Direitos sociais e proporcionalidade: análise da doutrina e da jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal

A presente pesquisa tem por objetivo analisar o uso do método da proporcionalidade para decidir questões acerca de direitos sociais. Nesse sentido, antes relacionada somente à proibição do excesso (Übermaßverbot), a proporcionalidade passa a ter reconhecida sua outra face, denominada proibição da proteção insuficiente ou deficiente (Untermaßverbot). O legislador e o administrador passam a ter suas ações balizadas pela proibição do excesso de intervenção e pela imposição da intervenção para proteção de direitos. O termo pouco usual se refere ao controle judicial das omissões do legislador e administrador, na medida em que orienta a atividade deles quando da conformação e implementação dos direitos sociais. Os escassos estudos na doutrina não permitiram o desenvolvimento do método em relação aos direitos sociais no Brasil, em que pese a jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal se utilizar da proporcionalidade como proibição da proteção insuficiente ou deficiente em alguns de seus julgados, especialmente em época recente. Mas se a utilização de tal método na argumentação judicial passa a ser vista de forma recorrente, o Tribunal deve primeiro ter clareza de seus elementos quando pretende invocá-lo em suas decisões e até mesmo firmeza da utilidade de seu uso quanto a esses direitos. Ainda, tem-se que o transplante de métodos de revisão judicial dos direitos de defesa para os direitos sociais merece estudo específico, tanto em relação à concepção desses direitos quanto à possível aplicabilidade da proporcionalidade, pois as diferenças entre eles apontam que nem sempre ambos os direitos comportarão argumentações idênticas para os problemas que enfrentam.

Justiça e direitos humanos: análise da jurisprudência no STF(1988-2012)

A tese analisa a produção jurisprudencial dos direitos humanos no Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), defendendo o argumento de que, no quadro brasileiro, o STF ao interpretar a normativa vigente atua na construção desses direitos. Reconstruindo o cenário de afirmação dos direitos humanos a partir da Carta da ONU (1945) e da Declaração Universal dos Direitos Humanos (1948), o estudo questiona o consenso em torno dos direitos humanos propondo uma leitura ampliada que os vincula aos debates sobre justiça. São objetivos do trabalho, que faz uso de pesquisa bibliográfica e documental (i) aferir qual enquadramento os direitos humanos recebem no STF, o que envolve investigar, no recorte selecionado entre 1988 e 2012, como tem sido construída a categoria jurídica direitos humanos no tratamento jurisprudencial desse Tribunal e (ii) investigar com base em quais fundamentos esse enquadramento se apresenta. O marco teórico da Teoria Integrada da Justiça de Nancy Fraser é utilizado para problematizar a concepção contemporânea de Direitos Humanos, bem como o desenho institucional do STF. A análise dos acórdãos coletados é feita com tratamento quantitativo e o adensamento do material é feito por meio de uma tipologia de casos, que orienta a abordagem qualitativa. O trabalho é concluído apontando a existência de concepções de direitos humanos que não condizem com a conjuntura de aceitação na qual esses direitos estariam assentados.

Supremo Tribunal Federal e a concretização dos direitos fundamentais no sistema constitucional tributário brasileiro

Este trabalho trata do papel desempenhado pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal na apreciação de questões relativas ao Sistema Constitucional Tributário brasileiro à luz dos direitos fundamentais. Com efeito, o STF é responsável por guardar os direitos fundamentais também quando decide controvérsias constitucionais tributárias, o que significa considerar o delicado equilíbrio entre a proteção dos contribuintes e a necessidade de o Estado arrecadar os recursos suficientes à concretização dos direitos fundamentais. Assim, a tese tem dois objetivos. Por um lado, pretende identificar se o Supremo Tribunal Federal adota algum parâmetro condizente com os direitos fundamentais ao julgar questões constitucionais relativas ao sistema tributário. Nessa perspectiva, diversos acórdãos do Supremo Tribunal Federal, proferidos na égide da CF/1988, são analisados com vistas a examinar se a Corte tem cumprido bem suas responsabilidades constitucionais. Por outro lado, sugere o Estado Fiscal como parâmetro adequado aos direitos fundamentais e ao sistema constitucional tributário, considerando sua preocupação tanto com a proteção dos contribuintes quanto com a existência de meios mínimos para o financiamento das atividades públicas.

A judicialização da política: o poder judiciário e a definição de políticas nacionais

O papel desempenhado pelo Poder Judiciário nos mais diversos Estados passa por sensível evolução ao longo do século XX, à medida que se desenvolveram os sistemas de controle de constitucionalidade. De um lado, os atores políticos assumem especial importância nesse processo. Os modelos de revisão judicial foram reforçados, no mais das vezes, em paralelo à positivação, em âmbito constitucional, de um amplo rol de direitos fundamentais e de princípios balizadores e limitadores do poder estatal. Com isso, os elementos cotejados no processo legislativo de tomada de decisões políticas são revestidos de status constitucional e transportados para o discurso argumentativo do Direito, o que leva a um processo de judicialização da Política que permite que a atividade legiferante seja passível de confronto perante instâncias judiciárias. Os instrumentos de controle de constitucionalidade assumem, assim, novos contornos, permitindo que o Judiciário interfira no conteúdo das escolhas políticas feitas pela maioria governante. De outro lado, o Poder Judiciário particularmente as Cortes Constitucionais passa a assumir a corresponsabilidade na efetivação das metas e compromissos estatais, com o que desenvolve uma política institucional mais proativa e comprometida com a concretização substancial de valores democráticos, interferindo, assim, de maneira mais incisiva e rígida no controle do processo político. A definição de políticas fundamentais e o processo legiferante passam a contar com constante participação do Judiciário. Na realidade brasileira, a Constituição de 1988 amplia as competência do Supremo Tribunal Federal em sede de controle de constitucionalidade, inserindo o órgão de maneira efetiva nesse contexto de intervenção judicial na Política. A última década, por sua vez, marcou uma perceptível mudança em sua atividade e em sua interferência no processo de tomada de decisões políticas pelos demais Poderes. Valendo-se dos diversos instrumentos de controle que lhe são disponibilizados, assumiu o compromisso de participar na efetivação dos preceitos constitucionais pátrios mediante a revisão do conteúdo normativo decorrente das escolhas políticas tomadas em outras instâncias. Desse modo, tornou-se verdadeiro copartícipe do processo de definição de políticas legislativas nacionais, seja rechaçando normas que repute inconstitucionais, seja proferindo decisões com claros efeitos normativos que buscam readequar e conformar as escolhas dos atores políticos. Nesse processo decisório, entra em jogo a intensidade com que a Corte busca impor sua visão e suas concepções no tocante à efetivação e concretização dos compromissos constitucionais. A sobreposição de ponderações judiciais e legislativas acarreta, a seu turno, importantes efeitos sistêmicos ao diálogo interinstitucional que se desenvolve entre os Poderes, em especial no que concerne à distribuição das funções estatais dentro das premissas democráticas e ao dimensionamento do papel que compete a cada um dos Poderes no processo de efetivação e proteção da Constituição.

Immigration Law by Proxy: The Case of Colorado’s Human Smuggling Crime

Despite the federal government’s well known expansive reach in creating and enforcing immigration law, the states retain substantial authority to play an important role in migrants’ lives. Through their traditional powers to adopt criminal statutes and police their communities, states can indirectly — but intentionally — inject themselves into the incidents of ordinary life as a migrant. Colorado’s human smuggling statute, currently being challenged before the state supreme court, illustrates this type of state regulation of migration. This essay addresses the statute’s reach, its shaky constitutional footing, and places it in a broader context in which states criminalize immigration-related activity.

Dignity and the Eighth Amendment: A New Approach to Challenging Solitary Confinement

The use of solitary confinement in U.S. prisons and jails has come under increasing scrutiny. Over the past few months, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy all but invited constitutional challenges to the use of solitary confinement, while President Obama asked, “Do we really think it makes sense to lock so many people alone in tiny cells for 23 hours a day for months, sometime for years at a time?” Even some of the most notorious prisons and jails, including California’s Pelican Bay State Prison and New York’s Rikers Island, are reforming their use of solitary confinement because of successful litigation and public outcry. Rovner suggests that in light of these developments and “the Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on human dignity as a substantive value underlying and animating constitutional rights,” there is a strong case to make that long-term solitary confinement violates the constitutional right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.

The First Century of Right to Arms Litigation

This Article examines state court cases involving the right to arms, during the first century following ratification of the Amendment in 1791. This is not the first article to survey some of those cases. This Article includes additional cases, and details the procedural postures and facts, not only the holdings. The Article closely examines how the Supreme Court integrated the nineteenth century arms cases into Heller and McDonald to shape modern Second Amendment law. Part I briefly explains two English cases which greatly influenced American legal understandings. Semayne’s Case is the foundation of “castle doctrine” — the right to home security which includes the right of armed self-defense in the home. Sir John Knight’s Case fortified the tradition of the right to bear arms, providing that the person must bear arms in a non-terrifying manner. Part II examines American antebellum cases; these are the cases to which Heller looked for guidance on the meaning of the Second Amendment. Part III looks at cases from Reconstruction and the early years of Jim Crow, through 1891. As with the antebellum cases, the large majority of post-war cases are from the Southeast, which during the nineteenth century was the region most ardent for gun control. The heart of gun control country was Tennessee and Arkansas; courts there resisted some infringements of the right to arms, but eventually gave up. Heller and McDonald did not look to the Jim Crow cases as constructive precedents on the Second Amendment.

Double Reasonableness and the Fourth Amendment

Recently the Supreme Court has placed new limits on both the substance of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary that serves as the principal remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. In this Article we briefly summarize these limitations and then argue that the curtailment of the exclusionary rule has the potential to ameliorate substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine. The limited reach of the modern exclusionary rule provides the Court with license to develop an expansive new substantive framework free of the specter of a correspondingly expansive remedial framework. One point on which nearly all jurists and commentators agree is that current Fourth Amendment doctrine is a mess. We argue that the Court’s exclusionary rule cases, while frustrating and ill-conceived if viewed in isolation, provide the Court with an opportunity to revisit problematic Fourth Amendment doctrine that was born under a very different remedial regime. Such an approach would allow the Court to adhere to its current view of the exclusionary rule as a remedy of last resort while creating a Fourth Amendment with teeth. The goal is a Fourth Amendment right that is more substantial and clearly defined, but a remedy that remains limited to egregious violations of clear substantive rules. The time is now to lift the Fourth Amendment fog.

Setting Congress Up to Fail

In Shelby County v. Holder the Supreme Court invalidated key provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 based on Congress’s failure to justify the formula used to determine which jurisdictions would be subject to the Act’s pre-clearance requirement of submitting all changes to voting procedures to the Justice Department for prior approval. This short essay explores one problematic feature of the Court’s analysis: its refusal to consider the legislative record as adequate because it was created to justify the coverage formula after the fact, rather than to facilitate deliberation on the coverage formula before a decision had been made. This reasoning essentially imports from administrative law a rule called the Chenery principle, and as this essay explains, it does so without justification. The differences between administrative and legislative decision making processes compel different treatment by the courts, and treating legislative records like administrative ones, in essence, asks of Congress something it is institutionally ill-equipped to perform. It sets Congress up to fail.

Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children in Support of Petitioners in Obergefell v. Hodges

Supreme Court precedent establishes that the government may not punish children for matters beyond their control. Same-sex marriage bans and non-recognition laws (“marriage bans”) do precisely this. The states argue that marriage is good for children, yet marriage bans categorically exclude an entire class of children – children of same-sex couples – from the legal, economic and social benefits of marriage. This amicus brief recounts a powerful body of equal protection jurisprudence that prohibits punishing children to reflect moral disapproval of parental conduct or to incentivize adult behavior. We then explain that marriage bans punish children of same-sex couples because they: 1) foreclose their central legal route to family formation; 2) categorically void their existing legal parent-child relationships incident to out-of-state marriages; 3) deny them economic rights and benefits; and 4) inflict psychological and stigmatic harm. States cannot justify marriage bans as good for children and then exclude children of same-sex couples based on moral disapproval of their same-sex parents’ relationships or to incentivize opposite-sex couples to “procreate” within the bounds of marriage. To do so, severs the connection between legal burdens and individual responsibility and creates a permanent class or caste distinction.

Causation and Harm in a Multicomponent World

On September 17, 2015, the Federal Circuit issued another decision in the epic Apple v. Samsung smartphone war. This was the fourth court decision in the ongoing saga to deal with injunctions. Apple IV explained the level of proof necessary to satisfy the "causal nexus" requirement. This requirement had emerged as a response to patent litigations involving products with thousands of features, the vast majority of which are unrelated to the asserted patent. To prove a causal nexus, patentees seeking an injunction have to do more than just show that the infringing product caused the patentee irreparable harm. The harm must be specifically attributable to the infringing feature. In Apple IV, the Federal Circuit noted that proving causation was "nearly impossible" in these multicomponent cases. So it decided to water down the causal nexus requirement saying that it was enough for Apple to show that the infringing features were "important"and customer sought these particular features. This lower standard is an ill-advised mistake that leaves multicomponent product manufacturers more susceptible to patent holdup. My critique takes two parts. First, I argue that a single infringing feature rarely, if ever, "causes" consumers to buy the infringer’s multicomponent products. The minor features at issue in Apple IV illustrate this point vividly. Thus, the new causal nexus standard does not accurately reflect how causation and harm operate in a multicomponent world. Second, I explain why the court was so willing to accept such little evidence of real injury. It improperly applied notions of traditional property law to patents. Specifically, the court viewed patent infringement as harmful regardless of any concrete consequences. This view may resonate for other forms of property where an owner's rights are paramount and a trespass is considered offensive in and of itself. But the same concepts do not apply to patent law where the Supreme Court has consistently said that private interests must take a back seat to the public good. Based on these principles, the courts should restore the "causal nexus" requirement and not presume causation.

High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment

Lying has a complicated relationship with the First Amendment. It is beyond question that some lies – such as perjury or pretending to be a police officer – are not covered by the First Amendment. But it is equally clear that some lies, even intentionally lying about military honors, are entitled to First Amendment protection. U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). To date, however, both Supreme Court doctrine and academic commentary has taken for granted that any constitutional protection for lies is purely prophylactic – it protects the liar to avoid chilling truthful speech. This Article is the first to argue, contrary to conventional wisdom, that certain types of lies paradoxically advance the values underlying the First Amendment. Our framework is descriptively novel and doctrinally important insofar as we provide the first comprehensive post-Alvarez look at the wide range of lies that may raise First Amendment issues. Because there was no majority opinion in Alvarez, there is uncertainty about which standard of constitutional scrutiny should apply to protected lies, an issue we examine at length. Moreover, our normative claim is straightforward: when a lie has intrinsic or instrumental value it should be treated differently from other types of lies and warrant the greatest constitutional protection. Specifically, we argue that investigative deceptions – lies used to secure truthful factual information about matters of public concern – deserve the utmost constitutional protection because they advance the underling purposes of free speech: they enhance political discourse, help reveal the truth, and promote individual autonomy. A prototypical investigative deception is the sort of misrepresentation required in order for an undercover journalist, investigator, or activist to gain access to information or images of great political significance that would not be available if the investigator disclosed her reporting or political objectives. Tactical use of such lies have a long history in American journalism and activism, from Upton Sinclair to his modern day heirs. Using the proliferation of anti-whistleblower statutes like Ag Gag laws as an illustrative example, we argue that investigative deceptions are a category of high value lies that ought to receive rigorous protection under the First Amendment. At the same time, we recognize that not all lies are alike and that in other areas, the government regulation of lies serves legitimate interests. We therefore conclude the Article by drawing some limiting principles to our theory.

Opinions filed by the commissioners acting under the VII. article of the Treaty of Amity Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and the United States of America : manuscript, 1797-1799

Opinions concerning the 7th article of the treaty.

Letter from Daniel Upton to James Savage, 1799 September 29

Daniel Upton wrote this letter from Machias, Maine on September 29, 1799; it is addressed to James Savage, who was then a freshman at Harvard College. In the letter, Upton advises Savage to study ardently, avoiding the temptation to procrastinate. He thanks Savage for having sent him a copy of "Mr. Lowell's oration" and sends greetings to a Mr. Holbrook and Mr. Jones. He also passes along the fond wishes of those in Machias who know Savage, including John Cooper and his wife, Phineas Bruce and his wife, and Hannah Bruce (Upton's future wife). Upton explains that he is writing the letter in a hurry because he is sending it on board with Captain Merryman, who is about to set sail, presumably for Boston.

Letters to George Simpson, 1796, 1806

Two letters to the cashier of the Bank of the United States requesting that funds be transferred to Andrew Bayard in Philadelphia, so that Paterson could receive his salary as associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.