Plan Golo-pristanskogo meliorativnogo tovarishchestva

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Plan Mikolaivskoiï okrugi Poltavskogo raĭonu , v chastke kolfondu chº 351 pid nazvoi︠u︡ Abkinsʻkiĭ

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Plan Mikolaivskoiï okrugi Poltavskogo raĭonu , v chastke kolfondu chº 351 pid nazvoi︠u︡ Abkinsʻkiĭ

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Skhematicheskiĭ plan 2-ogo agronomicheskogo uchastka, Khersonskiĭ okrug

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Plan zemelʻnogo otvoda "Poltavt︠s︡y

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NORDEK : A Plan for Increased Nordic Economic Co-operation and Integration 1968-1970

For the first time the attempt of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden to increase Nordic economic co-operation and integration (NORDEK 1968-1970) is analysed by using records from the four governments archives and interviews with central actors participating. A dominating argument has until now been that dynamics in Nordic economic integration is different from dynamics in European integration. This archive based study disproves the myth however of ideological Nordism and of short term political developments outside Norden as most important for the NORDEK initiative. The NORDEK initiative was actually more a consequence of a long term socioeconomic and socio-political path dependant process. The study also disproves the myth that the NORDEK plan was a political and ideological symbol without socioeconomic substance. The purpose with NORDEK was to create a better basis for generating economic growth and social welfare. The proposed NORDEK institutions were therefore developed to promote economic progress. The study finally shows that the NORDEK failure in 1970 was not a result of lacking economic rationale or incompatible economic interests. The failure was a result of a power struggle in Finnish domestic policy and lacking political will in the other Nordic countries to continue without Finland.

Strategic Information Acquisition: Applications to Herding and Auctions

The information that the economic agents have and regard relevant to their decision making is often assumed to be exogenous in economics. It is assumed that the agents either poses or can observe the payoff relevant information without having to exert any effort to acquire it. In this thesis we relax the assumption of ex-ante fixed information structure and study what happens to the equilibrium behavior when the agents must also decide what information to acquire and when to acquire it. This thesis addresses this question in the two essays on herding and two essays on auction theory. In the first two essays, that are joint work with Klaus Kultti, we study herding models where it is costly to acquire information on the actions that the preceding agents have taken. In our model the agents have to decide both the action that they take and additionally the information that they want to acquire by observing their predecessors. We characterize the equilibrium behavior when the decision to observe preceding agents' actions is endogenous and show how the equilibrium outcome may differ from the standard model, where all preceding agents actions are assumed to be observable. In the latter part of this thesis we study two dynamic auctions: the English and the Dutch auction. We consider a situation where bidder(s) are uninformed about their valuations for the object that is put up for sale and they may acquire this information for a small cost at any point during the auction. We study the case of independent private valuations. In the third essay of the thesis we characterize the equilibrium behavior in an English auction when there are informed and uninformed bidders. We show that the informed bidder may jump bid and signal to the uninformed that he has a high valuation, thus deterring the uninformed from acquiring information and staying in the auction. The uninformed optimally acquires information once the price has passed a particular threshold and the informed has not signalled that his valuation is high. In addition, we provide an example of an information structure where the informed bidder initially waits and then makes multiple jumps. In the fourth essay of this thesis we study the Dutch auction. We consider two cases where all bidders are all initially uninformed. In the first case the information acquisition cost is the same across all bidders and in the second also the cost of information acquisition is independently distributed and private information to the bidders. We characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium in the first and a pure strategy equilibrium in the second case. In addition we provide a conjecture of an equilibrium in an asymmetric situation where there is one informed and one uninformed bidder. We compare the revenues that the first price auction and the Dutch auction generate and we find that under some circumstances the Dutch auction outperforms the first price sealed bid auction. The usual first price sealed bid auction and the Dutch auction are strategically equivalent. However, this equivalence breaks down in case information is acquired during the auction.

Ministers as strategic political leaders? : Strategic political steering after NPM reforms in Finland

This study explores strategic political steering after the New Public Management (NPM) reforms, with emphasis on the new role assigned to Government ministers in Finland. In the NPM model, politicians concentrate on broad, principal issues, while agencies have discretion within the limits set by politicians. In Finland, strategic steering was introduced with Management by Results (MBR), but the actual tools for strategic political steering have been the Government Programme, the Government Strategy Portfolio (GSP) and Frame Budgeting. This study addresses these tools as means of strategic steering conducted by the Cabinet and individual ministers within their respective ministries. The time frame of the study includes the two Lipponen Cabinets between 1995 and 2003. Interviews with fourteen ministers as well as with fourteen top officials were conducted. In addition, administrative reform documents and documents related to strategic steering tools were analysed. The empirical conclusions of the study can be summarised as follows: There were few signs of strategic political steering in the Lipponen Cabinets. Although the Government Programmes of both Cabinets introduced strategic thinking, the strategic guidelines set forth at the beginning of the Programme were not linked to the GSP or to Frame Budgeting. The GSP could be characterised as the collected strategic agendas of each ministry, while there was neither the will nor the courage among Cabinet members to prioritise the projects and to make selections. The Cabinet used Frame Budgeting mainly in the sense of spending limits, not in making strategic allocation decisions. As for the GSP at the departmental level, projects were suggested by top officials, and ministers only approved the suggested list. Frame Budgeting at the departmental level proved to be the most interesting strategic steering tool from ministers viewpoint: they actively participated in defining which issues would need extra financing. Because the chances for extra financing were minimal, ministers had an effect only on a marginal share of the budget. At the departmental level, the study shows that strategic plans were considered the domain of officials. As for strategies concerning specific substances, there was variation in the interest shown by the ministers. A few ministers emphasised the importance of strategic work and led strategy processes. In most cases, however, officials led the process while ministers offered comments on the drafts of strategy documents. The results of this study together with experiences reported in other countries and local politics show that political decision-makers have difficulty operating at the strategic level. The conclusion is that politicians do not have sufficient incentive to perform the strategic role implied by the NPM type of reforms. Overall, the empirical results of the study indicate the power of politics over management reforms.

G20 tax reform plan should prevent another Lux leaks

The G20 Communique is good news on the international tax reform front. As part of the G20 commitment to boost economic resilience the Communique commits G20 nations to taking action to ensure fairness in the international tax system. This means they are looking at ways to ensure profits are taxed where economic activities deriving the profits are performed and where value is created.

Cost Sharing Mechanisms for Business Clusters with Strategic Firms

A business cluster is a co-located group of micro, small, medium scale enterprises. Such firms can benefit significantly from their co-location through shared infrastructure and shared services. Cost sharing becomes an important issue in such sharing arrangements especially when the firms exhibit strategic behavior. There are many cost sharing methods and mechanisms proposed in the literature based on game theoretic foundations. These mechanisms satisfy a variety of efficiency and fairness properties such as allocative efficiency, budget balance, individual rationality, consumer sovereignty, strategyproofness, and group strategyproofness. In this paper, we motivate the problem of cost sharing in a business cluster with strategic firms and illustrate different cost sharing mechanisms through the example of a cluster of firms sharing a logistics service. Next we look into the problem of a business cluster sharing ICT (information and communication technologies) infrastructure and explore the use of cost sharing mechanisms.

Performance based planning in Queensland : A case of unintended plan-making outcomes

Performance based planning (PBP) is purported to be a viable alternative to traditional zoning. The implementation of PBP ranges between pure approaches that rely on predetermined quantifiable performance standards to determine land use suitability, and hybrid approaches that rely on a mix of activity based zones in addition to prescriptive and subjective standards. Jurisdictions in the USA, Australia and New Zealand have attempted this type of land use regulation with varying degrees of success. Despite the adoption of PBP legislation in these jurisdictions, this paper argues that a lack of extensive evaluation means that PBP is not well understood and the purported advantages of this type of planning are rarely achieved in practice. Few empirical studies have attempted to examine how PBP has been implemented in practice. In Queensland, Australia, the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (IPA) operated as Queensland's principal planning legislation between March 1998 and December 2009. While the IPA did not explicitly use the term performance based planning, the Queensland's planning system is widely considered to be performance based in practice. Significantly, the IPA prevented Local Government from prohibiting development or use and the term zone was absent from the legislation. How plan-making would be advanced under the new planning regime was not clear, and as a consequence local governments produced a variety of different plan-making approaches to comply with the new legislative regime. In order to analyse this variation the research has developed a performance adoption spectrum to classify plans ranging between pure and hybrid perspectives of PBP. The spectrum compares how land use was regulated in seventeen IPA plans across Queensland. The research found that hybrid plans predominated, and that over time a greater reliance on risk adverse drafting approaches created a quasi-prohibition plan, the exact opposite of what was intended by the IPA. This paper concludes that the drafting of the IPA and absence of plan-making guidance contributed to lack of shared understanding about the intended direction of the new planning system and resulted in many administrative interpretations of the legislation. It was a planning direction that tried too hard to be different, and as a result created a perception of land use risk and uncertainty that caused a return to more prescriptive and inflexible plan-making methods.

Struggling over subjectivity: A discursive analysis of strategic development in a group

We have seen growing interest in discursive perspectives on strategy. This perspective holds great promise for development of an understanding on how strategy discourse and subjectivity are intertwined. We wish to add to this existing research by outlining a discursive struggle approach to subjectivity. To understand the complex subjectification and empowering/disempowering effects of organizational strategy discourse, this approach focuses on organization-specific discourse mobilizations an various ways of resistance. Drawing on an analysis of the discourses and practices of ‘strategic development’ in an engineering and consulting group we provide an empirical illustration of such struggles over subjectivity. In particular, we report three examples of competing ways of making sense of and giving sense to strategic development, with specific subjectification tendencies. First, we show how corporate management can mobilize and appropriate a specific kind of discourse to attempt to gain control of the organization, which tends to reproduce managerial hegemony, but also trigger discursive and other forms of resistance. Second, we will illustrate how middle managers resist this hegemony by initiating a strategy discourse of their own to create room for manoeuvre in controversial situations. Third, we show how project engineers can distance themselves from managerial-initiated strategy discourses to maintain a viable identity despite all kinds of pressures. Although our examples are case-specific, we believe that similar discursive dynamics also characterize strategizing in other organizations.