A Model of Endogenous Union Density and Membership


Autoria(s): Ahmed, Habib; Miller, Stephen M.
Data(s)

01/07/1999

Resumo

We develop a theoretical model of endogenously determined union density and union membership. A union is formed, continued, or dissolved by majority voting. Given the profitability, production technology, and labor and product market conditions, the union determines the reservation wage that is acceptable to the firm. Based on this reservation wage and other subjective factors, workers vote for or against the union. If the union is formed, the firm determines the employment level at the union wage.

Formato

application/pdf

Identificador

http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/econ_wpapers/199901

http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1321&context=econ_wpapers

Publicador

DigitalCommons@UConn

Fonte

Economics Working Papers

Palavras-Chave #unions #bargaining #median voter #Economics
Tipo

text