Endogenous bargaining power

We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea thatthe agreement reached in a negotiation is determined by how the directconflict resulting from disagreement would be resolved. Our basic buildingblock is the disagreement function, which maps each set of feasible outcomesinto a disagreement point. Using this function and a weak axiom basedon individual rationality we reach a unique solution: the agreement inthe shadow of conflict, ASC. This agreement may be construed as the limitof a sequence of partial agreements, each of which is reached as a functionof the parties relative power. We examine the connection between ASC andasymmetric Nash solutions. We show the connection between the power ofthe parties embodied in the ASC solution and the bias in the SWF thatwould select ASC as an asymmetric Nash solution.

A Walrasian theory of commodity money: Paradoxical results

The objective of this note is to analyze some implications of the model of commodity money described in Banerjee and Maskin (1996) which may seem paradoxical. In order to do this, we incorporate a general production cost structure into the model. We focus on two different results. First, the existence of technologies that make counterfeiting a commodity more difficult may exclude it from being used as medium of exchange. Second, allocative distortions due to problems of asymmetric information may become larger in the presence of such technologies.

Educational opportunity and the college premium

Since World War II, the United States government has made improved accessto higher education a priority. This e¤ort has substantially increasedthe number of people who complete college. We show that by reducing theeffective interest rate on borrowing for education, such policies canactually increase the gap in wages between those with a college educationand those without. The mechanism that drives our results is the signaling role of education first explored by Spence (1973). We argue that financialconstraints on education reduce the value of education as a signal. Wesolve for the reduced form relationship between the interest rate and thewage premium in the steady state of a dynamic asymmetric information model.In addition, we discuss evidence of decreases in borrowing costs for educationfinancing in the U.S.

Long run relationships and price rigidity

I study a repeated buyer-seller relationship for the exchange of a givengood. Asymmetric information over the buyer's reservation price, which issubject to random shocks, may lead the seller to use a rigid pricing policydespite the possibility of making higher profits through price discriminationacross the different satates of the buyer's reservation price. The existence of a flexible price subgame perfect equilibrium is shown for the buyerssufficiently locked-in. When the seller faces a population of buyers whose degree of involvmentin the relatioship is unknown, the flexible price equilibrium is notnecessarily optimal. Thus tipically the seller will prefer to use therigid price strategy. A learning process allowing the seller to screenthe population of buyers is derived abd the existence of a switching pointbetween the two regimes (i.e. price rigidity and price felxibility) isshown.

A note on the convergence to competitive equilibria in economies with moral hazard

We examine the conditions under which competitive equilibria can beobtained as the limit, when the number of strategic traders getslarge, of Nash equilibria in economies with asymmetric informationon agents' effort and possibly imperfect observability of agents'trades. Convergence always occur when either effort is publiclyobserved (no matter what is the information available tointermediaries on agents' trades); or effort is private informationbut agents' trades are perfectly observed; or no information at allis available on agents' trades. On the other hand, when eachintermediary can observe its trades with an agent, but not theagent's trades with other intermediaries, the (Nash) equilibriawith strategic intermediaries do not converge to any of thecompetitive equilibria, for an open set of economies. The source ofthe difficulties for convergence is the combination of asymmetricinformation and the restrictions on the observability of tradeswhich prevent the formation of exclusive contractual relationshipsand generate barriers to entry in the markets for contracts.

On ignoring scientific evidence: The bumpy road to enlightenment

It is well accepted that people resist evidence that contradicts their beliefs.Moreover, despite their training, many scientists reject results that are inconsistent withtheir theories. This phenomenon is discussed in relation to the field of judgment anddecision making by describing four case studies. These concern findings that clinical judgment is less predictive than actuarial models; simple methods have proven superiorto more theoretically correct methods in times series forecasting; equal weighting ofvariables is often more accurate than using differential weights; and decisions cansometimes be improved by discarding relevant information. All findings relate to theapparently difficult-to-accept idea that simple models can predict complex phenomenabetter than complex ones. It is true that there is a scientific market place for ideas.However, like its economic counterpart, it is subject to inefficiencies (e.g., thinness,asymmetric information, and speculative bubbles). Unfortunately, the market is only correct in the long-run. The road to enlightenment is bumpy.

Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).

An experimental study of discharge partitioning and flow structure at symmetrical bifurcations

Recent research has examined the factors controlling the geometrical configuration of bifurcations, determined the range of stability conditions for a number of bifurcation types and assessed the impact of perturbations on bifurcation evolution. However, the flow division process and the parameters that influence flow and sediment partitioning are still poorly characterized. To identify and isolate these parameters, three-dimensional velocities were measured at 11 cross-sections in a fixed-walled experimental bifurcation. Water surface gradients were controlled, and systematically varied, using a weir in each distributary. As may be expected, the steepest distributary conveyed the most discharge ( was dominant) while the mildest distributary conveyed the least discharge ( was subordinate). A zone of water surface super-elevation was co-located with the bifurcation in symmetric cases or displaced into the subordinate branch in asymmetric cases. Downstream of a relatively acute-angled bifurcation, primary velocity cores were near to the water surface and against the inner banks, with near-bed zones of lower primary velocity at the outer banks. Downstream of an obtuse-angled bifurcation, velocity cores were initially at the outer banks, with near-bed zones of lower velocities at the inner banks, but patterns soon reverted to match the acute-angled case. A single secondary flow cell was generated in each distributary, with water flowing inwards at the water surface and outwards at the bed. Circulation was relatively enhanced within the subordinate branch, which may help explain why subordinate distributaries remain open, may play a role in determining the size of commonly-observed topographic features, and may thus exert some control on the stability of asymmetric bifurcations. Further, because larger values of circulation result from larger gradient disadvantages, the length of confluence-diffluence units in braided rivers or between diffluences within delta distributary networks may vary depending upon flow structures inherited from upstream and whether, and how, they are fed by dominant or subordinate distributaries. Copyright (C) 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Risk dominance selects the leader. An experimental analysis

Coordination games arise very often in studies of industrial organization and international trade. This type of games has multiple strict equilibria, and therefore the identification of testable predictions isvery difficult. We study a vertical product differentiation model with two asymmetric players choosing first qualities and then prices. This game has two equilibria for some parameter values. However, we apply the risk dominance criterion suggested by Harsanyi and Selten and show that it always selects the equilibrium where the leader is the firm having some initial advantage. We then perform an experimental analysis totest whether the risk dominance prediction is supported by the behaviour oflaboratory agents. We show that the probability that the risk dominance prediction is right depends crucially on the degree of asymmetry of the game. The stronger the asymmetries the higher the predictive power of the risk dominance criterion.

First price auctions: Monotonicity and uniqueness

I study monotonicity and uniqueness of the equilibrium strategies in a two-person first price auction with affiliated signals. I show thatwhen the game is symmetric there is a unique Nash equilibrium thatsatisfies a regularity condition requiring that the equilibrium strategies be{\sl piecewise monotone}. Moreover, when the signals are discrete-valued, the equilibrium is unique. The central part of the proof consists of showing that at any regular equilibrium the bidders' strategies must be monotone increasing within the support of winning bids. The monotonicity result derived in this paper provides the missing link for the analysis of uniqueness in two-person first price auctions. Importantly, this result extends to asymmetric auctions.

Reputation and honesty in a market for information

Previous works on asymmetric information in asset markets tendto focus on the potential gains in the asset market itself. We focus on the market for information and conduct an experimental study to explore, in a game of finite but uncertain duration, whether reputation can be an effective constraint on deliberate misinformation. At the beginning of each period, an uninformed potential asset buyer can purchase information, at a fixed price and from a fully-informed source, about the value of the asset in that period. The informational insiders cannot purchase the asset and are given short-term incentives to provide false information when the asset value is low. Our model predicts that, in accordance with the Folk Theorem, Pareto-superior outcomes featuring truthful revelation should be sustainable. However, this depends critically on beliefs about rationality and behavior. We find that, overall, sellers are truthful 89% of the time. More significantly, the observed frequency of truthfulness is 81% when the asset value is low. Our result is consistent with both mixed-strategy and trigger strategy interpretations and provides evidence that most subjects correctly anticipate rational behavior. We discuss applications to financial markets, media regulation, and the stability of cartels.

Gross capital flows: Dynamics and crises

This paper analyzes the behavior of international capital flows by foreign and domestic agents,dubbed gross capital flows, over the business cycle and during financial crises. We show thatgross capital flows are very large and volatile, especially relative to net capital flows. Whenforeigners invest in a country, domestic agents invest abroad, and vice versa. Gross capital flowsare also pro-cyclical. During expansions, foreigners invest more domestically and domesticagents invest more abroad. During crises, total gross flows collapse and there is a retrenchmentin both inflows by foreigners and outflows by domestic agents. These patterns hold for differenttypes of capital flows and crises. This evidence sheds light on the sources of fluctuations drivingcapital flows and helps discriminate among existing theories. Our findings seem consistent withcrises affecting domestic and foreign agents asymmetrically, as would be the case under thepresence of sovereign risk or asymmetric information.

Electoral competition under the threat of political unrest

We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls a source of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate riots if it lost the election. We show that the strong party is more likely to win the election when there is less information about its ability to cause unrest. This is because when theweak party is better informed, it can more reliably prevent political unrest by implementing a ``centrist'' policy. When there is uncertainty over the credibility of the threat, ``posturing'' by the strong party leads to platform divergence.

Synapses on motoneuron dendrites in the brachial section of the frog spinal cord: a computer-aided electron microscopic study of cobalt-filled cells.

Cobalt-labelled motoneuron dendrites of the frog spinal cord at the level of the second spinal nerve were photographed in the electron microscope from long series of ultrathin sections. Three-dimensional computer reconstructions of 120 dendrite segments were analysed. The samples were taken from two locations: proximal to cell body and distal, as defined in a transverse plane of the spinal cord. The dendrites showed highly irregular outlines with many 1-2 microns-long 'thorns' (on average 8.5 thorns per 100 microns 2 of dendritic area). Taken together, the reconstructed dendrite segments from the proximal sites had a total length of about 250 microns; those from the distal locations, 180 microns. On all segments together there were 699 synapses. Nine percent of the synapses were on thorns, and many more close to their base on the dendritic shaft. The synapses were classified in four groups. One third of the synapses were asymmetric with spherical vesicles; one half were symmetric with spherical vesicles; and one tenth were symmetric with flattened vesicles. A fourth, small class of asymmetric synapses had dense-core vesicles. The area of the active zones was large for the asymmetric synapses (median value 0.20 microns 2), and small for the symmetric ones (median value 0.10 microns 2), and the difference was significant. On average, the areas of the active zones of the synapses on thin dendrites were larger than those of synapses on large calibre dendrites. About every 4 microns 2 of dendritic area received one contact. There was a significant difference between the areas of the active zones of the synapses at the two locations. Moreover, the number per unit dendritic length was correlated with dendrite calibre. On average, the active zones covered more than 4% of the dendritic area; this value for thin dendrites was about twice as large as that of large calibre dendrites. We suggest that the larger active zones and the larger synaptic coverage of the thin dendrites compensate for the longer electrotonic distance of these synapses from the soma.

Solving ambiguities in contig assembly of Idiomarina loihiensis L2TR chromosome by in silico analyses.

Nucleotide composition analyses of bacterial genomes such as cumulative GC skew highlight the atypical, strongly asymmetric architecture of the recently published chromosome of Idiomarina loihiensis L2TR, suggesting that an inversion of a 600-kb chromosomal segment occurred. The presence of 3.4-kb inverted repeated sequences at the borders of the putative rearrangement supports this hypothesis. Reverting in silico this segment restores (1) a symmetric chromosome architecture; (2) the co-orientation of transcription of all rRNA operons with DNA replication; and (3) a better conservation of gene order between this chromosome and other gamma-proteobacterial ones. Finally, long-range PCRs encompassing the ends of the 600-kb segment reveal the existence of the reverted configuration but not of the published one. This demonstrates how cumulative nucleotide-skew analyses can validate genome assemblies.