Natures muses in Bruno Tuat’s Glashaus

Constructed for the 1914 Werkbund Exhibition in Cologne, Germany, the Glashaus was both a seminal example of early modernist architecture and Bruno Taut’s signature building. Over time, metaphors have come to be applied to the Glashaus. Within the realm of nature these metaphors include cosmic, geological, botanic and sexual. However these metaphors, like the history of the Glashaus, are not a foregone conclusion. Recently it has been argued that the majority of our current knowledge regarding the Glashaus derives not from the perspective of Bruno Taut as the architect, but rather directly from perspective of the art critic Adolf Behne. This argument goes further and proposes that Behne’s official history of Glashaus is possibly fabricated propaganda. So, if indeed the official history of the Glashaus is questionable, then too are the natural metaphors commonly applied to the building. By revisiting Bruno Taut’s pre-1915 writings, this investigation reveals that botanic metaphors appear to have been Taut’s primary source of inspiration for the design of the Glashaus. Through the exposure of this fact, this research contributes significantly to the current debates surrounding Bruno Taut, the Glashaus and the re-evaluation of the official histories of the modern movement.

Cultural diplomacy with Chinese characteristics : the case of Confucius Institutes in Australia

Since 2004,China has set up more than 400 Confucius Institutes and 500 Confucius Classrooms in 108 countries to promote Chinese language and culture. Despite these impressive numbers, these institutions are still surprisingly under-studied. This article uses Confucius Institutes in Australia as a case study to deepen the understanding of China’s new cultural diplomacy tool. The article describes Confucius Institutes as a form of strategic stakeholder engagement and argues that this collaborative tool of cultural diplomacy depends heavily on the commitment of its local stakeholders.

A study of Beijing‘s competitive advantage as an emergent media capital

The development of creative industries has been connected to urban development since the end of the 20th century. However, the causality of why creative industries always cluster and develop in certain cities hasn‘t been adequately demonstrated, especially as to how various resources grow, interact and nurture the creative capacity of the locality. Therefore it is vital to observe how the local institutional environment nurtures creative industries and how creative industries consequently change the environment in order to better address the connection between creative industries and localities. In Beijing, the relocation of CCTV, BTV and Phoenix to Chaoyang District raises the possibility of a new era for Chinese media, one in which the stodginess of propaganda content will give way to exciting new forms and genres. The mixing of media companies in an open commercial environment (away from the political power district of Xicheng) holds the promise of more freedom of expression and, ultimately, to a =media capital‘ (Curtin, 2003). These are the dreams of many media practitioners in Beijing. But just how realistic are their expectations? This study adopts the concept of =media capital‘ to demonstrate how participants, including state-media organisations, private media companies and international media conglomerates, are seeking out space and networks to survive in Beijing. Drawing on policy analysis, interviews and case studies, this study illustrates how different agents meet, confront and adapt in Beijing. This study identifies factors responsible for the media industries clustering in China, and argues that Beijing is very likely to be the next Chinese media capital, after enough accumulation and development, although as a lower tier version compared to other media capitals in the world. This study contributes to Curtin‘s =media capital‘ concept, develops his interpretation on the relationship of media industries and the government, and suggests that the influence over the government of media companies and professionals should be acknowledged. Therefore, empirically, this study assists media practitioners in understanding how the Chinese government perceives media industries and, consequently, how media industries are operated in China. The study also reveals that despite the government‘s aspirations, China‘s media industries are still greatly constrained by institutional obstacles. Hence Beijing really needs to speed up its pace on the path of media reform, abandon the old mindset and create more room for creativity. Policy-makers in China should keep in mind that the only choice left to them is to further the reform.

Confucius Institutes and the rise of China: How the People's Republic of China uses its cultural institutions abroad to communicate with the world

This thesis examines the role of Confucius Institutes in China's cultural diplomacy. It analyses Confucius Institutes in Australia and Germany and explains the differences between Confucius Institutes and their international counterparts such as the British Council or the Goethe Institute. China's unique approach to establish these institutes as joint ventures has multiple implications not only for individual institutes and their partners involved, but more generally for the Chinese understanding of cultural diplomacy. The case of Confucius Institutes shows China's willingness to cooperate with foreigners in the context of cultural diplomacy, which, as with all such diplomatic endeavours, eventually serves national interests.

May the best Tweeter win : The Twitter strategies of key campaign accounts in the 2012 US election

The 2008 US election has been heralded as the first presidential election of the social media era, but took place at a time when social media were still in a state of comparative infancy; so much so that the most important platform was not Facebook or Twitter, but the purpose-built campaign site my.barackobama.com, which became the central vehicle for the most successful electoral fundraising campaign in American history. By 2012, the social media landscape had changed: Facebook and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Twitter are now well-established as the leading social media platforms in the United States, and were used extensively by the campaign organisations of both candidates. As third-party spaces controlled by independent commercial entities, however, their use necessarily differs from that of home-grown, party-controlled sites: from the point of view of the platform itself, a @BarackObama or @MittRomney is technically no different from any other account, except for the very high follower count and an exceptional volume of @mentions. In spite of the significant social media experience which Democrat and Republican campaign strategists had already accumulated during the 2008 campaign, therefore, the translation of such experience to the use of Facebook and Twitter in their 2012 incarnations still required a substantial amount of new work, experimentation, and evaluation. This chapter examines the Twitter strategies of the leading accounts operated by both campaign headquarters: the ‘personal’ candidate accounts @BarackObama and @MittRomney as well as @JoeBiden and @PaulRyanVP, and the campaign accounts @Obama2012 and @TeamRomney. Drawing on datasets which capture all tweets from and at these accounts during the final months of the campaign (from early September 2012 to the immediate aftermath of the election night), we reconstruct the campaigns’ approaches to using Twitter for electioneering from the quantitative and qualitative patterns of their activities, and explore the resonance which these accounts have found with the wider Twitter userbase. A particular focus of our investigation in this context will be on the tweeting styles of these accounts: the mixture of original messages, @replies, and retweets, and the level and nature of engagement with everyday Twitter followers. We will examine whether the accounts chose to respond (by @replying) to the messages of support or criticism which were directed at them, whether they retweeted any such messages (and whether there was any preferential retweeting of influential or – alternatively – demonstratively ordinary users), and/or whether they were used mainly to broadcast and disseminate prepared campaign messages. Our analysis will highlight any significant differences between the accounts we examine, trace changes in style over the course of the final campaign months, and correlate such stylistic differences with the respective electoral positioning of the candidates. Further, we examine the use of these accounts during moments of heightened attention (such as the presidential and vice-presidential debates, or in the context of controversies such as that caused by the publication of the Romney “47%” video; additional case studies may emerge over the remainder of the campaign) to explore how they were used to present or defend key talking points, and exploit or avert damage from campaign gaffes. A complementary analysis of the messages directed at the campaign accounts (in the form of @replies or retweets) will also provide further evidence for the extent to which these talking points were picked up and disseminated by the wider Twitter population. Finally, we also explore the use of external materials (links to articles, images, videos, and other content on the campaign sites themselves, in the mainstream media, or on other platforms) by the campaign accounts, and the resonance which these materials had with the wider follower base of these accounts. This provides an indication of the integration of Twitter into the overall campaigning process, by highlighting how the platform was used as a means of encouraging the viral spread of campaign propaganda (such as advertising materials) or of directing user attention towards favourable media coverage. By building on comprehensive, large datasets of Twitter activity (as of early October, our combined datasets comprise some 3.8 million tweets) which we process and analyse using custom-designed social media analytics tools, and by using our initial quantitative analysis to guide further qualitative evaluation of Twitter activity around these campaign accounts, we are able to provide an in-depth picture of the use of Twitter in political campaigning during the 2012 US election which will provide detailed new insights social media use in contemporary elections. This analysis will then also be able to serve as a touchstone for the analysis of social media use in subsequent elections, in the USA as well as in other developed nations where Twitter and other social media platforms are utilised in electioneering.

Playing "Nordic": The Women of Niskavuori, Agri/Culture, and Imagining Finland on the Third Reich Stage

The theatrical censorship of the Third Reich considered the playwright's race and politics alongside the content of the drama. Given the political stigma of its "leftist" author, it is rather surprising that Hella Wuolijoki's Niskavuoren naiset opened in 1938 at the Staatliches Schauspielhaus in Hamburg. The play ran for fourteen performances before being closed by the Reichsdramaturgie, apparently at the instigation of Finnish critics. Yet this was not the end of the play's or its author's fortunes in the Third Reich, as the possibility of staging the play was raised several times over the next four years, coming to a close in 1942. Playing "Nordic" examines the ideological and theatrical background of this extended "cultural performance," as a means to reopening and reconstructing the work of the 1938 Die Frauen auf Niskavuori. Written by a Finnish, northern, "Nordic" author, and preoccupied with the dynamics of rural culture in an increasingly urbanized world, Niskavuoren naiset was understood in the Third Reich to illustrate and reinforce the racial, agri/cultural themes of Blut und Boden ("veri ja maa"). Playing "Nordic" examines this thematic relationship in three phases. The first phase uses archival materials to investigate the Reichsdramaturgie's understanding of the play and its author, and its ongoing discussion of Wuolijoki from 1937 to 1942. Play evaluator Sigmund Graff's description of Niskavuoren naiset as hamsunartig, or "Hamsun-esque," inspires the second phase of the dissertation, which first elaborates the meanings of Blut und Boden through a reading of contemporary "racial" theory and anthropology, and then assesses the representation of Finland within this discourse, one of the dominant cultural paradigms of the Third Reich. Imaging Finland for German audiences, the play stood among analogous, continued efforts to represent Finland and the rural life in the Third Reich, colored by Blut und Boden: art and agricultural exhibitions, essays and propaganda literature, mass demonstrations of the peasantry. This wider framework for the performance of "Finland" materializes the abstract or theoretical program of Blut und Boden in its everyday performed meanings; as such it provides the essential background for reading the Hamburg production of Die Frauen auf Niskavuori, which sustains the third and final phase. The German translation and the Hamburg photographic record are compared with the Helsinki premiere to assess the impact of Blut und Boden on the representation of Wuolijoki's play in the Third Reich. The journalistic critical response illuminates the effect that the dramatic complex of rural and racial values - generically identified as Bauerndrama in the Third Reich - had on the reception of the play; at the same time, both visual and critical documents also suggest possible moments of theatrical dissent in the Hamburg production. Playing "Nordic" undertakes a documentary and cultural reading of the changing theatrical meanings of Wuolijoki's Niskavuoren naiset as it crossed the frontier from Finland to the stage of the Third Reich. It also provides a model for the ways theatrical signification operates within a network of cultural and ideological meanings, suggesting the ideological work of theatrical production depends on, reinforces, and contests that tissue of values. Although Finnish criticism of Niskavuoren naiset has assumed the play's Blut und Boden resonance contributed to Wuolijoki's success in the Third Reich, this study shows a considerably more complex situation. This revealing production dramatizes the changing uses of plays in a politicized national and transnational context. As part of the framing of "Nordic" identity on the wider stage of the Third Reich, Die Frauen auf Niskavuori exemplifies the conjunction of concurrent - sometimes independent, sometimes interlocking - "racial" and national ideologies.

Ranskan rooli ja asema läntisessä liittoutumassa neljännen ja viidennen tasavallan vaihtumakohdassa 1956-1958

The study discusses the position of France as the United States’ ally in NATO in 1956-1958. The concrete position of France and the role that it was envisioned to have are being treated from the point of view of three participants of the Cold War: France, the United States and the Soviet Union. How did these different parties perceive the question and did these views change when the French Fourth Republic turned into the Fifth in 1958? The study is based on published French and American documents of Foreign Affairs. Because of problems with accessibility to the Soviet archival sources, the study uses reports on France-NATO relations of Pravda newspaper, the official organ of the Communist Party of the USSR, to provide information about how the Soviet side saw the question. Due to the nature and use of source material, and the chronological structure of the work, the study belongs methodologically to the research field of History of International Relations. As distinct from political scientists’ field of research, more prone to theorize, the study is characteristically a historical research, a work based on qualitative method and original sources that aims at creating a coherent narrative of the views expressed during the period covered by the study. France’s road to a full membership of NATO is being treated on the basis of research literature, after which discussions about France’s position in the Western Alliance are being chronologically traced for the period of last years of the Fourth Republic and the immediate months of coming back to power of Charles de Gaulle. Right from the spring of 1956 there can be seen aspirations of France, on one hand, to maintain her freedom of action inside the Western Alliance and, on the other, to widen the dialogue between the allies. The decision on France’s own nuclear deterrent was made already during the Fourth Republic, when it was thought to become part of NATO’s common defence. This was to change with de Gaulle. The USA felt that France still fancied herself as a great power and that she could not participate in full in NATO’s common defence because of her colonies. The Soviet Union saw the concrete position of France in the Alliance as in complete dependence on the USA, but her desired role was expressed largely in “Gaullist” terms. The expressions used by the General and the Soviet propaganda were close to each other, but the Soviet Union could not support de Gaulle without endangering the position of the French Communist Party. Between the Fourth and Fifth Republics no great rupture in content took place concerning the views of France’s role and position in the Western Alliance. The questions posed by de Gaulle had been expressed during the whole period of Fourth Republic’s existence. Instead, along with the General the weight and rhetoric of these questions saw a great change. Already in the early phase the Americans saw it possible that with de Gaulle, France would try to change her role. The rupture took place in the form of expression, rather than in its content.

David Balter Archive, 1930s-1990s.

The David Balter Archive includes materials pertaining to World War II.The bulk of the collection consists of printed materials: brochures, newspapers, magazines, and clippings, and German propaganda l eaflets.Other materials include photographs, small amount of personal correspondence, and General Orders of the 79th Infantry Division.

Ett' varttuisi Suomenmaa : Suomalaisten kasvattaminen kulutusyhteiskuntaan kotimaisissa lyhytelokuvissa 1920-1969

The birth of the Modern Consumer Society in Finnish short films 1920-1969 The main subject of this research is Finnish short films in 1920-1969. These short films were produced by film studios for private enterprises, banks, advisory organizations, communities and the state. The evolution of short films on consumer affairs was greatly influenced by a special tax reduction system that was introduced in 1933 and lasted until 1964. The tax reduction system increased the production volumes of educational short films significantly. This study covers 342 Finnish short films, more than any other study in the field before this. The aim of this research is to examine how short films introduced Finns to modern consumer society. The cinemagoers were an excellent target group for different advisory groups as well as advertisers. Short films were used by organizations and private enterprises from very early on. In the 1920's Finns were still living in rural areas and agriculture was the dominant industry. Consumer society was still in its infancy, and the prevalent attitude to industrially produced goods was that of suspicion. From the cultural and ideological point of view the evolution of trust was one of the first steps towards the birth of the consumer society. Short films were an excellent means for helping to transform public attitudes. During the war period short films were an important means of propaganda. Short films were produced in abundance and shown for big audiences. They guided people how to survive shortages caused by the war. Even though the idea of rationalization was presented in short films somewhat in the 1920's and 1930's it became a national virtue during the war period. The idea of rationalization widened from the industry to households expecially in the late 1940's and the 1950's. New household apparati and the way in which daily chores were taken care of were presented not as luxury consumption but as a way of rationalization and saving money and effort. Banks and the advisory organizations guided the public to save their money for a specific target. Short films were use to help the public to acceps industrial goods and the notions of planning and saving. The ideological change from an agrarian society to consumer society was based on old acricultural ideas and self-sufficiency was evolved into rational and economizing consumerism. This made Finnish consumer society to value durable consumer goods and own homes. The public was also encouraged to consider their own decisions in the national context - especially after the second world war Finland laced capital, and personal savings were strongly presented as a way to help the whole nation. Modern hedonistic values were not dominant in Finland in the1950's and 1960's. Initial traces of modern hedonism can be seen in the films, but they were only marginal paths in the bigger.

Juutalaisvastaisuus suomalaisissa aikakauslehdissä ja kirjallisuudessa 1918-1944

Anti-Semitism existed in Finland during the whole period covered by this study. The immoral acts associated with Jews in the articles were mostly regarded as universal habits, qualities and/or modes of action, that is, unconnected with any particular Finnish Jew. Researchers have tried to explain anti-Semitism in several ways. The theory of Jews as outsiders has been a popular explanation as well as xenophobia, chimerical anti-Semitism and the socio-economic models. The main sources of this study have been over 400 Finnish periodicals and magazines, literature and text books published between 1918 and 1944. This vast number of magazines includes those of the army and the civil guard, religion, humour and the papers of the Finnish extreme right. One can see a distinct foreign and especially German influence in the subjects and phraseology of Finnish anti-Semitic writings between 1918 and 1944. Several known Finnish anti-Semitic writers had some kind of link with Germany. Some Finnish organisations and societies were openly anti-Semitic during this period. There had been cycles in the activity of anti-Semitic writing in Finland, obvious peaks appearing in 1918 1919, 1929 1931, 1933 1938 and 1942 1944. The reason for the 1918 1919 activity was the civil rights which were granted to the Jews in Finland, and the Russian Bolshevik revolution. The worldwide depression from 1929 to 1932 seem to be the reason for new anti-Semitic writing activity. The rise of National Socialism in Germany and the influence this phenomenon had in Finland was the reason for the peak during 1933 1938. During the continuation war 1942 1944 National Socialist Germany was fighting side-by-side with Finland and their anti-Semitic propaganda found easier access to Finland. Of the 433 magazines, journals and newspapers which were used in this study, 71 or 16.4 per cent had at least one article that can be identified as anti-Semitic; especially the magazines of national socialists and other extreme right parties were making anti-Semitic annotations. There were about 50 people known to have written anti-Semitic articles. At least half of these known writers had studied at the university, including as many as 10 priests. Over and above these, there was an even larger number of people who wrote under a pseudonym. The material used suggested that anti-Semitism was not very popular in Finland between 1918 and 1944. Anti-Semitic articles appeared mostly in the magazines of the extreme right, but their circulation was not very large. A proof of the slight influence of these extreme right anti-Semitic ideas is that, beside the tightening of policy towards Jewish immigrants in 1938 and the handing over of eight of these refugees to Germany in 1942, the official policy of Finland never became anti-Semitic. As was stated before, despite the cycles in the number of writings, there does not appear to have been any noticeable change in public opinion. One must also remember that most Finns had not at that period actually met a Jew. The material used suggests that between 1918 and 1944 the so-called Jewish question was seemingly unimportant for most Finns and their attitude to Jews and Jewishness can be described as neutral.

Stalinismin lyhyt kurssi : Suomalaiset Moskovan Lenin-koulussa 1926-1938

This study of the Finns at the International Lenin School (ILS) reflects history of the Soviet Union during Stalin's era, history of the Communist International (Comintern) as well as history of Finnish communism. The life span of the ILS (1926-1938) matches up with creating and establishing the power structures of Stalinism. Both the ILS and Finnish Communism in the USSR became casualties of the Great Terror (1937-1938). After the WW2, however, the Soviet education was appreciated inside the Communist Party of Finland (CPF). If Finland would have become People's Democracy, the former ILS students would have composed the inner circle of the new "democratic" government. The Finnish teachers of the ILS were leaders of the CPF that was headquartered in Moscow. At the ILS studied in total 141 Finnish communists. The purpose of the ILS was to educate the communist parties' leading stratum of functionaries. They were supposed to internalize current values, methods and discipline of the Bolsheviks. This study evaluates the effects of the total school experience on the Finns that often ended in another total institution in Finland: prison. The curricula of the ILS consisted of theory of Marxism-Leninism, party history, political economics and themes of campaigns of Stalinism. The ILS year included participation in Bolshevik party life and practical work. During summer excursions (praktikas) the students could acquaint themselves with building of socialism in the Soviet Republics. At the ILS, intention to ideological moulding was not hidden. The students were supposed to adopt the Stalinist identity of the professional revolutionaries of the era. The ILS was saturated with ideology and propaganda. This study analyzes especially uses of history as vehicle of ideological standardisation and as instrument of power. Stalin contributed personally to shortcomings of history writing of the communist party. Later he supervised writing of the inclusive handbook of communism, "History of the All-Union Communist Party. Short Course". Special attention will be paid to the effects of Stalin's intervention at the ILS and inside the CPF. The life of the Finns at the ILS and outside the school is described at grass roots. The dividing line between personal and political is analyzed by charting emotional, intimate and bodily experiences of the Finns of the ILS. The fates of the ILS Finns after the studying or teaching period in Moscow are explored in detail. The protagonist among the teachers is Yrjö Sirola that was called "father of the CPF cadres". The Finnish ILS teachers and the formed students that had remained in the USSR were most severely hit by the Great Terror. The Soviet education had most importance in Finland of post WW2 period. The training at the ILS, however, did not contribute to revolution in Finland. The main heading of the study, "A Short Course of Stalinism", crystallises interpretation of the ILS as seat of learning of ideological unity of Stalinism. On the other hand, the title includes a statement of incompleteness of the Stalinist education if the schooling at the ILS had remained in one year.

East Asian audio-visual collaboration and the global expansion of Chinese media

In recent years, many of the world’s leading media producers, screenwriters, technicians and investors, particularly those in the Asia-Pacific region, have been drawn to work in the People's Republic of China (hereafter China or Mainland China). Media projects with a lighter commercial entertainment feel – compared with the heavy propaganda-oriented content of the past – have multiplied, thanks to the Chinese state’s newfound willingness to consider collaboration with foreign partners. This is no more evident than in film. Despite their long-standing reputation for rigorous censorship, state policymakers are now encouraging Chinese media entrepreneurs to generate fresh ideas and to develop products that will revitalise the stagnant domestic production sector. It is hoped that an increase in both the quality and quantity of domestic feature films, stimulated by an infusion of creativity and cutting-edge technology from outside the country, will help reverse China’s ‘cultural trade deficit’ (wenhua maoyi chizi) (Keane 2007).

Communication and Political Crisis: Media, Politics and Governance in a Globalized Public Sphere

Communication and Political Crisis explores the role of the global media in a period of intensifying geopolitical conflict. Through case studies drawn from domestic and international political crises such as the conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine, leading media scholar Brian McNair argues that the digitized, globalized public sphere now confronted by all political actors has produced new opportunities for social progress and democratic reform, as well as new channels for state propaganda and terrorist spectaculars such as those performed by the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. In this major work, McNair argues that the role of digital communication will be crucial in determining the outcome of pressing global issues such as the future of feminism and gay rights, freedom of speech and media, and democracy itself.

Humanitaarisuuden varjossa : Poliittiset tekijät lastensiirroissa Ruotsiin sotiemme aikana ja niiden jälkeen

The evacuation of Finnish children to Sweden during WW II has often been called a small migration . Historical research on this subject is scarce, considering the great number of children involved. The present research has applied, apart from the traditional archive research, the framework of history-culture developed by Rüsen in order to have an all-inclusive approach to the impact of this historical event. The framework has three dimensions: political, aesthetic and cognitive. The collective memory of war children has also been discussed. The research looks for political factors involved in the evacuations during the Winter War and the Continuation War and the post-war period. The approach is wider than a purely humanitarian one. Political factors have had an impact in both Finland and Sweden, beginning from the decision-making process and ending with the discussion of the unexpected consequences of the evacuations in the Finnish Parliament in 1950. The Winter War (30.11.1939 13.3.1940) witnessed the first child transports. These were also the model for future decision making. The transports were begun on the initiative of Swedes Maja Sandler, the wife of the resigned minister of foreign affairs Rickard Sandler, and Hanna Rydh-Munck af Rosenschöld , but this activity was soon accepted by the Swedish government because the humanitarian help in the form of child transports lightened the political burden of Prime Minister Hansson, who was not willing to help Finland militarily. It was help that Finland never asked for and it was rejected at the beginning. The negative response of Minister Juho Koivisto was not taken very seriously. The political forces in Finland supporting child transports were stronger than those rejecting them. The major politicians in support belonged to Finland´s Swedish minority. In addition, close to 1 000 Finnish children remained in Sweden after the Winter War. No analysis was made of the reasons why these children did not return home. A committee set up to help Finland and Norway was established in Sweden in 1941. Its chairman was Torsten Nothin, an influential Swedish politician. In December 1941 he appealed to the Swedish government to provide help to Finnish children under the authority of The International Red Cross. This plea had no results. The delivery of great amounts of food to Finland, which was now at war with Great Britain, had automatically caused reactions among the allies against the Swedish imports through Gothenburg. This included the import of oil, which was essential for the Swedish navy and air force. Oil was later used successfully to force a reduction in commerce between Sweden and Finland. The contradiction between Sweden´s essential political interests and humanitarian help was solved in a way that did not harm the country´s vital political interests. Instead of delivering help to Finland, Finnish children were transported to Sweden through the organisations that had already been created. At the beginning of the Continuation War (25.6.1941 27.4.1945) negative opinion regarding child transports re-emerged in Finland. Karl-August Fagerholm implemented the transports in September 1941. In 1942, members of the conservative parties in the Finnish Parliament expressed their fear of losing the children to the Swedes. They suggested that Finland should withdraw from the inter-Nordic agreement, according to which the adoptions were approved by the court of the country where the child resided. This initiative failed. Paavo Virkkunen, an influential member of the conservative party Kokoomus in Finland, favoured the so-called good-father system, where help was delivered to Finland in the form of money and goods. Virkkunen was concerned about the consequences of a long stay in a Swedish family. The risk of losing the children was clear. The extreme conservative party (IKL, the Patriotic Movement of the Finnish People) wanted to alienate Finland from Sweden and bring Finland closer to Germany. Von Blücher, the German ambassador to Finland, had in his report to Berlin, mentioned the political consequences of the child transports. Among other things, they would bring Finland and Sweden closer to each other. He had also paid attention to the Nordic political orientation in Finland. He did not question or criticize the child transports. His main interest was to increase German political influence in Finland, and the Nordic political orientation was an obstacle. Fagerholm was politically ill-favoured by the Germans, because he had a strong Nordic political disposition and had criticised Germany´s activities in Norway. The criticism of child transports was at the same time criticism of Fagerholm. The official censorship organ of the Finnish government (VTL) denied the criticism of child transports in January 1942. The reasons were political. Statements made by members of the Finnish Parliament were also censored, because it was thought that they would offend the Swedes. In addition, the censorship organ used child transports as a means of active propaganda aimed at improving the relations between the two countries. The Finnish Parliament was informed in 1948 that about 15 000 Finnish children still remained in Sweden. These children would stay there permanently. In 1950 the members of the Agrarian Party in Finland stated that Finland should actively strive to get the children back. The party on the left (SKDL, the Democratic Movement of Finnish People) also focused on the unexpected consequences of the child transports. The Social Democrats, and largely Fagerholm, had been the main force in Finland behind the child transports. Members of the SKDL, controlled by Finland´s Communist Party, stated that the war time authorities were responsible for this war loss. Many of the Finnish parents could not get their children back despite repeated requests. The discussion of the problem became political, for example von Born, a member of the Swedish minority party RKP, related this problem to foreign policy by stating that the request to repatriate the Finnish children would have negative political consequences for the relations between Finland and Sweden. He emphasized expressing feelings of gratitude to the Swedes. After the war a new foreign policy was established by Prime Minister (1944 1946) and later President (1946 1956) Juho Kusti Paasikivi. The main cornerstone of this policy was to establish good relations with the Soviet Union. The other, often forgotten, cornerstone was to simultaneously establish good relations with other Nordic countries, especially Sweden, as a counterbalance. The unexpected results of the child evacuation, a Swedish initiative, had violated the good relations with Sweden. The motives of the Democratic Movement of Finnish People were much the same as those of the Patriotic Movement of Finnish People. Only the ideology was different. The Nordic political orientation was an obstacle to both parties. The position of the Democratic Movement of Finnish People was much better than that of the Patriotic Movement of Finnish People, because now one could clearly see the unexpected results, which included human tragedy for the many families who could not be re-united with their children despite their repeated requests. The Swedes questioned the figure given to the Finnish Parliament regarding the number of children permanently remaining in Sweden. This research agrees with the Swedes. In a calculation based on Swedish population registers, the number of these children is about 7 100. The reliability of this figure is increased by the fact that the child allowance programme began in Sweden in 1948. The prerequisite to have this allowance was that the child be in the Swedish population register. It was not necessary for the child to have Swedish nationality. The Finnish Parliament had false information about the number of Finnish children who remained in Sweden in 1942 and in 1950. There was no parliamentary control in Finland regarding child transports, because the decision was made by one cabinet member and speeches by MPs in the Finnish Parliament were censored, like all criticism regarding child transports to Sweden. In Great Britain parliamentary control worked better throughout the whole war, because the speeches regarding evacuation were not censored. At the beginning of the war certain members of the British Labour Party and the Welsh Nationalists were particularly outspoken about the scheme. Fagerholm does not discuss to any great extent the child transports in his memoirs. He does not evaluate the process and results as a whole. This research provides some possibilities for an evaluation of this sort. The Swedish medical reports give a clear picture of the physical condition of the Finnish children when arriving in Sweden. The transports actually revealed how bad the situation of the poorest children was. According to Titmuss, similar observations were made in Great Britain during the British evacuations. The child transports saved the lives of approximately 2 900 children. Most of these children were removed to Sweden to receive treatment for illnesses, but many among the healthy children were undernourished and some suffered from the effects of tuberculosis. The medical inspection in Finland was not thorough. If you compare the figure of 2 900 children saved and returned with the figure of about 7 100 children who remained permanently in Sweden, you may draw the conclusion that Finland as a country failed to benefit from the child transports, and that the whole operation was a political mistake with far-reaching consequenses. The basic goal of the operation was to save lives and have all the children return to Finland after the war. The difficulties with the repatriation of the children were mainly psychological. The level of child psychology in Finland at that time was low. One may question the report by Professor Martti Kaila regarding the adaptation of children to their families back in Finland. Anna Freud´s warnings concerning the difficulties that arise when child evacuees return are also valid in Finland. Freud viewed the emotional life of children in a way different from Kaila: the physical survival of a small child forces her to create strong emotional ties to the person who is looking after her. This, a characteristic of all small children, occurred with the Finnish children too, and it was something the political decision makers in Finland could not see during and after the war. It is a characteristic of all little children. Yet, such experiences were already evident during the Winter War. The best possible solution had been to limit the child transports only to children in need of medical treatment. Children from large and poor families had been helped by organising meals and by buying food from Denmark with Swedish money. Assisting Finland by all possible means should have been the basic goal of Fagerholm in September 1941, when the offer of child transports came from Sweden. Fagerholm felt gratitude towards the Swedes. The risks became clear to him only in 1943. The war children are today a rather scattered and diffuse group of people. Emotionally, part of these children remained in Sweden after the war. There is no clear collective memory, only individual memories; the collective memory of the war children has partly been shaped later through the activities of the war child associations. The main difference between the children evacuated in Finland (for example from Karelia to safer areas with their families) and the war children, who were sent abroad, is that the war children lack a shared story and experience with their families. They were outsiders . The whole matter is sensitive to many of such mothers and discussing the subject has often been avoided in families. The war-time censorship has continued in families through silence and avoidance and Finnish politicians and Finnish families had to face each other on this issue after the war. The lack of all-inclusive historical research has also prevented the formation of a collective awareness among war children returned to Finland or those remaining permanently abroad.. Knowledge of historical facts will help war-children by providing an opportunity to create an all-inclusive approach to the past. Personal experiences should be regarded as part of a large historical entity shadowed by war and where many political factors were at work in both Finland and Sweden. This means strengthening of the cognitive dimension discussed in Rüsen´s all-inclusive historical approach.