The responsibility to protect and the Arab Spring : Libya as the exception, Syria as the norm?

On March 17 2011 the UN Security Council passed resolution 1973 authorising the use of force for civilian protection purposes in Libya.1 This resolution was hailed by many supporters of the responsibility to protect (R2P) as a crucial step towards the consolidation of the concept’s normative standing.2 Gareth Evans described the intervention as ‘a textbook case of the R2P norm working exactly as it was supposed to’.3 For Lloyd Axworthy the Libya episode signalled a move towards a ‘more humane world’.4 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon declared that it ‘affirms, clearly and unequivocally, the international community’s determination to fulfil its responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpetrated by their own government.’5 At first glance, the Security Council’s rapid, decisive response to escalating violence in Libya might well have suggested a new willingness on the part of the international community to take collective action to avert intra-state humanitarian crises. However, a closer examination of the text of resolution 1973 and statements by Security Council member states reveals a less than complete endorsement of R2P. Disagreements between states over the scope of the mandate for the use of force in Libya quickly emerged. Long-standing fears among Russia, China and other non-Western states that R2P could be used as a pretext for regime change returned to the fore as the legality and legitimacy of NATO’s military action were called into question. This post-Libya backlash against R2P has been a central factor in the international community’s subsequent inability to agree on effective civilian protection measures in Syria. Much of the optimism that surrounded R2P in the immediate aftermath of resolution 1973 has given way to a sober realization that achieving international consensus on civilian protection measures will rarely be straightforward.

The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-1957: Unconquerable Minds

Vaughan, J. (2005). The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-1957: Unconquerable Minds. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. RAE2008

The Jews in the Modern World : A History Since 1750

Rubinstein, William, et al., The Jews in the Modern World: A History Since 1750 (London: Hodder and Arnold, 2002), pp.xiv+449 RAE2008

Super-villains of the "real world": the political use of the characterization of villains in Chistopher Nolan's "Dark Knight Trilogy"

It is almost a tradition that celluloid (or digital) villains are represented with some characteristics that remind us the real political enemies of the producer country of the film, or even enemies within the country according to the particular ideology that sustains the film. The case of Christopher Nolan The Dark Knight trilogy, analyzed here, is representative of this trend for two reasons. First, because it gets marked by political radicalization conducted by the US government after the attack of September 11, 2001. Secondly, because it offers a profuse gallery of villains who are outside the circle of friends as the new doctrine “either with us or against us” opened by George Bush for the XXI century. This gallery includes from the very terrorists who justify the War on Terror (Ra's al Ghul, the Joker), to the “radical left” (Bane, Talia al Ghul) including liberal politicians (Harvey Dent), and corrupt that take advantage of the softness of the law to commit crimes with impunity (Dr. Crane, the Scarecrow).

World press photo 2012: a construção discursiva da Primavera Árabe

Dissertação apresentada à Escola Superior de Comunicação Social como parte dos requisitos para obtenção de grau de mestre em Jornalismo.

The Arab Spring: where was the EU, and what is its future in the region? Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 13 No. 4, February 2013

From the Introduction. In 2010 the martyring of Mohamed Bouazizi began a ripple of civil uprisings across the Middle East, and would lead to a wave of revolutions that the media would dub the Arab Spring. From North Africa to the Gulf Region, these civil uprisings made major headlines but found little intervention on behalf of world superpowers such as the United States or the European Union. Acting as more of an observer than as an active participant in these revolutions, it would seem that the European Union played a small role in preventing civil unrest, or in aiding in the policing of these oppressive governments. By example of the passive position held by Europe during these revolutions, the EU appears to be ill equipped to handle security issues such as the massive revolutionary chain witnessed across the Mediterranean. Now, however, they have a new opportunity to be involved in a post- Arab Spring Mediterranean. This paper seeks to address some reasons behind the Arab Spring, describe the institutional framework previously and currently in place, as well as to analyze the progress of Europe’s relationship with the Mediterranean by analyzing the EU’s past and current role in the Mediterranean. It will also look at critiques of the EU’s role in the Arab Spring, as well as the opportunities to be taken in the Mediterranean region.

Russia’s Middle East policy after the Arab revolutions. OSW Commentary No. 59, 2011-07-26

Russia’s policy towards the Middle East is instrumental. Its activity in the region has been growing since the middle of the last decade, and its aim is to help Moscow achieve its objectives in other areas, particularly in its policies towards the US and Europe, as well as its energy policy. The establishment of these political influences constitutes a bargaining chip for Russia in its relations with the US. Russia’s participation in resolving conflicts is aimed at building up its image as a supra-regional power. Russia’s Middle East policy is a key element in its contacts with the Muslim world. At the same time, Russia’s policy in the region remains cautious – despite its return to the region, Russia has not decided to ‘play’ for the Middle East, and its position and role in the region remain limited. The balance of power in the Middle East has been shifting in the aftermath of the Arab revolutions. However, it does not seem that they have opened up larger opportunities for Russian policy in the region. The Russian elite has been divided in its assessment of the consequences of these events. One part of it has displayed scepticism, treating the revolutions rather as a threat than a chance to strengthen their own position. The revolutions were not seen as democratisation processes, but rather as a destabilisation of the region and as posing an increased danger from radical Islam. For the other part of the elite, the revolutions were the natural consequence of the social changes occurring in the region. This internal dispute made it difficult for Russia to present a cohesive approach to the Arab revolutions, and its stance was reactive. The defensive position which Moscow adopted showed that Russia did not have the potential to mould the political situation, either in the region as a whole or its individual countries; neither did it display any willingness to do so. What Moscow is doing is positioning itself in such a way so as not to spoil relations with any other actor in the region, and to be able to exploit any possible emerging opportunities in case of further-reaching changes.

A Strong Europe in a Globalized World: From the Hungarian to the Polish presidency of the Council of the European Union. ACES Working Papers, 2011

On June 17, 2011, the Center for Transatlantic Relations – together with the Center for European Policy Analysis, the Polish Institute of International Affairs in Warsaw, and the Embassies of Hungary and Poland – hosted authors writing on the theme “A Strong Europe in a Globalized World,” and who offered in-depth, substantive reflections about how the United States and Europe can work together more closely in meeting global challenges. Drawing on the agendas of the outgoing and incoming EU Presidencies of the Council of the European Union – Hungary and Poland respectively – authors focused on the importance of a strong US-EU partnership in the face of mounting global challenges, from the current financial and economic crisis through the insecurities of energy markets and the promise of the Arab Spring. Authors explored in depth four key areas of shared interests: A Global Perspective (Transatlantic Partnership in a Globalized World); Achievements and Deliverables of Eastern Partnership; Euro-Atlantic Perspectives for the Balkans; and Common Challenges of Energy Security. Senior Hungarian and Polish government officials, subject matter experts, private sector actors, and think tank scholars participated.

Kitāb al-ʻibar wa-dīwān al-mubtadaʼ wa-al-khabar ̣fī ayyām al-ʻArab wa-al-ʻajam ̣wa-al-barbar wa-man ʻāṣarahym min dhawī al-sulṭān al-akllhbar wa-huwa tarīkh waḥīd ʻaṣrih /

Mode of access: Internet.

Reducing the global burden of depression : population level analysis of intervention cost-effectiveness in 14 world regions

International evidence on the cost and effects of interventions for reducing the global burden of depression remain scarce. Aims: To estimate the population-level cost-effectiveness of evidence-based depression interventions and their contribution towards reducing current burden. Method: Primary-care-based depression interventions were modelled at the level of whole populations in 14 epidemiological subregions of the world. Total population-level costs (in international dollars or I$) and effectiveness (disability adjusted life years (DALYs) averted) were combined to form average and incremental cost-effectiveness ratios. Results: Evaluated interventions have the potential to reduce the current burden of depression by 10–30%. Pharmacotherapy with older antidepressant drugs, with or without proactive collaborative care, are currently more cost-effective strategies than those using newer antidepressants, particularly in lower-income subregions. Conclusions: Even in resource-poor regions, each DALYaverted by efficient depression treatments in primary care costs less than 1 year of average per capita income, making such interventions a cost-effective use of health resources. However, current levels of burden can only be reduced significantlyif there is a substantialincrease substantial increase intreatment coverage.