PHYTOCHROME KINASE SUBSTRATE4 modulates phytochrome-mediated control of hypocotyl growth orientation

Gravity and light are major factors shaping plant growth. Light perceived by phytochromes leads to seedling deetiolation, which includes the deviation from vertical hypocotyl growth and promotes hypocotyl phototropism. These light responses enhance survival of young seedlings during their emergence from the soil. The PHYTOCHROME KINASE SUBSTRATE (PKS) family is composed of four members in Arabidopsis (Arabidopsis thaliana): PKS1 to PKS4. Here we show that PKS4 is a negative regulator of both phytochrome A- and B-mediated inhibition of hypocotyl growth and promotion of cotyledon unfolding. Most prominently, pks4 mutants show abnormal phytochrome-modulated hypocotyl growth orientation. In dark-grown seedlings hypocotyls change from the original orientation defined by seed position to the upright orientation defined by gravity and light reduces the magnitude of this shift. In older seedlings with the hypocotyls already oriented by gravity, light promotes the deviation from vertical orientation. Based on the characterization of pks4 mutants we propose that PKS4 inhibits changes in growth orientation under red or far-red light. Our data suggest that in these light conditions PKS4 acts as an inhibitor of asymmetric growth. This hypothesis is supported by the phenotype of PKS4 overexpressers. Together with previous findings, these results indicate that the PKS family plays important functions during light-regulated tropic growth responses

Outsourcing versus FDI in oligopoly equilibrium

We consider the make-or-buy decision of oligopolistic firms in an industry in which final good production requires specialised inputs. Factor price considerations dictate that firms acquire the intermediate abroad, by either producing it in a wholly owned subsidiary or outsourcing it to a supplier who must make a relationship specific investment. Firms’ internationalisation mode depends on cost and strategic considerations. Crucially, asymmetric equilibria emerge, with firms choosing different modes of internationalisation, even when they are ex-ante identical. With ex-ante asymmetries, lower cost producers have a stronger incentive to vertically integrate (FDI), while higher cost firms are more likely to outsource.

Resistance of schistosomes to hycanthone and oxamniquine

Genetic crosses between phenotypically resistant and sensitive schistosomes demonstrated that resistance to hycanthone and oxamniquine behaves like a recessive trait, thus suggesting that resistance is due to the lack of some factor. We hypothesized that, in order to kill schistosomes, hycanthone and oxamniquine need to be converted into an active metabolite by some parasite enzyme wich, if inactive, results in drug resistance. Esterification of the drugs seemed to be the most likely event as it would lead to the production of an alkylating agent upon dissociation of the ester. An artificial ester of hycanthone was indeed active even in resistant worms, thus indirectly supporting our hypothesis. In addition, several lines of evidence demonstrated that exposure to hycanthone and oxamniquine results in alkylation of worm macromolecules. Thus, radioactive drugs formed covalent bonds with the DNA of sensitive (but not of resistant) schistosomes; an antiserum raised against hycanthone detected the presence of the drug in the purified DNA fraction of sensitive (but not of resistant) schistosomes; a drug-DNA adduct was isolated from hycanthone-treated worms and fully characterized as hycanthone-deoxyguanosine.

3-Regime symmetric STAR modeling and exchange rate reversion

The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the adoption of generalized oating exchange rates ushered in a new era of exchange rate volatility and uncer- tainty. This increased volatility lead economists to search for economic models able to describe observed exchange rate behavior. In the present paper we propose more general STAR transition functions which encompass both threshold nonlinearity and asymmetric e¤ects. Our framework allows for a gradual adjustment from one regime to another, and considers threshold e¤ects by encompassing other existing models, such as TAR models. We apply our methodology to three di¤erent exchange rate data-sets, one for developing countries, and o¢ cial nominal exchange rates, the sec- ond emerging market economies using black market exchange rates and the third for OECD economies.

Optimal Climate Change Policies When Governments Cannot Commit

This paper examines the optimal design of climate change policies in the context where governments want to encourage the private sector to undertake significant immediate investment in developing cleaner technologies, but the carbon taxes and other environmental policies that could in principle stimulate such investment will be imposed over a very long future. The conventional claim by environmental economists is that environmental policies alone are sufficient to induce firms to undertake optimal investment. However this argument requires governments to be able to commit to these future taxes, and it is far from clear that governments have this degree of commitment. We assume instead that governments cannot commit, and so both they and the private sector have to contemplate the possibility of there being governments in power in the future that give different (relative) weights to the environment. We show that this lack of commitment has a significant asymmetric effect. Compared to the situation where governments can commit it increases the incentive of the current government to have the investment undertaken, but reduces the incentive of the private sector to invest. Consequently governments may need to use additional policy instruments – such as R&D subsidies – to stimulate the required investment.

Off-the-Record Target Zones: Theory with an Application to Hong Kongs Currency Board

This paper provides a modelling framework for evaluating the exchange rate dynamics of a target zone regime with undisclosed bands. We generalize the literature to allow for asymmetric one-sided regimes. Market participants' beliefs concerning an undisclosed band change as they learn more about central bank intervention policy. We apply the model to Hong Kong's one-sided currency board mechanism. In autumn 2003, the Hong Kong dollar appreciated from close to 7.80 per US dollar to 7.70, as investors feared that the currency board would be abandoned. In the wake of this appreciation, the monetary authorities finally revamped the regime as a symmetric two-sided system with a narrow exchange rate band.

Affirmative Action Policy and Effort Levels. Sequential-Move Contest Game Argument

In this paper we analyse a simple two-person sequential-move contest game with heterogeneous players. Assuming that the heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination, we study the effects of implementation of affirmative action policy, which tackles this heterogeneity by compensating discriminated players, and compare them with the situation in which the heterogeneity is ignored and the contestants are treated equally. In our analysis we consider different orders of moves. We show that the order of moves of contestants is a very important factor in determination of the effects of the implementation of the affirmative action policy. We also prove that in such cases a significant role is played by the level of the heterogeneity of individuals. In particular, in contrast to the present-in-the-literature predictions, we demonstrate that as a consequence of the interplay of these two factors, the response to the implementation of the affirmative action policy option may be the decrease in the total equilibrium effort level of the contestants in comparison to the unbiased contest game.

Economising, Strategising and the Decision to Outsource

We study the make-or-buy decision of oligopolistic firms in an industry in which final good production requires specialised inputs. Firms’ mode of operation decision depends on both the incentive to economize on costs and on strategic considerations. We explore the strategic incentives to outsource and show that asymmetric equilibria emerge, with firms choosing different modes of operation, even when they are ex-ante identical. With ex-ante asymmetries, higher cost firms are more likely to outsource. We apply our model to a number of different international trading setups.

Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of super majority rules

We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have single-peaked preferences, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. The existence and uniqueness of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is established, and its explicit characterization provided. We supply an explicit formula to determine the unique alternative that prevails, as impatience vanishes, for each majority. As an application, we examine the efficiency of majority rules. For symmetric distributions of peaks unanimity is the unanimously preferred majority rule. For asymmetric populations rules maximizing social surplus are characterized.

When Do We Learn to Cooperate? The Role of Social Learning in Social Dilemmas

In this paper, I look at the interaction between social learning and cooperative behavior. I model this using a social dilemma game with publicly observed sequential actions and asymmetric information about pay offs. I find that some informed agents in this model act, individually and without collusion, to conceal the privately optimal action. Because the privately optimal action is socially costly the behavior of informed agents can lead to a Pareto improvement in a social dilemma. In my model I show that it is possible to get cooperative behavior if information is restricted to a small but non-zero proportion of the population. Moreover, such cooperative behavior occurs in a finite setting where it is public knowledge which agent will act last. The proportion of cooperative agents within the population can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by increasing the finite number of agents playing the game. Finally, I show that under a broad set of conditions that it is a Pareto improvement on a corner value, in the ex-ante welfare sense, for an interior proportion of the population to be informed.

Unionisation, International Integration and Selection

We study how unionisation affects competitive selection between heterogeneous firms when wage negotiations can occur at the rm or at the profit-centre level. With productivity specific wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection-softening; (ii) a counter-competitive; (iii) a wage-inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two-country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit-centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalisation can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).

Unionism and Peer-Referencing

This study assesses the 'fair-wage-effort' hypothesis, by examining (a) the relationship between relative wage comparisons and job satisfaction and quitting intensions, and (b) the relative ranking of stated effort inducing-incentives, in a novel dataset of unionised and non-unionised European employees. By distinguishing between downward and upward-looking wage comparisons, it is shown that wage comparisons to similar workers exert an asymmetric impact on the job satisfaction of union workers, a pattern consistent with inequity-aversion and conformism to the reference point. Moreover, union workers evaluate peer observation and good industrial relations more highly than payment and other incentives. In contrast, non-union workers are found to be more status-seeking in their satisfaction responses and less dependent on their peers in their effort choices The results are robust to endogenous union membership, considerations of generic loss aversion and across different tenure profiles. They are supportive of the individual egalitarian bias of collective wage determination and self-enforcing effort norms.

Rebellion against Reason? A Study of Expressive Choice and Strikes

In this paper we challenge the conventional view that strikes are caused by asymmetric information regarding rm profitability such that union members are uninformed. Instead, we build an expressive model of strikes where the perception of unfairness provides the expressive benefi t of voting for a strike. The model predicts that larger union size increases both wage offers and the incidence of strikes. Furthermore, while asymmetric information is still important in causing strikes, we find that it is the employer who is not fully informed about the level of emotionality within the union, thereby contributing to strike incidence. An empirical test using UK data provides support for the predictions. In particular, union size has a positive effect on the incidence of strikes and other industrial actions even when asymmetric information regarding profitability is controlled for.

Combinatorial Synthesis and Biological Evaluation of Inhibitors of D-Ala-D-Ala-Ligase

Report for the scientific sojourn carried out at the Max Planck Institut of Molecular Phisiology, Germany, from 2006 to 2008.The work carried out during this postdoctoral stage was focused on two different projects. Firstly, identification of D-Ala D-Ala Inhibitors and the development of new synthethic approaches to obtain lipidated peptides and proteins and the use of these lipidated proteins in biological and biophysical studies. In the first project, new D-Ala D-Ala inhibitors were identified by using structural alignments of the ATP binding sites of the bacterial ligase DDl and protein and lipid kinases in complex with ATP analogs. We tested a series of commercially available kinase inhibitors and found LFM-A13 and Tyrphostine derivatives to inhibit DDl enzyme activity. Based on the initial screening results we synthesized a series of malononitrilamide and salicylamide derivatives and were able to confirm the validity of these scaffolds as inhibitors of DDl. From this investigation we gained a better understanding of the structural requirements and limitations necessary for the preparation of ATP competitive DDl inhibitors. The compounds in this study may serve as starting points for the development of bi-substrate inhibitors that incorporate both, an ATP competitive and a substrate competitive moiety. Bisubstrate inhibitors that block the ATP and D-Ala binding sites should exhibit enhanced selectivity and potency profiles by preferentially inhibiting DDl over kinases. In the second project, an optimized synthesis for tha alkylation of cysteins using the thiol ene reaction was establisehd. This new protocol allowed us to obtain large amounts of hexadecylated cysteine that was required for the synthesis of differently lipidated peptides. Afterwards the synthesis of various N-ras peptides bearing different lipid anchors was performed and the peptides were ligated to a truncated N-ras protein. The influence of this differently lipidated N-ras proteins on the partioning and association of N-Ras in model membrane subdomains was studied using Atomic Force Microscopy.

Rebellion against Reason? A Study of Expressive Choice and Strikes

In this paper we challenge the conventional view that strikes are caused by asymmetric information regarding firm protability such that union members are uninformed. Instead, we build an expressive model of strikes where the perception of unfairness provides the expressive benefit of voting for a strike. The model predicts that larger union size increases both wage offers and the incidence of strikes. Furthermore, while asymmetric information is still important in causing strikes, we find that it is the employer who is not fully informed about the level of emotionality within the union, thereby contributing to strike incidence. An empirical test using UK data provides support for the predictions. In particular, union size has a positive effect on the incidence of strikes and other industrial actions even when asymmetric information regarding protability is controlled for.