The evolutionary structure of scientific theories

David Hull's (1988c) model of science as a selection process suffers from a two-fold inability: (a) to ascertain when a lineage of theories has been established; i.e., when theories are descendants of older theories or are novelties, and what counts as a distinct lineage; and (b) to specify what the scientific analogue is of genotype and phenotype. This paper seeks to clarify these issues and to propose an abstract model of theories analogous to particulate genetic structure, in order to reconstruct relationships of descent and identity.

The conserved quantity theory of causation and chance raising

In this paper I offer an 'integrating account' of singular causation, where the term 'integrating' refers to the following program for analysing causation. There are two intuitions about causation, both of which face serious counterexamples when used as the basis for an analysis of causation. The 'process' intuition, which says that causes and effects are linked by concrete processes, runs into trouble with cases of misconnections', where an event which serves to prevent another fails to do so on a particular occasion and yet the two events are linked by causal processes. The chance raising intuition, according to which causes raise the chance of their effects, easily accounts for misconnections but faces the problem of chance lowering causes, a problem easily accounted for by the process approach. The integrating program attempts to provide an analysis of singular causation by synthesising the two insights, so as to solve both problems. In this paper I show that extant versions of the integrating program due to Eells, Lewis, and Menzies fail to account for the chance-lowering counterexample. I offer a new diagnosis of the chance lowering case, and use that as a basis for an integrating account of causation which does solve both cases. In doing so, I accept various assumptions of the integrating program, in particular that there are no other problems with these two approaches. As an example of the process account, I focus on the recent CQ theory of Wesley Salmon (1997).

Causal loops and the independence of causal facts

According to Hugh Mellor in Real Time II (1998, Ch. 12), assuming the logical independence of causal facts and the 'law of large numbers', causal loops are impossible because if they were possible they would produce inconsistent sets of frequencies. I clarify the argument, and argue that it would be preferable to abandon the relevant independence assumption in the case of causal loops.

The advantages of theft over toil: The design inference and arguing from ignorance

Intelligent design theorist William Dembski has proposed an explanatory filter for distinguishing between events due to chance, lawful regularity or design. We show that if Dembski's filter were adopted as a scientific heuristic, some classical developments in science would not be rational, and that Dembski's assertion that the filter reliably identifies rarefied design requires ignoring the state of background knowledge. If background information changes even slightly, the filter's conclusion will vary wildly. Dembski fails to overcome Hume's objections to arguments from design.

Bringing the state to England: Andrew Tooke's translation of Samuel Pufendorf's 'De officio hominis et civis'

Andrew Tooke's 1691 English translation of Samuel Pufendorf's De officio hominis et civis, published as The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of Nature, brought Pufendorf's manual fo statist natural law into English politics at a moment of temporary equilibrium in the unfinished contest between Crown and Parliament for the rights and powers of sovereignty. Drawing on the authors' re-edition of The Whole Duty of Man, this article describes and analyses a telling instance of how--by translation--the core political terms and concepts of the German natural jurist's 'absolutist' formulary were reshaped for reception in the different political culture of late seventeenth-century England.

How to be a chaste species pluralist-realist: the origins of species modes and the synapomorphic species concept

The biological species (biospecies) concept applies only to sexually reproducing species, which means that until sexual reproduction evolved, there were no biospecies. On the universal tree of life, biospecies concepts therefore apply only to a relatively small number of clades, notably plants and animals. I argue that it is useful to treat the various ways of being a species (species modes) as traits of clades. By extension from biospecies to the other concepts intended to capture the natural realities of what keeps taxa distinct, we can treat other modes as traits also, and so come to understand that the plurality of species concepts reflects the biological realities of monophyletic groups. We should expect that specialists in different organisms will tend to favour those concepts that best represent the intrinsic mechanisms that keep taxa distinct in their clades. I will address the question whether modes of reproduction such as asexual and sexual reproduction are natural classes, given that they are paraphyletic in most clades.

Language, discourse and politics

After discussing the meaning of the word politics, this paper shows that there are four possible approaches to the issue of the relationships between language, discourse and politics: a) the intrinsic political nature of language; b) the relations of power between discourses and their political dimension; c) the relations of power between languages and the political dimension of their usage and; d) linguistic policies. This paper addresses only the first two of these items. Languages have an intrinsically political nature because they subject their speakers to their order. The acts of silencing operationalized in discourse manifest a relation of power. The spread of discourses in the social space is also subject to the order of power. The use of language may be the space of pertinence, but is also that of exclusion, separation and even the elimination of the other. Therefore, language is not a neutral communication tool, but it is permeated by politics, by power. Because of the dislocations that it produces, literature is a form of swindling language, unveiling the powers that are imprinted on it.

Updated Clinical Classification of Pulmonary Hypertension

The aim of a clinical classification of pulmonary hypertension (PH) is to group together different manifestations of disease sharing similarities in pathophysiologic mechanisms, clinical presentation, and therapeutic approaches. In 2003, during the 3rd World Symposium on Pulmonary Hypertension, the clinical classification of PH initially adopted in 1998 during the 2nd World Symposium was slightly modified. During the 4th World Symposium held in 2008, it was decided to maintain the general architecture and philosophy of the previous clinical classifications. The modifications adopted during this meeting principally concern Group 1, pulmonary arterial hypertension (PAH). This subgroup includes patients with PAH with a family history or patients with idiopathic PAH with germline mutations (e. g., bone morphogenetic protein receptor-2, activin receptor-like kinase type 1, and endoglin). In the new classification, schistosomiasis and chronic hemolytic anemia appear as separate entities in the subgroup of PAH associated with identified diseases. Finally, it was decided to place pulmonary venoocclusive disease and pulmonary capillary hemangiomatosis in a separate group, distinct from but very close to Group 1 (now called Group 1`). Thus, Group 1 of PAH is now more homogeneous. (J Am Coll Cardiol 2009;54:S43-54) (C) 2009 by the American College of Cardiology Foundation

A defense of backwards in time causation models in quantum mechanics

This paper offers a defense of backwards in time causation models in quantum mechanics. Particular attention is given to Cramer's transactional account, which is shown to have the threefold virtue of solving the Bell problem, explaining the complex conjugate aspect of the quantum mechanical formalism, and explaining various quantum mysteries such as Schrodinger's cat. The question is therefore asked, why has this model not received more attention from physicists and philosophers? One objection given by physicists in assessing Cramer's theory was that it is not testable. This paper seeks to answer this concern by utilizing an argument that backwards causation models entail a fork theory of causal direction. From the backwards causation model together with the fork theory one can deduce empirical predictions. Finally, the objection that this strategy is questionable because of its appeal to philosophy is deflected.