Essays in behavioral and neuro-economics

This thesis examines foundational questions in behavioral economics—also called psychology and economics—and the neural foundations of varied sources of utility. We have three primary aims: First, to provide the field of behavioral economics with psychological theories of behavior that are derived from neuroscience and to use those theories to identify novel evidence for behavioral biases. Second, we provide neural and micro foundations of behavioral preferences that give rise to well-documented empirical phenomena in behavioral economics. Finally, we show how a deep understanding of the neural foundations of these behavioral preferences can feed back into our theories of social preferences and reference-dependent utility.

The first chapter focuses on classical conditioning and its application in identifying the psychological underpinnings of a pricing phenomenon. We return to classical conditioning again in the third chapter where we use fMRI to identify varied sources of utility—here, reference dependent versus direct utility—and cross-validate our interpretation with a conditioning experiment. The second chapter engages social preferences and, more broadly, causative utility (wherein the decision-maker derives utility from making or avoiding particular choices).

Design, operation and economics of a small-scale hatchery for the larval rearing of sugpo, Penaeus monodon Fab.

One of the major problems in the mass production of sugpo is how to obtain a constant supply of fry. Since ultimately it is the private sector which should produce the sugpo fry to fill the needs of the industry, the Barangay Hatchery Project under the Prawn Program of the Aquaculture Department of SEAFDEC has scaled down the hatchery technology from large tanks to a level which can be adopted by the private sector, especially in the villages, with a minimum of financial and technical inputs. This guide to small-scale hatchery operations is expected to generate more enthusiasm among fish farmers interested in venturing into sugpo culture.

Salvaging the freshwater ecosystems in Nigeria: great threat to sustainable fisheries and aquaculture development

Nigeria, the country of many rivers is also rich in lakes, and wetlands, sustainable and wise use of these inland aquatic ecosystem and water resources has become a matter of widespread and intense concern. Unhealthy freshwater ecosystems and seriously diminishing and unequal availability of quality freshwater call for high quality limnological research and expertise to underpin the enhancement of sustainable fisheries and aquaculture development.In every regard of national health, agriculture and economics, the continued over exploitation and misuse of finite freshwater resources is directly causal to the progressively deteriorating fish production and general standard of living.The integration of basic understanding of inland ecosystems with applied problems and their solutions should be of fundamental concern to all stakeholders in our freshwater resource. This is a basic element in creating an attractive and security ensured economic for investment in fisheries development, including aquaculture. This is the focus of this paper

Distributed optimization in power networks and general multi-agent systems

The dissertation studies the general area of complex networked systems that consist of interconnected and active heterogeneous components and usually operate in uncertain environments and with incomplete information. Problems associated with those systems are typically large-scale and computationally intractable, yet they are also very well-structured and have features that can be exploited by appropriate modeling and computational methods. The goal of this thesis is to develop foundational theories and tools to exploit those structures that can lead to computationally-efficient and distributed solutions, and apply them to improve systems operations and architecture.

Specifically, the thesis focuses on two concrete areas. The first one is to design distributed rules to manage distributed energy resources in the power network. The power network is undergoing a fundamental transformation. The future smart grid, especially on the distribution system, will be a large-scale network of distributed energy resources (DERs), each introducing random and rapid fluctuations in power supply, demand, voltage and frequency. These DERs provide a tremendous opportunity for sustainability, efficiency, and power reliability. However, there are daunting technical challenges in managing these DERs and optimizing their operation. The focus of this dissertation is to develop scalable, distributed, and real-time control and optimization to achieve system-wide efficiency, reliability, and robustness for the future power grid. In particular, we will present how to explore the power network structure to design efficient and distributed market and algorithms for the energy management. We will also show how to connect the algorithms with physical dynamics and existing control mechanisms for real-time control in power networks.

The second focus is to develop distributed optimization rules for general multi-agent engineering systems. A central goal in multiagent systems is to design local control laws for the individual agents to ensure that the emergent global behavior is desirable with respect to the given system level objective. Ideally, a system designer seeks to satisfy this goal while conditioning each agent’s control on the least amount of information possible. Our work focused on achieving this goal using the framework of game theory. In particular, we derived a systematic methodology for designing local agent objective functions that guarantees (i) an equivalence between the resulting game-theoretic equilibria and the system level design objective and (ii) that the resulting game possesses an inherent structure that can be exploited for distributed learning, e.g., potential games. The control design can then be completed by applying any distributed learning algorithm that guarantees convergence to the game-theoretic equilibrium. One main advantage of this game theoretic approach is that it provides a hierarchical decomposition between the decomposition of the systemic objective (game design) and the specific local decision rules (distributed learning algorithms). This decomposition provides the system designer with tremendous flexibility to meet the design objectives and constraints inherent in a broad class of multiagent systems. Furthermore, in many settings the resulting controllers will be inherently robust to a host of uncertainties including asynchronous clock rates, delays in information, and component failures.

Essays on economics networks

This thesis belongs to the growing field of economic networks. In particular, we develop three essays in which we study the problem of bargaining, discrete choice representation, and pricing in the context of networked markets. Despite analyzing very different problems, the three essays share the common feature of making use of a network representation to describe the market of interest.

In Chapter 1 we present an analysis of bargaining in networked markets. We make two contributions. First, we characterize market equilibria in a bargaining model, and find that players' equilibrium payoffs coincide with their degree of centrality in the network, as measured by Bonacich's centrality measure. This characterization allows us to map, in a simple way, network structures into market equilibrium outcomes, so that payoffs dispersion in networked markets is driven by players' network positions. Second, we show that the market equilibrium for our model converges to the so called eigenvector centrality measure. We show that the economic condition for reaching convergence is that the players' discount factor goes to one. In particular, we show how the discount factor, the matching technology, and the network structure interact in a very particular way in order to see the eigenvector centrality as the limiting case of our market equilibrium.

We point out that the eigenvector approach is a way of finding the most central or relevant players in terms of the “global” structure of the network, and to pay less attention to patterns that are more “local”. Mathematically, the eigenvector centrality captures the relevance of players in the bargaining process, using the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of a given network. Thus our result may be viewed as an economic justification of the eigenvector approach in the context of bargaining in networked markets.

As an application, we analyze the special case of seller-buyer networks, showing how our framework may be useful for analyzing price dispersion as a function of sellers and buyers' network positions.

Finally, in Chapter 3 we study the problem of price competition and free entry in networked markets subject to congestion effects. In many environments, such as communication networks in which network flows are allocated, or transportation networks in which traffic is directed through the underlying road architecture, congestion plays an important role. In particular, we consider a network with multiple origins and a common destination node, where each link is owned by a firm that sets prices in order to maximize profits, whereas users want to minimize the total cost they face, which is given by the congestion cost plus the prices set by firms. In this environment, we introduce the notion of Markovian traffic equilibrium to establish the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy price equilibrium, without assuming that the demand functions are concave nor imposing particular functional forms for the latency functions. We derive explicit conditions to guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibria. Given this existence and uniqueness result, we apply our framework to study entry decisions and welfare, and establish that in congested markets with free entry, the number of firms exceeds the social optimum.

Experimental Economics Meets Language Choice

Roughly one half of World's languages are in danger of extinction. The endangered languages, spoken by minorities, typically compete with powerful languages such as En- glish or Spanish. Consequently, the speakers of minority languages have to consider that not everybody can speak their language, converting the language choice into strategic,coordination-like situation. We show experimentally that the displacement of minority languages may be partially explained by the imperfect information about the linguistic type of the partner, leading to frequent failure to coordinate on the minority language even between two speakers who can and prefer to use it. The extent of miscoordination correlates with how minoritarian a language is and with the real-life linguistic condition of subjects: the more endangered a language the harder it is to coordinate on its use, and people on whom the language survival relies the most acquire behavioral strategies that lower its use. Our game-theoretical treatment of the issue provides a new perspective for linguistic policies.

Where Tori fear to tread : hypermassive neutron star remnants and absolute event horizons Or topics in computational general relativity

Computational general relativity is a field of study which has reached maturity only within the last decade. This thesis details several studies that elucidate phenomena related to the coalescence of compact object binaries. Chapters 2 and 3 recounts work towards developing new analytical tools for visualizing and reasoning about dynamics in strongly curved spacetimes. In both studies, the results employ analogies with the classical theory of electricity and magnitism, first (Ch. 2) in the post-Newtonian approximation to general relativity and then (Ch. 3) in full general relativity though in the absence of matter sources. In Chapter 4, we examine the topological structure of absolute event horizons during binary black hole merger simulations conducted with the SpEC code. Chapter 6 reports on the progress of the SpEC code in simulating the coalescence of neutron star-neutron star binaries, while Chapter 7 tests the effects of various numerical gauge conditions on the robustness of black hole formation from stellar collapse in SpEC. In Chapter 5, we examine the nature of pseudospectral expansions of non-smooth functions motivated by the need to simulate the stellar surface in Chapters 6 and 7. In Chapter 8, we study how thermal effects in the nuclear equation of state effect the equilibria and stability of hypermassive neutron stars. Chapter 9 presents supplements to the work in Chapter 8, including an examination of the stability question raised in Chapter 8 in greater mathematical detail.

Carbon leakage and the future of Old Industrial Regions after Copenhagen

35 p.

Market Instruments and CO2 Mitigation: A General Equilibrium Analysis for Spain

25 p.

Efficient methods for empirical tests of behavioral economics theories in laboratory and field experiments

In the quest for a descriptive theory of decision-making, the rational actor model in economics imposes rather unrealistic expectations and abilities on human decision makers. The further we move from idealized scenarios, such as perfectly competitive markets, and ambitiously extend the reach of the theory to describe everyday decision making situations, the less sense these assumptions make. Behavioural economics has instead proposed models based on assumptions that are more psychologically realistic, with the aim of gaining more precision and descriptive power. Increased psychological realism, however, comes at the cost of a greater number of parameters and model complexity. Now there are a plethora of models, based on different assumptions, applicable in differing contextual settings, and selecting the right model to use tends to be an ad-hoc process. In this thesis, we develop optimal experimental design methods and evaluate different behavioral theories against evidence from lab and field experiments.

We look at evidence from controlled laboratory experiments. Subjects are presented with choices between monetary gambles or lotteries. Different decision-making theories evaluate the choices differently and would make distinct predictions about the subjects' choices. Theories whose predictions are inconsistent with the actual choices can be systematically eliminated. Behavioural theories can have multiple parameters requiring complex experimental designs with a very large number of possible choice tests. This imposes computational and economic constraints on using classical experimental design methods. We develop a methodology of adaptive tests: Bayesian Rapid Optimal Adaptive Designs (BROAD) that sequentially chooses the "most informative" test at each stage, and based on the response updates its posterior beliefs over the theories, which informs the next most informative test to run. BROAD utilizes the Equivalent Class Edge Cutting (EC²) criteria to select tests. We prove that the EC² criteria is adaptively submodular, which allows us to prove theoretical guarantees against the Bayes-optimal testing sequence even in the presence of noisy responses. In simulated ground-truth experiments, we find that the EC² criteria recovers the true hypotheses with significantly fewer tests than more widely used criteria such as Information Gain and Generalized Binary Search. We show, theoretically as well as experimentally, that surprisingly these popular criteria can perform poorly in the presence of noise, or subject errors. Furthermore, we use the adaptive submodular property of EC² to implement an accelerated greedy version of BROAD which leads to orders of magnitude speedup over other methods.

We use BROAD to perform two experiments. First, we compare the main classes of theories for decision-making under risk, namely: expected value, prospect theory, constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and moments models. Subjects are given an initial endowment, and sequentially presented choices between two lotteries, with the possibility of losses. The lotteries are selected using BROAD, and 57 subjects from Caltech and UCLA are incentivized by randomly realizing one of the lotteries chosen. Aggregate posterior probabilities over the theories show limited evidence in favour of CRRA and moments' models. Classifying the subjects into types showed that most subjects are described by prospect theory, followed by expected value. Adaptive experimental design raises the possibility that subjects could engage in strategic manipulation, i.e. subjects could mask their true preferences and choose differently in order to obtain more favourable tests in later rounds thereby increasing their payoffs. We pay close attention to this problem; strategic manipulation is ruled out since it is infeasible in practice, and also since we do not find any signatures of it in our data.

In the second experiment, we compare the main theories of time preference: exponential discounting, hyperbolic discounting, "present bias" models: quasi-hyperbolic (α, β) discounting and fixed cost discounting, and generalized-hyperbolic discounting. 40 subjects from UCLA were given choices between 2 options: a smaller but more immediate payoff versus a larger but later payoff. We found very limited evidence for present bias models and hyperbolic discounting, and most subjects were classified as generalized hyperbolic discounting types, followed by exponential discounting.

In these models the passage of time is linear. We instead consider a psychological model where the perception of time is subjective. We prove that when the biological (subjective) time is positively dependent, it gives rise to hyperbolic discounting and temporal choice inconsistency.

We also test the predictions of behavioral theories in the "wild". We pay attention to prospect theory, which emerged as the dominant theory in our lab experiments of risky choice. Loss aversion and reference dependence predicts that consumers will behave in a uniquely distinct way than the standard rational model predicts. Specifically, loss aversion predicts that when an item is being offered at a discount, the demand for it will be greater than that explained by its price elasticity. Even more importantly, when the item is no longer discounted, demand for its close substitute would increase excessively. We tested this prediction using a discrete choice model with loss-averse utility function on data from a large eCommerce retailer. Not only did we identify loss aversion, but we also found that the effect decreased with consumers' experience. We outline the policy implications that consumer loss aversion entails, and strategies for competitive pricing.

In future work, BROAD can be widely applicable for testing different behavioural models, e.g. in social preference and game theory, and in different contextual settings. Additional measurements beyond choice data, including biological measurements such as skin conductance, can be used to more rapidly eliminate hypothesis and speed up model comparison. Discrete choice models also provide a framework for testing behavioural models with field data, and encourage combined lab-field experiments.

Analysis and Use of Information and Communication Tools in Economics of Climate Change

16 p.