The use of the pronouns we, us, and our in political speeches : A comparative study of the inaugural addresses of Bush and Obama

Pronouns carry considerable importance in language. The speaker’s identity and connection to the audience emerges through the consistent use of certain pronouns (De Fina, 1995). This research is about the use of we, us, and our in political discourse. Specifically, their use will be examined in the inaugural addresses of George W. Bush in 2005 and Barack Obama in 2009. The aim of this research is to examine the frequencies and the co-occurrences of these pronouns and then compare their use in these two speeches. More specifically, how do the pronouns examined affect the message and enhance hearer credibility. This is done by applying (a) a quantitative corpus linguistics analysis and (b) qualitative analysis of the context of use. The results show that there is a difference in frequency of pronoun use; however, the usage of pronouns is rather similar in the two speeches

State Political Action Committee Financing and the 2008 Presidential Election: A Detailed Look at Mitt Romney and the Commonwealth PACs

This study looks at the historical context in which PACs developed, as well as the current legal environment in which they operate. It will also briefly discuss the legal and procedural challenges that candidates face and the ways in which PACs alleviate some of these pressures in ways that presidential committees cannot. An understanding of the strategic dilemmas which cause candidates to seek extraneous structures through which to establish campaign networks is essential to extrapolating the potential future of campaign finance strategy. Furthermore, this study provides an in-depth analysis of the state Commonwealth PACs both in terms of fundraising and spending, and discusses the central issues this state PAC strategy raises with respect to campaign finance law. The study will conclude with a look into the future of campaign financing and the role these state-level PACs may play if current rules are not revised.

Special interests and political business cycles

In this paper we bridge the gap between special interest politics and political business cycle literature. We build a framework where the interplay between the lobby power of special interest groups and the voting power of the majority of the population leads to political business cycles. We apply our set up to explain electoral cycles in government expenditure composition, aggregate expenditures and real exchange rates.

The political economy of exchange rate in Brazil

This paper reviews part of the political economy literature on exchange rate policy relevant to understanding the political motivations behind the Brazilian exchange rate policy. We shall first examine the distributive role of the exchange rate, and the way it unfolds in terms of the desired political goals. We will follow by analyzing exchange policy as indicative of government effciency prior to elections. Finally, we discuss fiscal policy from the point of view of political economy, in which the exchange rate results from the macroeconomic equilibrium. Over this review, the Brazilian exchange rate policy is discussed in light of the theories presented.

Why did democracy become the preferred political regime only in the twentieth century?

A Democracia Tornou-Se a Forma Preferida de Governo Apenas no Século Vinte. a Busca por Motivos Racionais para Entendermos a Razão não é Suficiente. o Autor Procura por um Fato Histórico Novo que Tenha Levado a Essa Mudança de Preferência, Baseado Sucessivamente na Revolução Capitalista e na Perda Gradual do Medo da Expropriação Pela Burguesia. a Revolução Capitalista que Mudou o Modo de Apropriação do Excedente, da Violência para o Mercado, é a Primeira Condição Necessária. Representa Também a Transição do Estado Absoluto para o Estado Liberal. a Segunda Condição é o Desaparecimento do Medo da Expropriação, Permitindo a Transição do Regime Liberal para o Regime Liberal-Democrático. Depois de Estabelecer Estas Duas Condições, ou Estes Dois Fatos Históricos Novos, o Regime Democrático Tornou-Se Rational Choice para Todas as Classes. para os Capitalistas, Democracia é Agora a Forma de Governo que Melhor Assegura o Direito À Propriedade e Aos Contratos. para os Trabalhadores, é a Forma de Governo que Melhor Assegura o Aumento de Salários com Lucros

The political economy of global economic disgovernance

A Desgovernança Econômica Global, Mais do que a Governança Caracteriza Hoje a Economia Mundial. Dois Fatos Substanciam Essa Afirmativa: a Crise Recorrente do Balanço de Pagamentos nos Países em Desenvolvimento, e o Enorme Déficit em Conta Corrente dos Estados Unidos. as Crises nos Mercados Emergentes são Essencialmente Resultantes da Estratégia que o Norte Propõe para o Sul: a Estratégia de Crescimento com Poupança Externa. Dado o Fato de que a Entrada de Capital Aumenta a Taxa de Cambio, e que os Paises não Reconheceram as Principais Oportunidades de Investimento nos Anos 1990, Tal Estratégia Levou não ao Aumento das Taxas de Acumulação de Capital e ao Crescimento, Mas ao Aumento do Déficit em Conta Corrente e À Crise do Balanço de Pagamento (Financeiro). por Outro Lado, o Déficit em Conta Corrente dos Estados Unidos é um Problema Sério. Aquele Já é um País Devedor, Mas os Ajustes Continuam a ser Adiados. a Probabilidade de um Soft Landing (Desfecho Satisfatório) é Pequena. as Duas Fontes de Instabilidade Estão Relacionadas Aos Déficits em Conta Corrente e À Moeda Sobrevalorizada. a Política Econômica por Trás tem um Nome: Taxa de Câmbio Populista, uma das Duas Formas de Populismo Econômico (A Outra é o Populismo Fiscal). Isto não é Surpreendente em Países em Desenvolvimento, Mas Pode ser em um País Desenvolvido, como os Estados Unidos. Ainda Assim não é Surpreendente Quando se Considera a Recessão Política e Social que a Sociedade Americana Está Vivendo Desde o Fim da Segunda Guerra

Political institutions as substitute for democracy: a political economy analysis of economic growth

This manuscript empirically assesses the effects of political institutions on economic growth. It analyzes how political institutions affect economic growth in different stages of democratization and economic development by means of dynamic panel estimation with interaction terms. The new empirical results obtained show that political institutions work as a substitute for democracy promoting economic growth. In other words, political institutions are important for increasing economic growth, mainly when democracy is not consolidated. Moreover, political institutions are extremely relevant to economic outcomes in periods of transition to democracy and in poor countries with high ethnical fractionalization.

Electoral rules, political competition and fiscal spending: regression discontinuity evidence from brazilian municipalities

We exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on policy choices. In municipalities with less than 200,000 voters mayors are elected with a plurality of the vote. In municipalities with more than 200,000 voters a run-off election takes place among the top two candidates if neither achieves a majority of the votes. At a first stage, we show that the possibility of runoff increases political competition. At a second stage, we use the discontinuity as a source of exogenous variation to infer causality from political competition to fiscal policy. Our second stage results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current spending, particularly personnel expenses. Furthermore, the impact of political competition is larger when incumbents can run for reelection, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office.