Regime disciplinar do servidor público temporário

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo aprofundar o regime jurídico disciplinar do servidor público temporário. Analisam-se as características principais dessa espécie de agente público que o diferenciam dos demais servidores e que justificam um regime disciplinar próprio. Em uma breve investigação sobre as prováveis origens do temporário, constata-se a presença desse servidor na Administração Pública brasileira desde 1823. No direito estrangeiro (particularmente, no direito francês e no direito português), verifica-se a existência de figuras assemelhadas ao servidor público temporário brasileiro, que é uma espécie de servidor público do gênero agente público, exercendo uma função pública, mas não ocupando nem cargo, nem emprego públicos, sendo contratado por tempo determinado para atender a necessidade temporária de excepcional interesse público. A Constituição Federal, em seu artigo 37, IX, indica que a lei estabelecerá os casos de contratação por tempo determinado, mas não há uma uniformidade entre os entes da federação sobre o regime jurídico adotado para o servidor temporário. Esta análise concentra-se na Lei Federal n.º 8.745/93, que disciplina o assunto. No âmbito federal, o servidor público temporário é dotado de um regime jurídico com características mais próximas do regime jurídico administrativo, sendo recrutado por meio de contrato administrativo assemelhado ao regime estatutário. Tal contratação deve pautar-se pela observância dos princípios da continuidade do serviço público, da moralidade, da impessoalidade, da razoabilidade, da proporcionalidade e da motivação. Focaliza-se a responsabilidade do servidor público temporário no âmbito administrativo, procurando-se demonstrar que tal servidor, por um princípio de equiparação, submete-se a um processo administrativo disciplinar para apuração de suas faltas, o qual cumpre prazos especiais e condições específicas em razão do vínculo temporário com a Administração Pública, em tudo sendo respeitado o devido processo legal, a ampla defesa e o contraditório. Analisam-se as diferenças entre o processo disciplinar do servidor temporário (sindicância) e o processo do servidor público em geral, os ritos adotados, os prazos, as penalidades e os recursos, constatando-se que o servidor público temporário responde pelos atos ilícitos em todas as esferas: penal, civil, administrativa e por atos de improbidade. A transitoriedade na função não o exime de responsabilidades, por isso, com as devidas adaptações, está sujeito aos ônus e bônus do serviço público. Daí a necessidade de construir, com base nas características próprias dessa espécie de servidor público, um regime adaptado às especificações do vínculo especial a que se submete o servidor público temporário. Propõe-se aqui um miniprocesso disciplinar ou um processo disciplinar especial, ou uma minissindicância ou uma sindicância especial, sui generis.

An Introduction to Conservation Easements in the United States: A Simple Concept and a Complicated Mosaic of Law

The idea of a conservation easement – restrictions on the development and use of land designed to protect the land’s conservation or historic values – can be relatively easily understood. More significant and more challenging is the complex body of state and federal laws that shapes the creation, funding, tax treatment, enforcement, modification, and termination of conservation easements. The explosion in the number of conservation easements over the past four decades has made them one of the most popular land protection mechanisms in the United States. The National Conservation Easement Database estimates that the total number of acres encumbered by conservation easements exceeds 40 million.Because conservation easements are both novel and ubiquitous, understanding how they actual work is essential for practicing lawyers, policymakers, land trust professionals, and students of conservation. This article provides a “quick tour” through some of the most important aspects of the developing mosaic of conservation easement law. It gives the reader a sense of the complex inter-jurisdictional dynamics that shape conservation transactions and disputes about conservation easements. Professors of property law, environmental law, tax law, and environmental studies who wish to cover conservation easements in the context of a more general course can use the article to provide their students with a broad but comprehensive overview of the relevant legal and policy issues.

The Jewish Law Firm: Past and Present

The rise and growth of large Jewish law firms in New York City during the second half of the twentieth century was nothing short of an astounding success story. As late as 1950, there was not a single large Jewish law firm in town. By the mid-1960s, six of the largest twenty law firms were Jewish, and by 1980, four of the largest ten prestigious law firms were Jewish firms. Moreover, the accomplishment of the Jewish firms is especially striking because, while the traditional large White Anglo-Saxon Protestant law firms grew at a fast rate during this period, the Jewish firms grew twice as fast, and they did so in spite of experiencing explicit discrimination. What happened? This book chapter is a revised, updated study of the rise and growth of large New York City Jewish law firms. It is based on the public record, with respect to both the law firms themselves and trends in the legal profession generally, and on over twenty in-depth interviews with lawyers who either founded and practiced at these successful Jewish firms, attempted and failed to establish such firms, or were in a position to join these firms but decided instead to join WASP firms. According to the informants interviewed in this chapter, while Jewish law firms benefited from general decline in anti-Semitism and increased demand for corporate legal services, a unique combination of factors explains the incredible rise of the Jewish firms. First, white-shoe ethos caused large WASP firms to stay out of undignified practice areas and effectively created pockets of Jewish practice areas, where the Jewish firms encountered little competition for their services. Second, hiring and promotion discriminatory practices by the large WASP firms helped create a large pool of talented Jewish lawyers from which the Jewish firms could easily recruit. Finally, the Jewish firms benefited from a flip side of bias phenomenon, that is, they benefited from the positive consequences of stereotyping. Paradoxically, the very success of the Jewish firms is reflected in their demise by the early twenty-first century: because systematic large law firm ethno-religious discrimination against Jewish lawyers has become a thing of the past, the very reason for the existence of Jewish law firms has been nullified. As other minority groups, however, continue to struggle for equality within the senior ranks of Big Law, can the experience of the Jewish firms serve as a “separate-but-equal” blueprint for overcoming contemporary forms of discrimination for women, racial, and other minority attorneys? Perhaps not. As this chapter establishes, the success of large Jewish law firms was the result of unique conditions and circumstances between 1945 and 1980, which are unlikely to be replicated. For example, large law firms have become hyper-competitive and are not likely to allow any newcomers the benefit of protected pockets of practice. While smaller “separate-but-equal” specialized firms, for instance, ones exclusively hiring lawyer-mothers occasionally appear, the rise of large “separate-but-equal” firms is improbable.

Saint Mathew Law and Bonini Paradox in Textual Theory of Complex Models

The mathematical models of the complex reality are texts belonging to a certain literature that is written in a semi-formal language, denominated L(MT) by the authors whose laws linguistic mathematics have been previously defined. This text possesses linguistic entropy that is the reflection of the physical entropy of the processes of real world that said text describes. Through the temperature of information defined by Mandelbrot, the authors begin a text-reality thermodynamic theory that drives to the existence of information attractors, or highly structured point, settling down a heterogeneity of the space text, the same one that of ontologic space, completing the well-known law of Saint Mathew, of the General Theory of Systems and formulated by Margalef saying: “To the one that has more he will be given, and to the one that doesn't have he will even be removed it little that it possesses.

[ Minutes of the proceedings of a general courts-martial], 1776

Varick served as judge advocate during these court-martial proceedings.

Report of the proceedings of the general court martial held at the King's Arms Tavern in Albany, April 4, 1776

Contains summaries of court-martials of a variety of soldiers for desertion, drunk and disorderly conduct, striking an officer, and damning the American congress.

Cases adjudged in the General Court of Virginia, 1733-1741

A copy of the reports by Edward Barradall of decisions of the general court of Virginia made by Gustavus A. Myers for William Green from a copy lent him by Conway Robinson.

An Act of Assembly of Barbadoes to regulate sales at outcry and the proceedings of persons executing the office of Provost Marshall General ofthe said island and their under officers, 1763

An Act of Assembly of Barbadoes to regulate sales at outcry and the proceedings of persons executing the office of Provost Marshall General of the said island and their under officers (leaf 1) ; A state of some matters relative to the office of Provost Marshall, and to the passing of this bill (leaf 9) ; Observations drawn up by Jonathan Blenman Esq. his Majestys Atty. Gen. in Barbadoes ... on the Act as it had been first brought in 1761 (leaf 13) ; and two leaves laid in ; Power of attorney, granted to Christopher Scandrett, signed by Francis Reynolds and his son Thomas (25 April 1766) ; Petition of Francis Reynolds to the Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations (1766).

CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA: An Examination of Constitutional Positivism, Fundamental Law and Rights in Ghana and Nigeria

This work explores the idea of constitutional justice in Africa with a focus on constitutional interpretation in Ghana and Nigeria. The objective is to develop a theory of constitutional interpretation based upon a conception of law that allows the existing constitutions of Ghana and Nigeria to be construed by the courts as law in a manner that best serves the collective wellbeing of the people. The project involves an examination of both legal theory and substantive constitutional law. The theoretical argument will be applied to show how a proper understanding of the ideals of the rule of law and constitutionalism in Ghana and Nigeria necessitate the conclusion that socio-economic rights in those countries are constitutionally protected and judicially enforceable. The thesis argues that this conclusion follows from a general claim that constitutions should represent a ‘fundamental law’ and must be construed as an aspirational moral ideal for the common good of the people. The argument is essentially about the inherent character of ‘legality’ or the ‘rule of law.’ It weaves together ideas developed by Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, T.R.S. Allan and David Dyzenhaus, as well as the strand of common law constitutionalism associated with Sir Edward Coke, to develop a moral sense of ‘law’ that transcends the confines of positive or explicit law while remaining inherently ‘legal’ as opposed to purely moral or political. What emerges is an unwritten fundamental law of reason located between pure morality or natural law on the one hand and strict, explicit, or positive law on the other. It is argued that this fundamental law is, or should be, the basis of constitutional interpretation, especially in transitional democracies like Ghana and Nigeria, and that it grounds constitutional protection for socio-economic rights. Equipped with this theory of law, courts in developing African countries like Ghana and Nigeria will be in a better position to contribute towards developing a real sense of constitutional justice for Africa.

The concept of 'economic activity' in the EU treaty: from ideological dead-ends to workable judicial concepts. Research Paper in Law 06/2011

[From the Introduction]. The economic rules, or put more ambitiously, the economic constitution of the Treaty,1 only apply to economic activities. This general principle remains valid, even if some authors strive to demonstrate that certain Treaty rules also apply in the absence of an economic activity,2 and despite the fact that non-economic (horizontal) Treaty provisions (e.g. principle of nondiscrimination, rules on citizenship) are also applicable in the absence of any economic activity.3 Indeed, the exercise of some economic activity transcends the concepts of ‘goods’ (having positive or negative market value),4 workers (even if admitted in an extensive manner),5 and services (offered for remuneration).6 It is also economic activity or ‘the activity of offering goods and services into the market’7 that characterises an ‘undertaking’ thus making the competition rules applicable. Further, it is for regulating economic activity that Article 115 TFEU, Article 106(3) TFEU and most other legal bases in the TFEU provide harmonisation powers in favour of the EU. Last but not least, Article 14 TFEU on the distinction between services of general economic interest (SGEIs) and non-economic services of general interest (NESGIs), as well as Protocol n. 26 on Services of General Interest (SGIs) confirm the constitutional significance of the distinction between economic and non-economic: a means of dividing competences between the EU and the member states. The distinction between economic and non-economic activities is fraught with legal and technical intricacies – the latter being generated by dynamic technological advances and regulatory experimentation. More importantly, however, the distinction is overcharged with political and ideological significations and misunderstandings and, even, terminological confusions.8

Talking with the “pouvoir constituant” in times of constitutional reform: The European Court of Justice on Private Applicants’ Access to Justice. Research Paper in Law 3/2003

[From the Introduction]. European lawyers, at least those dealing predominantly with institutional matters, are living particularly interesting times since the setting-up of the “European Convention on the Future of Europe” in December 2001.1 As the Convention’s mandate, spelled out in rather broad terms in the European Council’s declaration of Laeken,2 is potentially unlimited, and as the future constitution of the European Union (EU) will be ultimately adopted by the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), there appears to be a great possibility to clarify, to simplify and also to reform many of the more controversial elements in the European legal construction. The present debate on the future of the European constitution also highlights the relationship between the pouvoir constituant3 and the European Courts, the Court of Justice (ECJ) and its Court of First Instance (CFI), who have to interpret the basic rules and principles of the EU.4 In that light, the present article will focus on a classic theme of the Court’s case law: the relationship between judges and pouvoir constituant. In the EU, this relationship has traditionally been marked by the ECJ’s role as driving force in the “constitutionalisation” of the EC Treaties – which has, to a large extent, been accepted and even codified by the Member States in subsequent treaty revisions. However, since 1994, the ECJ appears to be more reluctant to act as a “law-maker.”5 The recent judgment in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA)6 – an important decision by which the ECJ refused to liberalize individuals’ access to the Community Courts – is also interesting in this context. UPA may be seen as another proof of judicial restraint - or even as indicator of the beginning of a new phase in the “constitutional dialogue” between the ECJ and the “Masters of the Treaties.”

Access to environmental information in an Open European Society - Directive 2003/4. Research Paper in Law 5/2003

[From the Introduction]. Information gives knowledge and knowledge gives power. Though in all EC Member States, the task to protect the environment is given to the administration, it is obvious that the administration is not the owner of the environment. The environment is everybody's. It is for this reason that administrative decisions which affect the environment must be transparent, open and must strike a balance between the general interest to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment on the one hand, the satisfying of specific private or public interests on the other hand. In order to allow at least a certain control of whether the administration strikes the right balance between the need to protect the environment and other legitimate or less legitimate needs, it appears normal and self-evident that information on the environment which is in the hands of public authorities, be also made available to the public and to citizens.

A ação direta da vítima contra a seguradora nos seguros facultativos de responsabilidade civil na dogmática brasileira

A investigação parte do surgimento histórico do contrato de seguro, abordando em sequencia sua teoria geral e a dogmática brasileira pertinente para, após, traçar os contornos específicos do contrato de seguro de responsabilidade civil, tanto pelo viés doutrinário quanto da legislação vigente no Brasil, dando ênfase maior ao seu conceito e finalidade social, às peculiaridades de seu sinistro, assim como à pluralidade de interesses nele albergado, afastando-se a ideia de se tratar de um seguro de reembolso, e adotando-se sua conceituação como de um seguro de garantia. Após, são fixados os conceitos básicos de processo civil aplicáveis ao objeto do estudo: jurisdição, processo, ação e seus elementos, para somente então expor o surgimento e desenvolvimento teórico da ação direta da vítima contra a seguradora na doutrina e jurisprudência francesas, passando pelas fases exegética, legalista e doutrinária de sua análise. Com base neste desenvolvimento histórico, adota-se concepção da ação direta da vítima contra a seguradora como instituto jurídico de conformação própria, oriundo dos princípios de equidade e justiça, e destinado ao afastamento dos princípios gerais de direito civil da relatividade contratual e da igualdade entre credores, constituindo meio de exercício do direito próprio da vítima contra a seguradora do causador do dano. Delimitados os conceitos em estudo, são expostas algumas experiências estrangeiras acerca do uso da ação direta e, partindo-se do embasamento teórico do seguro de responsabilidade civil e da ação direta da vítima por este protegida, ingressa-se na análise de seu desenvolvimento na dogmática brasileira. Para tanto, volta-se à ideia do seguro de responsabilidade civil como seguro de reembolso, e aos argumentos dela decorrentes para afastar o cabimento da ação direta, tais como o princípio da relatividade contratual, a ausência de previsão de solidariedade entre segurado e seguradora, e as dificuldades de exercício da ação e também de defesa por parte da seguradora e do segurado. Expostos e criticados os argumentos contrários ao cabimento da ação direta, passa-se ao estudo das tentativas doutrinárias e jurisprudenciais, no direito brasileiro, de se fornecer à vítima um meio de exercício de sua ação contra a seguradora, inicialmente por instrumentos de processo civil, e terminando por se reconhecer a possibilidade de acionamento conjunto de segurado e seguradora pelo Superior Tribunal de Justiça na sua Súmula 529. Por último, são tratados os argumentos doutrinários e legislativos favoráveis ao cabimento da ação direta da vítima contra a seguradora em qualquer seguro de responsabilidade civil, com e sem a participação inicial do segurado no processo, com destaque à função social do contrato de seguro de responsabilidade civil facultativo e ao direito próprio da vítima perante a seguradora. Conclui-se, assim, que a ação direta da vítima contra a seguradora, em qualquer seguro de responsabilidade civil, é instrumento apto e cabível na dogmática brasileira para dar vazão aos preceitos de equidade e justiça, despersonalizando a responsabilidade civil, ao levar seu foco da imputação para a indenidade, respeitando ao duplo interesse do moderno contrato de seguro de responsabilidade civil, e solucionando pela via mais apta e simples situação complexa.

A admissibilidade jurídico-penal do crime de burla por omissão

O estudo da problemática da admissibilidade jurídico-penal do crime de burla por omissão, enquadrando-se na órbitra dos crimes comissivos por omissão, impõe, a título de questão prévia, a análise do conteúdo e alcance da cláusula de equiparação da omissão à acção, ínsita no art. 10.º do C.P, e, bem assim, a indagação do seu fundamento e da sua compatibilidade com o princípio jurídico-constitucional da legalidade das normas incriminadoras e suas exigências de determinação típica decorrentes dos princípios nullum crimen sine (prævia) lege e nulla poena sine (prævia) lege., matéria a que nos debruçaremos na Parte I da presente dissertação e que deverá ser essencialmente entendida à luz do princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana e da necessidade de um equilíbrio entre a certeza e a segurança jurídicas com a tutela de determinados bens-jurídicos fundamentais, enquanto pilares essenciais de qualquer Estado de Direito Democrático. Na parte II, tentaremos determinar o significado e alcance da conduta enganosa e astuciosa do crime de burla, previsto e punido pelo n.º 1 do art.º 217.º do C.P., desbravando, antes de mais, a sua evolução normativa até aos tempos hodiernos, após o que definiremos a estrutura normativa do tipo. Buscaremos, de seguida, uma aproximação ao conceito de engano e a determinação das formas e modalidades que a conduta enganosa e astuciosa poderá assumir: Exigirá a conduta típica uma mise-en-scène perpetrada pelo agente ou poderá bastar-se com uma mera mentira? Alcançada a sua (possível) determinação, estaremos já em condições de nos debruçarmos sobre a problemática da admissibilidade jurídico-penal da burla por omissão, altura em que, sob uma perspectiva crítica e acompanhada da análise igualmente crítica de casos, avançaremos com argumentos favoráveis e contrários a essa admissibilidade, sem, naturalmente, deixarmos de auscultar a tendência de entendimento da nossa Jurisprudência.