Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games

We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas¿ five player game with a unique stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed.

The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of assignment games

En aquest treball demostrem que en la classe de jocs d'assignació amb diagonal dominant (Solymosi i Raghavan, 2001), el repartiment de Thompson (que coincideix amb el valor tau) és l'únic punt del core que és maximal respecte de la relació de dominància de Lorenz, i a més coincideix amb la solucié de Dutta i Ray (1989), també coneguda com solució igualitària. En segon lloc, mitjançant una condició més forta que la de diagonal dominant, introduïm una nova classe de jocs d'assignació on cada agent obté amb la seva parella òptima almenys el doble que amb qualsevol altra parella. Per aquests jocs d'assignació amb diagonal 2-dominant, el repartiment de Thompson és l'únic punt del kernel, i per tant el nucleolo.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Monge assignment games

Un juego de asignación se define por una matriz A; donde cada fila representa un comprador y cada columna un vendedor. Si el comprador i se empareja a un vendedor j; el mercado produce aij unidades de utilidad. Estudiamos los juegos de asignación de Monge, es decir, aquellos juegos bilaterales de asignación en los cuales la matriz satisface la propiedad de Monge. Estas matrices pueden caracterizarse por el hecho de que en cualquier submatriz 2x2 un emparejamiento óptimo está situado en la diagonal principal. Para mercados cuadrados, describimos sus núcleos utilizando sólo la parte central tridiagonal de elementos de la matriz. Obtenemos una fórmula cerrada para el reparto óptimo de los compradores dentro del núcleo y para el reparto óptimo de los vendedores dentro del núcleo. Analizamos también los mercados no cuadrados reduciéndolos a matrices cuadradas apropiadas.

On the nucleolus of 2 x 2 assignment games

[spa] En este artículo hallamos fórmulas para el nucleolo de juegos de asignación arbitrarios con dos compradores y dos vendedores. Se analizan cinco casos distintos, dependiendo de las entradas en la matriz de asignación. Los resultados se extienden a los casos de juegos de asignación de tipo 2 x m o m x 2.

Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games

[cat] En aquest treball caracteritzem les solucions puntuals de jocs cooperatius d'utilitat transferible que compleixen selecció del core i monotonia agregada. També mostrem que aquestes dues propietats són compatibles amb la individualitat racional, la propietat del jugador fals i la propietat de simetria. Finalment, caracteritzem les solucions puntuals que compleixen les cinc propietats a l'hora.

Coalitionally monotonic set-solutions for cooperative TU games

A static comparative study on set-solutions for cooperative TU games is carried out. The analysis focuses on studying the compatibility between two classical and reasonable properties introduced by Young (1985) in the context of single valued solutions, namely core-selection and coalitional monotonicity. As the main result, it is showed that coalitional monotonicity is not only incompatible with the core-selection property but also with the bargaining-selection property. This new impossibility result reinforces the tradeoff between these kinds of interesting and intuitive economic properties. Positive results about compatibility between desirable economic properties are given replacing the core selection requirement by the core-extension property.

Targeted Small Business Link, Summer 2011, Vol. 4, no. 3

Targeted Small Business News and information from the Iowa Department of Economic Development.

A Note on Shapley's convex measure games

L. S. Shapley, in his paper 'Cores of Convex Games', introduces Convex Measure Games, those that are induced by a convex function on R, acting over a measure on the coalitions. But in a note he states that if this function is a function of several variables, then convexity for the function does not imply convexity of the game or even superadditivity. We prove that if the function is directionally convex, the game is convex, and conversely, any convex game can be induced by a directionally convex function acting over measures on the coalitions, with as many measures as players

Security strategies and equilibria in multiobjetives matrix games

Multiobjective matrix games have been traditionally analyzed from two different points of view: equiibrium concepts and security strategies. This paper is based upon the idea that both players try to reach equilibrium points playing pairs of security strategies, as it happens in scalar matrix games. We show conditions guaranteeing the existence of equilibria in security strategies, named security equilibria

All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer-seller exact representative

Coculture of bladder urothelial and smooth muscle cells on small intestinal submucosa: potential applications for tissue engineering technology.

PURPOSE: Small intestinal submucosa is a xenogenic, acellular, collagen rich membrane with inherent growth factors that has previously been shown to promote in vivo bladder regeneration. We evaluate in vitro use of small intestinal submucosa to support the individual and combined growth of bladder urothelial cells and smooth muscle cells for potential use in tissue engineering techniques, and in vitro study of the cellular mechanisms involved in bladder regeneration. MATERIALS AND METHODS: Primary cultures of human bladder urothelial cells and smooth muscle cells were established using standard enzymatic digestion or explant techniques. Cultured cells were then seeded on small intestinal submucosa at a density of 1 x 105 cells per cm.2, incubated and harvested at 3, 7, 14 and 28 days. The 5 separate culture methods evaluated were urothelial cells seeded alone on the mucosal surface of small intestinal submucosa, smooth muscle cells seeded alone on the mucosal surface, layered coculture of smooth muscle cells seeded on the mucosal surface followed by urothelial cells 1 hour later, sandwich coculture of smooth muscle cells seeded on the serosal surface followed by seeding of urothelial cells on the mucosal surface 24 hours later, and mixed coculture of urothelial cells and smooth muscle cells mixed and seeded together on the mucosal surface. Following harvesting at the designated time points small intestinal submucosa cell constructs were formalin fixed and processed for routine histology including Masson trichrome staining. Specific cell growth characteristics were studied with particular attention to cell morphology, cell proliferation and layering, cell sorting, presence of a pseudostratified urothelium and matrix penetrance. To aid in the identification of smooth muscle cells and urothelial cells in the coculture groups, immunohistochemical analysis was performed with antibodies to alpha-smooth muscle actin and cytokeratins AE1/AE3. RESULTS: Progressive 3-dimensional growth of urothelial cells and smooth muscle cells occurred in vitro on small intestinal submucosa. When seeded alone urothelial cells and smooth muscle cells grew in several layers with minimal to no matrix penetration. In contrast, layered, mixed and sandwich coculture methods demonstrated significant enhancement of smooth muscle cell penetration of the membrane. The layered and sandwich coculture techniques resulted in organized cell sorting, formation of a well-defined pseudostratified urothelium and multilayered smooth muscle cells with enhanced matrix penetration. With the mixed coculture technique there was no evidence of cell sorting although matrix penetrance by the smooth muscle cells was evident. Immunohistochemical studies demonstrated that urothelial cells and smooth muscle cells maintain the expression of the phenotypic markers of differentiation alpha-smooth muscle actin and cytokeratins AE1/AE3. CONCLUSIONS: Small intestinal submucosa supports the 3-dimensional growth of human bladder cells in vitro. Successful combined growth of bladder cells on small intestinal submucosa with different seeding techniques has important future clinical implications with respect to tissue engineering technology. The results of our study demonstrate that there are important smooth muscle cell-epithelial cell interactions involved in determining the type of in vitro cell growth that occurs on small intestinal submucosa. Small intestinal submucosa is a valuable tool for in vitro study of the cell-cell and cell-matrix interactions that are involved in regeneration and various disease processes of the bladder.

Sedimentological and palaeohydrological responses to tectonics and climate in a small, closed lacustrine system: Oligocene As Pontes Basin (Spain)

A small, closed, lacustrine system developed during the restraining overstep stages of the Oligocene As Pontes strike-slip basin (Spain). The increase in basin accommodation and the headward spread of the drainage, which increased the water input, triggered a change from shallow, holomictic to deeper, meromictic conditions.

Review of the Iowa Department of Economic Development targeted small business procurement activities for the year ended June 30, 2011

Review of the Iowa Department of Economic Development targeted small business procurement activities for the year ended June 30, 2011

Targeted Small Business Link, Fall 2011

Targeted Small Business news from the Iowa Economic Development Authority