Computer Democracy - Our Next Step in Europe

After about a quarter of a century of enlightened development and ongoing preparatory technological, scientific and political activities we are arrived at the realization period of the idea. The two major technological vehicles of progress are the World Wide Web, the most democratic international forum of information exchange and the advent of public key cryptography as a combined philosophical and practical device of individual integrity and collective responsibility.

The EU and democratic leverage:are there still lessons to be learnt from the Spanish transition to democracy?

The issue of conditionality and how the EU should seek to influence positive transformations in its periphery is as relevant today as it was in the early 1990s. There are some important lessons that can still be learned from the Spanish transition to democracy in this respect. By combining strict conditionality with its ‘normative power’, the European Community managed to shape—if not make—the Spanish transition to democracy. The consensus surrounding European integration worked as a unifying factor amongst all of the elite groups by giving them a common goal. This broad consensus ensured that no elite group could act in the sort of irresponsible way that could jeopardise the democratisation process and, by inference, the integration of Spain with the Community. At the same time, the EC worked as a sort of moderating force. Neither of these positive effects would have occurred had the EC not used its leverage potential and remained firmed in its stance of conditioning accession to Spain taking clear steps towards democratisation.

Why comparing experiences with democracy in Latin America matters

Review article

Solidifying system of democracy in the Central and Eastern European new EU members

The paper examines the requirements of an effective and legitimized democratic political system in the process of transition. The analysis and the conclusions are based on the Hungarian experience, which can carefully be applied to all Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Special focus is given to the relationship of legal certainty and the efficiency of the democratic system, to the tension between legalism and managerialism and to the characteristics of civil society organizations. In the conclusion special features of the transitional countries are pointed out.

Globalizáció, nemzeti szuverenitás és demokrácia. Magyarország helyzete a globális világban (Globalization, national sovereignity and democracy)

Korunk új világrendjében alapvetően átrendeződik a globalizáció, a nemzeti szuverenitás és a demokrácia viszonya. Ebben az új helyzetben minden országnak, köztük hazánknak is elkerülhetetlenül szembe kell nézni azzal a körülménnyel, amit Dani Rodrik fogalmazott meg és a globális világgazdaság politikai trilemmájának nevezett, hogy e hármas egyidejűleg nem valósítható meg. E trilemmára adott válasz pedig alapvetően meghatározza azt, hogy miként alakul a világ és benne hazánk jövőbeni sorsa. A cikk e trilemma kialakulásának mozgatóerőivel, az arra adható válaszokkal foglalkozik, kísérletet téve arra, hogy Magyarországra vonatkozó tanulságokat is levonjon. / === / Our contemporary world has basically rearranged the relationship between globalization, national sovereignty and democracy. In this new situation all countries including Hungary have to face the great challenges under the political trilemma of the global economy, coined by D. Rodrik. The answers given by countries to it will determine the future development path of the whole world, and of course Hungary's one as well. The driving forces behind this dilemma and the possible answers for it are the subject of the paper.

The multiple hierarchical legislatures in representative democracy

Multiple hierarchical models of representative democracies in which, for instance, voters elect county representatives, county representatives elect district representatives, district representatives elect state representatives and state representatives a president, reduces the number of electors a representative is answerable for, and therefore, considering each level separately, these models could come closer to direct democracy. In this paper we show that worst case policy bias increases with the number of hierarchical levels. This also means that the opportunities of a gerrymanderer increase in the number of hierarchical levels.

Válaszúton: Konszolidált vagy színlelt demokrácia? (At the crossroads: consolidated or simulated democracy)

Az írás az utóbbi néhány év magyarországi válságjelenségeinek magyarázatát keresi. Elméletileg egyrészt a demokratikus elitizmus fogalmi rendszere alkalmazhatóságának kérdőjeleit fogalmazza meg, másrészt a szimulált demokrácia fogalmának megalkotására tesz kísérletet. A színlelt demokrácia feltételei között a társadalom jelentős csoportjai és az elit csak imitálják a szabályok elfogadását, ami kiegészül a demokratikus játékszabályokat illető elitkonszenzus hiányával, valamint a politikai vezetőréteg és a társadalom kapcsolatában a szimbolikus képviselet dominanciájával – a tartalmi képviselet és a felelősség helyett. A populista tendenciák bátorítása, a transzformatív elemek túlsúlya, a politika perszonalizációja, a hétköznapi élet és a szakmai kérdések átpolitizálása, az ellenfelek legitimációjának megkérdőjelezése, eltérő irányú üzenetek küldése a köz és az elit számára, a közpénzek nem transzparens felhasználása, a széles körben elterjedt adóelkerülés és normaszegés, valamint az ígérgetés fatális lehet a demokratikus stabilitás és a politikai rendszer működése szempontjából. ________ The article seeks to identify the causes of the Hungarian crisis phenomena that emerged in the past couple of years. Theoretically, fi rst it asks whether the conceptual framework of democratic elitism can be applied, and then it attempts to outline the concept of simulated democracy. The article argues that in a simulated democracy both the elite and large groups within society only imitate that they accept the rules of the game. Moreover, there is no elite consensus about these rules and instead of substantive representation and responsibility symbolic representation does dominate the linkage between political elite and society. Both democratic stability and the performance of the regime will be seriously undermined because the elite encourage populist tendencies, transformative elements dominate, politics is personalized, everyday life and professional issues are over-politicized. In addition, the legitimacy of the opponents tends to be questioned, different and opposing messages are sent to the public and to the elite, public monies are spent in a nontransparent way, and tax-evasion, norm-breaching and over-bidding prevail.

Közjó és demokrácia. Két közgazdaságtani elmélet a demokráciáról (Common good and democracy. Two economic theories of democracy)

A tanulmány a demokrácia két közgazdaságtani elméletét mutatja be. A demokrácia klasszikus elmélete a közjó fogalmára épült: a klasszikus politikai filozófia érvelése szerint a demokrácia intézménye a közjó megvalósulásának eszköze. Schumpeter bírálta a klasszikus elméletet: a közgazdasági szemléletet alkalmazva a közjó értelmezésére leválasztotta a demokráciáról a közjó fogalmát. Schumpeter szerint a demokrácia szubsztantív felfogása nem tartható, ezért ehelyett a demokrácia procedurális értelmezését kínálta fel. Az alkotmányos közgazdaságtan nem fogadja el sem a közjó és demokrácia fogalmainak elválasztását, sem a közjó szubsztantív értelmezését, ehelyett a közjónak és a demokráciának egyaránt procedurális értelmezését javasolja. _____ This essay deals with two economic theories of democracy. The classical doctrine of democracy was built on the concept of the common good, classical political philosophy arguing that the institution of democracy was the instrument for realizing the common good. This theory was criticized by Schumpeter, who applied the method of modern economics to analysis of the concept, which he separated from democracy, arguing that the substantive concept of democracy was untenable, and proposing to replace it with the procedural concept of democracy. Constitutional economics does not accept such separation of the concepts of democracy and the common good, but it does not accept the substantive interpretation of the common good either. Rather, it proposes a procedural concept of both the common good and of democracy.

The Multiple Hierarchical Legislatures in a Representative Democracy: Districting for Policy Implementation

We build a multiple hierarchical model of a representative democracy in which, for instance, voters elect county representatives, county representatives elect district representatives, district representatives elect state representatives, and state representatives elect a prime minister. We use our model to show that the policy determined by the final representative can become more extreme as the number of hierarchical levels increases because of increased opportunities for gerrymandering. Thus, a sufficiently large number of voters gives a district maker an advantage, enabling her to implement her favorite policy. We also show that the range of implementable policies increases with the depth of the hierarchical system. Consequently, districting by a candidate in a hierarchical legislative system can be viewed as a type of policy implementation device.

The political economy of inequality and growth: Essays on sovereign debt, democracy and saving

This dissertation addresses three issues in the political economy of growth literature. The first study empirically tests the hypothesis that income inequality influences the size of a country's sovereign debt for a sample of developing countries for the period 1970–1990. The argument examined is that governments tend to yield to popular pressures to engage in redistributive policies, partially financed by foreign borrowing. Facing increased risk of default, international creditors limit the credit they extend, with the result that borrowing countries invest less and grow at a slower pace. The findings do not seem to support the negative relationship between inequality and sovereign debt, as there is evidence of increases in multilateral, countercyclical flows until the mid 1980s in Latin America. The hypothesis would hold for the period 1983–1990. Debt flows and levels seem to be positively correlated with growth as expected. ^ The second study empirically investigates the hypothesis that pronounced levels of inequality lead to unconsolidated democracies. We test the existence of a nonmonotonic relationship between inequality and democracy for a sample of Latin American countries for the period 1970–2000, where democracy appears to consolidate at some intermediate level of inequality. We find that the nonmonotonic relationship holds using instrumental variables methods. Bolivia seems to be a case of unconsolidated democracy. The positive relationship between per capita income and democracy disappears once fixed effects are introduced. ^ The third study explores the nonlinear relationship between per capita income and private saving levels in Latin America. Several estimation methods are presented; however, only the estimation of a dynamic specification through a state-of-the-art general method of moments estimator yields consistent estimates with increased efficiency. Results support the hypothesis that income positively affects private saving, while system GMM reveals nonlinear effects at income levels that exceed the ones included in this sample for the period 1960–1994. We also find that growth, government dissaving, and tightening of credit constraints have a highly significant and positive effect on private saving. ^

Democratic purgatory: The failure of democracy in Venezuela

This research provides an understanding of the conditions that presage the failure of consolidated democratic political regimes through constitutional processes. In seeking to answer the question of how democracy might fail through democratic means, this study has revealed a gap in the literature on democratization. Venezuela was selected as a heuristic case study to explain this phenomenon. Heuristic case studies place less emphasis on the more configurative or descriptive elements of the case itself, and instead see the case as a point of departure for the formulations of theoretical propositions. While in-case hypotheses are possible, heuristic case studies make it an explicit research plan to tease out mechanisms that exist in a particular case study that might survive in other situations. ^ This study demonstrates that the elements in society that act as direct participants in the establishment of a democratic political system are able to maintain their position in the new order largely through an expansion of their ability to meet popular demands through clientelistic arrangements. While these corporatist groups may serve to facilitate social mobilization during the establishment of democratic regimes, they do so only in so far as they can maintain social control of in-group membership without fully providing for representative democracy. Once these democratic institutions are consolidated as key parts of the democratic structure, these corporatist arrangements provide for a type of unstable democratic purgatory: democracy is not fully representative, yet it is not completely unresponsive to the demands of the electorate. ^ The condition of democratic purgatory produces a paradox whereby democracy can be undemocratic under certain conditions. The stability of these regimes allows for democratic consolidation, despite the undemocratic basis of legitimacy. While these regimes can undergo consolidation, ultimately, this condition is unstable: either these regimes must establish an endogenous basis of political legitimacy (one that is not simply a function of the corporatist/clientelistic political structure), or the democracy will suffer a qualitative decline that may result in a democratic breakdown. Furthermore, this study finds that the viability of any type of democratic regime rests upon its adaptability to ensure adequate representativeness. ^