Nothing but trouble.

Para Maisie empieza el día con su hermano bebé despertándola bruscamente, luego su madre, distraída. derrama los cereales del desayuno en su cabeza y desde entonces las cosas van de mal en peor para ella, tanto en casa como en la escuela.

A happy marriage between developmental psychology and neuroscience, yes but... with some problems. 'Un matrimonio feliz entre la psicología evolutiva y la neurociencia, sí pero... con algunos problemas'.

Resumen basado en el de la publicación

"It's always been stuck inside me but now it's come out" : children's explorations of their language identities though creative activities

Monogr??fico con el t??tulo: "La investigaci??n sobre la identidad profesional del profesorado en Europa

Série tirée des essais de mise en commun de termes en vrac se référant aux acteurs, aux notions empruntées au social, au politique, à l'education, à la terminologie courante de la muséologie adaptée aux présupposés de la muséologie sociale

POPULATION = Terme générique pour désigner l’adhésion d’une population, ou d’un groupe significatif de citoyens d’un territoire d’appartenance, au projet de muséologie sociale. Celle-ci se mesure par le degré de participation, d’implication et de vision partagée, d’interaction au sein de la collectivité territoriale, son fief. PARTICIPANTS = Sont les acteurs actifs au sein de la population adhérante, partie prenante au projet de muséologie social. La participation se mesure selon le degré d’implication dans le projet et de compréhension de celui-ci (Intérêt, gestion partagée, militance, volonté de capacitation...) COOPÉRANT = Par solidarité, par engagement, il s’insère dans le système de l’action ccopérative, possédant ses règles propres, offrant sa contribution à l’unité de production conciliant la dimension sociale (de la muséologie), son idée au regroupement de personnes désireuses de contribuer à la production commune de biens de qualité au service de la population dont ils sont issus.

Intra-Euro rebalancing is inevitable, but insufficient. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/15, August 2012

Greece, Portugal and Spain face a serious risk of external solvency due to their close to minus 100 percent of GDP net negative international investment positions, which are largely composed of debt. The perceived inability of these countries to rebalance their external positions is a major root of the euro crisis. Intra-euro rebalancing through declines in unit labour costs (ULC) in southern Europe, and ULC increases in northern Europe should continue, but has limits because: The share of intra-euro trade has declined. Intra-euro trade balances have already adjusted to a great extent. The intra-euro real exchange rates of Greece, Portugal and Spain have also either already adjusted or do not indicate significant appreciations since 2000. There are only two main current account surplus countries, Germany and the Netherlands. A purely intra-euro adjustment strategy would require too-significant wage increases in northern countries and wage declines in southern countries, which do not seem to be feasible. Before the crisis, the euro was significantly overvalued despite the close-to balanced current account position. The euro has depreciated recently, but more is needed to support the extra-euro trade of southern euro-area members. A weaker euro would also boost exports, growth, inflation and wage increases in Germany, thereby helping further intra-euro adjustment and the survival of the euro.

The euro crisis: ten roots, but fewer solutions. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/17, October 2012

Many factors have contributed to the euro crisis. Some have been addressed by policymakers, even if belatedly, and European Union member states have been willing to improve the functioning of the euro area by agreeing to relinquish national sovereignty in some important areas. However, the most pressing issue threatening the integrity, even the existence, of the euro, has not been addressed: the deepening economic contraction in southern euro-area member states. The common interest lies in preserving the integrity of the euro area and in offering these countries improved prospects. Domestic structural reform and appropriate fiscal consolidation, wage increases and slower fiscal consolidation in economically stronger euro-area countries, a weaker euro exchange rate, debt restructuring and an investment programme should be part of the arsenal. In the medium term, more institutional change will be necessary to complement the planned overhaul of the euro area institutional framework. This will include the deployment of a euro-area economic stabilising tool, managing the overall fiscal stance of the euro area, some form of Eurobonds and measures to make euro-area level decision making bodies more effective and democratically legitimate.

Backloading: A necessary, but not sufficient first step. CEPS Special Report No. 72, 20 November 2012

In July 2012, the European Commission issued an invitation for public consultation to review the ‘auctioning time profile’ for the EU Emissions Trading Scheme” in order to collect views from stakeholders and experts in the field of the EU carbon market on a draft for a future amendment of the Commission Regulation on the timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning of greenhouse gas emission allowances. In this submission, the CEPS Carbon Market Forum addresses the following questions and offers its views on the Commission’s proposed amendments: Is back loading a good idea? Is there a need for following up the back loading with structural measures? What should the number be? If this cannot be addressed, what are the considerations for deciding upon that number? What price expectations are linked to the number? On what basis are they construed?