Investigating The Sources Of Fresh Water Affecting The Hydrological Balance Of Lakes Enriquillo And Azuei (Hispaniola) – Data Analysis

The Enriquillo and Azuei are saltwater lakes located in a closed water basin in the southwestern region of the island of La Hispaniola, these have been experiencing dramatic changes in total lake-surface area coverage during the period 1980-2012. The size of Lake Enriquillo presented a surface area of approximately 276 km2 in 1984, gradually decreasing to 172 km2 in 1996. The surface area of the lake reached its lowest point in the satellite observation record in 2004, at 165 km2. Then the recent growth of the lake began reaching its 1984 size by 2006. Based on surface area measurement for June and July 2013, Lake Enriquillo has a surface area of ~358 km2. Sumatra sizes at both ends of the record are 116 km2 in 1984 and 134 km2in 2013, an overall 15.8% increase in 30 years. Determining the causes of lake surface area changes is of extreme importance due to its environmental, social, and economic impacts. The overall goal of this study is to quantify the changing water balance in these lakes and their catchment area using satellite and ground observations and a regional atmospheric-hydrologic modeling approach. Data analyses of environmental variables in the region reflect a hydrological unbalance of the lakes due to changing regional hydro-climatic conditions. Historical data show precipitation, land surface temperature and humidity, and sea surface temperature (SST), increasing over region during the past decades. Salinity levels have also been decreasing by more than 30% from previously reported baseline levels. Here we present a summary of the historical data obtained, new sensors deployed in the sourrounding sierras and the lakes, and the integrated modeling exercises. As well as the challenges of gathering, storing, sharing, and analyzing this large volumen of data in a remote location from such a diverse number of sources.

The polictical economy informed lobbies

We analize a discrete type version of a common agency model with informed principals of Martimort and Moreira (2005) in the context of lobby games. We begin discussing issues related to the common values nature of the model, i.e.the agent cares directly about the principal’s utility function. With this feature the equilibrium of Martimort and Moreira (2005) is not valid. We argue in favor of one solution, although we are not able to fully characterize the equilibrium in this context. We then turn to an application: a modification of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of lobbying for tariff protection to incoporate assimetric information (but disconsidering the problem of common values) in the lobbies objective function. We show that the main results of the original model do not hold and that lobbies may behave less agressively towards the police maker when there is private information in the lobbies valuation for the tariffs.

Are CGE Models still useful in economic policy making?

This paper develops background considerations to help better framing the results of a CGE exercise. Three main criticisms are usually addressed to CGE efforts. First, they are too aggregate, their conclusions failing to shed light on relevant sectors or issues. Second, they imply huge data requirements. Timeliness is frequently jeopardised by out-dated sources, benchmarks referring to realities gone by. Finally, results are meaningless, as they answer wrong or ill-posed questions. Modelling demands end up by creating a rather artificial context, where the original questions lose content. In spite of a positive outlook on the first two, crucial questions lie in the third point. After elaborating such questions, and trying to answer some, the text argues that CGE models can come closer to reality. If their use is still scarce to give way to a fruitful symbiosis between negotiations and simulation results, they remain the only available technique providing a global, inter-related way of capturing economy-wide effects of several different policies. International organisations can play a major role supporting and encouraging improvements. They are also uniquely positioned to enhance information and data sharing, as well as putting people from various origins together, to share their experiences. A serious and complex homework is however required, to correct, at least, the most dangerous present shortcomings of the technique.

Social welfare analysis in a simple financial economy with risk regulation

In the last years, regulating agencies of rnany countries in the world, following recommendations of the Basel Committee, have compelled financiaI institutions to maintain minimum capital requirements to cover market risk. This paper investigates the consequences of such kind of regulation to social welfare and soundness of financiaI institutions through an equilibrium model. We show that the optimum level of regulation for each financiaI institution (the level that maximizes its utility) depends on its appetite for risk and some of them can perform better in a regulated economy. In addition, another important result asserts that under certain market conditions the financiaI fragility of an institution can be greater in a regulated econolny than in an unregulated one

Infrastructure privatization in a neoclassical economy : macroeconomic impact and welfare computation

In this paper a competitive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ("infrastructure"), and a positive externality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent government can improve upon decentralized allocation internalizing the externality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuals' welfare, no• operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters .

The political economy of exchange rate in Brazil

This paper reviews part of the political economy literature on exchange rate policy relevant to understanding the political motivations behind the Brazilian exchange rate policy. We shall first examine the distributive role of the exchange rate, and the way it unfolds in terms of the desired political goals. We will follow by analyzing exchange policy as indicative of government effciency prior to elections. Finally, we discuss fiscal policy from the point of view of political economy, in which the exchange rate results from the macroeconomic equilibrium. Over this review, the Brazilian exchange rate policy is discussed in light of the theories presented.

Service industries and service economy

The study analyses the role of services in modern and less-developed economies. It shows the different meanings of the value, definition and classification of service activities found in economic literature. It discusses the relation between service production growth and economic development observing the role of these activities in the dynamics of economic restructuring. Further, it also examines the differences between private and public sector service restructuring and the consequences of internationalization of services. It concludes that economic restructuring also caused by changes in the nature of goods and services has important regional effects.

The political economy of global economic disgovernance

A Desgovernança Econômica Global, Mais do que a Governança Caracteriza Hoje a Economia Mundial. Dois Fatos Substanciam Essa Afirmativa: a Crise Recorrente do Balanço de Pagamentos nos Países em Desenvolvimento, e o Enorme Déficit em Conta Corrente dos Estados Unidos. as Crises nos Mercados Emergentes são Essencialmente Resultantes da Estratégia que o Norte Propõe para o Sul: a Estratégia de Crescimento com Poupança Externa. Dado o Fato de que a Entrada de Capital Aumenta a Taxa de Cambio, e que os Paises não Reconheceram as Principais Oportunidades de Investimento nos Anos 1990, Tal Estratégia Levou não ao Aumento das Taxas de Acumulação de Capital e ao Crescimento, Mas ao Aumento do Déficit em Conta Corrente e À Crise do Balanço de Pagamento (Financeiro). por Outro Lado, o Déficit em Conta Corrente dos Estados Unidos é um Problema Sério. Aquele Já é um País Devedor, Mas os Ajustes Continuam a ser Adiados. a Probabilidade de um Soft Landing (Desfecho Satisfatório) é Pequena. as Duas Fontes de Instabilidade Estão Relacionadas Aos Déficits em Conta Corrente e À Moeda Sobrevalorizada. a Política Econômica por Trás tem um Nome: Taxa de Câmbio Populista, uma das Duas Formas de Populismo Econômico (A Outra é o Populismo Fiscal). Isto não é Surpreendente em Países em Desenvolvimento, Mas Pode ser em um País Desenvolvido, como os Estados Unidos. Ainda Assim não é Surpreendente Quando se Considera a Recessão Política e Social que a Sociedade Americana Está Vivendo Desde o Fim da Segunda Guerra

Political institutions as substitute for democracy: a political economy analysis of economic growth

This manuscript empirically assesses the effects of political institutions on economic growth. It analyzes how political institutions affect economic growth in different stages of democratization and economic development by means of dynamic panel estimation with interaction terms. The new empirical results obtained show that political institutions work as a substitute for democracy promoting economic growth. In other words, political institutions are important for increasing economic growth, mainly when democracy is not consolidated. Moreover, political institutions are extremely relevant to economic outcomes in periods of transition to democracy and in poor countries with high ethnical fractionalization.

Mudanças institucionais, receitas cumulativas do governo federal e exportações no Brasil entre 1982 e 2001

Desde o início dos anos oitenta, o governo federal brasileiro passou a substituir a receitas de impostos tradicionais por receita de contribuições sociais (cumulativas) na composição da sua receita total (mudança de gestão). Alega-se que este procedimento é uma conseqüência das regras de compartilhamento estabelecidas (receitas de impostos do governo federal são compartilhadas com estados e municípios enquanto que receitas de contribuição não o são).Existem argumentos na literatura mostrando que este processo de descentralização das receitas teve sua origem na mudança de regime político (militar para democrático), outros com a nova Constituição de 1988 e, por último, outros afirmando que ele só foi possível porque a ineficiência das contribuições foi encoberta pela ineficiência alocativa da inflação. Por outro lado, fatos ocorridos no mesmo período, embora não citados na literatura, poderiam explicar ou ajudar na explicação deste comportamento. Entre eles, a fragmentação do poder executivo a partir de 1989 com a primeira eleição presidencial e/ou o processo de abertura da economia a partir dos anos noventa. Usando a técnica de OLS, observou-se que a Nova Constituição e a abertura da economia explicariam esta mudança de gestão. De qualquer forma, independente do que esteja explicando esta mudança, ela é apontada como altamente prejudicial a competitividade das exportações brasileiras. Existem várias proxies tentando medir este efeito, nenhuma delas considerando uma medida de gestão. Resolvemos realizar esta tentativa. Como tínhamos desconfiança da exogeneidade da variável representativa da abertura da economia no teste anterior, tratamos a questão com o instrumental de séries de tempo. No longo prazo, descobrimos que a mudança de gestão afeta negativamente as exportações e positivamente a abertura da economia por ser menos punitiva com as importações em termos de competitividade (as contribuições incidem apenas na comercialização dos produtos importados). JEL classification: H27; H77, H87.