Le syndrome métabolique chez les congéniques du rat Dahl : influence de la diète et rôle du récepteur de l'ANP

L’hypertension artérielle et l’obésité sont deux composantes conjointement reliées du syndrome métabolique. Les récepteurs de l’ANP (GCA) et de l’oxyde nitrique (GCs) ont des propriétés diurétiques, natriurétiques, vasodilatatrices et sont liés au contrôle de la pression. Des études récentes ont démontré leur implication dans l’obésité. Hypothèse : Une différence génétique au niveau du gène GCA pourrait contribuer à des différences physiologiques. La composante lipidique et/ou sodique de la diète pourrait influencer la fonction rénale, cardiaque et les valeurs anthropométriques différemment chez les souches congéniques. Objectifs : (1) Déterminer l’effet de la composante lipidique et sodique des diètes; (2) Évaluer l’influence de GCA sur la réponse physiologique des souches congéniques; (3) Expliquer les mécanismes physiologiques procurant une réduction de la pression artérielle chez la souche SM9. Méthodologie : Des modèles congéniques du rat Dahl (DSS) hypertendu, nourri avec une diète riche en gras (HF) ou normale (NF), ont été utilisés pour démontrer l’impact d’un segment chromosomique d’origine normotendue. Résultats : La souche SM9 a une prise de poids plus importante que SM12 et DSS sur diète HF malgré un apport alimentaire équivalent. La souche SM9 présente également un ratio masse adipeuse/masse maigre plus élevé que SM12 et DSS. Nous n’avons observé aucune augmentation de la pression artérielle en réponse à la diète HF pour les 3 souches malgré une augmentation du dommage rénal pour les 3 souches. Le dommage rénal est plus important chez DSS que pour les 2 congéniques. La réponse diurétique à l’ANP est plus élevée chez SM9 et est influencée par le contenu en sel dand la diète. La perte glomérulaire plus importante chez le rat DSS semble compensée par une augmentation de la réponse à l’ANP par les glomérules résiduels. Il y a une corrélation entre l’activité de GCA en réponse à l’ANP, les niveaux d’ARNm et le nombre de répétition du dinucléotide TA dans son promoteur. Le rat DSS présente une hypertrophie cardiaque plus importante que les deux souches congénique et ceci n’est pas modifié par la diète HF. Conclusion : Nos études ont permis de mettre en évidence un effet génétique impliquant le segment chromosomique normotendu contenant GCA dans la réponse à une diète HF chez le rat DSS.

Temporary and Permanent Buyout Prices in Online Auctions

Increasingly used in online auctions, buyout prices allow bidders to instantly purchase the item listed. We distinguish two types: a temporary buyout option disappears if a bid above the reserve price is made; a permanent one remains throughout the auction or until it is exercised. In a model featuring time-sensitive bidders with uniform valuations and Poisson arrivals but endogenous bidding times, we focus on finding temporary and permanent buyout prices maximizing the seller's discounted revenue, and examine the relative benefit of using each type of option in various environments. We characterize equilibrium bidder strategies in both cases and then solve the problem of maximizing seller's utility by simulation. Our numerical experiments suggest that buyout options may significantly increase a seller’s revenue. Additionally, while a temporary buyout option promotes early bidding, a permanent option gives an incentive to the bidders to bid late, thus leading to concentrated bids near the end of the auction.

Selecting Scientific Papers for Publication via Citation Auctions

The scientific community has been suffering from peer review for decades. This process (also called refereeing) subjects an author's scientific work or ideas to the scrutiny of one or more experts in the field. Publishers use it to select and screen manuscript submissions, and funding agencies use it to award research funds. The goal is to get authors to meet their discipline's standards and thus achieve scientific objectivity. Publications and awards that haven't undergone peer review are often regarded with suspicion by scholars and professionals in many fields. However, peer review, although universally used, has many drawbacks. We propose replacing peer review with an auction-based approach: the better the submitted paper, the more scientific currency the author likely bid to have it published. If the bid correctly reflects the paper's quality, the author is rewarded in this new scientific currency; otherwise, the author loses this currency. We argue that citations are an appropriate currency for all scientists. We believe that citation auctions encourage scientists to better control their submissions' quality. It also inspire them to prepare more exciting talks for accepted papers and to invite discussion of their results at congresses and conferences and among their colleagues. In the long run, citation auctions could have the power to greatly improve scientific research

Citation auctions as a method to improve selection of scientific papers

This paper describes the basis of citation auctions as a new approach to selecting scientific papers for publication. Our main idea is to use an auction for selecting papers for publication through - differently from the state of the art - bids that consist of the number of citations that a scientist expects to receive if the paper is published. Hence, a citation auction is the selection process itself, and no reviewers are involved. The benefits of the proposed approach are two-fold. First, the cost of refereeing will be either totally eliminated or significantly reduced, because the process of citation auction does not need prior understanding of the paper's content to judge the quality of its contribution. Additionally, the method will not prejudge the content of the paper, so it will increase the openness of publications to new ideas. Second, scientists will be much more committed to the quality of their papers, paying close attention to distributing and explaining their papers in detail to maximize the number of citations that the paper receives. Sample analyses of the number of citations collected in papers published in years 1999-2004 for one journal, and in years 2003-2005 for a series of conferences (in a totally different discipline), via Google scholar, are provided. Finally, a simple simulation of an auction is given to outline the behaviour of the citation auction approach

Information provision in procurement auctions

We analyze the optimal provision of information in a procurement auction with horizontally differentiated goods. The buyer has private information about her preferred location on the product space and has access to a costless communication device. A seller who pays the entry cost may submit a bid comprising a location and a minimum price. We characterize the optimal information structure and show that the buyer prefers to attract only two bids. Further, additional sellers are inefficient since they reduce total and consumer surplus, gross of entry costs. We show that the buyer will not find it optimal to send public information to all sellers. On the other hand, she may profit from setting a minimum price and that a severe hold-up problem arises if she lacks commitment to set up the rules of the auction ex-ante.

Egalitarian behaviour in multi unit combinatorial auctions

En entornos donde los recursos son precederos y la asignación de recursos se repite en el tiempo con el mismo conjunto o un conjunto muy similar de agentes, las subastas recurrentes pueden ser utilizadas. Una subasta recurrente es una secuencia de subastas donde el resultado de una subasta puede influenciar en las siguientes. De todas formas, este tipo de subastas tienen problemas particulares cuando la riqueza de los agentes esta desequilibrada y los recursos son precederos. En esta tesis se proponen algunos mecanismos justos o equitativos para minimizar los efectos de estos problemas. En una subasta recurrente una solución justa significa que todos los participantes consiguen a largo plazo sus objetivos en el mismo grado o en el grado más parecido posible, independientemente de su riqueza. Hemos demostrado experimentalmente que la inclusión de justicia incentiva a los bidders en permanecer en la subasta minimizando los problemas de las subastas recurrentes.

Effect of Information about benefits of biotechnology on consumer acceptance of genetically modified food; evidence from experimental auctions in the United States, England, and France

This study investigates the effect of information about potential benefits of biotechnology on consumer acceptance of genetically modified (GM) foods. Consumer willingness to accept compensation to consume a GM food was elicited using an incentive compatible auction mechanism in three US states (California, Florida, and Texas) and in two European countries (England and France). Results indicate that information on environmental benefits, health benefits and benefits to the third world significantly decreased the amount of money consumers demanded to consume GM food; however, the effect of information varied by type of information and location. Consistent with prior research, we find that initial attitudes toward biotechnology have a significant effect on how individuals responded to new information.

The role of undisclosed reserves in English open outcry auctions

This study considers the role that reserve prices may play in residential property auctions. In comparison to much of the previous empirical work, this study has access to undisclosed reserve prices from English auctions. Consistent with theoretical arguments in the auction literature, the results obtained illustrate that whilst higher reserve prices increase the revenue obtained for the seller, they also reduce the probability of sale. The findings also highlight the importance of auction participation, with the number of individual bidders and the number of bids significant in most specifications.

The role of undisclosed reserves in English open outcry auctions

This study considers the role that reserve prices may play in residential property auctions. In comparison to much of the previous empirical work, this study has access to undisclosed reserve prices from English auctions. Consistent with theoretical arguments in the auction literature, the results obtained illustrate that whilst higher reserve prices increase the revenue obtained for the seller, they also reduce the probability of sale. The findings also highlight the importance of auction participation, with the number of individual bidders and the number of bids significant in most specifications.

Modeling bidding competitiveness and position performance in multi-attribute construction auctions

Currently, multi-attribute auctions are becoming widespread awarding mechanisms for contracts in construction, and in these auctions, criteria other than price are taken into account for ranking bidder proposals. Therefore, being the lowest-price bidder is no longer a guarantee of being awarded, thus increasing the importance of measuring any bidder’s performance when not only the first position (lowest price) matters. Modeling position performance allows a tender manager to calculate the probability curves related to the more likely positions to be occupied by any bidder who enters a competitive auction irrespective of the actual number of future participating bidders. This paper details a practical methodology based on simple statistical calculations for modeling the performance of a single bidder or a group of bidders, constituting a useful resource for analyzing one’s own success while benchmarking potential bidding competitors.

Quick abnormal-bid-detection method for construction contract auctions

Noncompetitive bids have recently become a major concern in both public and private sector construction contract auctions. Consequently, several models have been developed to help identify bidders potentially involved in collusive practices. However, most of these models require complex calculations and extensive information that is difficult to obtain. The aim of this paper is to utilize recent developments for detecting abnormal bids in capped auctions (auctions with an upper bid limit set by the auctioner) and extend them to the more conventional uncapped auctions (where no such limits are set). To accomplish this, a new method is developed for estimating the values of bid distribution supports by using the solution to what has become known as the German Tank problem. The model is then demonstrated and tested on a sample of real construction bid data, and shown to detect cover bids with high accuracy. This paper contributes to an improved understanding of abnormal bid behavior as an aid to detecting and monitoring potential collusive bid practices.

Analysis of the distribution of the number of bidders in construction contract auctions

The number of bidders, N, involved in a construction procurement auction is known to have an important effect on the value of the lowest bid and the mark-up applied by bidders. In practice, for example, it is important for a bidder to have a good estimate of N when bidding for a current contract. One approach, instigated by Friedman in 1956, is to make such an estimate by statistical analysis and modelling. Since then, however, finding a suitable model for N has been an enduring problem for researchers and, despite intensive research activity in the subsequent 30 years, little progress has been made, due principally to the absence of new ideas and perspectives. The debate is resumed by checking old assumptions, providing new evidence relating to concomitant variables and proposing a new model. In doing this and in order to ensure universality, a novel approach is developed and tested by using a unique set of 12 construction tender databases from four continents. This shows the new model provides a significant advancement on previous versions. Several new research questions are also posed and other approaches identified for future study.

Improving the estimation of probability of bidder participation in procurement auctions

Anticipating the number and identity of bidders has significant influence in many theoretical results of the auction itself and bidders' bidding behaviour. This is because when a bidder knows in advance which specific bidders are likely competitors, this knowledge gives a company a head start when setting the bid price. However, despite these competitive implications, most previous studies have focused almost entirely on forecasting the number of bidders and only a few authors have dealt with the identity dimension qualitatively. Using a case study with immediate real-life applications, this paper develops a method for estimating every potential bidder's probability of participating in a future auction as a function of the tender economic size removing the bias caused by the contract size opportunities distribution. This way, a bidder or auctioner will be able to estimate the likelihood of a specific group of key, previously identified bidders in a future tender.

Scoring rules and competitive behavior in best value construction auctions

This paper examines the extent to which engineers can influence the competitive behavior of bidders in Best Value or multi-attribute construction auctions, where both the (dollar) bid and technical non-price criteria are scored according to a scoring rule. From a sample of Spanish construction auctions with a variety of bid scoring rules, it is found that bidders are influenced by the auction rules in significant and predictable ways. The bid score weighting, bid scoring formula and abnormally low bid criterion are variables likely to influence the competitiveness of bidders in terms of both their aggressive/conservative bidding and concentration/dispersion of bids. Revealing the influence of the bid scoring rules and their magnitude on bidders’ competitive behavior opens the door for the engineer to condition bidder competitive behavior in such a way as to provide the balance needed to achieve the owner’s desired strategic outcomes.

Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion

Within the context of a single-unit, independent private values auction model, we show that if bidder types are multidimensional, then under the optimal auction exclusion of some bidder types will occur. A second contribution of the paper is methodological in nature. In particular, we identify conditions under which an auction model with multidimensional types can be reduced to a model with one dimensional types without loss of generality. Reduction results of this type have achieved the status of folklore in the mechanism design literature. Here, we provide a proof of the reduction result for auctions.