Measuring citizens' implicit and explicit attitudes towards the European Union

Studies assessing citizens’ attitudes towards Europe have mostly used explicit concepts and measures. However, psychologists have shown that human behaviour is not only determined by explicit attitudes which can be assessed via self-report, but also by implicit attitudes which require indirect measurement. We combine a self-report questionnaire with an implicit Affective Misattribution Procedure for the first time in an online environment to estimate the reliability, validity and predictive power of this implicit measure for the explanation of European Union-skeptical behaviour. Based on a survey with a sample representative for Germany, we found evidence for good reliability and validity of the implicit measure. In addition, the implicit attitude had a significant incremental impact beyond explicit attitudes on citizens’ proneness to engage in EU-skeptical information and voting behaviour.

Zur neuen Relevanz des sozialen Kontexts für das Wahlverhalten. Antwort auf die kritischen Anmerkungen von Franz Urban Pappi

Wir antworten auf die Kritik an unserem Artikel (Ackermann u. Traunmüller 2014) und argumentieren, dass Theorien über die abnehmende Bedeutung sozial-struktureller Merkmale für das Wahlverhalten fehlgeleitet sind. Stattdessen interessiert uns die gehaltvollere Frage, wie und unter welchen Bedingungen sie politisch wirksam werden. Diese Theorieperspektive öffnet den Blick für regionale und temporale Variation sozialer Einflussprozesse, welche gängigen Ansichten zum Cleavage-Voting widersprechen. Wir unterstützen unser Argument, indem wir demonstrieren, dass soziale Kontexte für das individuelle Wahlverhalten heutzutage wichtiger sind als noch vor Jahrzehnten. Abschließend diskutieren wir weiterführende Implikationen für soziale Kontextanalysen des Wahlverhaltens.

A Validation Study on Voter Turnout Bias in Switzerland

Surveys on voting behavior typically overestimate turnout rates substantially. To disentangle different sources of bias - coverage error, nonresponse bias, and overreporting - we conducted a validation study in which respondents' self-reported voting behavior was compared to administrative voting records (N = 2000). Our results show that all three sources of error inflate the survey estimate of the turnout rate and also bias estimates from political participation models, although coverage error is only moderate compared to the more pronounced biases due to nonresponse and overreporting. Furthermore, results from a wording experiment do not provide evidence that revised wording reduces measurement bias.

On Voters' Attitudes Towards Unemployment Insurance Subsidies across Regions: A Canadian Simulation

The Canadian unemployment insurance program is designed to reflect the varying risk of joblessness across regions. Regions that are considered low-risk areas subsidize higher risk ones. A region's risk is typically proxied by its relative unemployment rate. We use a dynamic, heterogeneous-agent model calibrated to Canada to analyze voters preferences between a uniformly generous unemployment insurance and the current system with asymmetric generosity. We find that Canada's unusual unemployment insurance system is surprisingly close to what voters would choose in spite of the possibilities of moral hazard and self-insurance through asset build-up.

Economics and Ideology: Causal Evidence of the Impact of Economic Conditions on Support for Redistribution and Other Ballot Proposals

There is a large literature demonstrating that positive economic conditions increase support for incumbent candidates, but little understanding of how economic conditions affect preferences for parties and for particulars of their platforms. We ask how exogenous shifts to the value of residents. human capital affect voting behavior in California neighborhoods. As predicted by economic theory, we find that positive economic shocks decrease support for redistributive policies. More notably, we find that conservative voting on a wide variety of ballot propositions--from crime to gambling to campaign finance--is increasing in economic well being.

The Political Economy of Constitutional Choice: A Study of the 2005 Kenyan Constitutional Referendum

Recent studies of the linkages between the wealth of nations and the institutions of governance suggest that concentrating political power in a monarchy or a ruling coalition impedes economic growth and, moreover, that while power-diffusing reforms can enhance the wellbeing of society in general, opposition by groups benefitting from the status quo is predictable. In November 2005, Kenyans rejected a proposed constitution that, despite promises made by their new chief executive, would not have lessened the powers of the presidency. Using a unique, constituency-level dataset on the referendum vote, we estimate a model of the demand for power diffusion and find that ethnic groups' voting decisions are influenced by their expected gains and losses from constitutional change. The results also highlights the importance of ethnic divisions in hindering the power-diffusion process, and thus establish a channel through which ethnic fragmentation adversely impacts economic development.

A Model of Rights

In this paper, we develop a simple model of the rights a government provides its citizenry. Rights are treated as public goods and taken as primitives in agents utility functions; each agent has preferences over the entire policy vector. We model the interaction among citi-zens and the government as a game in which an exogenous lobbying set makes contributions to the government to in uence policy formu-lation in the matter of rights. When examining contribution schedules comprising truthful Nash strategies, we find that members of the lob-bying set obtain rights closer to their most-preferred bundle, while the rights of non-lobbyers further diverge from their most-preferred bun-dle. Further, if the lobbying set comprises the entire population, the government s allocation of rights does not differ from the allocation achieved in the absence of contributions.

The Moderating Role of Electoral Pressure on Congressional Ideological Polarization: A Cross-Sectional Time-Series Analysis

Reelection and self-interest are recurring themes in the study of our congressional leaders. To date, many studies have already been done on the trends between elections, party affiliation, and voting behavior in Congress. However, because a plethora of data has been collected on both elections and congressional voting, the ability to draw a connection between the two provides a very reasonable prospect. This project analyzes whether voting shifts in congressional elections have an effect on congressional voting. Will a congressman become ideologically more polarized when his electoral margins increase? Essentially, this paper assumes that all congressmen are ideologically polarized, and it is elections which serve to reel congressmen back toward the ideological middle. The election and ideological data for this study, which spans from the 56th to the 107th Congress, finds statistically significant relationships between these two variables. In fact, congressman pay attention to election returns when voting in Congress. When broken down by party, Democrats are more exhibitive of this phenomenon, which suggest that Democrats may be more likely to intrinsically follow the popular model of representation. Meanwhile, it can be hypothesized that insignificant results for Republicans indicate that Republicans may follow a trustee model of representation.

Intergenerational Conflict and the Political Economy of School Spending

In this paper we use survey data to examine support among voters from different age cohorts for public school spending. The survey asked potential voters in California how they intended to vote on two initiatives, one a statewide initiative that would increase spending on public schools throughout the state and the other a local initiative that would increase spending only in the respondent's local school district. We find that older voters without children generally oppose increases in state spending but are much more willing to support local spending. We examine two explanations for this voting pattern, namely the capitalization of local spending into housing values and intergenerational altruism. Our results do not strongly favor one explanation over the other. Consequently, we conclude that both factors (capitalization and intergenerational altruism) probably play important roles in sustaining support among older voters for local school spending.

Characterizing Paretian Preferences

A characterization of a property of binary relations is of type M if it can be stated in terms of ordered M-tuples of alternatives. A characterization of finite type provides an easy test of whether preferences over a large set of alternatives possesses the property characterized. Unfortunately, there is no characterization of finite type for Pareto representability in R..2. A partial result along the same lines is obtained for Pareto representability in R..k, k .. 2.

A Median Voter Theorem for Postelection Politics

We analyze a model of 'postelection politics', in which (unlike in the more common Downsian models of 'preelection politics') politicians cannot make binding commitments prior to elections. The game begins with an incumbent politician in office, and voters adopt reelection strategies that are contingent on the policies implemented by the incumbent. We generalize previous models of this type by introducing heterogeneity in voters' ideological preferences, and analyze how voters' reelection strategies constrain the policies chosen by a rent-maximizing incumbent. We first show that virtually any policy (and any feasible level of rent for the incumbent) can be sustained in a Nash equilibrium. Then, we derive a 'median voter theorem': the ideal point of the median voter, and the minimum feasible level of rent, are the unique outcomes in any strong Nash equilibrium. We then introduce alternative refinements that are less restrictive. In particular, Ideologically Loyal Coalition-proof equilibrium also leads uniquely to the median outcome.

Tiebout Choice and the Voucher

This paper examines who is likely to gain and who is likely to lose under a universal voucher program. Following Epple and Romano (1998, 2003), and Nechyba (2000, 2003a), we focus on the idea that gains and losses under a universal voucher depend on two effects: changes in peer group composition and changes in housing values. We show that the direction and magnitude of each of these effects hinges critically on market structure, i.e., the amount of school choice that already exists in the public sector. In markets with little or no Tiebout choice, potential changes in peer group composition create an incentive for high-socioeconomic (SES) households to vote for the voucher and for low-SES households to vote against voucher. In contrast, in markets with significant Tiebout choice, potential changes in housing values create an incentive for high-SES households to vote against the voucher and for low-SES households to vote for the voucher. Using data on vote outcomes from California's 2000 voucher initiative, we find evidence consistent with those predictions.

How Decisive Is the Decisive Voter?

This paper examines whether the voter with the median income is decisive in local spending decisions. Previous tests have relied on cross-sectional data while we make use of a pair of California referenda to estimate a first difference specification. The referenda proposed to lower the required vote share for passing local educational bonding initiatives from 67 to 50 percent and 67 to 55 percent, respectively. The jurisdiction median income appears to accurately capture the expected outcomes of majority votes on public service spending, and voters rationally consider such future public service decisions when deciding how to vote on voting rules.

A Model of Endogenous Union Density and Membership

We develop a theoretical model of endogenously determined union density and union membership. A union is formed, continued, or dissolved by majority voting. Given the profitability, production technology, and labor and product market conditions, the union determines the reservation wage that is acceptable to the firm. Based on this reservation wage and other subjective factors, workers vote for or against the union. If the union is formed, the firm determines the employment level at the union wage.

Finite Characterizations and Paretian Preferences

A characterization of a property of binary relations is of finite type if it is stated in terms of ordered T-tuples of alternatives for some positive integer T. A characterization of finite type can be used to determine in polynomial time whether a binary relation over a finite set has the property characterized. Unfortunately, Pareto representability in R2 has no characterization of finite type (Knoblauch, 2002). This result is generalized below Rl, l larger than 2. The method of proof is applied to other properties of binary relations.