Regular population monotonic allocation schemes and the core

A subclass of games with population monotonic allocation schemes is studied, namelygames with regular population monotonic allocation schemes (rpmas). We focus on theproperties of these games and we prove the coincidence between the core and both theDavis-Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set

Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] Aquest treball tracta d’extendre la noció d’equilibri simètric de negociació bilateral introduït per Rochford (1983) a jocs d’assignació multilateral. Un pagament corresponent a un equilibri simètric de negociación multilateral (SMB) és una imputación del core que garanteix que qualsevol agent es troba en equilibri respecte a un procés de negociación entre tots els agents basat en allò que cadascun d’ells podria rebre -i fer servir com a amenaça- en un ’matching’ òptim diferent al que s’ha format. Es prova que, en el cas de jocs d’assignació multilaterals, el conjunt de SMB és sempre no buit i que, a diferència del cas bilateral, no sempre coincideix amb el kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). Finalment, responem una pregunta oberta per Rochford (1982) tot introduïnt un conjunt basat en la idea de kernel, que, conjuntament amb el core, ens permet caracteritzar el conjunt de SMB.

Ruin Theory with Excess of Loss Reinsurance and Reinstatements

The present paper studies the probability of ruin of an insurer, if excess of loss reinsurance with reinstatements is applied. In the setting of the classical Cramer-Lundberg risk model, piecewise deterministic Markov processes are used to describe the free surplus process in this more general situation. It is shown that the finite-time ruin probability is both the solution of a partial integro-differential equation and the fixed point of a contractive integral operator. We exploit the latter representation to develop and implement a recursive algorithm for numerical approximation of the ruin probability that involves high-dimensional integration. Furthermore we study the behavior of the finite-time ruin probability under various levels of initial surplus and security loadings and compare the efficiency of the numerical algorithm with the computational alternative of stochastic simulation of the risk process. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

The set of undominated imputations and the core: an axiomatic approach

This paper provides an axiomatic framework to compare the D-core (the set of undominatedimputations) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility. Theorem1 states that the D-core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonableness (from above), (*)-antimonotonicity, and modularity. Theorem 2 characterizes the core replacing (*)-antimonotonicity by antimonotonicity. Moreover, these axioms alsocharacterize the core on the domain of convex games, totally balanced games, balancedgames, and superadditive games

Auction theory, sequential local service privatization, and the effects of geographical scale economies on effective competition

A sequential weakly efficient two-auction game with entry costs, interdependence between objects, two potential bidders and IPV assumption is presented here in order to give some theoretical predictions on the effects of geographical scale economies on local service privatization performance. It is shown that the first object seller takes profit of this interdependence. The interdependence externality rises effective competition for the first object, expressed as the probability of having more than one final bidder. Besides, if there is more than one final bidder in the first auction, seller extracts the entire bidder¿s expected future surplus differential between having won the first auction and having lost. Consequences for second object seller are less clear, reflecting the contradictory nature of the two main effects of object interdependence. On the one hand, first auction winner becomes ¿stronger¿, so that expected payments rise in a competitive environment. On the other hand, first auction loser becomes relatively ¿weaker¿, hence (probably) reducing effective competition for the second object. Additionally, some contributions to static auction theory with entry cost and asymmetric bidders are presented in the appendix

Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

Sequential decisions in allocation problems

[eng] In the context of cooperative TU-games, and given an order of players, we consider the problem of distributing the worth of the grand coalition as a sequentia decision problem. In each step of process, upper and lower bounds for the payoff of the players are required related to successive reduced games. Sequentially compatible payoffs are defined as those allocation vectors that meet these recursive bounds. The core of the game is reinterpreted as a set of sequentally compatible payoffs when the Davis-Maschler reduced game is considered (Th.1). Independently of the reduction, the core turns out to be the intersections of the family of the sets of sequentially compatible payoffs corresponding to the different possible orderings (Th.2), so it is in some sense order-independent. Finally, we analyze advantagenous properties for the first player

Modeling water movement in horizontal columns using fractal theory

Fractal mathematics has been used to characterize water and solute transport in porous media and also to characterize and simulate porous media properties. The objective of this study was to evaluate the correlation between the soil infiltration parameters sorptivity (S) and time exponent (n) and the parameters dimension (D) and the Hurst exponent (H). For this purpose, ten horizontal columns with pure (either clay or loam) and heterogeneous porous media (clay and loam distributed in layers in the column) were simulated following the distribution of a deterministic Cantor Bar with fractal dimension H" 0.63. Horizontal water infiltration experiments were then simulated using Hydrus 2D software. The sorptivity (S) and time exponent (n) parameters of the Philip equation were estimated for each simulation, using the nonlinear regression procedure of the statistical software package SAS®. Sorptivity increased in the columns with the loam content, which was attributed to the relation of S with the capillary radius. The time exponent estimated by nonlinear regression was found to be less than the traditional value of 0.5. The fractal dimension estimated from the Hurst exponent was 17.5 % lower than the fractal dimension of the Cantor Bar used to generate the columns.

Vertically coupled quantum dots in the local spin-density functional theory

We have investigated the structure of double quantum dots vertically coupled at zero magnetic field within local-spin-density functional theory. The dots are identical and have a finite width, and the whole system is axially symmetric. We first discuss the effect of thickness on the addition spectrum of one single dot. Next we describe the structure of coupled dots as a function of the interdot distance for different electron numbers. Addition spectra, Hund's rule, and molecular-type configurations are discussed. It is shown that self-interaction corrections to the density-functional results do not play a very important role in the calculated addition spectra

Freezing of 4He and its liquid-solid interface from density functional theory

We show that, at high densities, fully variational solutions of solidlike types can be obtained from a density functional formalism originally designed for liquid 4He . Motivated by this finding, we propose an extension of the method that accurately describes the solid phase and the freezing transition of liquid 4He at zero temperature. The density profile of the interface between liquid and the (0001) surface of the 4He crystal is also investigated, and its surface energy evaluated. The interfacial tension is found to be in semiquantitative agreement with experiments and with other microscopic calculations. This opens the possibility to use unbiased density functional (DF) methods to study highly nonhomogeneous systems, like 4He interacting with strongly attractive impurities and/or substrates, or the nucleation of the solid phase in the metastable liquid.

Optical response of two-dimensional few-electron concentric double quantum rings: A local-spin-density-functional theory study

We have investigated the dipole charge- and spin-density response of few-electron two-dimensional concentric nanorings as a function of the intensity of a erpendicularly applied magnetic field. We show that the dipole response displays signatures associated with the localization of electron states in the inner and outer ring favored by the perpendicularly applied magnetic field. Electron localization produces a more fragmented spectrum due to the appearance of additional edge excitations in the inner and outer ring.

Helium in polygonal nanopores at zero temperature: Density functional theory calculations

We investigate adsorption of helium in nanoscopic polygonal pores at zero temperature using a finite-range density functional theory. The adsorption potential is computed by means of a technique denoted as the elementary source method. We analyze a rhombic pore with Cs walls, where we show the existence of multiple interfacial configurations at some linear densities, which correspond to metastable states. Shape transitions and hysterectic loops appear in patterns which are richer and more complex than in a cylindrical tube with the same transverse area.