Assessment of damages for defamation of business and personal reputation

An award of damages for defamation is to provide reparation for harm to a plaintiff’s reputation for the publication of defamatory material, compensate for any personal distress caused and vindicate the plaintiff’s reputation.1 Assessing such damages is recognised as a difficult task and perhaps the Queensland courts face further difficulties as there are few awards of damages for defamation in the state. This was pointed out in the recent decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal, Cerutti & Anor v Crestside Pty Ltd & Anor.2 This decision examined in detail the principles of assessing damages for defamation.

Case note : Keegan v Sussan Corporation (Aust) Pty Ltd

A recent decision of the Queensland Supreme Court highlights that merely having a policy in a workplace is not sufficient in itself – the policy must be implemented and followed if an employer wishes to establish that it is not in breach of its duty of care owed to employees. In Keegan v Sussan Corporation (Aust) Pty Ltd an employee successfully sued in negligence for her psychiatric injury caused by her employer’s failure to follow its bullying and harassment policy.

Nondelegable duty : the implications of Woodland v Essex County Council

English law has long recognised that nondelagable duties exist, but it does not have a single theory to explain when or why - arguable, one might add, until now. That is the value of the reasons for judgement in Woodland v Essex County Council.

Assessment of damages in wrongful birth cases

More than ten years has passed since the High Court of Australia confirmed the recoverability of damages for the cost of raising a child in the well know decision of Cattanach v Melchior . A recent decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales was widely anticipated as potentially providing a comprehensive discussion of the principles relevant to the assessment of damages in wrongful birth cases.

Volunteering and recent governance reforms

The regulatory reforms touching volunteer governs over the last 25 years are identified and analysed. BOth direct reforms such as the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission's (ACNC) governance standards and society--wide indirect reforms to workplace health and safety, civil liability and deemed liability provisions are discussed in this chapter.

Hamcor Pty Ltd v Queensland

The Ipp Report recommendation that for claims for personal injury and death arising from the negligent performance or non-performance of a public function based upon a policy decision, could not establish negligence unless the public authority was so unreasonable that no reasonable public authority in the same position would have made it, was adopted in different ways by all jurisdictions except South Australia and the Northern Territory.1 This introduced the public law concept of Wednesbury unreasonableness to civil liability which caused much academic debate.2 Section 36 of the Queensland provides...

The ghost in the machine: Legal challenges of neural interface devices

Neural interface devices and the melding of mind and machine, challenge the law in determining where civil liability for injury, damage or loss should lie. The ability of the human mind to instruct and control these devices means that in a negligence action against a person with a neural interface device, determining the standard of care owed by him or her will be of paramount importance. This article considers some of the factors that may influence the court’s determination of the appropriate standard of care to be applied in this situation, leading to the conclusion that a new standard of care might evolve.

Putting the 'Personal' back into injury: An interpretation of Pt 3-5 of the ACL

There is an ongoing debate in relation to Part 3-5 of the ACL, particularly over its use in relation to other civil liability remedies. This article looks more closely at ss 138 and 139. It argues that, because of a possible design flaw in the statutory construction of s 138, it can be interpreted much more broadly than it has been to date. Also, the paper discusses the effect on an interpretation of s 139 ACL of both the High Court’s decision in Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd, and a small but significant amendment to s 139 when the ACL was enacted. It argues that s 139 can now be interpreted broadly to include claims not just for loss of financial support or services but for all loss or damage or injury caused.

The issue of consent: For the plaintiff or defendant to prove in trespass to person?

In White v Johnston1 the vexed question of whether it is for a plaintiff to prove lack of consent to a trespass to person or for the defendant to establish consent as defence was considered. The court also considered the principles of assessing an award of exemplary damages...

The doctrine of necessity and the detention and restraint of people with intellectual impairment: Is there any justification?

In Australia, the legal basis for the detention and restraint of people with intellectual impairment is ad hoc and unclear. There is no comprehensive legal framework that authorises and regulates the detention of, for example, older people with dementia in locked wards or in residential aged care, people with disability in residential services or people with acquired brain injury in hospital and rehabilitation services. This paper focuses on whether the common law doctrine of necessity (or its statutory equivalents) should have a role in permitting the detention and restraint of people with disabilities. Traditionally, the defence of necessity has been recognised as an excuse, where the defendant, faced by a situation of imminent peril, is excused from the criminal or civil liability because of the extraordinary circumstances they find themselves in. In the United Kingdom, however, in In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) and R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L, the House of Lords broadened the defence so that it operated as a justification for treatment, detention and restraint outside of the emergency context. This paper outlines the distinction between necessity as an excuse and as a defence, and identifies a number of concerns with the latter formulation: problems of democracy, integrity, obedience, objectivity and safeguards. Australian courts are urged to reject the United Kingdom approach and retain an excuse-based defence, as the risks of permitting the essentially utilitarian model of necessity as a justification are too great.

What’s law got to do with it?: Medical negligence, causation and the use of policy

In a medical negligence context, and under the causation provisions enacted pursuant to Civil Liability Legislation in most Australian jurisdictions, the normative concept of “scope of liability” requires a consideration of whether or not and why a medical practitioner should be responsible for a patient’s harm. As such, it places a limit on the extent to which practitioners are deemed liable for a breach of the duty of care owed by them, in circumstances where a legal factual connection between that breach and the causation of a patient’s harm has already been shown. It has been said that a determination of causation requires ‘the identification and articulation of an evaluative judgement by reference to “the purposes and policy of the relevant part of the law”’: Wallace v Kam (2013) 297 ALR 383, 388. Accordingly, one of the normative factors falling within scope of liability is an examination of the content and purpose of the rule or duty of care violated – that is, its underlying policy and whether this supports an attribution of legal responsibility upon a practitioner. In this context, and with reference to recent jurisprudence, this paper considers: the policy relevant to a practitioner’s duty of care in each of the areas of diagnosis, treatment and advice; how this has been used to determine an appropriate scope of liability for the purpose of the causation inquiry in medical negligence claims; and whether such an approach is problematic for medical standards or decision-making.

Strategically Pleading Intentional Torts in medical cases

The opportunities and challenges faced by litigants who strategically plead intentional torts are borne out by two recent medical cases. Both arose out of dental treatment. Dean v Phung established some key principles which were clarified in White v Johnston. Before considering those two cases it is worth examining the environment in which such intentional torts claims now exist. Following the Ipp Review of the Law of Negligence, non-uniform legislative changes to the law of negligence were introduced across Australia which have imposed limitations on liability and quantum of damages in cases where a person has been injured through the fault of another. While it seems that, given the limitation of the scope of the review and recommendations to negligently caused damage, the Ipp Review reforms were meant to be limited to injury resulting from negligent acts rather than intentional torts, the extent to which the civil liability legislation applies to intentional torts differs across Australia.

The Statutory Defence(s) of 'peer professional opinion'

In the wake of the GFC and with ever increasing consumer-protection-related laws, clients are more aware of their rights and your obligations as a professional valuer. They also are more likely to take legal action if, as a result of their reliance on a valuation, they suffer a financial loss. In some Australian jurisdictions, in response to a claim of negligence, the professional valuer may be able to raise a professional practice defence under civil liability legislation. This article considers the nature of this statutory defence, what is required to rely upon it and in which jurisdictions it applies.

A responsabilidade extracontratual da Administração pública por atos omissivos

Trata-se de estudo dirigido à afirmação da natureza objetiva da responsabilidade objetiva da Administração Pública por atos omissivos. Defende-se a correta aplicação do artigo 37 parágrafo 6 da Constituição da República, em que se fora estabelecida a responsabilidade objetiva da Administração em todas as hipóteses em que esteja configurado nexo causal entre sua atuação, comissiva ou omissiva, e um dano injusto ocorrido. É novo o enfoque que norteia a reparação civil, não mais a atividade realizada pelo agente, mas as conseqüências sofridas pela vítima deste dano injusto. Exercitada na seara da responsabilidade civil do Estado, considerado em sentido lato, parece ainda mais lógica a mudança de enfoque mencionada, em razão do princípio norteador do seu dever de reparar, que é o da repartição eqüitativa dos encargos da Administração. De fato, sempre que a atividade administrativa estatal, exercida em benefício de toda a coletividade, gerar dano injusto a um particular específico, configurar-se-á sua responsabilidade de reparar este dano, já que, se é em nome da coletividade que se adotou a conduta geradora do dano, esta a idéia principal daquela diretriz enunciada. Daí por que a verificação da presença do elemento subjetivo culpa, em sede de responsabilidade do Poder Público, fora tornada inteiramente estranho ao exame. A correta leitura do artigo constitucional, com reconhecimento da responsabilidade objetiva do Estado nas hipóteses de ato comissivo e omissivo da Administração Pública, realiza, ainda, o princípio da solidariedade social, que implica preponderância do interesse da reparação da vítima lesada sobre o interesse do agente que realiza, comissiva ou omissivamente, o ato lesivo. Essa a legitimidade da teoria do risco administrativo adotada, a adoção de coerente verificação do nexo causal, com admissão da oposição de excludentes de responsabilidade. Ademais, entre a vítima e o autor do dano injusto, a primeira não obtém, em geral, beneficio algum com o fato ou a atividade de que se originou o dano. Se assim é, a configuração do dever de indenizar da Administração Pública dependerá, apenas, da comprovação, no caso concreto, de três pressupostos que se somam: a atuação do Estado, a configuração do dano injusto e o nexo de causalidade. Será referida a jurisprudência espanhola consagrada à regra de responsabilidade objetiva da Administração Pública por atos omissivos, com considerações acerca da resposta da Jurisprudência daquele país ao respectivo enunciado normativo. Buscou-se, desta forma, elencar-se os elementos básicos à compreensão do tema, e também os pressupostos essenciais à afirmação da natureza objetiva da responsabilidade da Administração Pública por atos omissivos, que são, primordialmente, a compreensão do fundamento da regra constitucional, a correta delimitação do conceito de omissão e de causalidade omissiva. Destacados os pressupostos necessários à correta compreensão do tema, conclui-se pela afirmação da natureza objetiva da responsabilidade da Administração Pública por dano injusto advindo de ato omissivo, desde que assim o seja, querendo-se significar, desta forma, que a responsabilidade mencionada não prescinde da configuração do nexo causal entre o comportamento omissivo ocorrido e o dano injusto que se quer reparar.

A matriz eletronuclear no Brasil proposta de um marco jurídico adequado: natureza de serviço público das atividades do ciclo nuclear e a necessidade de uma entidade reguladora autônoma.

Partindo de uma análise histórica comparativa do tratamento da questão nuclear no Brasil, buscou-se compreender os condicionantes da estrutura normativa constitucional do tema atômico na atual Carta de 1988 para então lançar-se a uma análise crítica do atual quadro institucional, posto que é anterior à Constituição, mas que teria sido pela mesma recepcionado. Após esta análise crítica, tenta-se, no mesmo ambiente, reconstruir uma tessitura mínima para um ramo jurídico da energia nuclear, analisando, juntamente, a natureza das atividades do chamado ciclo nuclear. Enfim, cotejando todos estes dados, procura-se demonstrar que o atual marco legal é, ao menos, desatualizado e não atende a um projeto maior de desenvolvimento e controle das atividades nucleares no Brasil. Insta ainda salientar que, devido à própria natureza de uma tese de doutoramento, fez-se um recorte temático na questão nuclear, propositadamente não se aprofundando na temática referente à responsabilidade civil por dano nuclear, uma vez que já é tema tratado com bastante propriedade por variados escritos e autores.