821 resultados para Grounded theory method
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The aim of this Master’s Thesis was to examine the determinants of intention and behavior of playing sports betting games in order to explain the intention to play in a more precise way and to be able to understand the behavior of playing. The theory of planned behavior was applied in explaining the intention of young Finnish adults aged 18 to 34. A quantitative research method was applied and an online survey was sent to the students of Lappeenranta University of Technology and to the subscribers of Urheilulehti in order to reach a sample that present the young population of Finland. The theory of the study focused on the theory of planned behavior and its antecedents, attitude towards behavior, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control as well as motivation. By analyzing the data, causal relationships were found through which the explanation of intention was possible. The results showed that attitude towards playing, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control and motivation impact the formation of intention significantly. The results also indicated that intention impacts significantly to the playing frequency.
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Many economists show certain nonconformity relative to the excessive mathematical formalization of economics. This stems from dissatisfaction with the old debate about the lack of correspondence between mainstream theoretical models and reality. Although we do not propose to settle this debate here, this article seeks to associate the mismatch of mathematized models with the reality of the adoption of the hypothetical-deductive method as reproduced by general equilibrium. We begin by defining the main benefits of the mathematization of economics. Secondly, we address traditional criticism leveled against it. We then focus on more recent criticism from Gillies (2005) and Bresser-Pereira (2008). Finally, we attempt to associate the reproduction of the hypothetical-deductive method with a metatheoretical process triggered by Debreu's general equilibrium theory. In this respect, we appropriate the ideas of Weintraub (2002), Punzo (1991), and mainly Woo (1986) to support our hypothesis.
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A general derivation of the anharmonic coefficients for a periodic lattice invoking the special case of the central force interaction is presented. All of the contributions to mean square displacement (MSD) to order 14 perturbation theory are enumerated. A direct correspondance is found between the high temperature limit MSD and high temperature limit free energy contributions up to and including 0(14). This correspondance follows from the detailed derivation of some of the contributions to MSD. Numerical results are obtained for all the MSD contributions to 0(14) using the Lennard-Jones potential for the lattice constants and temperatures for which the Monte Carlo results were calculated by Heiser, Shukla and Cowley. The Peierls approximation is also employed in order to simplify the numerical evaluation of the MSD contributions. The numerical results indicate the convergence of the perturbation expansion up to 75% of the melting temperature of the solid (TM) for the exact calculation; however, a better agreement with the Monte Carlo results is not obtained when the total of all 14 contributions is added to the 12 perturbation theory results. Using Peierls approximation the expansion converges up to 45% of TM• The MSD contributions arising in the Green's function method of Shukla and Hubschle are derived and enumerated up to and including 0(18). The total MSD from these selected contributions is in excellent agreement with their results at all temperatures. Theoretical values of the recoilless fraction for krypton are calculated from the MSD contributions for both the Lennard-Jones and Aziz potentials. The agreement with experimental values is quite good.
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It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.
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This thesis deals with the nature of ignorance as it was interpreted in the Upani~adic tradition, specifically in Advaita Vedanta, and in early and Mahayana Buddhism , e specially in the Madhyamika school of Buddhism. The approach i s a historical and comparative one. It examines the early thoughts of both the upanis.a ds and Buddhism abou t avidya (ignorance), shows how the notion was treated by the more speculative and philosphically oriented schools which base d themselves on the e arly works, and sees how their views differ. The thesis will show that the Vedinta tended to treat avidya as a topic for metaphysical s peculation as t he s chool developed, drifting from its initial e xistential concerns, while the Madhyamika remained in contact with the e xistential concerns evident in the first discourses of the Buddha. The word "notion" has been chosen for use in referring t o avidya, even though it may have non-intellectual and emotional connotations, to avoid more popular a lternatives such as "concept" or "idea". In neither the Upani,ads, Advaita Vedanta, or Buddhism is ignorance merely a concept or an idea. Only in a secondary sense, in texts and speech , does it become one. Avidya has more to do with the lived situation in which man finds himself, with the subjectobject separation in which he f eels he exists, than with i i i intel lect ual constr ucts . Western thought has begun to r ealize the same with concerns such as being in modern ontology, and has chosen to speak about i t i n terms of the question of being . Avidya, however, i s not a 'question' . If q ue stions we r e to be put regarding the nature of a vidya , they would be more of t he sort "What is not avidya?", though e ven here l anguage bestows a status t o i t which avidya does not have. In considering a work of the Eastern tradition, we f ace t he danger of imposing Western concepts on it. Granted t hat avidya is customari ly r endered i n English as ignorance, the ways i n which the East and West view i gno rance di f f er. Pedagogically , the European cultures, grounded in the ancient Greek culture, view ignorance as a l ack or an emptiness. A child is i gnorant o f certain t hings and the purpose o f f ormal education , in f act if not in theory, is to fill him with enough knowledge so that he can cope wit h t he complexities and the e xpectations of s ociety. On another level, we feel t hat study and research will l ead t o the discovery o f solutions, which we now lack , for problems now defying solut i on . The East, on the o t her hand, sees avidya in a d i fferent light.Ignorance isn't a lack, but a presence. Religious and philosophical l iterature directs its efforts not towards acquiring something new, but at removing t.he ideas and opinions that individuals have formed about themselves and the world. When that is fully accomplished, say the sages , t hen Wisdom, which has been obscured by those opinions, will present itself. Nothing new has to be learned, t hough we do have t o 'learn' that much. The growing interest in t he West with Eastern religions and philosophies may, in time, influence our theoretical and practical approaches to education and learning, not only in the established educati onal institutions, but in religious , p sychological, and spiritual activities as well. However, the requirements o f this thesis do no t permit a formulation of revolutionary method or a call to action. It focuses instead on the textual arguments which attempt to convince readers that t he world in which they take themselves to exist is not, in essence, real, on the ways i n which the l imitations of language are disclosed, and on the provisional and limited schemes that are built up to help students see through their ignorance. The metaphysic s are provisional because they act only as spurs and guides. Both the Upanisadic and Buddhist traditions that will be dealt with here stress that language constantly fails to encompass the Real. So even terms s uch as 'the Real', 'Absolute', etc., serve only to lead to a transcendent experience . The sections dealing with the Upanisads and Advaita Vedanta show some of the historical evolution of the notion of avidya, how it was dealt with as maya , and the q uestions that arose as t o its locus. With Gau?apada we see the beginnings of a more abstract treatment of the topic, and , the influence of Buddhism. Though Sankhara' S interest was primarily directed towards constructing a philosophy to help others attain mok~a ( l iberation), he too introduced t echnica l t e rminology not found in the works of his predecessors. His work is impressive , but areas of it are incomplete. Numbers of his followers tried to complete the systematic presentation of his insi ghts . Their work focuses on expl anat i ons of adhyasa (superimposition ) , t he locus and object of ignorance , and the means by which Brahman takes itself to be the jiva and the world. The section on early Buddhism examines avidya in the context o f the four truths, together with dubkha (suffering), the r ole it p l ays in t he chain of dependent c ausation , a nd t he p r oblems that arise with t he doctrine of anatman. With t he doct rines of e arly Buddhism as a base, the Madhyamika elaborated questions that the Buddha had said t e nded not t o edi f ication. One of these had to do with own - being or svabhava. Thi s serves a s a centr e around which a discussion o f i gnorance unfolds, both i ndividual and coll ective ignorance. There follows a treatment of the cessation of ignorance as it is discussed within this school . The final secti on tries to present t he similarities and differences i n the natures o f ignorance i n t he two traditions and discusses the factors responsible for t hem . ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Dr. Sinha for the time spent II and suggestions made on the section dealing with Sankara and the Advait.a Vedanta oommentators, and Dr. Sprung, who supervised, direoted, corrected and encouraged the thesis as a whole, but especially the section on Madhyamika, and the final comparison.
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This is a Self-study about my role as a teacher, driven by the question: "How do I improve my practice?" (Whitehead, 1989)? In this study, I explored the discomfort that I had with the way that I had been teaching. Specifically, I worked to uncover the reasons behind my obsessive (mis)management of my students. I wrote of how I came to give my Self permission for this critique: how I came to know that all knowledge is a construction, and that my practice, too, is a construction. I grounded this journey within my experiences. I constructed these experiences in narrative fomi in order to reach a greater understanding of how I came to be the teacher I initially was. I explored metaphors that impacted my practice, re-constructed them, and saw more clearly the assumptions and influences that have guided my teaching. I centred my inquiry into my teaching within an Action Reflection methodology, bon-owing Jack Whitehead's (1989) term to describe my version of Action Research. I relied upon the embedded cyclical pattern of Action Reflection to understand my teaching Self: beginning from a critical moment, reflecting upon it, and then taking appropriate action, and continuing in this way, working to improve my practice. To understand these critical moments, I developed a personal definition of critical literacy. I then tumed this definition inward. In treating my practice as a textual production, I applied critical literacy as a framework in coming to know and understand the construction that is my teaching. I grounded my thesis journey within my Self, positioning my study within my experiences of being a grade 1 teacher struggling to teach critical literacy. I then repositioned my journey to that of a grade 1 teacher struggling to use critical literacy to improve my practice. This journey, then, is about the transition from critical literacyit as-subject to critical literacy-as-instmctional-method in improving my practice. I joumeyed inwards, using a critical moment to build new understandings, leading me to the next critical moment, and continued in this cyclical way. I worked in this meandering yet deliberate way to reach a new place in my teaching: one that is more inclusive of all the voices in my room. I concluded my journey with a beginning: a beginning of re-visioning my practice. In telling the stories of my journey, of my teaching, of my experiences, I changed into the teacher that I am more comfortable with. I've come to the frightening conclusion that I am the decisive element in the classroom. It's my personal approach that creates the climate. It's my daily mood that makes the weather As a teacher, I possess a tremendous power to make a person's life miserable or joyous. I can be a tool of torture or an instrument of inspiration. I can humiliate or humour, hurt or heal. In all situations, it is my response that decides whether a crisis will be escalated or de-escalated and a person humanized or de-humanized. (Ginott, as cited in Buscaglia, 2002, p. 22)
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In this thesis I outline a critical approach to interpreting the considerable academic literature on Aboriginal women in North America. I locate the scholarship concerning Native women within an understanding of three developments related to a philosophy of science: (I) paradigmatic shifts concerning the philosophy of science, (2) materialist-idealist debates and (3) transitions in feminist theory characterized by what is tenned the shift from second to third wave feminism. My exploration of emergent themes suggests that the elements indicated above provide overlapping frameworks within which most scholarship about Indigenous women is positioned. I illustrate my finding that employing critical discourse analysis and postcolonial feminism as both method and theory provides a useful approach in attending to intersecting experiences of 'race, class, and gender.' I view these intersecting experiences as central to the socio-political positioning of Indigenous women within contemporary feminist theorizing. I conclude my thesis by reflecting on the conceptual struggles I experienced in fonnulating and organizing the thesis and the significance of my underlying epistemological position and value-orientation as both a feminist and Native woman.
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Second-rank tensor interactions, such as quadrupolar interactions between the spin- 1 deuterium nuclei and the electric field gradients created by chemical bonds, are affected by rapid random molecular motions that modulate the orientation of the molecule with respect to the external magnetic field. In biological and model membrane systems, where a distribution of dynamically averaged anisotropies (quadrupolar splittings, chemical shift anisotropies, etc.) is present and where, in addition, various parts of the sample may undergo a partial magnetic alignment, the numerical analysis of the resulting Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR) spectra is a mathematically ill-posed problem. However, numerical methods (de-Pakeing, Tikhonov regularization) exist that allow for a simultaneous determination of both the anisotropy and orientational distributions. An additional complication arises when relaxation is taken into account. This work presents a method of obtaining the orientation dependence of the relaxation rates that can be used for the analysis of the molecular motions on a broad range of time scales. An arbitrary set of exponential decay rates is described by a three-term truncated Legendre polynomial expansion in the orientation dependence, as appropriate for a second-rank tensor interaction, and a linear approximation to the individual decay rates is made. Thus a severe numerical instability caused by the presence of noise in the experimental data is avoided. At the same time, enough flexibility in the inversion algorithm is retained to achieve a meaningful mapping from raw experimental data to a set of intermediate, model-free
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This research is a self-study into my life as an athlete, elementary school teacher, leamer, and as a teacher educator/academic. Throughout the inquiry, I explore how my beliefs and values infused my lived experiences and ultimately influenced my constructivist, humanist, and ultimately my holistic teaching and learning practice which at times disrupted the status quo. I have written a collection of narratives (data generation) which embodied my identity as an unintelligent student/leamer, a teacher/learner, an experiential learner, a tenacious participant, and a change agent to name a few. As I unpack my stories and hermeneutically reconstruct their intent, I question their meaning as I explore how I can improve my teaching and learning practice and potentially effect positive change when instructing beginning teacher candidates at a Faculty of Education. At the outset I situate my story and provide the necessary political, social, and cultural background information to ground my research. I follow this with an in depth look at the elements that interconnect the theoretical framework of this self-study by presenting the notion of writing at the boundaries through auto ethnography (Ellis, 2000; Ellis & Bochner, 2004) and writing as a method of inquiry (Richardson, 2000). The emergent themes of experiential learning, identity, and embodied knowing surfaced during the data generation phase. I use the Probyn' s (1990) .. metaphor of locatedness to unpack these themes and ponder the question, Where is experience located? I deepen the exploration by layering Drake's (2007) KnowlDo/Be framework alongside locatedness and offer descriptions of learning moments grounded in pedagogical theories. In the final phase, I introduce thirdspace theory (Bhabha, 1994; Soja, 1996) as a space that allowed me to puzzle educational dilemmas and begin to reconcile the binaries that existed in my life both personally, and professionally. I end where I began by revisiting the questions that drove this study. In addition, Ireflect upon the writing process and the challenges that I encountered while immersed in this approach and contemplate the relevance of conducting a self-study. I leave the reader with what is waiting for me on the other side of the gate, for as Henry James suggested, "Experience is never limited, and it is never complete."
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The purpose of this study was to investigate the learning preferences and the post-secondary educational experiences of a group of Net-Gen adult learners, aged between 18 and 35, currently working in the knowledge economy workplace, and their assessment of how adequately they were prepared to meet the requirements of the knowledge economy workplace. This study utilized an explanatory mixed-method research design. Participants completed a questionnaire providing information on their self-reported learning style preferences, their use of digital tools for formal and informal learning, their use of digital technologies in postsecondary educational experiences, and their use of digital technologies in their workplace. Four volunteers from the questionnaire respondents were selected to participate in interviews based on the diversity of their experiences in higher education, including digital environments, and the diversity of their knowledge economy workplaces. Data collected from the questionnaire were analyzed for descriptive and demographic statistics, and categorized so that common patterns could be identified from information gathered from the online questionnaire and interviews. Findings based on this study indicated that these Net-Gen adult learners were fluent with all types of digital technologies in collaborative environments, expecting their educational experiences to provide a similar experience. Participants clearly expressed an understanding that digital/collaborative aptitudes are essential to successful employment in the knowledge economy workplace. The findings of this study indicated that the majority of participants felt that their post-secondary educational experiences did not adequately prepare them to meet the expectations of this type of working environment.
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The purpose of this study was to explore elementary educators’ knowledge of moral development, how this knowledge relates to their beliefs and sense of efficacy pertaining to character education practices and the socio-moral reasoning of their students. It was hypothesized that educators’ beliefs and practices related to character education would reflect their pedagogy rather than knowledge of moral development theory. It was further hypothesized that there would be differences in student socio-moral reasoning specifically the beliefs and desires that guide actions would differ based on grade and gender. This mixed-method study employing self-report questionnaires, open response vignettes, and semi-structured educator interviews yielded quantitative and qualitative data. Findings indicated socio-moral reasoning of students differed according to grade (age) and gender. Knowledge of moral development theory was found to vary among participants however some practices employed by educators did align with a social cognitive approach to moral development. Significant variables identified consistently among educator and student participants included, autonomy, social competence, sense of school community, and supportiveness. These variables, in conjunction with a sense of fairness, have been identified elsewhere as foundational to moral development (Nucci, 2009), and intrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000) and are relevant to educators working to develop student socio-moral reasoning as an aspect of character.
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This paper presents a new theory of random consumer demand. The primitive is a collection of probability distributions, rather than a binary preference. Various assumptions constrain these distributions, including analogues of common assumptions about preferences such as transitivity, monotonicity and convexity. Two results establish a complete representation of theoretically consistent random demand. The purpose of this theory of random consumer demand is application to empirical consumer demand problems. To this end, the theory has several desirable properties. It is intrinsically stochastic, so the econometrician can apply it directly without adding extrinsic randomness in the form of residuals. Random demand is parsimoniously represented by a single function on the consumption set. Finally, we have a practical method for statistical inference based on the theory, described in McCausland (2004), a companion paper.
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Resumo:
Cette recherche porte sur des questions relatives à la conception des interfaces humain-ordinateur. Elle s’inscrit dans le courant des recherches sur l’utilisabilité et elle s’intéresse particulièrement aux approches centrées sur l’utilisateur. Nous avons été très souvent témoin des difficultés éprouvées par les utilisateurs dans l’usage de certaines interfaces interactives et nous considérons que ces difficultés découlent d’un problème de design. Le design d’interface doit être basé sur les besoins de l’utilisateur dans le cadre de ses activités, dont les caractéristiques devaient être bien comprises et bien prises en considération pour mener à la conception d’interfaces qui respectent les critères d’utilisabilité. De plus, la communauté des chercheurs ainsi que l’industrie admettent maintenant que pour améliorer le design, il est crucial de développer les interfaces humain-ordinateur au sein d’une équipe multidisciplinaire. Malgré les avancées significatives dans le domaine du design centrées sur l’utilisateur, les visées annoncées sont rarement réalisées. La problématique étudiée nous a conduit à poser la question suivante : En tant que designer d’une équipe multidisciplinaire de conception, comment modifier la dynamique de collaboration et créer les conditions d’une conception véritablement centrée sur l’interaction humain-ordinateur ? Notre démarche de recherche a été guidée par l’hypothèse voulant que l’activité de design puisse être le moyen de faciliter la création d’un langage commun, des échanges constructifs entre les disciplines, et une réflexion commune centrée sur l’utilisateur. La formulation de cette hypothèse nous a mené à réfléchir sur le rôle du designer. Pour mener cette recherche, nous avons adopté une méthodologie mixte. Dans un premier temps, nous avons utilisé une approche de recherche par projet (recherche-projet) et notre fonction était celle de designer-chercheur. La recherche-projet est particulièrement appropriée pour les recherches en design. Elle privilégie les méthodes qualitatives et interprétatives ; elle étudie la situation dans sa complexité et de façon engagée. Nous avons effectué trois études de cas successives. L’objectif de la première étude était d’observer notre propre rôle et nos interactions avec les autres membres de l’équipe de projet pendant le processus de design. Dans la seconde étude, notre attention a été portée sur les interactions et la collaboration de l’équipe. Nous avons utilisé le processus de design comme méthode pour la construction d’un langage commun entre les intervenants, pour enrichir les réflexions et pour favoriser leur collaboration menant à redéfinir les objectifs du projet. Les limites de ces deux cas nous ont conduit à une intervention différente que nous avons mise en œuvre dans la troisième étude de cas. Cette intervention est constituée par la mise en place d’un atelier intensif de conception où les intervenants au projet se sont engagés à développer une attitude interdisciplinaire permettant la copratique réflexive pour atteindre les objectifs d’un projet de construction d’un site web complexe centré sur l’utilisateur. L’analyse et l’interprétation des données collectées de ces trois études de cas nous ont conduit à créer un modèle théorique de conception d’interface humain-ordinateur. Ce modèle qui informe et structure le processus de design impliquant une équipe multidisciplinaire a pour objectif d’améliorer l’approche centrée sur l’utilisateur. Dans le cadre de ce modèle, le designer endosse le rôle de médiateur en assurant l’efficacité de la collaboration de l’équipe. Dans un deuxième temps, afin de valider le modèle et éventuellement le perfectionner, nous avons utilisé une approche ethnographique comportant des entrevues avec trois experts dans le domaine. Les données des entrevues confirment la validité du modèle ainsi que son potentiel de transférabilité à d’autres contextes. L’application de ce modèle de conception permet d’obtenir des résultats plus performants, plus durables, et dans un délai plus court.
Resumo:
The thesis report results obtained from a detailed analysis of the fluctuations of the rheological parameters viz. shear and normal stresses, simulated by means of the Stokesian Dynamics method, of a macroscopically homogeneous sheared suspension of neutrally buoyant non-Brownian suspension of identical spheres in the Couette gap between two parallel walls in the limit of vanishingly small Reynolds numbers using the tools of non-linear dynamics and chaos theory for a range of particle concentration and Couette gaps. The thesis used the tools of nonlinear dynamics and chaos theory viz. average mutual information, space-time separation plots, visual recurrence analysis, principal component analysis, false nearest-neighbor technique, correlation integrals, computation of Lyapunov exponents for a range of area fraction of particles and for different Couette gaps. The thesis observed that one stress component can be predicted using another stress component at the same area fraction. This implies a type of synchronization of one stress component with another stress component. This finding suggests us to further analysis of the synchronization of stress components with another stress component at the same or different area fraction of particles. The different model equations of stress components for different area fraction of particles hints at the possible existence a general formula for stress fluctuations with area fraction of particle as a parameter