Principal curves and principal oriented points

Principal curves have been defined Hastie and Stuetzle (JASA, 1989) assmooth curves passing through the middle of a multidimensional dataset. They are nonlinear generalizations of the first principalcomponent, a characterization of which is the basis for the principalcurves definition.In this paper we propose an alternative approach based on a differentproperty of principal components. Consider a point in the space wherea multivariate normal is defined and, for each hyperplane containingthat point, compute the total variance of the normal distributionconditioned to belong to that hyperplane. Choose now the hyperplaneminimizing this conditional total variance and look for thecorresponding conditional mean. The first principal component of theoriginal distribution passes by this conditional mean and it isorthogonal to that hyperplane. This property is easily generalized todata sets with nonlinear structure. Repeating the search from differentstarting points, many points analogous to conditional means are found.We call them principal oriented points. When a one-dimensional curveruns the set of these special points it is called principal curve oforiented points. Successive principal curves are recursively definedfrom a generalization of the total variance.

Forecasting and turning point predictions in a Bayesian panel VAR model

We provide methods for forecasting variables and predicting turning points in panel Bayesian VARs. We specify a flexible model which accounts for both interdependencies in the cross section and time variations in the parameters. Posterior distributions for the parameters are obtained for a particular type of diffuse, for Minnesota-type and for hierarchical priors. Formulas for multistep, multiunit point and average forecasts are provided. An application to the problem of forecasting the growth rate of output and of predicting turning points in the G-7 illustrates the approach. A comparison with alternative forecasting methods is also provided.

Price regulation of plastic money: A critical assessment of Spanish rules

Recent decisions by the Spanish national competition authority (TDC) mandate paymentsystems to include only two costs when setting their domestic multilateral interchange fees(MIF): a fixed processing cost and a variable cost for the risk of fraud. This artificiallowering of MIFs will not lower consumer prices, because of uncompetitive retailing; but itwill however lead to higher cardholders fees and, likely, new prices for point of saleterminals, delaying the development of the immature Spanish card market. Also, to the extent that increased cardholders fees do not offset the fall in MIFs revenue, the task of issuing new cards will be underpaid relatively to the task of acquiring new merchants, causing an imbalance between the two sides of the networks. Moreover, the pricing scheme arising from the decisions will cause unbundling and underprovision of those services whose costs are excluded. Indeed, the payment guarantee and the free funding period will tend to be removed from the package of services currently provided, to be either provided by third parties, by issuers for a separate fee, or not provided at all, especially to smaller and medium-sized merchants. Transaction services will also suffer the consequences that the TDC precludes pricing them in variable terms.

Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate

This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some fixed distance \delta. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and its distribution is commonly known by both candidates. The candidates simultaneously choose locations to maximize the probability of victory. Pure strategy equilibria often fails to exist in this model, except under special conditions about \delta and the distribution of the median ideal point. We solve for the essentially unique symmetric mixed equilibrium, show that candidate A adopts more moderate policies than candidate D, and obtain some comparative statics results about the probability of victory and the expected distance between the two candidates' policies.

Financing constraints and fixed-term employment contracts

This paper studies the interactions between financing constraints and theemployment decisions of firms when both fixed-term and permanent employmentcontracts are available. We first develop a dynamic model that shows theeffects of financing constraints and firing costs on employment decisions. Oncecalibrated, the model shows that financially constrained firms tend to use moreintensely fixed term workers, and to make them absorb a larger fraction of thetotal employment volatility than financially unconstrained firms do. We testand confirm the predictions of the model on a unique panel data of Italian manufacturingfirms with detailed information about the type of workers employedby the firms and about firm financing constraints.

Audit report on the City of Center Point, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2008

Audit report on the City of Center Point, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2008

Rein et tabac : revue de la littérature et mise au point [Kidney and smoking: literature review and focus].

Smoking remains a major public health problem. It is associated with a considerable number of deaths in the world's population. Smoking is just like high blood pressure, an independent predictor of progression to any primary renal disease and renal transplant patients. It seems that smoking cessation slows the progression of kidney disease in smokers. The literature data are sometimes contradictory about it because of some methodological weaknesses. However, experimental models highlight the harmful effects of tobacco by hemodynamic and non-hemodynamic factors. The conclusion is that a major effort should be further produced by the nephrology community to motivate our patients to stop smoking.

Human immunodeficiency virus type 1 fitness is a determining factor in viral rebound and set point in chronic infection.

Human immunodeficiency virus type 1 (HIV-1) isolates from 20 chronically infected patients who participated in a structured treatment interruption (STI) trial were studied to determine whether viral fitness influences reestablishment of viremia. Viruses derived from individuals who spontaneously controlled viremia had significantly lower in vitro replication capacities than viruses derived from individuals that did not control viremia after interruption of antiretroviral therapy (ART), and replication capacities correlated with pre-ART and post-STI viral set points. Of note, no clinically relevant improvement of viral loads upon STI occurred. Virus isolates from controlling and noncontrolling patients were indistinguishable in terms of coreceptor usage, genetic subtype, and sensitivity to neutralizing antibodies. In contrast, viruses from controlling patients exhibited increased sensitivity to inhibition by chemokines. Sensitivity to inhibition by RANTES correlated strongly with slower replication kinetics of the virus isolates, suggesting a marked dependency of these virus isolates on high coreceptor densities on the target cells. In summary, our data indicate that viral fitness is a driving factor in determining the magnitude of viral rebound and viral set point in chronic HIV-1 infection, and thus fitness should be considered as a parameter influencing the outcome of therapeutic intervention in chronic infection.

Fixed and random effects in Classical and Bayesian regression

This paper proposes a common and tractable framework for analyzingdifferent definitions of fixed and random effects in a contant-slopevariable-intercept model. It is shown that, regardless of whethereffects (i) are treated as parameters or as an error term, (ii) areestimated in different stages of a hierarchical model, or whether (iii)correlation between effects and regressors is allowed, when the sameinformation on effects is introduced into all estimation methods, theresulting slope estimator is also the same across methods. If differentmethods produce different results, it is ultimately because differentinformation is being used for each methods.