The American botanist : a monthly journal for the plant lover.

v.12-15 (1907-1909)

The American botanist : a monthly journal for the plant lover.

v.25-27 (1919-1921)

Transactions of the American Entomological Society

v. 47 1921

Transactions of the American Entomological Society

v. 46 1920

Hope: a poem delivered at an exhibition in Cambridge, July 10, 1800

This four-page handwritten poem was composed by Harvard student Joseph Mansfield for a College exhibition on July 8, 1800. The poem begins, "I am not blesd, but may hereafter be; / Who knows what fortune has in store for me?" and concludes with verses about the American Revolutionary War and George Washington.

Documents: concerning North American Atlantic coastal areas : manuscript, [17--]

Acts, reports, petitions, court opinions, and other documents, spanning 1680-1725, concerning Antigua, Barbados, the Carolinas, St. Christopher [Saint Kitts], Jamaica, New York, Virginia, and other areas on the Atlantic coast.

Mr. Cline's lectures on anatomy & surgery, 1799-1800 (inclusive)

Volume containing notes on the lectures of Henry Cline (1750-1827), a surgeon at St. Thomas's Hospital, London, England, that were kept by American medical student John Collins Warren in 1799 and 1800. The lectures were on topics including blood, blood vessels, absorbents, cellular membranes, and the nerves. There are annotations in pencil in an unknown hand throughout the volume.

Thabat al-ʻAllāmah al-Shaykh ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad ibn Mukarram Allāh al-Ṣaʻīdī : manuscript, [ca. 1850]

Unbound.

Kitāb Sharḥ al-istiʻārāt / lil-ʻAllāmah al-Shaykh Aḥmad al-Mallawī : manuscript, 1850

Author's own abridgement of his longer work "ʻIqd al-durar al-bahīyah fī sharḥ al-Risālah al-Samarqandīyah".

Fashions and fads in finance: contingent emulation and the political economy of sovereign wealth fund creation. IHS Political Science Series No. 131, July 2012

Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), government-owned or managed investment vehicles, have proliferated at a remarkable rate over the past decade, even as political controversy has surrounded them. Why? The extant literature depicts the process of SWF creation as driven by functional imperatives associated with “excess” revenue and reserves accumulated from commodity booms and large current account surpluses. I argue that SWF creation also reflects in large part a process of contingent emulation in which first this policy has been constructed as appropriate for countries with given characteristics, and then when countries took on these characteristics, they followed their peers. Put simply, fashions and fads in finance matter for policy diffusion. I assess this argument using a new dataset on SWF creation that covers nearly 80 countries from 1984 to 2007. The results suggest peer-based contingent emulation has been a crucial factor shaping the decision of many countries to create a SWF, especially among fuel exporters. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 2 – 5 September 2010. The author would like to thank Eric Neumayer for his many suggestions and comments on previous versions of the manuscript. The author would also like to thank Zachary Elkins for sharing data. Finally, the author would like to acknowledge the research assistance of Natali Bulamacioglu and Christopher Gandrud.

Research and teaching the European Union in Latin America. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Special, December 2012

NOTE: there is an appendix to this document on the Archive at ei.pitt.edu/29784/ From the Introduction. The tasks of research, teaching and public opinion outreach activities on the European Union in the Latin American subcontinent2 are propelled by two principal motivations. In the first place, interest on the EU originates from the historical proximity between Europe and Latin America. There are no other two regions in the world with a deeper mutual affinity than the one existing between Europe and the conglomerate composed by Latin America and the Caribbean. Only the intimate relationship forged by the United States with the Europe continent is perhaps stronger, and even more special with the United Kingdom.

Obama 2: future implications for EU-US relations. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 12, No. 8, November 2012

Introduction. The week following his reelection, President Obama traveled to Asia – Thailand, Myanmar, and Cambodia –, while facing at home a fiscal cliff, the need to select the next Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, and the resignation of one of America’s most senior and respected generals and Director of the CIA, David Petraeus; all this at the moment wherein the Middle East is burning in flames due to another round of violence between Israel and Hamas. On the other side of the pond, the EU is currently trying to solve or at least contain several crises: the Eurozone, agreeing on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020, or MFF 2014-2020,2 and saving France.3 For both giants, the American and European priorities are domestic; they both need to do some ‘nation-building at home.’4 The threat of the fiscal cliff in the US and the one of the Eurocrisis in Europe are too important to be ignored and so visceral that they will affect the way both actors behave internationally and interact with one another. The big question since Obama’s reelection has been what will the EU-US relations look like under his second mandate? And will there be any differences from the first one?5 This paper argues that the US-EU relations will remain quite similar as it was under the first Obama presidency. Nevertheless, with the current shift to Asia, the ‘pivot,’ the EU will be required to increase its contributions to global politics and international security. This paper is structured in three parts. First, the economic and political climax of the EU and the US will be presented. In a second a part, the EU and US strategies and foreign policies will be laid out. Last but not least, several core issues facing the Euro-Atlantic community, such as the Asia pivot, Iran, climate change, and the economy will be addressed. Other issues such as Syria, Afghanistan, and the Middle East and North Africa will not be addressed in this paper.6

The Mirage of the State: Why the West has failed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic? Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 15, July 2014

The state still matters. However, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community may be misinterpreting this crucial baseline prior launching their military interventions since 2001. The latest violence and collapse of the state of Iraq after the invasion of Northern Iraq by a radical Sunni Muslim terrorist group, so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), demonstrate once again the centrality and requirement of a functioning state in order to maintain violent forces to disrupt domestic and regional stability. Since 2001, the US and its European allies have waged wars against failed-states in order to increase this security and national interests, and then have been involved in some type of state-building.1 This has been the case in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, and Central African Republic (CAR). France went into Mali (2012) and CAR (2013), which preceded two European Union military and civilian Common Security and Defense Policy missions (CSDP), in order to avoid the collapse of these two states. The threat of the collapse of both states was a concern for the members of the Euro-Atlantic community as it could have spread to the region and causing even greater instabilities. In Mali, the country was under radical Islamic pressures coming from the North after the collapse of Libya ensuing the 2011 Western intervention, while in CAR it was mainly an ethno-religious crisis. Failed states are a real concern, as they can rapidly become training grounds for radical groups and permitting all types of smuggling and trafficking.2 In Mali, France wanted to protect its large French population and avoid the fall of Mali in the hands of radical Islamic groups directly or indirectly linked to Al-Qaeda. A fallen Mali could have destabilized the region of the Sahel and ultimately affected the stability of Southern European borders. France wanted to avoid the development of a safe haven across the Sahel where movements of people and goods are uncontrolled and illegal.3 Since the end of the Cold War, Western powers have been involved in stabilizing neighborhoods and regions, like the Balkans, Africa, and Middle East, which at the exceptions of the Balkans, have led to failed policies. 9/11 changes everything. The US, under President George W. Bush, started to wage war against terrorism and all states link to it. This started a period of continuous Western interventions in this post-9/11 era in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and CAR. If history has demonstrated one thing, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community are struggling and will continue to struggle to stabilize Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic (CAR) for one simple reason: no clear endgame. Is it the creation of a state à la Westphalian in order to permit these states to operate as the sole guarantor of security? Or is the reestablishment of status quo in these countries permitting to exit and end Western operations? This article seeks to analyze Western interventions in these five countries in order to reflect on the concept of the state and the erroneous starting point for each intervention.4 In the first part, the political status of each country is analyzed in order to understand the internal and regional crisis. In a second time, the concept of the state, framed into the Buzanian trinity, is discussed and applied to the cases. In the last part the European and American civilian-military doctrines are examined in accordance with their latest military interventions and in their broader spectrum.

Investor-State Dispute Resolution as an Issue in Transatlantic Trade Negotiations: Lessons from NAFTA. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 15 No. 3, August 2015

A major issue in the ongoing Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations is investor-state dispute resolution as it relates to foreign investments. The United States would like to have strong investor protections similar to those of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) included in the TTIP agreement. Civil society groups on both sides of the Atlantic object to binding arbitration of investment disputes, fearing that arbitration awards could endanger environmental and other types of regulations. This paper examines the experience with investor-state dispute resolution under NAFTA to determine whether judgments rendered in these cases have had adverse effects.

Anglo-South American handbook.

Mode of access: Internet.