Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems

The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties : (a) the core is a subset of the set; (b) the set is a lattice; (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b) and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems.

On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.

Solidarity in Choosing a Location on a Cycle

We study the implications of two solidarity conditions on the efficient location of a public good on a cycle, when agents have single-peaked, symmetric preferences. Both conditions require that when circumstances change, the agents not responsible for the change should all be affected in the same direction: either they all gain or they all loose. The first condition, population-monotonicity, applies to arrival or departure of one agent. The second, replacement-domination, applies to changes in the preferences of one agent. Unfortunately, no Pareto-efficient solution satisfies any of these properties. However, if agents’ preferred points are restricted to the vertices of a small regular polygon inscribed in the circle, solutions exist. We characterize them as a class of efficient priority rules.

A Systematic Framework for Analyzing the Dynamic Effects of Permanent and Transitory Shocks.

This paper proposes a systematic framework for analyzing the dynamic effects of permanent and transitory shocks on a system of n economic variables.

A Semi-Parametric Factor Model for Interest Rates.

Understanding the dynamics of interest rates and the term structure has important implications for issues as diverse as real economic activity, monetary policy, pricing of interest rate derivative securities and public debt financing. Our paper follows a longstanding tradition of using factor models of interest rates but proposes a semi-parametric procedure to model interest rates.

Cognition in Seemingly Riskless Choices and Judgments.

We instillate rational cognition and learning in seemingly riskless choices and judgments. Preferences and possibilities are given in a stochastic sense and based on revisable expectations. the theory predicts experimental preference reversals and passes a sharp econometric test of the status quo bias drawn from a field study.

Cooperative of Noncooperative Behavior?

In an abstract two-agent model, we show that every deterministic joint choice function compatible with the hypothesis that agents act noncooperatively is also compatible with the hypothesis that they act cooperatively. the converse is false.

Stochastic Volatility.

This paper prepared for the Handbook of Statistics (Vol.14: Statistical Methods in Finance), surveys the subject of stochastic volatility. the following subjects are covered: volatility in financial markets (instantaneous volatility of asset returns, implied volatilities in option prices and related stylized facts), statistical modelling in discrete and continuous time and, finally, statistical inference (methods of moments, quasi-maximum likelihood, likelihood-based and bayesian methods and indirect inference).

A Note on Ordinally Equivalent Pareto Surfaces

Assuming at least three individuals and some regularity conditions, we construct a set S* of Pareto surfaces which is an ordinal basis of the set S of all surfaces: every surface in S is ordinally equivalent to some surface in S* and all surfaces in S* are ordinally distinct.

The Rationality of Revolution.

Did the recent transition to liberal democracy in Eastern Europe consitute revolutions? Here, game theory is used to structure an explanation of institutional change proposed by Harold Innis (1950).