México, aztec, spanish and republican : A historical, geographical, political...

UANL

A political history of modern Europe : from the reformation to the present day

UANL

Principles of political economy

UANL

Lessons on political economy

UANL

The elements of political economy : with some applications to questions of the day

UANL

Does IMF Induce Political Business Cycles? An Empirical Analysis on Latin America's Indebted Countries.

Rapport de recherche

A Representation Theorem for Domains with Discrete and Continuous Variables.

This paper proves a new representation theorem for domains with both discrete and continuous variables. The result generalizes Debreu's well-known representation theorem on connected domains. A strengthening of the standard continuity axiom is used in order to guarantee the existence of a representation. A generalization of the main theorem and an application of the more general result are also presented.

On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.

ARMA Representation of Integrated and Realized Variances

This paper derives the ARMA representation of integrated and realized variances when the spot variance depends linearly on two autoregressive factors, i.e., SR SARV(2) models. This class of processes includes affine, GARCH diffusion, CEV models, as well as the eigenfunction stochastic volatility and the positive Ornstein-Uhlenbeck models. We also study the leverage effect case, the relationship between weak GARCH representation of returns and the ARMA representation of realized variances. Finally, various empirical implications of these ARMA representations are considered. We find that it is possible that some parameters of the ARMA representation are negative. Hence, the positiveness of the expected values of integrated or realized variances is not guaranteed. We also find that for some frequencies of observations, the continuous time model parameters may be weakly or not identified through the ARMA representation of realized variances.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INIFICATION OF GERMANY: 1815-1871. PART 1: THE ZOLLVEREIN AND RAILWAYS..

Rapport de recherche

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF GERMANY: 1815-1871. PART 2: THE SHARE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN THE ECONOMY..

Rapport de recherche

Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy.

This paper makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First, we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism literature and provide an incomplete contract approach to political economy. Then, in various settings, we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a purely standard economic viewpoint.

On the Manipulability of Proportional Representation

This paper presents a new model of voter behaviour under methods of proportional representation (PR). We abstract away from rounding, and assume that a party securing k percent of the vote wins exactly k percent of the available seats. Under this assumption PR is not manipulable by any voter aiming at maximisation of the number of seats in the parliament of her most preferred party. However in this paper we assume that voters are concerned, first and foremost, with the distribution of power in the post-election parliament. We show that, irrespective of which positional scoring rule is adopted, there will always exist circumstances where a voter would have an incentive to vote insincerely. We demonstrate that a voter’s attitude toward uncertainty can influence her incentives to make an insincere vote. Finally, we show that the introduction of a threshold - a rule that a party must secure at least a certain percentage of the vote in order to reach parliament - creates new opportunities for strategic voting. We use the model to explain voter behaviour at the most recent New Zealand general election.

Les défis de la politique européenne de défense

"Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur en droit (LL.D) et à l'Université Jean Moulin en vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur en droit"