The 2008 financial crisis and neoclassical economics

The 2008 global financial crisis was the consequence of the process of financialization, or the creation of massive fictitious financial wealth, that began in the 1980s, and of the hegemony of a reactionary ideology, namely, neoliberalism, based on self-regulated and efficient markets. Although capitalism is intrinsically unstable, the lessons from the stock-market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression of the 1930s were transformed into theories and institutions or regulations that led to the "30 glorious years of capitalism" (1948-1977) and that could have avoided a financial crisis as profound as the present one. It did not because a coalition of rentiers and "financists" achieved hegemony and, while deregulating the existing financial operations, refused to regulate the financial innovations that made these markets even more risky. Neoclassical economics played the role of a meta-ideology as it legitimized, mathematically and "scientifically", neoliberal ideology and deregulation. From this crisis a new capitalism will emerge, though its character is difficult to predict. It will not be financialized but the tendencies present in the 30 glorious years toward global and knowledge-based capitalism, where professionals will have more say than rentier capitalists, as well as the tendency to improve democracy by making it more social and participative, will b e resumed.

Alkoholin verkkokauppamarkkinat Suomessa

Opinnäytetyö alkoholin verkkokauppamarkkinoista Suomessa on katsaus markkinoihin, jotka ovat olleet esillä mediassa viime aikoina hyvinkin paljon. Opinnäytetyössä analysoidaan Michael Porterin viiden kilpailuvoiman mallin avulla toimialaa. Porterin viisi kilpailuvoimaa ovat toimialan nykyinen kilpailu, tavarantoimittajien neuvotteluvoima, kuluttajien neuvotteluvoima, uusien kilpailijoiden uhka sekä korvaavien tuotteiden tai palveuluiden uhka. Tämän lisäksi työssä tarkastellaan lainsäädäntöä kuudentena kilpailuvoimana, sillä se asettaa merkittävät kilpailulliset reunaehdot. Toimiala-analyysin jälkeen siirrytään varsinaiseen tutkimusongelmaan, jossa pohditaan, kannattaako Alkon perustaa verkkokauppa? Tähän liittyen apututkimuskysymyksissä pohditaan mitä lisäarvoa alkoholin verkkokauppa luo ylipäätään kuluttajille sekä tavarantoimittajille/maahantuojille. Opinnäytetyöhön on liitetty ajatuksia, joita on kerätty haastattelemalla kolmea eri henkilöä, joilta löytyy merkittävästi tietoa alkoholimarkkinoista. Alko Oy ei ole osallisena, vaan opinnäytetyö on kirjoitettu täysin objektiivisesti, vaikka siinä onkin paljon kirjoittan omaa empiriaa. Haastattelut ovat tarkoituksella jätetty keskustelunomaisiksi, ja ovat siten melko subjektiivisia näkemyksiä eri ihmisten silmin. Monopolit herättävät keskustelua ja Alkon asema yhteiskunnallisena monopolina onkin asetettu kriittiseen tarkasteluun tutkimuksessa. Teoriassa käsiteltiin myös Alkon palvelualttiutta 4C –mallin avulla sekä Alkoa yrityksenä analysoitiin SWOT –analyysilla. Näiden teorioiden, toimiala-analyysin, haastatteluiden, kirjoittajan oman näkemyksen sekä eri lähteistä löydetyn informaation myötä voidaan todeta, että Alkon verkkokaupalle on tarve, joka on ollut olemassa jo pitkään. Monopoliaseman oletetaan olleen syy tälle hitaalle kehitykselle. Kuluttajien lisäarvoa olisi ehdottomasti kotiinkuljetus, mutta sitä Alko ei tarjoa. Toisaalta verkkokaupan myötä laajeneva tuotevalikoima on selkeä lisäarvo. Tavarantoimittajien/maahantuojien lisäarvoa ei vielä pystytty selvittämään, koska siihen suhtauduttiin ristiriitaisesti.

Viimeisimmän finanssikriisin vaikutukset Helsingin Pörssin kulutuspalveluita tuottaviin yrityksiin

Tämän kandidaatintutkielman tarkoituksena on analysoida miten vuonna 2008 alkanut finanssikriisi ja sen aiheuttama taloudellinen epävarmuus ovat vaikuttaneet Nasdaq OMX Helsingin pörssiin listattujen kulutuspalveluita tuottavien yritysten suorituskykyyn. Näiden yritysten suorituskykyä analysoitiin tarkemmin tarkastelemalla kannattavuuden, maksuvalmiuden ja vakavaraisuuden tunnuslukuja aikavälillä 2008-2014. Tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli selvittää, minkälaisia muutoksia suorituskyvyn suhteen tutkitulla aikavälillä oli tapahtunut kulutuspalveluita tuottavien yritysten keskuudessa. Muutoksia analysoitiin sekä kokonaisuutena että yrityskohtaisesti. Lisäksi tutkittiin, miten kulutuspalveluryhmän sisäiset toimialat olivat selviytyneet finanssikriisistä. Käsiteltävää yritysryhmää analysoitiin tunnuslukuanalyysiä hyödyntäen. Saatujen tulosten mukaan finanssikriisillä ei ollut suurta vaikutusta käsiteltävien yritysten maksuvalmiuteen tai vakavaraisuuteen. Kannattavuuden tunnusluvut sen sijaan heikkenivät merkittävästi koko ryhmän osalta finanssikriisin vaikutuksesta. Yrityskohtaiset erot olivat tutkimuksessa melko suuria. Etenkin mediayhtiöiden tunnusluvut heikkenivät merkittävästi tutkitulla aikavälillä. Mediayhtiöiden huonoon suoriutumiseen liittyy finanssikriisin lisäksi muitakin tekijöitä. Median digitalisoituminen on aiheuttanut useille yrityksille ongelmia liiketoiminnan kannattavuuden ylläpitämisessä. Monet tutkituista yrityksistä ovat kuitenkin pystyneet kääntämään liiketoimintansa kannattavampaan suuntaan vuoden 2013 jälkeen. Johtopäätöksenä voidaankin vetää, että viimeisin finanssikriisi oli vaikutuksiltaan merkittävä ja pitkäkestoinen.

Traité de versification, premier livre de Crétin et recueils de pièces de poésies.

Contient : 1 Traité de versification française ; 2 Premier livre du Recueil sommaire de la chronique française de GUILLAUME CRETIN, allant de l'enlèvement d'Hélène à Clotaire Ier ; 3 Recueil de pièces de vers, sans noms d'auteurs ; 1 « Verbum caro factum est ». Premier vers : « Le premier mot de nostre tesme » ; 2 Pater noster. Premier vers : « Pater noster, vray amateur » ; 3 Ave Maria. Premier vers : « Ave, angelicque salut » ; 4 Poésie sur la Passion. Premier vers : « Croix arrousée du sainct et precieulx » ; 5 Autre. Premier vers : « Soubz pain et vin est Jesus contenu » ; 6 Autre. Premier vers : « Pere eternel et juge raisonnable » ; 7 Poème à la Vierge. Premier vers : « Foy d'Abrahan, vision monsayque » ; 8 Épître. Premier vers : « Aymé de Dieu, si n'as en souvenir » ; 9 Pièce sans titre. Premier vers : « Amour et mort, la terre et ciel ont pris » ; 10 Paraphrase des neuf leçons de Job, en vers français, par PIERRE DE NESSON. Premier vers : « Pardonnez-moy, beau sire Dieux » ; 11 « Dizains ». Premier vers : « Pour le pechié d'Adam la mort j'attens » ; 4 Recueil de pièces de vers, la plupart avec noms d'auteurs ; 1 « Dizain » par « FRANÇOYS ROUSSIN ». Premier vers : « Si tu sçavoys ma volunté entière » ; 2 « Dizain » par « NICOLAS DE REILLAC ». Premier vers : « Tres bien parler et d'aucun ne mocquer » ; 3 « Dizain » par le même. Premier vers : « Oncques Venuz ne receut tel plaisir » ; 4 « Dizain » par « FRANÇOYS ROUSSIN ». Premier vers : « L'excelant bruit de ton haultain sçavoir » ; 5 « Dizain en adieu ». Premier vers : « Adieu le cueur que j'estimoys si bon » ; 6 « Dizain ». Premier vers : « Au temps passé, si le pouvoir des dieux » ; 7 « Quatrain ». Premier vers : « Sans force fort » ; 8 « Quatrain » par « FRANÇ. SAGON ». Premier vers : « On dict qu'Amour n'a plus les yeulx bandez » ; 9 « Quatrain » par « FRANÇ. ROUSSIN ». Premier vers : « Si le dieu Mars, tres puissant belliqueur » ; 10 « Quatrain ». Premier vers : « Il me a prommys, j'ay ma liberté quise » ; 11 « De l'empereur et du Turc ». Premier vers : « Pour plus vouloir hault monster que dessendre » ; 12 « Epistre ». Premier vers : « Declairez-moi, je vous supplie, madame » ; 13 « Epistre » par « GERMAIN COLIN ». Premier vers : « Tenez, voilà ce que m'avez requis » ; 14 « Epistre » par « N. DE REILLAC ». Premier vers : « Voulant t'escripre, doubte à moy se presente » ; 15 « Epistre respondante » par « FRANÇ. ROUSSIN ». Premier vers : « Puys que ay receu la lettre de celluy » ; 16 « Epistre à ung medecin » par « GERMAIN COLLIN ». Premier vers : « Quant vers Mercure j'auroys si bon accès » ; 17 « Epistre à madamoyselle de Lordon », par « FRANÇ. SAGON ». Premier vers : « Le dueil que j'é contre une damoyselle » ; 18 « A messrs les portenotaires (sic) de Raillac frères ». Premier vers : « Tout au contraire ay d'amour les doulceurs » ; 19 « Chant royal ». Premier vers : « Amour conjoinct à vertu paternelle » ; 20 « Balade ». Premier vers : « On peult de nature la grace » ; 21 « Dizain » par « FRANÇ. SAGON ». Premier vers : « L'affection ou peine corpourelle » ; 22 « Dizain » du même « au roy et la royne de Navarre ». Premier vers : « Le frere ayant maladye ennuyeuse » ; 23 « Dizain » du même. Premier vers : « Mort parson droict de nature enhardie » ; 24 « Dizain » par le même. Premier vers : « Comme le feu, s'il n'est mort qu'à demy » ; 25 « Dizain » par le même. Premier vers : « Qui n'a amour, ne peult bien dire do » ; 26 « Dizain » par le même. Premier vers : « Si j'eusse peu en dizain exprimer » ; 27 « Dizain contre Clement Marot » par le même. Premier vers : « Maro sant (sic) T est excellent poete » ; 28 « Rondeau d'un oisellet que autrement on appelle ung noble ». Premier vers : « D'un noble ung cueur tousjours sera nobly » ; 29 « Huictain ». Premier vers : « Je ne veulx pas blasmer les amoureulx » ; 30 « Epistre ». Premier vers : « Aucuns facteurs sçavans et bien apris » ; 31 « Balade ; responce des dames aux estourdis folz ». Premier vers : « Quel fruict vous sourt de voz dictz compouser » ; 32 « Balade ». Premier vers : « Amour me rend par mon voloir subjecte » ; 33 « Epitaphe de mons. le dauphin ». Premier vers : « En l'an que l'aigle en ses fremyssans aelles » ; 34 « Epistre à une medisante ». Premier vers : « En escripvant d'une dame l'audace » ; 35 Pièce sans titre. Premier vers : « Ne doibs je pas en forme de complaincte » ; 36 « Blason, faict en motz resoluz, d'une fille, qui par son sens a receu des escuz troys cens et n'y a presté qu'un Carolus ». Premier vers : « Une fille de ceste ville » ; 37 « Epistre ». Premier vers : « Qui veult aymer sans exceder raison » ; 38 « Dizain » par « FRANÇOYS SAGON ». Premier vers : « Vous faictes bien ung dizain promptement » ; 39 « A une nonnain, du latin ». Premier vers : « Pourquoy cela, seur Jehanne, reffuzez » ; 40 « Epitaphe du president Le Viste ». Premier vers : « C'est ung arrest que le depositaire » ; 41 « Traduction de l'epigramme d'Hermaphrodite, faict et composé en latin par AUSONE ». Premier vers : « Ma mere enceincte alla vers Mars le fort » ; 42 « Dispute, lequel est meilleur que j'aye le monde en moy ou que le monde me ayt en soy ». Premier vers : « Puisque j'ay corps de femme terrienne » ; 43 « Elegie et deploration lachrimable, faicte par dame Université sur le tenebre de Hieremye, qui se nomme Quo modo sedet sola civitas, en se complaignant du meurtre de ses suppoux, adressant à la court supresme de la cité de Tholose, implorant justice ». Premier vers : « O court tres illustre et supresme » ; 44 Pièce sans titre. Premier vers : « Je ne voudroys poinct estre d'or » ; 45 « Quatrin en lexandrins (sic) ». Premier vers : « Quant Palas veit Venuz d'un arnoys accoustrée » ; 46 « Dizain » par « PHILIPPE LE BEAU ». Premier vers : « Si à Paris la pomme on rapportoit » ; 47 « Huitain contre maistre François de Sagon, du coup d'essay contre Clement Marot, par NICOLE COMPAIN ». Premier vers : « Sagon volant à la quille jouer » ; 48 « Epitaphe d'un qui tant ayma la saveur du piot qu'il mourut tout yvre », par « NICOLAS COMPAIN ». Premier vers : « Celluy qui gist icy tout estendu » ; 49 « Epistre » d' « HIEROSME DU VERGIER ». Premier vers : « Quiconques soys qui soubz une faintise » ; 50 « Responce à l'epistre du coq à l'asne de Clement Marot ». Premier vers : « Les doulx salutz, ami Marot » ; 51 Pièce sans titre, datée de « 1536 ». Premier vers : « De mon coq à l'asne dernier » ; 52 « Dizain d'un prescheur qui comparoit la vierge Marie à Venus et Jesus Christ à Cupido, et preschoit d'amour en son sermon », par « FRANÇ. ROUSSIN ». Premier vers : « Où yront plus jeunes dames et filles » ; 53 « Dizain du cordellier, qui prescha aux (sic) Mans que sainct Françoys tous les ans visitoit Purgatoire et d'illec retiroit les ames de ses bons amys ». Premier vers : « Le cordelier qui nagueres prescha » ; 54 « Aultre dizain à ce mesme propos ». Premier vers : « Puisque l'on peult icy bas meriter » ; 55 Pièce sans titre. Premier vers : « Puisque scez la rebellion » ; 56 Pièce sans titre. Premier vers : « Pour l'esguillon d'un vray bouvier » ; 57 Pièce sans titre, par « NICOLAS DE REILLAC ». Premier vers : « Si de l'ayment le pensser convenable » ; 58 « Huictain d'un qui doubtoit tousjours de ce que on luy eut sceu dire ». Premier vers : « Les dieux ont esté en ce doubte » ; 59 « Epitaphe d'ung nommé Livre, qui eut à jamays discord avec sa femme ; en dialogue ». Premier vers : « O passant, c'est grand chose icy » ; 60 Pièce sans titre. Premier vers : « Le temps qui court requiert que l'on se taise » ; 61 Autre. Premier vers : « O dur deppart, ô pitoyble adieu » ; 62 « A la duchesse de Ferrare », par « CL. MAROT ». Premier vers : « Me souvenant de tes bontez divines » ; 63 « Epitaphe de madame la regente, par SAINCT GELAIZ ». Premier vers : « Quant Madame eut la paix semée en terre » ; 64 « Aultre epitaphe de madicte dame par LA MAISON NEUFVE ». Premier vers : « L'intention est parverce en nature » ; 65 « Blason des couleurs ». Premier vers : « Pour fermeté doibt estre le noir pris » ; 66 « Dizain ». Premier vers : « Pres d'un russeau revestu de verdure » ; 67 « Quatrain ». Premier vers : « Si pour aymer l'on ne quiert que beaulté » ; 68 « Dicton ». Premier vers : « En esperant, je desespere » ; 69 « Le Pied ». Premier vers : « Pied de façon à la main comparable » ; 70 Pièce sans titre. Premier vers : « Si vous aymez ne soyez poinct fascheulx » ; 71 Pièce sans titre. Premier vers : « Venus, beaulté, eloquance, la gorge » ; 72 « Le nom du roy Françoys etthymologisé ». Premier vers : « Françoys fera fermement florir France » ; 73 « Rondeau ». Premier vers : « Laissez cela, vous m'affollez » ; 74 Pièce sans titre. Premier vers : « Madame, ung jour qu'elle eut son picotin » ; 75 « Sine Cerere et Baccho ». Premier vers : « Il est escript que si n'avez Cerès » ; 76 « CHARLES DE MERE EGLISE respond à Clement Marot ». Premier vers : « Charles est riche et sçavant tout ensemble » ; 77 « Luy-mesmes parlant en pape guay au marmot et au sagouyn ». Premier vers : « D'où vient cela, ô bestes insensées » ; 78 « Balade de la royne des canettes ». Premier vers : « Qui sont ceulx là qui ont si grand envye » ; 79 « Dizain à ce propoz ». Premier vers : « Royne des canes à bon droict bien nommée » ; 80 « Rondeau ». Premier vers : « Comme la cane en ordure barboulle » ; 81 A Rageau. Premier vers : « Lettres, allez legierement en court » ; 82 « Epitaphe d'une belette » par « S. GELAIS ». Premiervers : « Soubz ceste menue herbelete » ; 83 « CAP. Les grans jours à Paris. Salut ». Premier vers : « Sang bieu ! Paris, aymez vous les grands jours » ; 84 « CH. à Cap ». Premier vers : « J'ay veu l'escript bruyant comme tonnerre » ; 85 Pièce sans titre. Premier vers : « Amour me rend par mon vouloir subjecte » ; 86 « Epistre. » Premier vers : « Ne plus, ne moins que l'arbitre Paris » ; 87 « Rondeau ». Premier vers : « Sur toutes gens, comme dict l'Escripture » ; 88 « Epistre ». Premier vers : « Amour me brusle, amour m'enflamme et art » ; 89 « Epistre ». Premier vers : « Je ne sçauroys faire enarration » ; 90 « Epistre ». Premier vers : « Si les amours et haynes des bestes » ; 91 Pièce sans titre. Premier vers : « Serchant plaisir, je meurs du mal d'aymer » ; 92 « Responce ». Premier vers : « Cherchant plaisir, ma mort vous pourchassez » ; 93 « Requeste du seigneur GAUDELU au roy ». Premier vers : « Sire, vostre humble Gaudelu » ; 94 « Response à ladicte Requeste ». Premier vers : « Tres puissant roy, j'ay esté advertie » ; 95 « A mon bon et loyal compaignon ». Premier vers : « Pour m'acquitter de ce que te promys » ; 96 « Responce à l'epitaphe de Alix ». Premier vers : « Dedans Paris bien fort l'on te menasse » ; 97 « Epitaphe de Centy Maisons ». Premier vers : « Il n'est aux infernaulx palus » ; 98 « Tohibac Onasson, roy d'une des contrées de Brezil au successeur du grand Hercules lybien, monarque des Gaules ». Premier vers : « Roy tres puissant, ton renom et vaillance » ; 99 « Epistre ». Premier vers : « Avant vouloir cest escript commencer » ; 100 « Balade ». Premier vers : « Forgez avans, tant que le fer est chault » ; 101 « Dizain ». Premier vers : « Qui congé prent, monstre qu'il veult partir » ; 102 « Autre ». Premier vers : « Ad vostre advis, qui est plus douloureux » ; 103 « Epitaphe de la contrerolleuse Caqueton ». Premier vers : « Cy-gist morte, ce dict-on » ; 104 « Balade ». Premier vers : « Plaisant assez et des biens de fortune » ; 105 « Fragment ». Premier vers : « Amour, te faict cy jecter au passaige » ; 106 « Hommaige d'amour ». Premier vers : « Amour vouloit par ire son arc tendre » ; 107 « Ejusdem authoris, ut appar[et], propositio ». Premier vers : « Amour me tient depuis seize ans en laisse » ; 108 « Probatio ». Premier vers : « L'honnesteté, la prudence et sçavoir » ; 109 « Invective ». Premier vers : « Beste, bavard, je devoys dire maistre » ; 110 « Le second coq à l'asne de C. MAROT, tousjours revenant à ses moutons ». Premier vers : « Puis que respondre tu ne veulx » ; 111 « Epistre aux poètes françoys qui ont blasonné tous les membres », par « C. MAROT ». Premier vers : « Nobles espritz de France poeticques » ; 112 « Le contre tetin de MAROT ». Premier vers : « Tetin, qui n'a riens que la peau » ; 113 « Dizain envoyé par le chappellain de frippelippes aux facteurs disciples de Clement Marot ». Premier vers : « Gentilz facteurs, escolliers de Clement » ; 114 Pièce sans titre. Premier vers : « Qui de Marot et de Sagon les vers » ; 115 Pièce composée par « LA MAISON NEUFVE ». Premier vers : « Honneur de vous se voyant dechassé » ; 116 Pièce sans titre. Premier vers : « Considerant de celle qui me tue » ; 117 Pièce sans titre. Premier vers : « On tient d'Amour ung propos fort estrange » ; 118 Pièce sans titre : « Entre ung million d'amoureux ennemys » ; 119 Pièce sans titre. Premier vers : « Nous entreaymons, c'est un poinct arresté » ; 120 Autre. Premier vers : « Je sçay pour moy qu'elle est bien malaisée » ; 121 Autre. Premier vers : « Qui ayme bien d'autant que tousjours pense » ; 122 Autre. Premier vers : « Se je reçoy de vous une faveur » ; 123 Autre. Premier vers : « Otous les sens d'elle et de moy confus » ; 124 « Rondeau ». Premier vers : « Tant de longs jours et tant de dures nuitz » ; 125 Autre. Premier vers : « Par mort et toy puis avoir allegeance » ; 126 « Devis, à ce propos ». Premier vers : « Mort et Amour ont semblables aspectz » ; 127 « Rondeau ». Premier vers : « Entre vivans est une question » ; 128 « Autre rondeau ». Premier vers : « Tant seullement ton amour te demande » ; 129 Autre. Premier vers : « Contre le coup de ta sajecte ou lance » ; 130 « Commencement d'une elegie ». Premier vers : « Petit cusin, qui en picquant m'esveilles » ; 131 « Autre commencement d'elegie, sur une couppe ». Premier vers : « Couppe, tu as plus que nulz tes desirs » ; 132 Pièce sans titre, audessus de laquelle on lit : « Aucto. LAZ. BA. ». Premier vers : « Ha ! petit chien, tant tu as de bonheur » ; 133 Autre, au-dessus de laquelle on lit : « Aucto. PORT. ». Premier vers : « Passant chemin deux dames regarderent » ; 134 Autre. Premier vers : « D'avoir loué cest ouvraige imparfait » ; 135 « Elegie d'Ovide translatée, auctore SANGESILAO ». Premier vers : « O dur mary, bien que ayes imposée » ; 136 « Huictain » par « CL. MAROT ». Premier vers : « Amour et Mort la terre et ciel ont pris » ; 137 « Epistre presentée à la royne de Navarre par madame Ysabeau et deux autres damoyselles habillées en Amazones en une mommerie. Penthazillée, royne des Amazones, à Marguerite, royne de Navarre ». Premier vers : « J'ay entendu, tres illustre compaigne » ; 138 Pièce sans titre. Premier vers : « Or ça, Marot, que diras-tu » ; 139 « Dizain ». Premier vers : « Bouche de coural precieux » ; 140 « Contre Claude Lescorché, moyne ». Premier vers : « Dessoubz se (sic) mot de moyne sont comprins » ; 141 « Dizain », précédé d'une sorte d'envoi en prose. Premier vers : « Mes yeulx sont bons et ne voy rien du tout » ; 142 « Epistre envoyée de Venize à madame la duchesse de Ferrare par CLEMENT MAROT ». Premier vers : « Apres avoir par mes jours visité » ; 143 « Epistre d'un serviteur à sa maistresse ». Premier vers : « Madame, un fol pour faire bon messaige » ; 144 « Epistre ». Premier vers : « Puis qu'il me fault à Paris faire ung tour » ; 145 « Autre epistre ». Premier vers : « Ma seur, je suis arrivé à Paris » ; 146 « Aultre ». Premier vers : « Va, se tu peuz, peine toute remyse » ; 147 Pièce sans titre. Premier vers : « Quiconque veult lectre missive escripre » ; 148 Pièce sans titre. Premier vers : « Mille mercys et graces je t'admeine » ; 149 « Rondeau à ce propos ». Premier vers : « En paradis Jesu Christ preigne l'ame » ; 150 Pièce sans titre. Premier vers. « Jeune seigneur, gentil prevost de Ouée » ; 151 Autre. Premier vers : « Peuple indiscret, obfusqué d'ignorance » ; 152 « Quatrain ». Premier vers : « Quant le penser sert ou lieu de propos » ; 153 « Autre ». Premier vers : « Mort, si tu peulx toutes choses casser » ; 154 « A Dieu seul louange ! » Premier vers : « Voudroict-on myeulx de Dieu monstrer la gloire » ; 155 « Huictain ». Premier vers : « Mes beaulx peres religieux » ; 156 Pièce sans titre. Premier vers : « Ains (lisez : amis) j'ay veu Cupido se tirant » ; 157 Autre. Premier vers : « Grand est le mal pour la personne esprise » ; 158 Autre. Premier vers : « Votre bon sens pour moy seul perverty »

Commentaires de BLAISE DE MONTLUC.

Contient : 1 Commentaires. Le prologue très court, dont les deux premières lettres sont écrites en lettres d'or, commence (fol. 1) par : « Le seigneur de Monluc se trouvant en l'eaige de soixante unze ans, ayant pourté les armes l'espace de cinquante deux... ». Le texte proprement dit commence (fol. 1) par : « Or, commenceray-je que aiant esté nourry paige du duc Anthoine de Lorraine et de madame la duchesse sa femme... » et finit (fol. 403) par : « ... et qui n'aye ordinairement besoing de luy et de son secours. Fin » ; 2 « Preambul à monseigneur par le seigneur DE MONLUC » ; 3 « Remonstrances au roy par le seigneur DE MONLUC » sur le choix des officiers royaux. « Sire, Encores que je sçaiche bien... » ; 4 « Remonstrance à Monseigneur, par le seigneur DE MONLUC. Monseigneur, voyant que j'ay faict une remonstrance à Sa Majesté, pourroict estre que ne trouveriés bon... » ; 5 « Remonstrances du seigneur DE MONLUC aux gouverneurs des places. Je sçay bien, messieurs les gouverneurs, qu'aulcuns prendront plaisir à ma remonstrance... » ; 6 « Remonstrance du seigneur DE MONLUC aux cappitaines de gens de pied. Cappitaines, mes compaignons, vous debvés estre certains... » ; 7 Autre copie des Commentaires

Heidegger on the way of thinking

This thesis attempts to clarify what Heidegger meant by the term "thinking" (Denken), where this ^'meanr is submitted in the double sense: firstly, in the sense of what Heidegger intended by the use and exposition of this term that we find in his lecture series. Was Heisst Denken?, where Heidegger quickly makes it clear that this intention is to actually bring thinking on the way, viz. making provision for the leap into thinking, and where this intention was carried out with the employment of a specific guiding phrase. In the second sense, it is an attempt at clarifying the meaning of the term. But this is not to say that we are here simply out to see how Heidegger defines the word '*thinking." It is in fact precisely within such definitive discourse that thought dies out. It is not merely be a case of defining a word, because this enterprise would be just as shallow as much as it would be unworkable. It is for this reason that Heidegger decided to establish for himself the task, not merely of explaining thinking as something to be beheld at a distance, but rather of bringing thinking underway by means of his lecture, proclaiming that, "Only the leap into the river tells us what is swimming. The question 'What is called thinking?' can never be answered by proposing a definition of the concept thinking, and then diligently explaining what is contained in that definition." (WCT, 21) This being Heidegger's intention, in order to understand Heidegger in his treatment of the term thinking, it is clear that we must also undergo an experience with thinking. It is in this spirit that the present work was written so as to collaborate the two senses of what Heidegger meant by "thinking."

Sensitivity to differences between posed and genuine facial expressions : are children easily fooled? /

Adults and children can discriminate various emotional expressions, although there is limited research on sensitivity to the differences between posed and genuine expressions. Adults have shown implicit sensitivity to the difference between posed and genuine happy smiles in that they evaluate T-shirts paired with genuine smiles more favorably than T-shirts paired with posed smiles or neutral expressions (Peace, Miles, & Johnston, 2006). Adults also have shown some explicit sensitivity to posed versus genuine expressions; they are more likely to say that a model i?,feeling happy if the expression is genuine than posed. Nonetheless they are duped by posed expressions about 50% of the time (Miles, & Johnston, in press). There has been no published study to date in which researchers report whether children's evaluation of items varies with expression and there is little research investigating children's sensitivity to the veracity of facial expressions. In the present study the same face stimuli were used as in two previous studies (Miles & Johnston, in press; Peace et al., 2006). The first question to be addressed was whether adults and 7-year-olds have a cognitive understanding of the differences between posed and genuine happiness {scenario task). They evaluated the feelings of children who expressed gratitude for a present that they did or did not want. Results indicated that all participants had a fundamental understanding of the difference between real and posed happiness. The second question involved adults' and children's implicit sensitivity to the veracity of posed and genuine smiles. Participants rated and ranked beach balls paired with faces showing posed smiles, genuine smiles, and neutral expressions. Adults ranked.but did not rate beach balls paired with genuine smiles more favorably than beach balls paired with posed smiles. Children did not demonstrate implicit sensitivity as their ratings and rankings of beach balls did not vary with expressions; they did not even rank beach balls paired with genuine expressions higher than beach balls paired with neutral expressions. In the explicit (show/feel) task, faces were presented without the beach balls and participants were first asked whether each face was showing happy and then whether each face wasfeeling happy. There were also two matching trials that presented two faces at once; participants had to indicate which person was actuallyfeeling happy. In the show condition both adults and 7-year-olds were very accurate on genuine and neutral expressions but made some errors on posed smiles. Adults were fooled about 50% of the time by posed smiles in thefeel condition (i.e., they were likely to say that a model posing happy was really feeling happy) and children were even less accurate, although they showed weak sensitivity to posed versus genuine expressions. Future research should test an older age group of children to determine when explicit sensitivity to posed versus genuine facial expressions becomes adult-like and modify the ranking task to explore the influence of facial expressions on object evaluations.

From inference to affordance : the problem of visual depth-perception in the optical writings of Descartes, Berkeley, and Gibson

This thesis explores the debate and issues regarding the status of visual ;,iferellces in the optical writings of Rene Descartes, George Berkeley and James 1. Gibson. It gathers arguments from across their works and synthesizes an account of visual depthperception that accurately reflects the larger, metaphysical implications of their philosophical theories. Chapters 1 and 2 address the Cartesian and Berkelean theories of depth-perception, respectively. For Descartes and Berkeley the debate can be put in the following way: How is it possible that we experience objects as appearing outside of us, at various distances, if objects appear inside of us, in the representations of the individual's mind? Thus, the Descartes-Berkeley component of the debate takes place exclusively within a representationalist setting. Representational theories of depthperception are rooted in the scientific discovery that objects project a merely twodimensional patchwork of forms on the retina. I call this the "flat image" problem. This poses the problem of depth in terms of a difference between two- and three-dimensional orders (i.e., a gap to be bridged by one inferential procedure or another). Chapter 3 addresses Gibson's ecological response to the debate. Gibson argues that the perceiver cannot be flattened out into a passive, two-dimensional sensory surface. Perception is possible precisely because the body and the environment already have depth. Accordingly, the problem cannot be reduced to a gap between two- and threedimensional givens, a gap crossed with a projective geometry. The crucial difference is not one of a dimensional degree. Chapter 3 explores this theme and attempts to excavate the empirical and philosophical suppositions that lead Descartes and Berkeley to their respective theories of indirect perception. Gibson argues that the notion of visual inference, which is necessary to substantiate representational theories of indirect perception, is highly problematic. To elucidate this point, the thesis steps into the representationalist tradition, in order to show that problems that arise within it demand a tum toward Gibson's information-based doctrine of ecological specificity (which is to say, the theory of direct perception). Chapter 3 concludes with a careful examination of Gibsonian affordallces as the sole objects of direct perceptual experience. The final section provides an account of affordances that locates the moving, perceiving body at the heart of the experience of depth; an experience which emerges in the dynamical structures that cross the body and the world.

Nietzsche's will-to-power ontology : an interpretation of Beyond Good and Evil

Abstract: Nietzsche's Will-to-Power Ontology: An Interpretation of Beyond Good and Evil § 36 By: Mark Minuk Will-to-power is the central component of Nietzsche's philosophy, and passage 36 of Beyond Good and Evil is essential to coming to an understanding of it. 1 argue for and defend the thesis that will-to-power constitutes Nietzsche's ontology, and offer a new understanding of what that means. Nietzsche's ontology can be talked about as though it were a traditional substance ontology (i.e., a world made up of forces; a duality of conflicting forces described as 'towards which' and 'away from which'). However, 1 argue that what defines this ontology is an understanding of valuation as ontologically fundamental—^the basis of interpretation, and from which a substance ontology emerges. In the second chapter, I explain Nietzsche's ontology, as reflected in this passage, through a discussion of Heidegger's two ontological categories in Being and Time (readiness-to-hand, and present-at-hand). In a nutshell, it means that the world of our desires and passions (the most basic of which is for power) is ontologically more fundamental than the material world, or any other interpretation, which is to say, the material world emerges out of a world of our desires and passions. In the first chapter, I address the problematic form of the passage reflected in the first sentence. The passage is in a hypothetical style makes no claim to positive knowledge or truth, and, superficially, looks like Schopenhaurian position for the metaphysics of the will, which Nietzsche rejects. 1 argue that the hypothetical form of the passage is a matter of style, namely, the style of a free-spirit for whom the question of truth is reframed as a question of values. In the third and final chapter, 1 address the charge that Nietzsche's interpretation is a conscious anthropomorphic projection. 1 suggest that the charge rests on a distinction (between nature and man) that Nietzsche rejects. I also address the problem of the causality of the will for Nietzsche, by suggesting that an alternative, perspectival form of causality is possible.

An electrophysiological examination of intentional and inadvertent sleep onset : the effect of intention on the sleep onset process

The main purpose ofthis study was to examine the effect ofintention on the sleep onset process from an electrophysiological point ofview. To test this, two nap conditions, the Multiple Sleep Latency Test (MSLT) and the Repeated Test of Sustained Wakefulness (RTSW) were used to compare intentional and inadvertent sleep onset. Sixteen female participants (aged 19-25) spent two non-consecutive nights in the sleep lab; however, due to physical and technical difficulties only 8 participants produced compete sets of data for analysis. Each night participants were given six nap opportunities. For three ofthese naps they were instructed to fall asleep (MSLT), for the remaining three naps they were to attempt to remain awake (RTSW). These two types of nap opportunities represented the conditions ofintentional (MSLT) and inadvertent (RTSW) sleep onset. Several other sleepiness, performance, arousal and questionnaire measures were obtained to evaluate and/or control for demand characteristics, subjective effort and mental activity during the nap tests. The nap opportunities were scored using a new 9 stage scoring system developed by Hori et al. (1994). Power spectral analyses (FFT) were also performed on the sleep onset data provided by the two nap conditions. Longer sleep onset latencies (approximately 1.25 minutes) were obseIVed in the RTSW than the MSLT. A higher incidence of structured mental activity was reported in the RTSW and may have been reflected in higher Beta power during the RTSW. The decent into sleep was more ragged in the RTSW as evidenced by an increased number shifts towards higher arousal as measured using the Hori 9 stage sleep scoring method. 1ll The sleep onset process also appears to be altered by the intention to remain awake, at least until the point ofinitial Stage 2 sleep (i.e. the first appearance of spindle activity). When only examining the final 4.3 minutes ofthe sleep onset process (ending with spindle activity), there were significant interactions between the type ofnap and the time until sleep onset for Theta, Alpha and Beta power. That is to say, the pattern of spectral power measurements in these bands differed across time as a function ofthe type ofnap. The effect ofintention however, was quite small (,,2 < .04) when compared to the variance which could be accounted for by the passage oftime (,,2 == .10 to .59). These data indicate that intention alone cannot greatly extend voluntary wakefulness if a person is sleepy. This has serious implications for people who may be required to perform dangerous tasks while sleepy, particularly for people who are in a situation that does not allow them the opportunity to engage in behavioural strategies in order to maintain their arousal.

Commodities and their fetishism

Many pr oblems present themselves in at tempting t o discuss Marx's noti on of the fetish characteristics of commodities. It has been argued that it is one of the central points of Marx's en tir e c or pus. 1 It has also been argued that it i s merely "a brilli an t s oci olog i cal genera lization l ! and, even furth er, that it is an Hi ndependent and separate entity, internally hardly related t o Marx's economic theory" .2 How could such a theory be understo od i n such drastically diff erent ways? Perhaps the clue is to be f ound somewhere in Marx' s discussion of the fetishism of commodities itself. Because of the difficulty in un derstanding fetishism , I intend t o examine what Marx himself has t o say first befor e dealing with any points related to the notion of fetishism. Thus , the first parts of this thesis will c onsist of l ong qu otations and repetition of what Marx has t o say. If a noti on may be called ' central' and yet 'hardly related' t o Marx's wor k at the same time, surely a clear examination of this section is necess ary. Aft er an examination of the initial secti ons of Cae ital ] I intend t G examine the f ollowing : the r e lation of fetishism t o the t he ory of alienati on; how one may regard f etishism as a pr oblem f or philosophy; and how, in f act, the theory of fetishism is of prime imp ortance f or an understan ding of Marx's wr itings. What I want to stress throughout is that with o u~ an understanding of what is inherent in the pr oduction of the commodity causing i t t o be necessarily fetishistic, it is practically imp ossible t o understand much of Marx's other writin gs. A commodity appears, at fir st sight, a very trivial thing and easi ly un derst ood. Itsanalysis shows that it i s , in r eality , a very queer thing , abo unding in ~taphysical s ubtleties and theological nic eties .

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Out of the darkness and into the light : a study of inauthentic and authentic speech

Introduction Man can be described as the being who shows himself in speech, and from birth to death is continually speaking. Communication is so close to us, so woven into our very being, that we have little understanding of the way it is constituted; for it is as hard to obtain distance from communication as it is to obtain distance from ourselves. All communication is not alike. There are two basic modesl of communication, the inauthentic and the authentic, between which there occurs a constant tension. It is in the inauthentic mode, points out Heidegger, that we find ourselves "proximately and for the most part"; 1. Being and Time, pg. 68 Dasein decides as to the way it will comport itself in taking up its task of having being as an issue for it. " •.• it~, in its very being 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself or only "seem" to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic--that is, something of its own--can it have lost itself and not yet won itself." 2. therefore Heidegger also terms it "everydayness".2 Caught up in the world of everydayness, our speaking covers over and conceals3 our rootedness in being, leaving us in the darkness of untruth. The image of darkness may be inferred from Heidegger's use of the image of "clearing,,4 to depict being as 2. ibid. pg. 69 "Dasein's average everydayness, however, is not to be taken as a mere 'aspect'. Here too, and even in the mode of inauthenticity, the structure of existentiality lies ~ priori and here too Dasein's being is an issue for it in a definite way; and Dasein comports itself towards it the mode of average everydayness, even if this is only the mode of fleeing in the face of it and forgetfulness thereof." 3. ibid. pg. 59 "covering over" and "concealing" are 1;yays Dasein tries to flee its task of having being as an issue for itself. " ••• This being can be covered up so extensively that it becomes forgotten and no question arises about it or its meaning ••• n How everyday speaking accomplishes this will be taken up in detail in the second chapter which explores Dasein's everyday speech. 4. ibid, pg. 171 lI ••• we have in mind nothing other than the Existential - ontological structure of this entity (Dasein), that it is in such a way as to be its 'there'. To say that it is -' illuminated' [tlerleuchtet"] means that as Being-in-theworld it is cleared [gelichtetJ in itself7 not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing. Only for an entity which is eXistentially cleared in this way does what is present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark •••• " 3 dis-coveredness and truth. Our first task will be to explore the nature of communication in general and then to explore each of the modes manifested in turn. The structure of the inauthentic mode of communication can be explored by asking the following questions: What is this speaking about? Who is it that is speaking and who is spoken to? Does this speaking show man in his speech? The authentic mode is distinguished by the rarity with which we encounter it; as the inauthentic conceals, so the authentic reveals our rootedness in being. Yet this rarity makes it difficult to delineate its elusive structure clearly. Its constituent elements can be brought into focus by asking the same questions of this mode that we previously asked of the inauthentic mode. Our initial response to the disclosure of the authentic mode is to attempt to abandon the inauthentic mode and leave the darkness behind dwelling only in the "lighted place". All through the ages, some men pushing this to extreme, have, upon uncovering their relatedness to being, experienced a deep longing to dwell in such a "place" of pure truth and oft times denigrated or attempted to exclude the everyday world. Such 4. flight is twice mistaken: first it atbempts to fix truth as unchanging and static and secondly, it opposes this to untruth which it seeks to abolish. This is both the wrong view of truth and the wrong view of untruth as Heidegger points out in The Origin of The-Work of Art: The Way-to-be of truth, i.e., of discoveredness, is under the sway of refusal. But this refusal is no lack or privation, as if truth could be simply discoveredness rid of all covers. If it could be that, it would no longer be itself . ••• Truth in its way-to-be is untruth.5 Pure light is not the nature of Being nor is pure unconcealedness possible for man. Failure to remember this is the failure to realize that communication destroys itself in such flight because it no longer maintains the contingency of its task, i.e., the dis-closedness of being. We are reminded of the strong attraction this flight from darkness held for Plato. Light, truth and Being are all beyond the darkness and have nothing to do with it. In Book VII of the R~public, Socrates' explanation of the Allegory of the Cave to Glaucon points to a decided preference men have for the "lighted place". 5. The Origin Of The Work Of Art, pg. 42 5. Come then, I said, and join me in this further thought, and do not be surprised that those who attained to this height are not willing to occupy themselves with the affairs of men, but their souls ever feel the upward urge and yearning for that sojourn above. For this, I take it, is likely if in this point too the likeliness of our image holds. 6 Despite the attraction to pure truth, human communication is more complex than putting down one mode of communication and picking up another. Due to the fact that we are always on the way, the title of my thesis will have to be amended: OUT OF THE DARKNESS AND INTO THE LIGHT--AGAIN AND AGAIN. It must be this way because this is what it means to be human. This is the point made by Mephisto to Faust in pointing out that man, standing between God and the devil, needs both darkness and light: Er findet sich in einem ewigen Gl~t Uns hat er in die Finsternis gebracht, Und euch taugt einzig Tag und Nacht. 7 6. Republic z (517 c & d) It should be noted however, that while the philosopherking must be compelled to return to the cave for purely political reasons, once he has taken adequate view of the "brightest region of being" he has the full truth and his return to darkness adds nothing to the truth. 7. Faust, pg. 188 6. This thesis proposes to examine the grounds that give rise to communication, uncovering the structure of its inauthentic and authentic modes and paying close attention to tpeir interrelationship and to their relationship to language as "the house of Being": language that both covers and opens up man's rootedness in Being, transforming him as he moves along his way, taking up his "ownmost task" of becoming who he is. roots. He is the being who shows himself inn that reflects his forgetfulness or remembrance of his rootedness in being. Man comes into an already existent world and is addressedl through things in the world which are c

The nature of avidyÄ in Buddhism and VedÄ nta

This thesis deals with the nature of ignorance as it was interpreted in the Upani~adic tradition, specifically in Advaita Vedanta, and in early and Mahayana Buddhism , e specially in the Madhyamika school of Buddhism. The approach i s a historical and comparative one. It examines the early thoughts of both the upanis.a ds and Buddhism abou t avidya (ignorance), shows how the notion was treated by the more speculative and philosphically oriented schools which base d themselves on the e arly works, and sees how their views differ. The thesis will show that the Vedinta tended to treat avidya as a topic for metaphysical s peculation as t he s chool developed, drifting from its initial e xistential concerns, while the Madhyamika remained in contact with the e xistential concerns evident in the first discourses of the Buddha. The word "notion" has been chosen for use in referring t o avidya, even though it may have non-intellectual and emotional connotations, to avoid more popular a lternatives such as "concept" or "idea". In neither the Upani,ads, Advaita Vedanta, or Buddhism is ignorance merely a concept or an idea. Only in a secondary sense, in texts and speech , does it become one. Avidya has more to do with the lived situation in which man finds himself, with the subjectobject separation in which he f eels he exists, than with i i i intel lect ual constr ucts . Western thought has begun to r ealize the same with concerns such as being in modern ontology, and has chosen to speak about i t i n terms of the question of being . Avidya, however, i s not a 'question' . If q ue stions we r e to be put regarding the nature of a vidya , they would be more of t he sort "What is not avidya?", though e ven here l anguage bestows a status t o i t which avidya does not have. In considering a work of the Eastern tradition, we f ace t he danger of imposing Western concepts on it. Granted t hat avidya is customari ly r endered i n English as ignorance, the ways i n which the East and West view i gno rance di f f er. Pedagogically , the European cultures, grounded in the ancient Greek culture, view ignorance as a l ack or an emptiness. A child is i gnorant o f certain t hings and the purpose o f f ormal education , in f act if not in theory, is to fill him with enough knowledge so that he can cope wit h t he complexities and the e xpectations of s ociety. On another level, we feel t hat study and research will l ead t o the discovery o f solutions, which we now lack , for problems now defying solut i on . The East, on the o t her hand, sees avidya in a d i fferent light.Ignorance isn't a lack, but a presence. Religious and philosophical l iterature directs its efforts not towards acquiring something new, but at removing t.he ideas and opinions that individuals have formed about themselves and the world. When that is fully accomplished, say the sages , t hen Wisdom, which has been obscured by those opinions, will present itself. Nothing new has to be learned, t hough we do have t o 'learn' that much. The growing interest in t he West with Eastern religions and philosophies may, in time, influence our theoretical and practical approaches to education and learning, not only in the established educati onal institutions, but in religious , p sychological, and spiritual activities as well. However, the requirements o f this thesis do no t permit a formulation of revolutionary method or a call to action. It focuses instead on the textual arguments which attempt to convince readers that t he world in which they take themselves to exist is not, in essence, real, on the ways i n which the l imitations of language are disclosed, and on the provisional and limited schemes that are built up to help students see through their ignorance. The metaphysic s are provisional because they act only as spurs and guides. Both the Upanisadic and Buddhist traditions that will be dealt with here stress that language constantly fails to encompass the Real. So even terms s uch as 'the Real', 'Absolute', etc., serve only to lead to a transcendent experience . The sections dealing with the Upanisads and Advaita Vedanta show some of the historical evolution of the notion of avidya, how it was dealt with as maya , and the q uestions that arose as t o its locus. With Gau?apada we see the beginnings of a more abstract treatment of the topic, and , the influence of Buddhism. Though Sankhara' S interest was primarily directed towards constructing a philosophy to help others attain mok~a ( l iberation), he too introduced t echnica l t e rminology not found in the works of his predecessors. His work is impressive , but areas of it are incomplete. Numbers of his followers tried to complete the systematic presentation of his insi ghts . Their work focuses on expl anat i ons of adhyasa (superimposition ) , t he locus and object of ignorance , and the means by which Brahman takes itself to be the jiva and the world. The section on early Buddhism examines avidya in the context o f the four truths, together with dubkha (suffering), the r ole it p l ays in t he chain of dependent c ausation , a nd t he p r oblems that arise with t he doctrine of anatman. With t he doct rines of e arly Buddhism as a base, the Madhyamika elaborated questions that the Buddha had said t e nded not t o edi f ication. One of these had to do with own - being or svabhava. Thi s serves a s a centr e around which a discussion o f i gnorance unfolds, both i ndividual and coll ective ignorance. There follows a treatment of the cessation of ignorance as it is discussed within this school . The final secti on tries to present t he similarities and differences i n the natures o f ignorance i n t he two traditions and discusses the factors responsible for t hem . ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Dr. Sinha for the time spent II and suggestions made on the section dealing with Sankara and the Advait.a Vedanta oommentators, and Dr. Sprung, who supervised, direoted, corrected and encouraged the thesis as a whole, but especially the section on Madhyamika, and the final comparison.

Manuscript of James Cummings- August 28, 1860

Transcript (spelling and grammar retained): Chippawa [Chippewa] 28th August 1860 My Dear Sir I duly received your very kind letter of the 24th [June] asking me to communicate such facts of general interest connected with my career during the War with the United States. I have no objection to afford you such information as came under my own observation; nevertheless I do so, with the understanding, I have no desire to be my own trumpeter. With respect to your circular wherein you state you have been for several years collecting materials for a History of the late War between the United States & Great Britain, for which you are now gathering further materials to add to your collection, concerning the Second War for Independence. I am rather at a loss to know, what is meant by the second war; If you allude to the petty Rebellion, it could not be called a War, Those that caused the outbreak were very soon put down, by the Loyal people of the Province without the aid of Regular Troops being satisfied with the Independence they enjoyed. With respect to the several questions names in your circular: To the 1st I would say, this locality is made memorable by the battle of Chippawa [Chippewa] which took place about a mile above the village on the ground I pointed out to you, when I had the pleasure of seeing you a few days ago, with Mr Porter of the Niagara Falls, of which I believe you took sketches at the time. 2nd I have no historical documents of any value; so many years having gone past, the most of my old papers have either been lost or destroyed, I however came across two letters, one dated Queenston 9th July 1812 from Lt. Col. Nicholl Quarter Master General of Militia, the other from Lt. Col Myers Deputy Quarter Master General of the Regular Army date Fort George 23rd same month, directed to me in the hand writing of each of those officers as Deputy Quarter Master General of Militia, which letters I shall be obliged you would return at as early a day possible, as I wish to place them with tome others in the case, I have had made to hold the cocked hat & feather I wore during that eventful period, which I am sorry I did not exhibit when you was at my house; with reference to it I now enclose a letter from Lt. Col. Clark, residing at Port Dalhousie he was Captain & Adjutant of Militia in the War of 1812__ I send the letter in proof of the cock’d hat it is a lengthy one, but you may find time to turn over it, as I shall also place it in the hat case__ 3rd Where are [but] [for] traditionary [sic] witnesses residing in this vicinity – Col Clark above named Mr Merritt of St. Catharines, & Mr Kerby of Brantford are the only ones I now recollect, who could offord [sic] you any statistical information. 4th I have no pictorial sketches of any Military Movements or fortifications. As regards my own career, which you appear [ ? ] of knowing__ I was first a Lieutenant in a volunteer flank company stationed on the river side opposite [Navy] Island not far from the battle ground of Chippawa [Chippewa], I got promotion as Lieutenant of Cavalry before I got my Cavalry dress completed in three days more, I was called by General Brock to Fort George, was appointed Deputy Quarter Master General of Militia with the rank of Captain s the accompanying letters will show. I was at the battle of Stony Creek, several skirmishes at the Cross Roads, when the American army [ ? ] Fort George, at the taking of Col. Boerstler at the Beaver Dam, & had the honor of receiving Colonel Chapens sword at the surrender, who commanded a company of volunteer Horse Men was at the taking of 15 regulars & two officers at Fort Schlosser—was with Col. Bishop at the taking of Black Rock, near him when he fell, three men of the 8th Reg. more killed in the Boat I was in – I was at Chippawa battle, and the last, not the least in Lundy’s lane battle, which the Americans call the battle of Bridge [Waters]. I had forgot; there was another small affair at Corks Mill where I was. I could write a little history of events, but have not the time to do so. If what I have stated will be of any service for the purpose you require I shall feel happy. The history of the late War was published at Toronto in the Anglo American Magazine. Did you ever see it, I have the Books, there were however several errors which came under my notice, which I could have corrected. If my time would permit I could give you a more detailed statement of events. I trust however you may succeed with your publication , and I shall be most happy to hear from you at all times—I related many little occurances verbally to you when here, which I thought not necessary to repeat again as you would have a perfect recollection of them. Be pleased to return the letters for the purpose I require them. I am My Dear Sir Your respectful friend James Cummings