundedly rational agents; (2) such individual heterogeneity is not simply a consequence of the random elements contained in the genetic algorithm; (3) the more rational agents are in terms of memory abilities and pre-play evaluation of strategies, the less heterogeneous they are in their actions. At the limit case of full rationality, the outcome converges to the standard result of uniform individual behavior.

A rotation method which gives linear Lp-Estimates for powers of the Ahlfors-Beurling operator

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Large deviation for BSDE with subdifferential operator

In this paper we prove that the solution of a backward stochastic differential equation, which involves a subdifferential operator and associated to a family of reflecting diffusion processes, converges to the solution of a deterministic backward equation and satisfes a large deviation principle.

Complexity and Bounded Rationality in Individual Decision Problemsing.

I develop a model of endogenous bounded rationality due to search costs, arising implicitly from the problems complexity. The decision maker is not required to know the entire structure of the problem when making choices but can think ahead, through costly search, to reveal more of it. However, the costs of search are not assumed exogenously; they are inferred from revealed preferences through her choices. Thus, bounded rationality and its extent emerge endogenously: as problems become simpler or as the benefits of deeper search become larger relative to its costs, the choices more closely resemble those of a rational agent. For a fixed decision problem, the costs of search will vary across agents. For a given decision maker, they will vary across problems. The model explains, therefore, why the disparity, between observed choices and those prescribed under rationality, varies across agents and problems. It also suggests, under reasonable assumptions, an identifying prediction: a relation between the benefits of deeper search and the depth of the search. As long as calibration of the search costs is possible, this can be tested on any agent-problem pair. My approach provides a common framework for depicting the underlying limitations that force departures from rationality in different and unrelated decision-making situations. Specifically, I show that it is consistent with violations of timing independence in temporal framing problems, dynamic inconsistency and diversification bias in sequential versus simultaneous choice problems, and with plausible but contrasting risk attitudes across small- and large-stakes gambles.

Positive solutions of nonlinear problems involving the square root of the Laplacian

We consider nonlinear elliptic problems involving a nonlocal operator: the square root of the Laplacian in a bounded domain with zero Dirichlet boundary conditions. For positive solutions to problems with power nonlinearities, we establish existence and regularity results, as well as a priori estimates of Gidas-Spruck type. In addition, among other results, we prove a symmetry theorem of Gidas-Ni-Nirenberg type.

Dynamics of experimental populations of native and introduced blowflies (Diptera: Calliphoridae): mathematical modelling and the transition from asymptotic equilibrium to bounded oscillations

The equilibrium dynamics of native and introduced blowflies is modelled using a density-dependent model of population growth that takes into account important features of the life-history in these flies. A theoretical analysis indicates that the product of maximum fecundity and survival is the primary determinant of the dynamics. Cochliomyia macellaria, a blowfly native to the Americas and the introduced Chrysomya megacephala and Chrysomya putoria, differ in their dynamics in that the first species shows a damping oscillatory behavior leading to a one-point equilibrium, whereas in the last two species population numbers show a two-point limit cycle. Simulations showed that variation in fecundity has a marked effect on the dynamics and indicates the possibility of transitions from one-point equilibrium to bounded oscillations and aperiodic behavior. Variation in survival has much less influence on the dynamics.