832 resultados para cluster-voting
Resumo:
It is expected that an Asian triangle of growth will be formed in the coming few decades. China, India and ASEAN surround the Asian triangle, which is home to many industrial clusters. Multinational corporations will link these clusters together. Regional integration will help them in this task by lowering the barriers of national borders. This paper explains the necessity of regional integration for cluster-to-cluster linkages in the Asian triangle of growth.
Resumo:
Recent studies have shown that party systems in emerging democracies do not always adequately reflect the various cleavages of society. Under such circumstances, retrospective voting may play a more important role than cleavage voting in determining electoral outcomes. For studies of retrospective voting, the choice between macro and micro level as the independent variable is a major methodological issue. Using individual-level data on Turkey, this paper addresses two major questions: (1) Are voters' decisions based on household economic conditions or national economic conditions? Do sociopolitical conditions also count? (2) Does the future evaluation of the economy affect voting decisions apart from past evaluation? Logit models are used in this research to answer these questions.
Resumo:
A flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy emphasizes the importance ofthe ordering of policy measures. The flow of policy implementation is to establish an industrial zone, to invite an anchor company, and to promote its related companies to invest in the industrial zone. This article delineated "a flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy" by proposing sufficient conditions for forming industrial clusters typical in the manufacturing industry in Asia to enhance regional economic growth. The typical industrial cluster policy was theorized by defining an industrial zone as "quasi-public goods", and it was shown that the policy enhances economic growth under a production function of "increasing returns to scale" of an anchor company. Critical amounts of the production of "scale economies" that are used by the related companies to decide whether or not to invest in clusters were also shown.
Resumo:
This article examined the issue of whether or not the currency exchange rate, country risk, and cooperate tax rate affect decisions of multinational firms to invest in industrial clusters. First, if the exchange rate between a multinational company in an industry of diminishing returns to scale and a developing country is appreciated, then production in the developing country should increase. Second, if the investment period becomes longer, the currency exchange rate of a multinational company's country should be revalued more in order for it to further invest in the developing country. Third, if the investment period becomes longer, the developing country's risk should become less. Fourth, compensation for the developing country's high risk can be made by lowering its corporate tax rate.
Resumo:
The purpose of this report is to use information provided by a questionnaire survey to analyze the factors and processes underlying the formation of industrial clusters in Japan. The study, based on questionnaire surveys, forms part of an "Industrial Cluster Project". The Japanese government has implemented policies for industrial clusters so as to enable Japanese industries to maintain competitive power in global markets, and to aid the self-sufficient expansion of local industries. The government's project goes under the heading "Industry Agglomeration for the Recovery of Local Industries with respect to so-called "Industry Clusters." The authors aim to identify what expectations are held of government by the enterprises that make up industrial clusters. As part of our investigation, we used the results of a survey conducted by UNDP in 2004. Tsuji's study, published by the Osaka School of International Public Policy, surveyed 1198 small or medium sized manufacturing companies located in O ward, Tokyo and Higashi Osaka city, Osaka prefecture. The outcome of the present study, together with data from Tsuji's work on IT usage by SMEs in Japan, is meant to form the basis for policy design and implementation.
Resumo:
China’s huge domestic market is constantly expanding, and is low-end demand oriented and highly dispersed. The domestic market-based development of China’s industrial cluster, however, is not only a quantitative expansion, but has also been accompanied with remarkable qualitative upgrading. Specialized markets are a microcosm that clearly indicate this paradoxical phenomenon. By analyzing three typical cases of industrial clusters that have specialized markets, this paper will make the case that under modern China’s market conditions, the local public sector is the crucial driving force for upgrading industrial clusters, which organize complicated transactions, promote quality control, and stimulate the division of labor.
Resumo:
This paper proposes a flowchart approach to the automobile industry cluster policy and the hi-technology industry cluster policy to prioritize policy measures. First, in the automobile industry cluster, suppliers of parts and components to anchor firms such as Honda, Nissan and Toyota of Japanese assembly makers in Guangzhou, China, can innovate partly because the suppliers have become independent of their anchor firms in the Japanese Keiretsu system. Second, concerning the hi-technology industry clustering in Beijing, we show that the existence of universities is a precondition for the industrial cluster policy and that the leadership of the Zhongguancun Science Park Management Committee of Beijing Municipality is crucial to the success of the industrial cluster policy. The flowchart for the hi-technology industry is different from the one for the automobile industry cluster.
Resumo:
This paper proposes a general model of the flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy and applies this model to Guangzhou's automobile industry cluster. The flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy is an action plan for prioritizing policy measures in a time-ordered series. We reached the following two conclusions. First,we clarified the effects of Honda, Nissan, and Toyota on agglomeration in Guangzhou's automobile industry cluster. Second, we established that local governments play a crucial role in successful industrial cluster policy, and that the mayor of the local government should be offered incentives in order to target industrial clustering and implement cluster policy.
Resumo:
In this paper, we apply a flowchart approach to investigate Malaysia's automobile cluster policy. We investigate whether the industrial cluster policy has been successful or not, suggest policy prescriptions, and propose a way to prioritize policy measures. Our flowchart approach leads to the following three policy prescriptions: (1) Malaysian firms should establish sites for exporting compact cars with automatic transmissions; (2) actors in the public, semi-public and private sector should work to upgrade skilled labor; and (3) the central government should promote liberalization and deregulation to attract foreign firms into the supporting industries.
Resumo:
Clustering small manufacturers are believed to attain various types of collective efficiency. A woodworking and furniture SME district in Uganda has created a learning environment for artisans to start up their own workshops. In the district workers can access various managerial information including business skills and input materials easily than outside. Hence it attracted new entrants to follow and district growth continued. On contrary large firms are locating separately and dispersedly from SME district and have a negative image to SME. This dichotomy has been created partly through spatial division of two sectors and partly through policy favouritism toward large firms.
Resumo:
Two groups of questions were addressed in this paper: (1) Is voter punishment of the incumbent the primary factor in electoral volatility? Are there any other types of vote swings that underlie volatility? (2) In general, does a decline in economic growth destabilize voter behavior? If so, what kinds of vote swings does an economic downturn tend to generate? Provincial-level panel data analysis yielded the following results: (1) Changes in volatility is primarily due to vote swings from the incumbent to the opposition and also to and from left-wing and right-wing parties. (2) Lower economic growth increases electoral volatility. Economic decline induces vote swings not only from the government to the opposition but also from left-wing to right-wing parties. This is probably because right-wing parties seem more concerned with economic issues and are thus more popular than left-wing parties with lower-income voters.
Resumo:
After the 10th Iranian Presidential election on June 12, 2009, several public opinion polls taken in Iran attracted the attention of policy-makers and journalists around the world because of the political crisis that followed. In this paper I first review critically the polls conducted by the WPO (WorldPublicOpinion.org), PIPA (Program on International Policy Attitudes) at the University of Maryland. I also review an essay by Steven Kull, which is based on the aforementioned poll results and which in my opinion leads to false conclusions concerning Iran’s political prospects. I also discuss “An Analysis of Multiple Polls of the Iranian Public,” published by WPO-PIPA on February 3 2010. The present paper arrives at the overall conclusion that it is impossible to obtain an accurate image of political opinions in societies as complicated as that of Iran by concentrating on only one technique of research and analysis, especially when the political and social situation in the society concerned is in a state of constant flux.
Resumo:
Evidence suggests that incumbent parties find it harder to be re-elected in emerging than in advanced democracies because of more serious economic problems in the former. Yet the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) has ruled Turkey since 2002. Does economic performance sufficiently account for the electoral strength of the AKP government? Reliance on economic performance alone to gain public support makes a government vulnerable to economic fluctuations. This study includes time-series regressions for the period 1950-2011 in Turkey and demonstrates that even among Turkey's long-lasting governments, the AKP has particular electoral strength that cannot be adequately explained by economic performance.
Resumo:
In this study, we examine the voting behavior in Indonesian parliamentary elections from 1999 to 2014. After summarizing the changes in Indonesian parties' share of the vote from a historical standpoint, we investigate the voting behavior with simple regression models to analyze the effect of regional characteristics on Islamic/secular parties' vote share, using aggregated panel data at the district level. Then, we also test the hypothesis of retrospective economic voting. The results show that districts which formerly stood strongly behind Islamic parties continued to select those parties, or gave preference to abstention over the parties in some elections. From the point of view of retrospective economic voting, we found that districts which experienced higher per capita economic growth gave more support to the ruling parties, although our results remain tentative because information on 2014 is not yet available.