The mechanisms of agglomeration: Evidence from the effect of inter-industry relations on the location of new firms

The objective of this paper is to explore the relative importance of each of Marshall's agglomeration mechanisms by examining the location of new manufacturing firms in Spain. In particular, we estimate the count of new firms by industry and location as a function of (pre-determined) local employment levels in industries that: 1) use similar workers (labor market pooling); 2) have a customer- supplier relationship (input sharing); and 3) use similar technologies (knowledge spillovers). We examine the variation in the creation of new firms across cities and across municipalities within large cities to shed light on the geographical scope of each of the three agglomeration mechanisms. We find evidence of all three agglomeration mechanisms, although their incidence differs depending on the geographical scale of the analysis.

Michael's Game ou le jeu des hypothèses

Basé sur les psychothérapies cognitives des psychoses, Michael's Game est un jeu de cartes qui propose à des patients de s'entraîner au raisonnement par hypothèses. Après une présentation théorique du jeu (cadre, déroulement, bénéfices attendus pour les patients...) les auteurs illustrent avec des réactions d'un groupe de patients.

On the dimension of the core of the assignment game

The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assignment game. This result provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the core is not as much determined by the number of optimal matchings as by their relative position in the assignment matrix.

Single-valued solutions for the Böhm-Bawerk horse market game

Single-valued solutions for the case of two-sided market games without product differentiation, also known as Böhm-Bawerk horse market games, are analyzed. The nucleolus is proved to coincide with the tau-value, and is thus the midpoint of the core. Moreover a characterization of this setof games in terms of the assignment matrix is provided.

Agglomeration and labour productivity in Spanish industry: a long-term analysis

This paper analyzes the relationship between spatial density of economic activity and interregional differences in the productivity of industrial labour in Spain during the period 1860-1999. In the spirit of Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Ciccone (2002), we analyze the evolution of this relationship over the long term in Spain. Using data on the period 1860-1999 we show the existence of an agglomeration effect linking the density of economic activity with labour productivity in the industry. This effect was present since the beginning of the industrialization process in the middle of the 19th century but has been decreasing over time. The estimated elasticity of labour productivity with respect to employment density was close to 8% in the subperiod 1860-1900, reduces to a value of around 7% in the subperiod 1914-1930, to 4% in the subperiod 1965-1979 and becomes insignificant in the final subperiod 1985-1999. At the end of the period analyzed there is no evidence of the existence of net agglomeration effects in the industry. This result could be explained by an important increase in the congestion effects in large industrial metropolitan areas that would have compensated the centripetal or agglomeration forces at work. Furthermore, this result is also consistent with the evidence of a dispersion of industrial activity in Spain during the last decades.

The mechanisms of agglomeration: Evidence from the effect of inter-industry relations on the location of new firms

The objective of this paper is to explore the relative importance of each of Marshall's agglomeration mechanisms by examining the location of new manufacturing firms in Spain. In particular, we estimate the count of new firms by industry and location as a function of (pre-determined) local employment levels in industries that: 1) use similar workers (labor market pooling); 2) have a customer- supplier relationship (input sharing); and 3) use similar technologies (knowledge spillovers). We examine the variation in the creation of new firms across cities and across municipalities within large cities to shed light on the geographical scope of each of the three agglomeration mechanisms. We find evidence of all three agglomeration mechanisms, although their incidence differs depending on the geographical scale of the analysis.

An axiomatization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

[cat] En el domini dels jocs bilaterals d’assignació, es presenta una axiomàtica del nucleolus com l´unica solució que compleix les propietats de consistència respecte del joc derivat definit per Owen (1992) i monotonia de les queixes dels sectors respecte de la seva cardinalitat. Com a conseqüència obtenim una caracterització geomètrica del nucleolus mitjançant una propietat de bisecció més forta que la que satisfan els punts del kernel (Maschler et al, 1979).

A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

[cat] A Navas i Marín Solano es va demostrar la coincidència entre els equilibris de Nash i de Stackelberg per a una versi´o modificada del joc diferencial proposat por Lancaster (1973). Amb l’objectiu d’obtenir una solució interior, es van imposar restriccions importants sobre el valors dels paràmetres del model. En aquest treball estenem aquest resultat, en el límit en que la taxa de descompte és igual a zero, eliminant les restriccions i considerant totes les solucions possibles.

Petróleo y gas en África: viejas realidades, nuevos escenarios

[cat] En els últims temps es parla molt del nou paper dels hidrocarburs d'Àfrica, fins i tot s'al·ludeix a un oil rush o a un african oil scramble , que inevitablement desembocarà en una confrontació bipolar entre la Xina i els Estats Units, pel control de les reserves de petroli del subsòl del continent africà. Així, el propòsit d'aquest text és, en primer lloc, realitzar una anàlisi descriptiva que ajudi a valorar la hipòtesi d'aquest african oil scramble. A continuación, amb les dades obtingudes, es discutirà sobre la possibilitat de que aquest fenomen desemboqui en un escenari de confrontació xinoamericana. Aquesta especulació ens durà a concloure que hi ha suficients indicis per a argumentar que el joc petrolífer africà podria desenvolupar-se en un escenari marcat per la multilateralitat.

On the industry experience premium and labor mobility

[cat] Hi ha evidència que l'experiència es remunera diferentment segons la indústria. Proposem un model teòric que explica aquestes diferències. Suposem que la mobilitat de treballadors aporta coneixement extern a l'empresa i això augmenta la seva productivitat. Els resultats mostren que l'experiència és millor remunerada en les indústries amb costos de mobilitat baixos, amb molt aprenentatge (learning-by-doing) i alt nivell tecnològic. A més, trobem una relació en forma de U entre la remuneració de l'experiència i el nivell d'absorció de coneixement extern, la substitutibilitat entre diferents tipus de treballadors i la varietat de coneixement dins la indústria. Els resultats són consistents amb l'evidència que les indústries intensives en I and D remuneren millor l'experiència.

Game story, une histoire des jeux vidéo

Compte rendu de l'exposition « Game Story. Une histoire du jeu vidéo » qui s'est tenue au Grand Palais à Paris du 10 novembre 2011 au 9 janvier 2012, envisagée à partir du champ de l'histoire et de la théorie du cinéma en termes de discours historique sur un « nouveau média » ainsi que dans une optique intermédiale.

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

The geographical concentration of industry across Spanish Regions, 1856-1995

New economic geography models show that there may be a strong relationship between economic integration and the geographical concentration of industries. Nevertheless, this relationship is neither unique nor stable, and may follow a ?-shaped pattern in the long term. The aim of the present paper is to analyze the evolution of the geographical concentration of manufacturing across Spanish regions during the period 1856-1995. We construct several geographical concentration indices for different points in time over these 140 years. The analysis is carried out at two levels of aggregation, in regions corresponding to the NUTS-II and NUTS-III classifications. We confirm that the process of economic integration stimulated the geographical concentration of industrial activity. Nevertheless, the localization coefficients only started to fall after the beginning of the integration of the Spanish Economy into the international markets in the mid-70s, and this new path was not interrupted by Spain¿s entry in the European Union some years later

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game