Audit report on the Delaware County Solid Waste Disposal Commission for the year ended June 30, 2010

Audit report on the Delaware County Solid Waste Disposal Commission for the year ended June 30, 2010

Audit report on the Jones County Solid Waste Management Commission for the year ended June 30, 2010

Audit report on the Jones County Solid Waste Management Commission for the year ended June 30, 2010

Audit report on the Wayne-Ringgold-Decatur County Solid Waste Management Commission for the year ended June 30, 2010

Audit report on the Wayne-Ringgold-Decatur County Solid Waste Management Commission for the year ended June 30, 2010

Stress reaction of kidney epithelial cells to inorganic solid-core nanoparticles.

A route of accumulation and elimination of therapeutic engineered nanoparticles (NPs) may be the kidney. Therefore, the interactions of different solid-core inorganic NPs (titanium-, silica-, and iron oxide-based NPs) were studied in vitro with the MDCK and LLC-PK epithelial cells as representative cells of the renal epithelia. Following cell exposure to the NPs, observations include cytotoxicity for oleic acid-coated iron oxide NPs, the production of reactive oxygen species for titanium dioxide NPs, and cell depletion of thiols for uncoated iron oxide NPs, whereas for silica NPs an apparent rapid and short-lived increase of thiol levels in both cell lines was observed. Following cell exposure to metallic NPs, the expression of the tranferrin receptor/CD71 was decreased in both cells by iron oxide NPs, but only in MDCK cells by titanium dioxide NPs. The tight association, then subsequent release of NPs by MDCK and LLC-PK kidney epithelial cells, showed that following exposure to the NPs, only MDCK cells could release iron oxide NPs, whereas both cells released titanium dioxide NPs. No transfer of any solid-core NPs across the cell layers was observed.

Factors influencing privatization of urban solid waste collection: some evidence from Spain

In this paper we analyse some of the organisational aspects of the urban solid waste collection and, in particular, the privatization modality of contracting out. We start by discussing some of the theoretical aspects of contracting out. We then specify and estimate an explanatory model on a sample of municipalities that we surveyed. Our purpose is twofold: on the one hand, we identify the economic factors at work when deciding to contract out the service and, on the other hand, we analyse the role of ideological factors in choosing between the public production of the service or contracting it out. The results show a significant effect of the demand for waste collection on contracting out. There also appears to be a neighbouring effect as the municipalities close to other cities that contract out are also more prone to do so. Finally, the decisions to contract seem to have been motivated by pragmatic rather than ideological reasons.

Single-valued solutions for the Böhm-Bawerk horse market game

Single-valued solutions for the case of two-sided market games without product differentiation, also known as Böhm-Bawerk horse market games, are analyzed. The nucleolus is proved to coincide with the tau-value, and is thus the midpoint of the core. Moreover a characterization of this setof games in terms of the assignment matrix is provided.

Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.

Heterogeneous discounting in consumption-investment problems. Time consistent solutions

[cat] En aquest treball s'analitza un model estocàstic en temps continu en el que l'agent decisor descompta les utilitats instantànies i la funció final amb taxes de preferència temporal constants però diferents. En aquest context es poden modelitzar problemes en els quals, quan el temps s'acosta al moment final, la valoració de la funció final incrementa en comparació amb les utilitats instantànies. Aquest tipus d'asimetria no es pot descriure ni amb un descompte estàndard ni amb un variable. Per tal d'obtenir solucions consistents temporalment es deriva l'equació de programació dinàmica estocàstica, les solucions de la qual són equilibris Markovians. Per a aquest tipus de preferències temporals, s'estudia el model clàssic de consum i inversió (Merton, 1971) per a les funcions d'utilitat del tipus CRRA i CARA, comparant els equilibris Markovians amb les solucions inconsistents temporalment. Finalment es discuteix la introducció del temps final aleatori.

Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games

[cat] En aquest treball caracteritzem les solucions puntuals de jocs cooperatius d'utilitat transferible que compleixen selecció del core i monotonia agregada. També mostrem que aquestes dues propietats són compatibles amb la individualitat racional, la propietat del jugador fals i la propietat de simetria. Finalment, caracteritzem les solucions puntuals que compleixen les cinc propietats a l'hora.

Coalitionally monotonic set-solutions for cooperative TU games

A static comparative study on set-solutions for cooperative TU games is carried out. The analysis focuses on studying the compatibility between two classical and reasonable properties introduced by Young (1985) in the context of single valued solutions, namely core-selection and coalitional monotonicity. As the main result, it is showed that coalitional monotonicity is not only incompatible with the core-selection property but also with the bargaining-selection property. This new impossibility result reinforces the tradeoff between these kinds of interesting and intuitive economic properties. Positive results about compatibility between desirable economic properties are given replacing the core selection requirement by the core-extension property.

Development, design and validation of solid reference samples.

We developed a method of sample preparation using epoxy compound, which was validated in two steps. First, we studied the homogeneity within samples by scanning tubes filled with radioactive epoxy. We found within-sample homogeneity better than 2%. Then, we studied the homogeneity between samples during a 4.5 h dispensing time. The homogeneity between samples was found to be better than 2%. This study demonstrates that we have a validated method, which assures the traceability of epoxy samples.