Iowa Comprehensive Annual Financial Report, 2001

In accordance with Iowa Code Section421.3(5), we are please to sbmit the Comprehensive Annual Finanical Report (CAFR) for the State of iowa for the fiscal year ending in June. The Department of Revenue and Finance is responsible for both the accuracy in all materials respects and the necessary disclosures have been made which enable the reader to obtain an understanding of the State's finanical activity. This report is prepared in accordance with generally accepted accountinfg principles (GAAP) for governments Standards Board (GASB).

Iowa Comprehensive Annual Financial Report, 2002

In accordance with Iowa Code Section421.3(5), we are please to sbmit the Comprehensive Annual Finanical Report (CAFR) for the State of iowa for the fiscal year ending in June. The Department of Revenue and Finance is responsible for both the accuracy in all materials respects and the necessary disclosures have been made which enable the reader to obtain an understanding of the State's finanical activity. This report is prepared in accordance with generally accepted accountinfg principles (GAAP) for governments Standards Board (GASB).

Iowa Comprehensive Annual Financial Report, 2003

In accordance with Iowa Code Section421.3(5), we are please to submit the Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) for the State of Iowa for the fiscal year ending in June. The Department of Administrative Services is responsible for both the accuracy in all materials respects and the necessary disclosures have been made which enable the reader to obtain an understanding of the State's financial activity. This report is prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) for governments Standards Board (GASB).

Iowa Comprehensive Annual Financial Report, 2004

In accordance with Iowa Code Section421.3(5), we are please to submit the Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) for the State of Iowa for the fiscal year ending in June. The Department of Administrative Services is responsible for both the accuracy in all materials respects and the necessary disclosures have been made which enable the reader to obtain an understanding of the State's financial activity. This report is prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) for governments Standards Board (GASB).

Iowa Comprehensive Annual Financial Report, 2005

In accordance with Iowa Code Section 8A.502(8) we are pleased to submit the Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) for the State of Iowa for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2005. The report is presented in three sections as follows: • The Introductory Section includes this transmittal letter, the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) Certificate of Achievement for the fiscal year 2004 CAFR, an organizational chart of State government, and a list of principal State officials. • The Financial Section contains the independent auditor’s report on the Basic Financial Statements, Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A), the Basic Financial Statements, and Notes to the Financial Statements. The Financial Section also contains Required Supplementary Information (RSI), other than the MD&A, and supplementary information in the form of combining financial statements and schedules. This letter is intended to be read in conjunction with the MD&A. • The Statistical Section highlights selected financial and demographic information, generally presented on a multi-year basis. The Department of Administrative Services is responsible for both the accuracy of the presented data, and the completeness and fairness of the presentation. We believe the information presented is accurate in all material respects and the necessary disclosures have been made which enable the reader to obtain an understanding of the State’s financial activity. This report has been prepared in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) for governments as promulgated by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB). As a part of the statewide accounting system upgrade during fiscal year 2005, the implementation team performed a comprehensive review of the adequacy of internal controls and budgetary controls of the system. The team determined that internal controls continue to be in place to provide reasonable, but not absolute, assurance that assets are safeguarded against unauthorized use or disposition, and that financial records from all appropriate sources are reliable for preparing financial statements and maintaining accountability. The concept of reasonable assurance recognizes the cost of internal controls should not exceed the benefits likely to be derived from their use. To monitor the adequacy of internal controls, the Auditor of State reviews internal control procedures as an integral part of departmental audits.

Adoption of financial technologies: Implications for money demand and monetary policy

In this paper we argue that inventory models are probably not usefulmodels of household money demand because the majority of households does nothold any interest bearing assets. The relevant decision for most people is notthe fraction of assets to be held in interest bearing form, but whether to holdany of such assets at all. The implications of this realization are interesting and important. We find that(a) the elasticity of money demand is very small when the interest rate is small,(b) the probability that a household holds any amount of interest bearing assetsis positively related to the level of financial assets, and (c) the cost ofadopting financial technologies is positively related to age and negatively relatedto the level of education. Unlike the traditional methods of money demand estimation, our methodology allowsfor the estimation of the interest--elasticity at low values of the nominalinterest rate. The finding that the elasticity is very small for interest ratesbelow 5 percent suggests that the welfare costs of inflation are small. At interest rates of 6 percent, the elasticity is close to 0.5. We find thatroughly one half of this elasticity can be attributed to the Baumol--Tobin orintensive margin and half of it can be attributed to the new adopters or extensivemargin. The intensive margin is less important at lower interest rates and moreimportant at higher interest rates.

Understanding Insurance Company Financial Stability Ratings, January 2007

Choosing a financially strong insurance company is important when buying health insurance. You want the company to still be in business when you have claims, which can be 20 to 30 years from now. Insurance companies selling insurance in Iowa have met the minimum legal standards to be licensed by the State of Iowa Insurance Division. This licensure doesn’t mean the company has a high financial stability rating. Several independent rating agencies evaluate the financial stability of insurance companies. The rating for an individual insurance company is an opinion as to its financial strength and ability to pay claims in the future. When evaluating a company, a rating agency may consider a company's balance sheet strength, operating performance and business management and strategies.

Regulating financial conglomerates

We investigate the optimal regulation of financial conglomerates which combinea bank and a non-bank financial institution. The conglomerate s risk-taking incentivesdepend upon the level of market discipline it faces, which in turn isdetermined by the conglomerate s liability strucure. We examine optimal capitalrequirements for standalone institutions, for integrated financial conglomerates,and for financial conglomerates that are structured as holding companies.For a given risk profile, integrated conglomerates have a lower probability offailure than either their standalone or decentralised equivalent. However, whenrisk profiles are endogenously selected conglomeration may extend the reachof the deposit insurance safety net and hence provide incentives for increasedrisk-taking. As a result, integrated conglomerates may optimally attract highercapital requirements. In contrast, decentralised conglomerates are able to holdassets in the socially most efficient place. Their optimal capital requirementsencourage this. Hence, the practice of regulatory arbitrage , or of transferingassets from one balance sheet to another, is welfare-increasing. We discuss thepolicy implications of our finding in the context not only of the present debateon the regulation of financial conglomerates but also in the light of existingUS bank holding company regulation.

A dilution cost approach to financial intermediation and securities markets

This paper proposes a model of financial markets and corporate finance,with asymmetric information and no taxes, where equity issues, Bankdebt and Bond financing may all co-exist in equilibrium. The paperemphasizes the relationship Banking aspect of financial intermediation:firms turn to banks as a source of investment mainly because banks aregood at helping them through times of financial distress. The debtrestructuring service that banks may offer, however, is costly. Therefore,the firms which do not expect to be financially distressed prefer toobtain a cheaper market source of funding through bond or equity issues.This explains why bank lending and bond financing may co-exist inequilibrium. The reason why firms or banks also issue equity in our modelis simply to avoid bankruptcy. Banks have the additional motive that theyneed to satisfy minimum capital adequacy requeriments. Several types ofequilibria are possible, one of which has all the main characteristics ofa "credit crunch". This multiplicity implies that the channels of monetarypolicy may depend on the type of equilibrium that prevails, leadingsometimes to support a "credit view" and other times the classical "moneyview".

Designing institutions for financial stability: Regulation and supervision by objective for the Euro area

In this paper, we discuss pros and cons ofdifferent models for financial market regulationand supervision and we present a proposal forthe re-organisation of regulatory and supervisoryagencies in the Euro Area. Our arguments areconsistent with both new theories and effectivebehaviour of financial intermediaries inindustrialized countries. Our proposed architecturefor financial market regulation is based on theassignment of different objectives or "finalities"to different authorities, both at the domesticand the European level. According to thisperspective, the three objectives of supervision- microeconomic stability, investor protectionand proper behaviour, efficiency and competition- should be assigned to three distinct Europeanauthorities, each one at the centre of a Europeansystem of financial regulators and supervisorsspecialized in overseeing the entire financialmarket with respect to a single regulatoryobjective and regardless of the subjective natureof the intermediaries. Each system should bestructured and organized similarly to the EuropeanSystem of Central Banks and work in connectionwith the central bank which would remain theinstitution responsible for price and macroeconomicstability. We suggest a plausible path to buildour 4-peak regulatory architecture in the Euro area.

Financial intermediation and equity investment with costly monitoring

This paper studies the efficiency of equilibria in a productive OLG economy where the process of financial intermediation is characterized by costly state verification. Both competitive equilibria and Constrained Pareto Optimal allocations are characterized. It is shown that market outcomes can be socially inefficient, even when a weaker notion than Pareto optimality is considered.

Rethinking the effects of financial liberalization

During the last few decades, many emerging markets have lifted restrictions on cross-borderfinancial transactions. The conventional view was that this would allow these countries to: (i)receive capital inflows from advanced countries that would finance higher investment and growth;(ii) insure against aggregate shocks and reduce consumption volatility; and (iii) accelerate thedevelopment of domestic financial markets and achieve a more efficient domestic allocationof capital and better sharing of individual risks. However, the evidence suggests that thisconventional view was wrong.In this paper, we present a simple model that can account for the observed effects of financialliberalization. The model emphasizes the role of imperfect enforcement of domestic debts and theinteractions between domestic and international financial transactions. In the model, financialliberalization might lead to different outcomes: (i) domestic capital flight and ambiguous effectson net capital flows, investment, and growth; (ii) large capital inflows and higher investmentand growth; or (iii) volatile capital flows and unstable domestic financial markets. The modelshows how these outcomes depend on the level of development, the depth of domestic financialmarkets, and the quality of institutions.