935 resultados para socio-political
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Between January and March 1998, a cross-sectional survey was carried out in four rural communities in Honduras, Central America. We examined the prevalence and intensity of Ascaris lumbricoides and Trichuris trichiura infections among 240 fecal specimens, and the association between selected socio-demographic variables and infection for 62 households. The overall prevalence of A. lumbricoides and T. trichiura was 45% (95% CI 39.0-51.9) and 38% (95% CI 31.8-44.4) respectively. The most intense infections for Ascaris and Trichuris were found in children aged 2-12 years old. By univariate analysis variables associated with infections of A. lumbricoides were: number of children 2-5 years old (p=0.001), level of formal education of respondents (p=0.01), reported site of defecation of children in households (p=0.02), households with children who had a recent history of diarrhea (p=0.002), and the location of households (p=0.03). Variables associated with both A. lumbricoides and T. trichiura infection included: number of children 6-14 years old (p=0.01, p=0.04, respectively), ownership of a latrine (p=0.04, p=0.03, respectively) and coinfection with either helminth (p=0.001, p=0.001, respectively). By multivariate analysis the number of children 2-5 years living in the household, (p=0.01, odds ratio (OR)=22.2), children with a recent history of diarrhea (p=0.0, OR=39.8), and infection of household members with T. trichiura (p=0.02, OR=16.0) were associated with A. lumbricoides infection. The number of children 6-14 years old in the household was associated with both A. lumbricoides and T. trichiura infection (p=0.04, p=0.01, OR=19.2, OR=5.2, respectively).
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This paper analyzes a spatial model of political competition between two policy- motivated parties in hard times of crisis. Hard times are modeled in terms of policy- making costs carried by a newly elected party. The results predict policy divergence in equilibrium. If the ideological preferences of parties are quite diverse and extreme, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce symmetric platforms and each party wins with probability one half. If one party is extreme while the other is more moderate, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce asymmetric platforms. If the preferred policies of the parties are not very distinct, there are two equilibria with asymmetric platforms. An important property of equilibrium with asymmetric platforms is that a winning party necessarily announces its most preferred policy as a platform. JEL classification: D72. Keywords: Spatial model; Political competition; Two-party system; Policy-motivated parties; Hard times; Crisis.
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Pre-requisites for health are equity, minimum income, nutrition, peace, water, sanitation, housing, education, work, political will and public support (WHO, 1986). It has long been known that social disadvantage harms health (Black, 1980, Ettner, 1996). Many researchers have documented that those in lower socio-economic groups are more at risk of developing major chronic diseases such as cardiovascular diseases (Beaglehole and Yach, 2003, WHO, 2003a), diabetes (Wilder et al., 2005), and some cancers (Brunner et al., 1993, Strong et al., 2005), and are at a higher risk of having multiple risk factors associated with these diseases (Lynch et al., 1997). The living standards that many people enjoy and the behavioural choices they make are heavily determined by their access to resources such as income, wealth, goods and services (O’Flynn and Murphy, 2001). The most prominent explanation between disadvantage and health is that lack of resources restricts access to the fundamental conditions of health such as adequate housing (Macintyre et al., 2003, Macintyre et al., 2005), good nutrition (Nelson et al., 2002) and opportunities to participate in society (McDonough et al., 2005). Each of these issues are very much influenced by material and structural factors inherent to and determined by fiscal, social and health policy (Graham and Kelly, 2004, Milio, 1986).
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Distribution of socio-economic features in urban space is an important source of information for land and transportation planning. The metropolization phenomenon has changed the distribution of types of professions in space and has given birth to different spatial patterns that the urban planner must know in order to plan a sustainable city. Such distributions can be discovered by statistical and learning algorithms through different methods. In this paper, an unsupervised classification method and a cluster detection method are discussed and applied to analyze the socio-economic structure of Switzerland. The unsupervised classification method, based on Ward's classification and self-organized maps, is used to classify the municipalities of the country and allows to reduce a highly-dimensional input information to interpret the socio-economic landscape. The cluster detection method, the spatial scan statistics, is used in a more specific manner in order to detect hot spots of certain types of service activities. The method is applied to the distribution services in the agglomeration of Lausanne. Results show the emergence of new centralities and can be analyzed in both transportation and social terms.
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In 2012, CARDI was asked by The Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland to carry out a series of research projects on ageing in Ireland, North and South. This research project, 'Understanding socio-economic inequalities affecting older people’ , was carried out by Paul McGill, CARDI. The research sought to answer the following questions: Are there inequalities that affect older people as a group compared with younger people, or inequalities that exist within the older population? How are these inequalities changing over time? Do these socio-economic inequalities have a detrimental impact on older people or on a substantial number of them? How can any harmful socio-economic inequalities be reduced or eliminated and what are the implications for policy-making? Key Findings*: In RoI the poorest older people had a rise of €32 per week between 2004 and 2011 in total incomes while those with the highest incomes had a rise of €255 (CSO 2013). Total incomes of the poorest pensioner couples in NI did not change between 2003-06 and 2008-11 but the best off had a rise of �37 per week (DSD 2013). Employees aged 60+ earn €10,000 less per year than earners in their peak years in RoI and �2,400 less in NI (CSO Database and NISRA 2012). The richest older people in RoI earn 14 times more from employment than the poorest. In NI it is 36 times more for single pensioners and 44 times more for pensioner couples (CSO 2013; NISRA 2013). The gap in weekly earnings between top and bottom earners aged 60+ in NI rose from �294 to �430 between 2005 and 2012 (NISRA 2012). In the two years 2009-2011 the incomes of the poorest older people in ROI declined by €24 per week (11.4%) (CSO, 2013).