A Grand Tour: A Catalogue of Eighteenth-Century Print Works at Memorial University Libraries

This catalogue highlights forty-seven of the 1,180 eighteenth-century imprints held by Memorial University Libraries. Intended as a general introduction to eighteenth-century literature in its original formats, the work is aimed at students and teachers of book history and bibliography, as well as at the general reader. Consequently, the focus is broad, highlighting the emerging free press, imaginative literature—particularly the novel—travel literature, street literature, illustration, as well as works of religion, philosophy, science, and medicine. The introduction discusses each of the works presented in the catalogue and makes a case for the collection as a whole as representing a range of developments both in eighteenth-century literature and in the book trade. Catalogue entries highlight the physical artifact, offering both description and photographic evidence. Each entry contains information about the author and the content of the work, and attempts to place the work in its literary context.

From physics to metaphysics: philosophy and style in the critical writings of T. S. Eliot (1913-1935)

This thesis considers Eliot's critical writing from the late 1910s till the mid-1930s, in the light of his PhD thesis - Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley - and a range of unpublished material: T S. Eliot's Philosophical Essays and Notes (1913- 4) in the Hayward Bequest (King's College, Cambridge University); T. S. Eliot's Family Papers in the T. S. Eliot Collection at the Houghton Library (Harvard University); and items from the Harvard University Archives at the Pusey Library. 'Me thesis offers a comprehensive view of Eliot's critical development throughout this important period. It starts by considering The Sacred Wood's ambivalence towards the metaphysical philosophy of F. H. Bradley and Eliot's apparent adoption of a scientific method, under the influence of Bertrand Russell. It will be argued that Eliot uses rhetorical strategies which simultaneously subvert the method he is propounding, and which set the tone for an assessment of his criticism throughout the 1920s. His indecision, in this period, about the label 'Metaphysical' for some poets of the seventeenth century, reveals the persistence of the philosophical thought he apparently rejects in 1916, when he chooses not to pursue a career in philosophy in Harvard. This rhetorical tactic achieves its fulfilment in Dante (1929), where Eliot finds a model in the medieval allegorical method and 'philosophical' poetry. Allegory is also examined in connection with the evaluation of Eliot's critical writings themselves to determine, for instance, the figurative dimension of his early scientific vocabulary and uncover metaphysical residues he had explicitly disowned but would later embrace. Finally, it is suggested that, the hermeneutics of allegory are historical and it is used here to test the relationship between Eliot's early and later critical writings, that is the early physics and the later metaphysics.

The aporetics of religious diversity

My thesis situates itself within the field of the Philosophy of Worldviews. Specifically, it aims to address the normative question of what the task should be of such a philosophy when faced with the problem of conflicting beliefs between religious worldviews. To answer this question, I turn to the procedure of aporetical analysis, in short, aporetics. Firstly, aporetics offers a distinct method of consistency restoration within inconsistent sets on the basis of thesis rejection and thesis modification. Secondly, aporetics leads to an understanding of the availability of aporetic exits on the basis of epistemic criteria. On the one hand, this leads us to opt for an orientational monism/pluralism, which steers the middle course between the epistemic stances of exclusivism and pluralism. On the other hand, it allows us to identify epistemic criteria for worldview acquisition on the basis of three distinct superclasses. These superclasses can be derived from Jürgen Habermas' validity claims, and applied to the self-understanding of contemporary theories of religion.

Neuroscience and Hindu Aesthetics: A Critical Analysis of V.S. Ramachandran’s “Science of Art”

Neuroaesthetics is the study of the brain’s response to artistic stimuli. The neuroscientist V.S. Ramachandran contends that art is primarily “caricature” or “exaggeration.” Exaggerated forms hyperactivate neurons in viewers’ brains, which in turn produce specific, “universal” responses. Ramachandran identifies a precursor for his theory in the concept of rasa (literally “juice”) from classical Hindu aesthetics, which he associates with “exaggeration.” The canonical Sanskrit texts of Bharata Muni’s Natya Shastra and Abhinavagupta’s Abhinavabharati, however, do not support Ramachandran’s conclusions. They present audiences as dynamic co-creators, not passive recipients. I believe we could more accurately model the neurology of Hindu aesthetic experiences if we took indigenous rasa theory more seriously as qualitative data that could inform future research.

Form, Intention, and Indexing: The Liminal and Integrated Conceptions of Work in Knowledge Organization

This paper proposes a dual conception of work in knowledge organization. The first part is a conception of work as liminal, set apart from everyday work. The second is integrated, without separation. This talk is the beginning of a larger project where we will characterize work in knowledge organization, both as it is set out in our literature (Šauperl, 2004; Hjørland 2003 Wilson, 1968), and in a philosophical argument for its fundamental importance in the activities of society (Shera, 1972; Zandonade, 2004).But in order to do this, we will co-opt the conception of liminality from the anthropology of religion (Turner, 1967), and Zen Buddhist conceptions of moral action, intention, and integration (Harvey, 2000 and cf., Harada, S., 2008).The goal for this talk is to identify the acts repeated (form) and the purpose of those acts (intention), in knowledge organization, with specific regard to thresholds (liminal points) of intention present in those acts.We can then ask the questions: Where is intention in knowledge organization liminal and where is it integrated? What are the limits of knowledge organization work when considered at a foundational level of the intention labor practices? Answering such questions, in this context, allows us to reconsider the assumptions we have about knowledge organization work and its increasingly important role in society. As a consequence, we can consider the limits of classification research if we see the foundations of knowledge organization work when we see forms and intentions. I must also say that incorporating Zen Buddhist philosophy into knowledge organization research seems like it fits well with ethics and ethical responses the practice of knowledge organization. This is because 20th Century Western interpretations of Zen are often rooted in ethical considerations. This translates easily to work.

An alternative to the Pythagorean rule? Reevaluating Problem 1 of cuneiform tablet BM 34 568

The first problem of the Seleucid mathematical cuneiform tablet BM 34 568 calculates the diagonal of a rectangle from its sides without resorting to the Pythagorean rule. For this reason, it has been a source of discussion among specialists ever since its first publication. but so far no consensus in relation to its mathematical meaning has been attained. This paper presents two new interpretations of the scribe`s procedure. based on the assumption that he was able to reduce the problem to a standard Mesopotamian question about reciprocal numbers. These new interpretations are then linked to interpretations of the Old Babylonian tablet Plimpton 322 and to the presence of Pythagorean triples in the contexts of Old Babylonian and Hellenistic mathematics. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

What is the Problem of Ad Hoc Hypotheses?

The received view of an ad hoc hypothesis is that it accounts for only the observation(s) it was designed to account for, and so non-adhocness is generally held to be necessary or important for an introduced hypothesis or modification to a theory. Attempts by Popper and several others to convincingly explicate this view, however, prove to be unsuccessful or of doubtful value, and familiar and firmer criteria for evaluating the hypotheses or modified theories so classified are characteristically available. These points are obscured largely because the received view fails to adequately separate psychology from methodology or to recognise ambiguities in the use of 'ad hoc'.

Religious Information Poverty in Australian State Schools

This paper introduces the concept of religious information poverty in Australian state schools from an information science perspective. Information scientists have been theorising about the global information society for some time, along with its increased provision of vital information for the good of the world. Australian state schools see themselves as preparing children for effective participation in the information society, yet Australian children are currently suffering a religious illiteracy that undermines this goal. Some reasons and theories are offered to explain the existence of religious information poverty in state schools, and suggestions for professional stakeholders are offered for its alleviation.

The evolutionary structure of scientific theories

David Hull's (1988c) model of science as a selection process suffers from a two-fold inability: (a) to ascertain when a lineage of theories has been established; i.e., when theories are descendants of older theories or are novelties, and what counts as a distinct lineage; and (b) to specify what the scientific analogue is of genotype and phenotype. This paper seeks to clarify these issues and to propose an abstract model of theories analogous to particulate genetic structure, in order to reconstruct relationships of descent and identity.

The conserved quantity theory of causation and chance raising

In this paper I offer an 'integrating account' of singular causation, where the term 'integrating' refers to the following program for analysing causation. There are two intuitions about causation, both of which face serious counterexamples when used as the basis for an analysis of causation. The 'process' intuition, which says that causes and effects are linked by concrete processes, runs into trouble with cases of misconnections', where an event which serves to prevent another fails to do so on a particular occasion and yet the two events are linked by causal processes. The chance raising intuition, according to which causes raise the chance of their effects, easily accounts for misconnections but faces the problem of chance lowering causes, a problem easily accounted for by the process approach. The integrating program attempts to provide an analysis of singular causation by synthesising the two insights, so as to solve both problems. In this paper I show that extant versions of the integrating program due to Eells, Lewis, and Menzies fail to account for the chance-lowering counterexample. I offer a new diagnosis of the chance lowering case, and use that as a basis for an integrating account of causation which does solve both cases. In doing so, I accept various assumptions of the integrating program, in particular that there are no other problems with these two approaches. As an example of the process account, I focus on the recent CQ theory of Wesley Salmon (1997).

Causal loops and the independence of causal facts

According to Hugh Mellor in Real Time II (1998, Ch. 12), assuming the logical independence of causal facts and the 'law of large numbers', causal loops are impossible because if they were possible they would produce inconsistent sets of frequencies. I clarify the argument, and argue that it would be preferable to abandon the relevant independence assumption in the case of causal loops.