Managing wetlands sustainably as ecosystems : The contribution of the law (part 1)

The ways in which a society set standards of behaviour and of conduct for its members vary hugely. For example, accepted practices, recognised customs, spiritually or morally inspired norms, judicially declared rules, executively formulated edicts, formal legislative enactments or constitutionally embedded rights and duties. Whatever form they assume, these standards are the artificial construction of the human mind. Accordingly the law - whatever its form - can do no more and no less than regulate or set standards for human behaviour, human conduct, and human decision-making. The law cannot regulate the environment. It can only regulate human activities that impact directly or indirectly upon the environment. This applies as much to wetlands as components of the environment as it does to any other components of the environment or the environment at large. The capacity of the law to protect the environment and therefore wetlands is thus totally dependent upon the capacity of the law to regulate human behaviour, human conduct and human decision-making. At the same time the law needs to reflect the specific nature, functions and locations of wetlands. A wetland is an ecosystem by itself; it comprises a range of ecosystems within it; and it is part of a wider set of ecosystems. Hence, the significant ecological functions performed by wetlands. Then there are the benefits flowing to humans from wetlands. These may be social, economic, cultural, aesthetic, or a combination of some or of all of these. It is a challenge for a society acting through its legal system to find the appropriate balance between these ecological and these human values. But that is what sustainability requires.The ways in which a society set standards of behaviour and of conduct for its members vary hugely. For example, accepted practices, recognised customs, spiritually or morally inspired norms, judicially declared rules, executively formulated edicts, formal legislative enactments or constitutionally embedded rights and duties. Whatever form they assume, these standards are the artificial construction of the human mind. Accordingly the law - whatever its form - can do no more and no less than regulate or set standards for human behaviour, human conduct, and human decision-making. The law cannot regulate the environment. It can only regulate human activities that impact directly or indirectly upon the environment. This applies as much to wetlands as components of the environment as it does to any other components of the environment or the environment at large. The capacity of the law to protect the environment and therefore wetlands is thus totally dependent upon the capacity of the law to regulate human behaviour, human conduct and human decision-making. At the same time the law needs to reflect the specific nature, functions and locations of wetlands. A wetland is an ecosystem by itself; it comprises a range of ecosystems within it; and it is part of a wider set of ecosystems. Hence, the significant ecological functions performed by wetlands. Then there are the benefits flowing to humans from wetlands. These may be social, economic, cultural, aesthetic, or a combination of some or of all of these. It is a challenge for a society acting through its legal system to find the appropriate balance between these ecological and these human values. But that is what sustainability requires.

The level and quality of Value-at-Risk disclosure by commercial banks

In this paper we study both the level of Value-at-Risk (VaR) disclosure and the accuracy of the disclosed VaR figures for a sample of US and international commercial banks. To measure the level of VaR disclosures, we develop a VaR Disclosure Index that captures many different facets of market risk disclosure. Using panel data over the period 1996–2005, we find an overall upward trend in the quantity of information released to the public. We also find that Historical Simulation is by far the most popular VaR method. We assess the accuracy of VaR figures by studying the number of VaR exceedances and whether actual daily VaRs contain information about the volatility of subsequent trading revenues. Unlike the level of VaR disclosure, the quality of VaR disclosure shows no sign of improvement over time. We find that VaR computed using Historical Simulation contains very little information about future volatility.

Managing Wetlands Sustainably as Ecosystems: The Contribution of the Law (Part 2)

In this Part 2 attention is turned towards the legal arrangements in nation states for managing wetlands. These national arrangements have effect within the international arrangements already mentioned and any regional arrangements that are relevant. However, each national system is a reflection of its own historical, cultural, political and constitutional background. It is the purpose of this Part 2 to review and assess the national approaches to wetlands management. This involves an analysis of a range of instruments. These are: constitutional rules; strategic rules; regulatory rules; and management rules. Each of these sets of rules performs different functions, assumes different forms and is differentially capable of enforcement.

Court-provided trial technology : efficiency and fairness for criminal trials

In Australia, trials conducted as 'electronic trials' have ordinarily run with the assistance of commercial service providers, with the associated costs being borne by the parties. However, an innovative approach has been taken by the courts in Queensland. In October 2007 Queensland became the first Australian jurisdiction to develop its own court-provided technology, to facilitate the conduct of an electronic trial. This technology was first used in the conduct of civil trials. The use of the technology in the civil sphere highlighted its benefits and, more significantly, demonstrated the potential to achieve much greater efficiencies. The Queensland courts have now gone further, using the court-provided technology in the high proffle criminal trial of R v Hargraves, Hargraves and Stoten, in which the three accused were tried for conspiracy to defraud the Commonwealth of Australia of about $3.7 million in tax. This paper explains the technology employed in this case and reports on the perspectives of all of the participants in the process. The representatives for all parties involved in this trial acknowledged, without reservation, that the use of the technology at trial produced considerable overall efficiencies and costs savings. The experience in this trial also demonstrates that the benefits of trial technology for the criminal justice process are greater than those for civil litigation. It shows that, when skilfully employed, trial technology presents opportunities to enhance the fairness of trials for accused persons. The paper urges governments, courts and the judiciary in all jurisdictions to continue their efforts to promote change, and to introduce mechanisms to facilitate more broadly a shift from the entrenched paper-based approach to both criminal and civil procedure to one which embraces more broadly the enormous benefits trial technology has to offer.

Adam Smith's dinner

In 1961, the East German government erected what they claimed was an anti-capitalist barricade. In 1989, this barricade was dismantled by those whom it was supposed to keep apart: the forces it was intended to contain had overwhelmed it. In the aftermath, the victims of Stalinist oppression and the planned economy opted for radical change. Some might have hoped that they would intellectually march resolutely westwards towards the forms of social democracy that had proven so successful in their nearest neighbours – Scandinavia, Germany and Austria – and stop when they had reached a point on the political spectrum with which they felt comfortable, and which worked for them. Unfortunately, they went to the opposite end of political economy. That choice was celebrated by those theorists who wanted our own countries to move in the same direction. Eastern Europe suffered a decline of 50% in its GDP. Much earlier in 1653, Peter Stuyvesant had erected an earth and wooden wall to protect the westernmost settlement of a great commercial nation from those they imagined to be barbarians. In 1699 Stuyvesant’s barrier was dismantled by the British, who replaced it with a street named after the wall. So it came to be that one of the most inconsequential walls in history became one of history’s most famous streets. I am not sure if the Dutch had left some tulip bulbs on either side of the wall, perhaps as a reminder of capitalism’s first bubble, and an inspiration to later bubbles. However, many of the victims of the latest burst bubble are pretty keen to tear down that Wall.1 As in 1989, they want to take action against the guardians of the system that failed them. And the more they suffer, the more likely it is that they will demand radical change, and the more likely that the resulting change will go too far – as seems to have been the case in Eastern Europe after the terminal crisis of communism, and in the majority of democracies that fell in the dozen years following the Great Crash. The current reaction is so strong that some are even wondering what role there will be for markets. I was invited to address a conference in the EU Parliament last November on the topic ‘Capitalism: Quo Vadis?’, where I apologized to the international audience that the topic was posed in a dead European language because the answer to this question is not going to be determined by the west alone. The problems we have been addressing emerged in the west and have affected the rest. However, the answers will not come, solely from the west, and may even come primarily from the south and the east.