984 resultados para cognitive functions
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Neuroimaging, functional image analysis, spatial model, cortical surface, spatially variable convolution
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Naturwiss., Diss., 2011
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Vectorial Boolean function, almost bent, almost perfect nonlinear, affine equivalence, CCZ-equivalence
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik, Diss., 2007
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Social intelligence
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Natuwiss., Diss., 2009
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Humanwiss., Diss., 2013
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Naturwiss., Diss., 2015
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L'anàlisi de la densitat urbana és utilitzada per examinar la distribució espacial de la població dins de les àrees urbanes, i és força útil per planificar els serveis públics. En aquest article, s'estudien setze formes funcionals clàssiques de la relació existent entre la densitat i la distancia en la regió metropolitana de Barcelona i els seus onze subcentres.
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Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt
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We prove that any subanalytic locally Lipschitz function has the Sard property. Such functions are typically nonsmooth and their lack of regularity necessitates the choice of some generalized notion of gradient and of critical point. In our framework these notions are defined in terms of the Clarke and of the convex-stable subdifferentials. The main result of this note asserts that for any subanalytic locally Lipschitz function the set of its Clarke critical values is locally finite. The proof relies on Pawlucki's extension of the Puiseuxlemma. In the last section we give an example of a continuous subanalytic function which is not constant on a segment of "broadly critical" points, that is, points for which we can find arbitrarily short convex combinations of gradients at nearby points.
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We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders. To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders' complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the experiment. In the aggregate, behavior is consistent with the basic equilibrium predictions for risk neutral or homogenous risk averse bidders (extent of bid shading, average seller's revenues and deviations from equilibrium). However, when we look at the extent of best reply behavior and the shape of bid functions, we find that individual behavior is not in line with the received equilibrium models, although it exhibits strategic sophistication.