ERA Defeat

General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.

Bella Abzug speaks at Women's Equality Day Rally

General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.

Bella Abzug votes for passage of ERA in NY with husband Martin Abzug to her right

General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.

Macroeconomics, economic crisis and electoral outcomes: A national European pool

An abundance of comparative survey research argues the presence of economic voting as an individual force in European elections, thereby refuting a possible ecological fallacy. But the hypothesis of economic voting at the aggregate level, with macroeconomics influencing overall electoral outcomes, seems less sure. Indeed, there might be a micrological fallacy at work, with the supposed individual economic vote effect not adding up to a national electoral effect after all. Certainly that would account for the spotty evidence linking macroeconomics and national election outcomes. We examine the possibility of a micrological fallacy through rigorous analysis of a large time-series cross-sectional dataset of European nations. From these results, it becomes clear that the macroeconomy strongly moves national election outcomes, with hard times punishing governing parties, and good times rewarding them. Further, this economy-election connection appears asymmetric, altering under economic crisis. Indeed, we show that economic crisis, defined as negative growth, has much greater electoral effects than positive economic growth. Hard times clearly make governments more accountable to their electorates.

The economic voter and economic crisis

Theories of economic voting have a long tradition in political science and continue to inspire a large group of scholars. Classical economic voting theory assumes a reward-and-punishment mechanism (Key, 1966). This mechanism implies that incumbents are more likely to stay in power under a good economy, but are cast out under a bad economy (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). The economy has repeatedly been shown to be a major determinant of electoral behavior (see especially the recent book by Duch and Stevenson, 2008), but the current economic crisis seems to provide a marked illustration of how the economy affects voting. In recent elections across the Western industrialized world, most ruling coalitions lost their majority. Opposition parties, on the other hand, whether right wing or left wing, have appeared to benefit from the economic downturn.

Election Forecasting under Opaque Conditions

Election forecasting models assume retrospective economic voting and clear mechanisms of accountability. Previous research indeed indicates that incumbent political parties are being held accountable for the state of the economy. In this article we develop a ‘hard case’ for the assumptions of election forecasting models. Belgium is a multiparty system with perennial coalition governments. Furthermore, Belgium has two completely segregated party systems (Dutch and French language). Since the prime minister during the period 1974-2011 has always been a Dutch language politician, French language voters could not even vote for the prime minister, so this cognitive shortcut to establish political accountability is not available. Results of an analysis for the French speaking parties (1981-2010) show that even in these conditions of opaque accountability, retrospective economic voting occurs as election results respond to indicators with regard to GDP and unemployment levels. Party membership figures can be used to model the popularity function in election forecasting.

Punishing Local Incumbents for the Local Economy

After decennia of research on economic voting, it is now established that the state of the economy affects voting behaviour. Nevertheless, this conclusion is the result of a focus on predominantly national-level economies and national-level elections. In this paper, we show that at a local level as well, mechanisms of accountability linked to the economy are at work. The local economic context affected voting behaviour in the 2012 Belgian municipal elections, with a stronger increase of unemployment rates in their municipality significantly decreasing the probability that voters choose an incumbent party. Additionally, we observe that voters are not opportunistically voting for incumbents who lower tax rates. Instead, voters seem to be holding local incumbents accountable for local economic conditions. We hence conclude that voters care about economic outcomes, not about what specific policies are implemented to reach these outcomes.

Institutional Persistence in Eastern Europe: Economic and Political Legacies of Empires and Communism

This dissertation seeks to advance our understanding of the roles that institutions play in economic development. How do institutions evolve? What mechanisms are responsible for their persistence? What effects do they have on economic development?

I address these questions using historical and contemporary data from Eastern Europe and Russia. This area is relatively understudied by development economists. It also has a very interesting history. For one thing, for several centuries it was divided between different empires. For another, it experienced wars and socialism in the 20th century. I use some of these exogenous shocks as quasi-natural social experiments to study the institutional transformations and its effects on economic development both in the short and long run.

This first chapter explores whether economic, social, and political institutions vary in their resistance to policies designed to remove them. The empirical context for the analysis is Romania from 1690 to the 2000s. Romania represents an excellent laboratory for studying the persistence of different types of historical institutional legacies. In the 18th and 19th centuries, Romania was split between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, where political and economic institutions differed. The Habsburgs imposed less extractive institutions relative to the Ottomans: stronger rule of law, a more stable and predictable state, a more developed civil society, and less corruption. In the 20th century, the Romanian Communist regime tried deliberately to homogenize the country along all relevant dimensions. It was only partially successful. Using a regression discontinuity design, I document the persistence of economic outcomes, social capital, and political attitudes. First, I document remarkable convergence in urbanization, education, unemployment, and income between the two former empires. Second, regarding social capital, no significant differences in organizational membership, trust in bureaucracy, and corruption persist today. Finally, even though the Communists tried to change all political attitudes, significant discontinuities exist in current voting behavior at the former Habsburg-Ottoman border. Using data from the parliamentary elections of 1996-2008, I find that former Habsburg rule decreases by around 6 percentage points the vote share of the major post-Communist left party and increases by around 2 and 5 percentage points the vote shares of the main anti-Communist and liberal parties, respectively.

The second chapter investigates the effects of Stalin’s mass deportations on distrust in central authority. Four deported ethnic groups were not rehabilitated after Stalin’s death; they remained in permanent exile until the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This allows one to distinguish between the effects of the groups that returned to their homelands and those of the groups that were not allowed to return. Using regional data from the 1991 referendum on the future of the Soviet Union, I find that deportations have a negative interim effect on trust in central authority in both the regions of destination and those of origin. The effect is stronger for ethnic groups that remained in permanent exile in the destination regions. Using data from the Life in Transition Survey, the chapter also documents a long-term effect of deportations in the destination regions.

The third chapter studies the short-term effect of Russian colonization of Central Asia on economic development. I use data on the regions of origin of Russian settlers and push factors to construct an instrument for Russian migration to Central Asia. This instrument allows me to interpret the outcomes causally. The main finding is that the massive influx of Russians into the region during the 1897-1926 period had a significant positive effect on indigenous literacy. The effect is stronger for men and in rural areas. Evidently, interactions between natives and Russians through the paid labor market was an important mechanism of human capital transmission in the context of colonization.

The findings of these chapters provide additional evidence that history and institutions do matter for economic development. Moreover, the dissertation also illuminates the relative persistence of institutions. In particular, political and social capital legacies of institutions might outlast economic legacies. I find that most economic differences between the former empires in Romania have disappeared. By the same token, there are significant discontinuities in political outcomes. People in former Habsburg Romania provide greater support for liberalization, privatization, and market economy, whereas voters in Ottoman Romania vote more for redistribution and government control over the economy.

In the former Soviet Union, Stalin’s deportations during World War II have a long-term negative effect on social capital. Today’s residents of the destination regions of deportations show significantly lower levels of trust in central authority. This is despite the fact that the Communist regime tried to eliminate any source of opposition and used propaganda to homogenize people’s political and social attitudes towards the authorities. In Central Asia, the influx of Russian settlers had a positive short-term effect on human capital of indigenous population by the 1920s, which also might have persisted over time.

From a development perspective, these findings stress the importance of institutions for future paths of development. Even if past institutional differences are not apparent for a certain period of time, as was the case with the former Communist countries, they can polarize society later on, hampering economic development in the long run. Different institutions in the past, which do not exist anymore, can thus contribute to current political instability and animosity.

Equitable representation in councils: theory and an application to the United Nations Security Council

We analyze democratic equity in council voting games (CVGs). In a CVG, a voting body containing all members delegates decision-making to a (time-varying) subset of its members, as describes, e.g., the relationship between the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). We develop a theoretical framework for analyzing democratic equitability in CVGs at both the country and region levels, and for different assumptions regarding preference correlation. We apply the framework to evaluate the equitability of the UNSC, and the claims of those who seek to reform it. We find that the individual permanent members are overrepresented by between 21.3 times (United Kingdom) and 3.8 times (China) from a country-level perspective, while from a region perspective Eastern Europe is the most heavily overrepresented region with more than twice its equitable representation, and Africa the most heavily underrepresented. Our equity measures do not preclude some UNSC members from exercising veto rights, however.

El interés de la audiencia por las intervenciones televisivas de Pablo Iglesias: estrategia comunicativa de Podemos

Este artículo analiza la eclosión mediática y política del partido político Podemos durante sus primeros meses de vida tras las elecciones europeas. Comprobaremos si el interés que despierta el partido en sus inicios, en intención de voto, se traslada a las audiencias de televisión con dos hipótesis que muestran la estrategia comunicativa de Podemos y su repercusión: la H1 afirma que los programas en los que participa Pablo Iglesias obtienen mayor audiencia de la habitual y la H2 plantea que la apuesta del líder de Podemos por el medio televisivo es muy superior y con mejores resultados con respecto a los partidos clásicos. Los resultados demuestran que los programas en los que participa (N=14) crecen un 62% y baten récord de audiencia. Concluimos que la estrategia comunicativa de Podemos da importancia a la televisión, además de continuar con la estrategia en redes aprendida en el 15M.

The impact of political and economic crisis on the polarization of the Spanish media

In this paper the characteristics of the cyclical political polarization of the Spanish media system are defined. From this study, a prospective analysis raises doubts about this scenario remains unchanged because of the political and economic crisis. It seeks to define the role played by political and media actors in polarization focusing on the two legislatures where the tension reached higher levels (1993-1996 and 2004-2008) and compares it with the developments faced by them in the current economical and political context of crisis. To achieve these aims, it has been performed an analysis of media content (since 1993) and looked through primary sociological sources and the scientific literature about polarization. This is an exploratory, critical and descriptive case analysis.

The Electoral Rise of Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe: Ideological Parameters and Social Motivations

Populist radical right parties have become major political actors in Europe. This paper analyses the path and the different phases that have led them from the fringes of public debate to their present signifi cance, which is based on their capacity to attract electoral support and infl uence the political agendas in their respective countries. Besides, an analysis of the core ideological beliefs of these parties, and of the topics on which their mobilization capacity rests, is provided, as well as of the type of voters that are attracted by them. Finally, the authors discuss the meaning and impact of the growing popularity of the ideas and proposals put forward by the populist radical right parties.

Programas de tertulia política en Twitter: un modelo neurocomunicativo de análisis del discurso

En este trabajo aplicamos a la red social Twitter un modelo de análisis del discurso político y mediático desarrollado en publicaciones previas, que permite hacer compatible el estudio de los datos discursivos con propuestas explicativas surgidas a propósito de la comunicación política (neurocomunicación) y de la comunicación digital (la red como quinto estado, convergencia, inteligencia colectiva). Asumimos que hay categorías del encuadre discursivo (frame) que pueden ser tratadas como indicadores de habilidades cognitivas y comunicativas. Analizamos estas categorías agrupándolas en tres dimensiones fundamentales: la intencional (ilocutividad del tuit, encuadre interpretativo de las etiquetas), referencial (temas, protagonistas), e interactiva (alineamiento estructural, predictibilidad; marcas de intertextualidad y dialogismo; afiliación partidista). El corpus consta de 4116 tuits: 3000 tuits pertenecientes a los programas Al Rojo Vivo (La Sexta: A3 Media), Las Mañanas Cuatro (Cuatro: Mediaset) y Los Desayunos de TVE (RTVE), 1116 tuits de seguidores de los programas, que corresponden a 45 tuits de cada programa. Los resultados confirman que el modelo permite establecer diferentes perfiles de subjetividad política en las cuentas de Twitter.

Random Forest Based Approach for Concept-Drift Handling

Algorithms for concept drift handling are important for various applications including video analysis and smart grids. In this paper we present decision tree ensemble classication method based on the Random Forest algorithm for concept drift. The weighted majority voting ensemble aggregation rule is employed based on the ideas of Accuracy Weighted Ensemble (AWE) method. Base learner weight in our case is computed for each sample evaluation using base learners accuracy and intrinsic proximity measure of Random Forest. Our algorithm exploits both temporal weighting of samples and ensemble pruning as a forgetting strategy. We present results of empirical comparison of our method with îriginal random forest with incorporated replace-the-looser forgetting andother state-of-the-art concept-drift classiers like AWE2.

Resolving conflict in bipolar societies: The fate of political settlements in Fiji and Northern Ireland

Ethnically divided societies that might be described as ‘balanced bicommunal’ (where there are two communities, each of which comes close to representing half of the population) pose a particular challenge to conventional principles of collective decision-making, and commonly threaten political stability. This article analyses the experience of two such societies – Northern Ireland and Fiji – with a view to exploring whether there are common processes in the route by which political stability has been pursued. We assess the manner in which a distinctive relationship with Great Britain and its political culture has interacted with local conditions to produce a highly competitive, bipolar party system. This leads to consideration of the devices that have been adopted in an effort to bridge the gap between the communities: the Fiji constitution as amended in 1997, and Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement of 1998. We focus, in particular, on the use of unusual (preferential voting) formulas for the election of parliamentarians and of an inclusive principle in the selection of ministers, and consider the contribution of these institutional devices to the attainment of political stability. We find that, in both cases, the intervention of forces from outside the political system had a decisive impact, though in very different ways. In addition to being underpinned by solid institutional design, for political settlements to work effectively, some minimal level of trust between rival elites is required.