What ‘Security’, whose ‘Rights’ and which ‘Law’? : the Israeli High Court of Justice and the Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank

Cette thèse examine l’interprétation et l’application, par l’Haute Cour d'Israël (HCJ), de principes du droit international de l’occupation et du droit international des droits de la personne dans le traitement de requêtes judiciaires formulées par des justiciables palestiniens. Elle s’intéresse plus particulièrement aux jugements rendus depuis le déclenchement de la deuxième Intifada (2000) suite à des requêtes mettant en cause la légalité des mesures adoptées par les autorités israéliennes au nom d’un besoin prétendu d’accroitre la sécurité des colonies et des colons israéliens dans le territoire occupé de la Cisjordanie. La première question sous étude concerne la mesure dans laquelle la Cour offre un recours effectif aux demandeurs palestiniens face aux violations alléguées de leurs droits internationaux par l’occupant. La recherche fait sienne la position de la HJC selon laquelle le droit de l’occupation est guidé par une logique interne tenant compte de la balance des intérêts en cause, en l’occurrence le besoin de sécurité de l’occupant, d’une part, et les droits fondamentaux de l’occupé, d’autre part. Elle considère, en outre, que cette logique se voit reflétée dans les principes normatifs constituant la base de ce corpus juridique, soit que l’occupation est par sa nature temporaire, que de l’occupation découle un rapport de fiduciaire et, finalement, que l’occupant n’acquiert point de souveraineté sur le territoire. Ainsi, la deuxième question qui est posée est de savoir si l’interprétation du droit par la Cour (HCJ) a eu pour effet de promouvoir ces principes normatifs ou, au contraire, de leur porter préjudice. La réunion de plusieurs facteurs, à savoir la durée prolongée de l’occupation de la Cisjordanie par Israël, la menace accrue à la sécurité depuis 2000 ainsi qu’une politique de colonisation israélienne active, soutenue par l’État, présentent un cas de figure unique pour vérifier l’hypothèse selon laquelle les tribunaux nationaux des États démocratiques, généralement, et ceux jouant le rôle de la plus haute instance judiciaire d’une puissance occupante, spécifiquement, parviennent à assurer la protection des droits et libertés fondamentaux et de la primauté du droit au niveau international. Le premier chapitre présente une étude, à la lumière du premier principe normatif énoncé ci-haut, des jugements rendus par la HCJ dans les dossiers contestant la légalité de la construction du mur à l’intérieur de la Cisjordanie et de la zone dite fermée (Seam Zone), ainsi que des zones de sécurité spéciales entourant les colonies. Le deuxième chapitre analyse, cette fois à la lumière du deuxième principe normatif, des jugements dans les dossiers mettant en cause des restrictions sur les déplacements imposées aux Palestiniens dans le but allégué de protéger la sécurité des colonies et/ou des colons. Le troisième chapitre jette un regard sur les jugements rendus dans les dossiers mettant en cause la légalité du tracé du mur à l’intérieur et sur le pourtour du territoire annexé de Jérusalem-Est. Les conclusions découlant de cette recherche se fondent sur des données tirées d’entrevues menées auprès d’avocats israéliens qui s’adressent régulièrement à la HCJ pour le compte de justiciables palestiniens.

What ‘Security’, whose ‘Rights’ and which ‘Law’? : the Israeli High Court of Justice and the Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank

Cette thèse examine l’interprétation et l’application, par l’Haute Cour d'Israël (HCJ), de principes du droit international de l’occupation et du droit international des droits de la personne dans le traitement de requêtes judiciaires formulées par des justiciables palestiniens. Elle s’intéresse plus particulièrement aux jugements rendus depuis le déclenchement de la deuxième Intifada (2000) suite à des requêtes mettant en cause la légalité des mesures adoptées par les autorités israéliennes au nom d’un besoin prétendu d’accroitre la sécurité des colonies et des colons israéliens dans le territoire occupé de la Cisjordanie. La première question sous étude concerne la mesure dans laquelle la Cour offre un recours effectif aux demandeurs palestiniens face aux violations alléguées de leurs droits internationaux par l’occupant. La recherche fait sienne la position de la HJC selon laquelle le droit de l’occupation est guidé par une logique interne tenant compte de la balance des intérêts en cause, en l’occurrence le besoin de sécurité de l’occupant, d’une part, et les droits fondamentaux de l’occupé, d’autre part. Elle considère, en outre, que cette logique se voit reflétée dans les principes normatifs constituant la base de ce corpus juridique, soit que l’occupation est par sa nature temporaire, que de l’occupation découle un rapport de fiduciaire et, finalement, que l’occupant n’acquiert point de souveraineté sur le territoire. Ainsi, la deuxième question qui est posée est de savoir si l’interprétation du droit par la Cour (HCJ) a eu pour effet de promouvoir ces principes normatifs ou, au contraire, de leur porter préjudice. La réunion de plusieurs facteurs, à savoir la durée prolongée de l’occupation de la Cisjordanie par Israël, la menace accrue à la sécurité depuis 2000 ainsi qu’une politique de colonisation israélienne active, soutenue par l’État, présentent un cas de figure unique pour vérifier l’hypothèse selon laquelle les tribunaux nationaux des États démocratiques, généralement, et ceux jouant le rôle de la plus haute instance judiciaire d’une puissance occupante, spécifiquement, parviennent à assurer la protection des droits et libertés fondamentaux et de la primauté du droit au niveau international. Le premier chapitre présente une étude, à la lumière du premier principe normatif énoncé ci-haut, des jugements rendus par la HCJ dans les dossiers contestant la légalité de la construction du mur à l’intérieur de la Cisjordanie et de la zone dite fermée (Seam Zone), ainsi que des zones de sécurité spéciales entourant les colonies. Le deuxième chapitre analyse, cette fois à la lumière du deuxième principe normatif, des jugements dans les dossiers mettant en cause des restrictions sur les déplacements imposées aux Palestiniens dans le but allégué de protéger la sécurité des colonies et/ou des colons. Le troisième chapitre jette un regard sur les jugements rendus dans les dossiers mettant en cause la légalité du tracé du mur à l’intérieur et sur le pourtour du territoire annexé de Jérusalem-Est. Les conclusions découlant de cette recherche se fondent sur des données tirées d’entrevues menées auprès d’avocats israéliens qui s’adressent régulièrement à la HCJ pour le compte de justiciables palestiniens.

Beyond charity : outlines of a jurisprudence for civil society

There is not a single, coherent, jurisprudence for civil society organisations. Pressure for a clearly enuciated body of law applying to the whole of this sector of society continues to increase. The rise of third sector scholarship, the retreat of the welfare state, the rediscovery of the concept of civil society and pressures to strengthen social capital have all contributed to an ongoing stream of inquiry into the laws that regulate and favour civil society organisations. There have been almost thirty inquiries over the last sixty years into the doctrine of charitable purpose in common law countries. Those inquiries have established that problems with the law applying to civil society organisations are rooted in the common law adopting a ‘technical’ definition of charitable purpose and the failure of this body of law to develop in response to societal changes. Even though it is now well recognised that problems with law reform stem from problems inherent in the doctrine of charitable purpose, statutory reforms have merely ‘bolted on’ additions to the flawed ‘technical’ definition. In this way the scope of operation of the law has been incrementally expanded to include a larger number of civil society organisations. This piecemeal approach continues the exclusion of most civil society organisations from the law of charities discourse, and fails to address the underlying jurisprudential problems. Comprehensive reform requires revisiting the foundational problems embedded in the doctrine of charitable purpose, being informed by recent scholarship, and a paradigm shift that extends the doctrine to include all civil society organisations. Scholarly inquiry into civil society organisations, particularly from within the discipline of neoclassical economics, has elucidated insights that can inform legal theory development. This theory development requires decoupling the two distinct functions performed by the doctrine of charitable purpose which are: setting the scope of regulation, and determining entitlement to favours, such as tax exemption. If the two different functions of the doctrine are considered separately in the light of theoretical insights from other disciplines, the architecture for a jurisprudence emerges that facilitates regulation, but does not necessarily favour all civil society organisations. Informed by that broader discourse it is argued that when determining the scope of regulation, civil society organisations are identified by reference to charitable purposes that are not technically defined. These charitable purposes are in essence purposes which are: Altruistic, for public Benefit, pursued without Coercion. These charitable puposes differentiate civil society organisations from organisations in the three other sectors namely; Business, which is manifest in lack of altruism; Government, which is characterised by coercion; and Family, which is characterised by benefits being private not public. When determining entitlement to favour, it is theorised that it is the extent or nature of the public benefit evident in the pursuit of a charitable purpose that justifies entitlement to favour. Entitlement to favour based on the extent of public benefit is the theoretically simpler – the greater the public benefit the greater the justification for favour. To be entitled to favour based on the nature of a purpose being charitable the purpose must fall within one of three categories developed from the first three heads of Pemsel’s case (the landmark categorisation case on taxation favour). The three categories proposed are: Dealing with Disadvantage, Encouraging Edification; and Facilitating Freedom. In this alternative paradigm a recast doctrine of charitable purpose underpins a jurisprudence for civil society in a way similar to the way contract underpins the jurisprudence for the business sector, the way that freedom from arbitrary coercion underpins the jurisprudence of the government sector and the way that equity within families underpins succession and family law jurisprudence for the family sector. This alternative architecture for the common law, developed from the doctrine of charitable purpose but inclusive of all civil society purposes, is argued to cover the field of the law applying to civil society organisations and warrants its own third space as a body of law between public law and private law in jurisprudence.

The insured's non-disclosure in the formation of insurance contracts : a comparative perspective

The requirements that an insured disclose all facts material to a transaction as well as not misrepresent material facts in the formation of an insurance contract are universal requirements of insurance law. The nature and extent of these obligations varies from one jurisdiction to the next. Disclosure in the insurance context is distinct from the general approach in commercial contracts, and in others between persons dealing at arm's length. It is the purpose of this article therefore to examine, on a comparative basis, the approaches adopted in the Anglo-Commonwealth context of England, Australia New Zealand and Singapore to the resolution of disclose issues in the formation of insurance contracts. Particular attention is focused on the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Australia) as this statue effects the most significant overhaul of the common law and the National Consumer Council in the United Kingdom has advocated that similar reforms be adopted.

Towards a relational theory of copyright law

This research provides a systematic and theoretical analysis of the digital challenges to the established exclusive regime of the economic rights enjoyed by authors (and related rightholders) under the law of copyright. Accordingly, this research has developed a relational theory of authorship and a relational approach to copyright, contending that the regulatory emphasis of copyright law should focus on the facilitation of the dynamic relations between the culture, the creators, the future creators, the users and the public, rather than the allocation of resources in a static world. In this networked digital world, the creative works and contents have become increasingly vital for people to engage in creativity and cultural innovation, and for the evolution of the economy. Hence, it is argued that today copyright owners, as content holders, have certain obligations to make their works accessible and available to the public under fair conditions. This research sets forward a number of recommendations for the reform of the current copyright system.

The rules of autogeddon : sex death and law in J G Ballard’s Crash

It was reported that the manuscript of Crash was returned to the publisher with a note reading ‘The author is beyond psychiatric help’. Ballard took the lay diagnosis as proof of complete artistic success. Crash conflates the Freudian tropes of libido and thanatos, overlaying these onto the twentieth century erotic icon, the car. Beyond mere incompetent adolescent copulatory fumblings in the back seat of the parental sedan or the clichéd phallic locomotor of the mid-life Ferrari, Ballard engages the full potentialities of the automobile as the locus and sine qua non of a perverse, though functional erotic. ‘Autoeroticism’ is transformed into automotive, traumatic or surgical paraphilia, driving Helmut Newton’s insipid photo-essays of BDSM and orthopædics into an entirely new dimension, dancing precisely where (but more crucially, because) the ‘body is bruised to pleasure soul’. The serendipity of quotidian accidental collisions is supplanted, in pursuit of the fetishised object, by contrived (though not simulated) recreations of iconographic celebrity deaths. Penetration remains as a guiding trope of sexuality, but it is confounded by a perversity of focus. Such an obsessive pursuit of this autoerotic-as-reality necessitates the rejection of the law of human sexual regulation, requiring the re-interpretation of what constitutes sex itself by looking beyond or through conventional sexuality into Ballard’s paraphiliac and nightmarish consensual Other. This Other allows for (if not demands) the tangled wreckage of a sportscar to function as a transformative sexual agent, creating, of woman, a being of ‘free and perverse sexuality, releasing within its dying chromium and leaking engine-parts, all the deviant possibilities of her sex’.

Physical effect in patent law

This thesis addresses one of the fundamental issues that remains unresolved in patent law today. It is a question that strikes at the heart of what a patent is and what it is supposed to protect. That question is whether an invention must produce a physical effect or cause a physical transformation of matter to be patentable, or whether it is sufficient that an invention involves a specific practical application of an idea or principle to achieve a useful result. In short, the question is whether patent law contains a physicality requirement. Resolving this issue will determine whether only traditional mechanical, industrial and manufacturing processes are patent eligible, or whether patent eligibility extends to include purely intangible, or non-physical, products and processes. To this end, this thesis seeks to identify where the dividing line lies between patentable subject matter and the recognised categories of excluded matter, namely, fundamental principles of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. It involves determining which technological advances are worth the inconvenience monopoly protection causes the public at large, and which should remain free for all to use without restriction. This is an issue that has important ramifications for innovation in the ‘knowledge economy’ of the Information Age. Determining whether patent law contains a physicality requirement is integral to deciding whether much of the valuable innovation we are likely to witness, in what are likely to be the emerging areas of technology in the near future, will receive the same encouragement as industrial and manufacturing advances of previous times.

Peer assisted learning, skills development and Generation Y : a case study of a first year undergraduate law unit

The majority of current first year university students belong to Generation Y. Consequently, research suggests that, in order to more effectively engage them, their particular learning preferences should be acknowledged in the organisation of their learning environments and in the support provided. These preferences are reflected in the Torts Student Peer Mentor Program, which, as part of the undergraduate law degree at the Queensland University of Technology, utilises active learning, structured sessions and teamwork to supplement student understanding of the substantive law of Torts with the development of life-long skills. This article outlines the Program, and its relevance to the learning styles and experiences of Generation Y first year law students transitioning to university, in order to investigate student perceptions of its effectiveness – both generally and, more specifically, in terms of the Program’s capacity to assist students to develop academic and work-related skills.

The doctrine of command responsibility in the midst of war : legal fallacy or reflection of reality

The history of war is blighted with astonishing reminders of man’s ability to cast his sense of humanity aside and inflict unspeakable harm upon one another. The ruthless bombing of Dresden, the callousness of the Nazi concentration camps and the massacre of the Tutsis are but a few of the atrocities that have haunted our past. In response to these atrocities, society has imposed an ever-increasing number of laws and rules to regulate warfare. Amongst these is the doctrine of command responsibility. The doctrine of command responsibility states that a commander is criminally liable for the crimes of his subordinates if he knew or should have known of their crimes. This paper will examine whether the doctrine is an appropriate and realistic legal standard to hold commanders accountable to or whether the doctrine is more a reflection of social sentiment and legal rhetoric. If the doctrine, and indeed the law of war in general, is unrealistic then the law cannot fulfil its purpose - that is, the prevention of atrocities. Instead of being solely a reflection of moral authority and social sentiments the law must also be a tool that guides and shapes the decisions and actions of the military through the chaotic and brutal nature of war...

Considering a whole-of-community approach to integrating nature in cities, an international case study of Vauban, Germany

Globally, cities face a convergence of complex and rapidly evolving challenges, including climate change, resource shortages, population growth and urbanization, and financial pressures. Biophilic urbanism is an emerging design principle capable of considering the multidimensional and interdependent complexities of urban systems and infrastructure, which through the use of natural design features, can meet society’s inherent need for contact with nature, and assist efforts to respond to these growing challenges. Considering the imperative for addressing these challenges, this paper proposes that significant lessons can be learned from existing examples of biophilic urbanism, avoiding ‘re-invention of the wheel’ and facilitating accelerated innovation in other areas. Vauban is a 38-hectare brownfield development located 3 kilometers from the centre of Germany’s ‘ecological capital’ of Freiburg city. It was developed using an innovative process with strong community participation and reinterpreted developer roles to produce an example of integrated sustainability. Innovation in transport, energy, housing, development and water treatment has enabled a relatively high-density, mixed-use development that integrates a considerable amount of nature. This paper discusses Vauban in light of research undertaken over the last two years through the Sustainable Built Environment National Research Centre in Australia, to investigate emerging elements of ‘biophilic urbanism’ (nature-loving cities), and their potential to be mainstreamed within urban environments. The paper considers the interplay between the policies, community dynamics and innovations in Vauban, within the context of the culture, history and practice of sustainability in Germany, and how these have enabled nature to be integrated into the urban environment of Vauban while achieving other desirable goals for urban areas. It highlights potential applications from Vauban for Australian cities.

Jurisprudential Challenges to the Protection of the Natural Environment

Nature exists. Humans exist. The behaviour of one impacts upon the other. The behaviour of humans is governed by the artificial contrivance described as the law. While the law can in this way control the behaviour of humans and the impact that human behaviour has on nature, the behaviour of nature is governed – if at all- in accordance with nature’s own sets of values which are quintessentially a matter for nature. The relationship between nature and humans may be the object of rules of law, but traditional legal doctrine dictates that humans but not nature are the subjects of the rules of law. The jurisprudence of the earth – it would appear – seeks to equalise in the eyes of the law nature as part of the global environment and humans as part of the global environment. How might this be done?

Medical negligence, causation and liability for non-disclosure of risk : a post-wallace framework and critique

Through an examination of Wallace v Kam, this article considers and evaluates the law of causation in the specific context of a medical practitioner’s duty to provide information to patients concerning material risks of treatment. To supply a contextual background for the analysis which follows, Part II summarises the basic principles of causation law, while Part III provides an overview of the case and the reasoning adopted in the decisions at first instance and on appeal. With particular emphasis upon the reasoning in the courts of appeal, Part IV then examines the implications of the case in the context of other jurisprudence in this field and, in so doing, provides a framework for a structured consideration of causation issues in future non-disclosure cases under the Australian civil liability legislation. As will become clear, Wallace was fundamentally decided on the basis of policy reasoning centred upon the purpose behind the legal duty violated. Although the plurality in Rogers v Whitaker rejected the utility of expressions such as ‘the patient’s right of self-determination’ in this context, some Australian jurisprudence may be thought to frame the practitioner’s duty to warn in terms of promoting a patient’s autonomy, or right to decide whether to submit to treatment proposed. Accordingly, the impact of Wallace upon the protection of this right, and the interrelation between it and the duty to warn’s purpose, is investigated. The analysis in Part IV also evaluates the courts’ reasoning in Wallace by questioning the extent to which Wallace’s approach to liability and causal connection in non-disclosure of risk cases: depends upon the nature and classification of the risk(s) in question; and can be reconciled with the way in which patients make decisions. Finally, Part V adopts a comparative approach by considering whether the same decision might be reached if Wallace was determined according to English law.

The empire of cancer: Gene patents and cancer voices

In his book, The Emperor of All Maladies, Siddhartha Mukherjee writes a history of cancer — "It is a chronicle of an ancient disease — once a clandestine, 'whispered-about' illness — that has metamorphosed into a lethal shape-shifting entity imbued with such penetrating metaphorical, medical, scientific, and political potency that cancer is often described as the defining plague of our generation." Increasingly, an important theme in the history of cancer is the role of law, particularly in the field of intellectual property law. It is striking that a number of contemporary policy debates over intellectual property and public health have concerned cancer research, diagnosis, and treatment. In the area of access to essential medicines, there has been much debate over Novartis’ patent application in respect of Glivec, a treatment for leukaemia. India’s Supreme Court held that the Swiss company’s patent application violated a safeguard provision in India’s patent law designed to stop evergreening. In the field of tobacco control, the Australian Government introduced plain packaging for tobacco products in order to address the health burdens associated with the tobacco epidemic. This regime was successfully defended in the High Court of Australia. In the area of intellectual property and biotechnology, there have been significant disputes over the Utah biotechnology company Myriad Genetics and its patents in respect of genetic testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2, which are related to breast cancer and ovarian cancer. The Federal Court of Australia handed down a decision on the validity of Myriad Genetics’ patent in respect of genetic testing for BRCA1 in February 2013. The Supreme Court of the United States heard a challenge to the validity of Myriad Genetics’ patents in this area in April 2013, and handed down a judgment in July 2013. Such disputes have involved tensions between intellectual property rights, and public health. This article focuses upon one of these important test cases involving intellectual property, public health, and cancer research. In June 2010, Cancer Voices Australia and Yvonne D’Arcy brought an action in the Federal Court of Australia against the validity of a BRCA1 patent — held by Myriad Genetics Inc, the Centre de Recherche du Chul, the Cancer Institute of Japan and Genetic Technologies Limited. Yvonne D’Arcy — a Brisbane woman who has had treatment for breast cancer — maintained: "I believe that what they are doing is morally and ethically corrupt and that big companies should not control any parts of the human body." She observed: "For my daughter, I've had her have [sic] mammograms, etc, because of me but I would still like her to be able to have the test to see if the mutation gene is in there from me." The applicants made the following arguments: "Genes and the information represented by human gene sequences are products of nature universally present in each individual, and the information content of a human gene sequence is fixed. Genetic variations or mutations are products of nature. The isolation of the BRCA1 gene mutation from the human body constitutes no more than a medical or scientific discovery of a naturally occurring phenomenon and does not give rise to a patentable invention." The applicants also argued that "the alleged invention is not a patentable invention in that, so far as claimed in claims 1–3, it is not a manner of manufacture within the meaning of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies". The applicants suggested that "the alleged invention is a mere discovery". Moreover, the applicants contended that "the alleged invention of each of claims 1-3 is not a patentable invention because they are claims for biological processes for the generation of human beings". The applicants, though, later dropped the argument that the patent claims related to biological processes for the generation of human beings. In February 2013, Nicholas J of the Federal Court of Australia considered the case brought by Cancer Voices Australia and Yvonne D’Arcy against Myriad Genetics. The judge presented the issues in the case, as follows: "The issue that arises in this case is of considerable importance. It relates to the patentability of genes, or gene sequences, and the practice of 'gene patenting'. Briefly stated, the issue to be decided is whether under the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) a valid patent may be granted for a claim that covers naturally occurring nucleic acid — either deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) or ribonucleic acid (RNA) — that has been 'isolated'". In this context, the word "isolated" implies that naturally occurring nucleic acid found in the cells of the human body, whether it be DNA or RNA, has been removed from the cellular environment in which it naturally exists and separated from other cellular components also found there. The genes found in the human body are made of nucleic acid. The particular gene with which the patent in suit is concerned (BRCA1) is a human breast and ovarian cancer disposing gene. Various mutations that may be present in this gene have been linked to various forms of cancer including breast cancer and ovarian cancer.' The judge held in this particular case that Myriad Genetics’ patent claims were a "manner of manufacture" under s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies and s 18(1)(a) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). The matter is currently under appeal in the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. This article interprets the dispute over Myriad Genetics in light of the scholarly work of Nobel Laureate Professor Joseph Stiglitz on inequality. Such work has significant explanatory power in the context of intellectual property and biotechnology. First, Stiglitz has contended that "societal inequality was a result not just of the laws of economics, but also of how we shape the economy — through politics, including through almost every aspect of our legal system". Stiglitz is concerned that "our intellectual property regime … contributes needlessly to the gravest form of inequality." He maintains: "The right to life should not be contingent on the ability to pay." Second, Stiglitz worries that "some of the most iniquitous aspects of inequality creation within our economic system are a result of 'rent-seeking': profits, and inequality, generated by manipulating social or political conditions to get a larger share of the economic pie, rather than increasing the size of that pie". He observes that "the most iniquitous aspect of this wealth appropriation arises when the wealth that goes to the top comes at the expense of the bottom." Third, Stiglitz comments: "When the legal regime governing intellectual property rights is designed poorly, it facilitates rent-seeking" and "the result is that there is actually less innovation and more inequality." He is concerned that intellectual property regimes "create monopoly rents that impede access to health both create inequality and hamper growth more generally." Finally, Stiglitz has recommended: "Government-financed research, foundations, and the prize system … are alternatives, with major advantages, and without the inequality-increasing disadvantages of the current intellectual property rights system.’" This article provides a critical analysis of the Australian litigation and debate surrounding Myriad Genetics’ patents in respect of genetic testing for BRCA1. First, it considers the ruling of Nicholas J in the Federal Court of Australia that Myriad Genetics’ patent was a manner of manufacture as it related to an artificially created state of affairs, and not mere products of nature. Second, it examines the policy debate over gene patents in Australia, and its relevance to the litigation involving Myriad Genetics. Third, it examines comparative law, and contrasts the ruling by Nicholas J in the Federal Court of Australia with developments in the United States, Canada, and the European Union. Fourth, this piece considers the reaction to the decision of Nicholas at first instance in Australia. Fifth, the article assesses the prospects of an appeal to the Full Federal Court of Australia over the Myriad Genetics’ patents. Finally, this article observes that, whatever happens in respect of litigation against Myriad Genetics, there remains controversy over Genetic Technologies Limited. The Melbourne firm has been aggressively licensing and enforcing its related patents on non-coding DNA and genomic mapping.

‘Lemon Laws’: an inquiry into consumer protections and remedies for buyers of new motor vehicles

1. Under the Terms of Reference for the Committee’s Inquiry, ‘lemons’ are defined as ‘new motor vehicles with numerous, severe defects that re-occur despite multiple repair attempts or where defects have caused a new motor vehicle to be out of service for a prolonged period of time’. Consumers are currently protected in relation to lemon purchases by the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) located in Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA). The ACL applies as a law of Queensland pursuant to the Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld). The voluntary recall and consumer guarantees law took effect on 1 January 2011. 2. In 2006, the Government of Victoria made a commitment to introduce a lemon law into the provisions of the then Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic). The public consultation process on the proposal to introduce a lemon law for motor vehicle purchases in Victoria was conducted by Ms Janice Munt MP, with the assistance of Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV). CAV released an Issues Paper to canvas with industry and the community options for the development and introduction of a motor vehicle lemon law.(Consumer Affairs Victoria, Introducing Victorian motor vehicle lemon laws, Issues Paper, (September, 2007). 3. A CAV report prepared by Janice Munt MP was released in July, 2008 (Consumer Affairs Victoria, Motor Cars: A report on the motor vehicle lemon law consultations (July 2008) (Victorian Lemon Law Report). However, the Victorian proposal was overtaken by events leading to the adoption of a uniform consumer protection law in all Australian jurisdictions, the ACL. 4. The structure of this submission is to consider first the three different bases upon which consumers can obtain relief for economic loss arising from defects in motor vehicles. The second part of the submission considers the difficulties encountered by consumers in litigating motor vehicle disputes in the courts and tribunals. The third part of the submission examines the approach taken in other jurisdictions to resolving motor vehicle disputes. The final part of the submission considers a number of possible reforms that could be made to the existing law and its enforcement to reduce consumer detriment arising from the purchase of ‘lemon’ motor vehicles. 5. There are three principal bases upon which a consumer can obtain redress for defects in new motor vehicles under the ACL. The first is where the manufacturer admits liability and initiates the voluntary recall procedure provided for in s 128 of the ACL. Under this basis the manufacturer generally repairs or replaces the part subject to the recall free of charge. The second basis is where the manufacturer or dealer denies liability and the consumer is initiates proceedings in the court or tribunal seeking a statutory remedy under the ACL, the nature of which will depend on whether the failure to comply with the consumer guarantee was major or not. The third basis upon which a consumer can obtain redress is pursuant to public enforcement by the ACCC. Each basis will be considered in this part. What all three bases have in common is the need to conduct an investigation to identify the nature of the defect and how it arose.

The effectiveness of the Precautionary Principle in protecting Australia's endangered species

This report is the result of a small-scale experiment looking at improving methods for evaluating environmental laws. The objective in this research was to evaluate the effectiveness of the precautionary principle – an accepted principle of international environmental law – in the context of Australia’s endangered species. Two case studies were selected by our team: the (Great) White Shark and an endangered native Australian plant known as Tylophora Linearis.