742 resultados para Contingent liabilities (Accounting)


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Chambers and Quiggin (2000) use state-contingent representations of risky production technologies to establish important theoretical results concerning producer behavior under uncertainty. Unfortunately, perceived problems in the estimation of state-contingent models have limited the usefulness of the approach in policy formulation. We show that fixed and random effects state-contingent production frontiers can be conveniently estimated in a finite mixtures framework. An empirical example is provided. Compared to conventional estimation approaches, we find that estimating production frontiers in a statecontingent framework produces significantly different estimates of elasticities, firm technical efficiencies and other quantities of economic interest.

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This paper is concerned with evaluating the performance of loss networks. Accurate determination of loss network performance can assist in the design and dimensioning of telecommunications networks. However, exact determination can be difficult and generally cannot be done in reasonable time. For these reasons there is much interest in developing fast and accurate approximations. We develop a reduced load approximation which improves on the famous Erlang fixed point approximation (EFPA) in a variety of circumstances. We illustrate our results with reference to a range of networks for which the EFPA may be expected to perform badly.

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As várias teorias acerca da estrutura de capital despertam interesse motivando diversos estudos sobre o assunto sem, no entanto, ter um consenso. Outro tema aparentemente pouco explorado refere-se ao ciclo de vida das empresas e como ele pode influenciar a estrutura de capital. Este estudo teve como objetivo verificar quais determinantes possuem maior relevância no endividamento das empresas e se estes determinantes alteram-se dependendo do ciclo de vida da empresa apoiada pelas teorias Trade Off, Pecking Order e Teoria da Agência. Para alcançar o objetivo deste trabalho foi utilizado análise em painel de efeito fixo sendo a amostra composta por empresas brasileiras de capital aberto, com dados secundários disponíveis na Economática® no período de 2005 a 2013, utilizando-se os setores da BM&FBOVESPA. Como resultado principal destaca-se o mesmo comportamento entre a amostra geral, alto e baixo crescimento pelo endividamento contábil para o determinante Lucratividade apresentando uma relação negativa, e para os determinantes Oportunidade de Crescimento e Tamanho, estes com uma relação positiva. Para os grupos de alto e baixo crescimento alguns determinantes apresentaram resultados diferentes, como a singularidade que resultou significância nestes dois grupos, sendo positiva no baixo crescimento e negativa no alto crescimento, para o valor colateral dos ativos e benefício fiscal não dívida apresentaram significância apenas no grupo de baixo crescimento. Para o endividamento a valor de mercado foi observado significância para o Benefício fiscal não dívida e Singularidade. Este resultado reforça o argumento de que o ciclo de vida influência a estrutura de capital

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The introduction of accounting and auditing oversight boards (OBs) has been promoted on a global scale as a key component of the international financial architecture that has emerged over the past two decades. Such institutions, modeled on the Anglo-American tradition, are domestically organized and embedded within distinctively diverse institutional contexts. Their role is to ease agency problems, improve the quality of financial reporting, and help provide stability in the global financial system. We employ an institutional approach, located within the broader political economy framework of global capitalism, to examine the establishment and operation of the new regulatory regime in Greece. Greece, a member of the European Union, exhibits characteristics of a "delegative" democracy, i.e. a traditionally weak institutionalization, reform (in)capacity problems and a clientelistic political system. Our case study shows that the formation and operation of the newly-established system of oversight is conditioned by local political and economic constraints and, thus, does not automatically translate into concrete benefits for the quality of financial reporting. We also draw attention to the structural mismatch between a progressing globalized financial integration and the fragmented nature of the system of oversight, and illustrate that OBs' independence from local governments is an important but neglected issue.