Optimal growth in a two-sector model without discounting: a geometric investigation

We characterize optimal policy in a two-sector growth model with xed coeÆcients and with no discounting. The model is a specialization to a single type of machine of a general vintage capital model originally formulated by Robinson, Solow and Srinivasan, and its simplicity is not mirrored in its rich dynamics, and which seem to have been missed in earlier work. Our results are obtained by viewing the model as a specific instance of the general theory of resource allocation as initiated originally by Ramsey and von Neumann and brought to completion by McKenzie. In addition to the more recent literature on chaotic dynamics, we relate our results to the older literature on optimal growth with one state variable: speci cally, to the one-sector setting of Ramsey, Cass and Koopmans, as well as to the two-sector setting of Srinivasan and Uzawa. The analysis is purely geometric, and from a methodological point of view, our work can be seen as an argument, at least in part, for the rehabilitation of geometric methods as an engine of analysis.

Optimal water use: is anyone getting the right incentives in California?

This paper discusses ~he widespread inefficiency in water pricing today and uses the State of California as an example. After solving the Planner' s Problem I conclude that water for irrigation should cost more than for domestic use. The optimal price leveI can be calculated from a correct measure of the true marginal cost of supply.

Optimal provision of implicit and explicit incentives in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of the fiow of funds as an implicit incetive provided by investors to portfolio managers in a two-period relationship. We show that the fiow of funds is a powerful incentive in an asset management contract. We build a binomial moral hazard model to explain the main trade-ofIs in the relationship between fiow, fees and performance. The main assumption is that efIort depend" on the combination of implicit and explicit incentives while the probability distrioutioll function of returns depends on efIort. In the case of full commitment, the investor's relevant trade-ofI is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce efIort in the first período The more concerned the investor is with today's payoff. the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the following periods. That is. in the second period, the investor penalizes observed low returns by withdrawing resources from non-performing portfolio managers. Besides, he pays performance fee when the observed excess return is positive. When commitment is not a plausible hypothesis, we consider that the investor also learns some symmetríc and imperfect information about the ability of the manager to generate positive excess returno In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as efIort choices exerted by the portfolio manager. We show that implicit incentives can explain the fiow-performance relationship and, conversely, endogenous expected return determines incentives provision and define their optimal leveIs. We provide a numerical solution in Matlab that characterize these results.

Optimal two-sided tests for instrumental variables regression with heteroskedastic and autocorrelated errors

This paper considers two-sided tests for the parameter of an endogenous variable in an instrumental variable (IV) model with heteroskedastic and autocorrelated errors. We develop the nite-sample theory of weighted-average power (WAP) tests with normal errors and a known long-run variance. We introduce two weights which are invariant to orthogonal transformations of the instruments; e.g., changing the order in which the instruments appear. While tests using the MM1 weight can be severely biased, optimal tests based on the MM2 weight are naturally two-sided when errors are homoskedastic. We propose two boundary conditions that yield two-sided tests whether errors are homoskedastic or not. The locally unbiased (LU) condition is related to the power around the null hypothesis and is a weaker requirement than unbiasedness. The strongly unbiased (SU) condition is more restrictive than LU, but the associated WAP tests are easier to implement. Several tests are SU in nite samples or asymptotically, including tests robust to weak IV (such as the Anderson-Rubin, score, conditional quasi-likelihood ratio, and I. Andrews' (2015) PI-CLC tests) and two-sided tests which are optimal when the sample size is large and instruments are strong. We refer to the WAP-SU tests based on our weights as MM1-SU and MM2-SU tests. Dropping the restrictive assumptions of normality and known variance, the theory is shown to remain valid at the cost of asymptotic approximations. The MM2-SU test is optimal under the strong IV asymptotics, and outperforms other existing tests under the weak IV asymptotics.

Optimal unemployment insurance for couples

This work analyzes the optimal design of an unemployment insurance program for couples, whose joint search problem in the labor market differ significantly from the problem faced by single agents. We use a version of the sequential search model of the labor market adapted to married agents to compare optimal constant policies for single and married agents, as well as characterize the optimal constant policy when the agency faces single and married agents simultaneously. Our main result is that an agency that gives equal weights to single and married agents will want to give equal utility promises to both types of agents and spend more on the single agent.

Optimal monetary policy under administered prices

This work aims to analyze the interaction and the effects of administered prices in the economy, through a DSGE model and the derivation of optimal monetary policies. The model used is a standard New Keynesian DSGE model of a closed economy with two sectors companies. In the first sector, free prices, there is a continuum of firms, and in the second sector of administered prices, there is a single firm. In addition, the model has positive trend inflation in the steady state. The model results suggest that price movements in any sector will impact on both sectors, for two reasons. Firstly, the price dispersion causes productivity to be lower. As the dispersion of prices is a change in the relative price of any sector, relative to general prices in the economy, when a movement in the price of a sector is not followed by another, their relative weights will change, leading to an impact on productivity in both sectors. Second, the path followed by the administered price sector is considered in future inflation expectations, which is used by companies in the free sector to adjust its optimal price. When this path leads to an expectation of higher inflation, the free sector companies will choose a higher mark-up to accommodate this expectation, thus leading to higher inflation trend when there is imperfect competition in the free sector. Finally, the analysis of optimal policies proved inconclusive, certainly indicating that there is influence of the adjustment model of administered prices in the definition of optimal monetary policy, but a quantitative study is needed to define the degree of impact.

Optimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor markets

We study optimal labor income taxation in non-competitive labor markets. Firms offer screening contracts to workers who have private information about their productivity. A planner endowed with a Paretian social welfare function tries to induce allocations that maximize its objective. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation of constrained efficient allocations using tax schedules. All allocations that are implementable by a tax schedule display negative marginal tax rates for almost all workers. Not all allocations that are implementable in a competitive setting are implementable in this noncompetitive environment.

Non-asymptotic confidence bounds for the optimal value of a stochastic program

We discuss a general approach to building non-asymptotic confidence bounds for stochastic optimization problems. Our principal contribution is the observation that a Sample Average Approximation of a problem supplies upper and lower bounds for the optimal value of the problem which are essentially better than the quality of the corresponding optimal solutions. At the same time, such bounds are more reliable than “standard” confidence bounds obtained through the asymptotic approach. We also discuss bounding the optimal value of MinMax Stochastic Optimization and stochastically constrained problems. We conclude with a small simulation study illustrating the numerical behavior of the proposed bounds.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.

Optimal Conditions for Biomass and Recombinant Glycerol Kinase Production Using the Yeast Pichia pastoris

The extracellular glycerol kinase gene from Saccharomyces cerevisiae (GUT]) was cloned into the expression vector pPICZ alpha. A and integrated into the genome of the methylotrophic yeast Pichia pastoris X-33. The presence of the GUT1 insert was confirmed by PCR analysis. Four clones were selected and the functionality of the recombinant enzyme was assayed. Among the tested clones, one exhibited glycerol kinase activity of 0.32 U/mL, with specific activity of 0.025 U/mg of protein. A medium optimized for maximum biomass production by recombinant Pichia pastoris in shaker cultures was initially explored, using 2.31 % (by volume) glycerol as the carbon source. Optimization was carried out by response surface methodology (RSM). In preliminary experiments, following a Plackett-Burman design, glycerol volume fraction (phi(Gly)) and growth time (t) were selected as the most important factors in biomass production. Therefore, subsequent experiments, carried out to optimize biomass production, followed a central composite rotatable design as a function of phi(Gly) and time. Glycerol volume fraction proved to have a significant positive linear effect on biomass production. Also, time was a significant factor (at linear positive and quadratic levels) in biomass production. Experimental data were well fitted by a convex surface representing a second order polynomial model, in which biomass is a function of both factors (R(2)=0.946). Yield and specific activity of glycerol kinase were mainly affected by the additions of glycerol and methanol to the medium. The optimized medium composition for enzyme production was: 1 % yeast extract, 1 % peptone, 100 mM potassium phosphate buffer, pH=6.0, 1.34 % yeast nitrogen base (YNB), 4.10(-5) % biotin, 1 %, methanol and 1 %, glycerol, reaching 0.89 U/mL of glycerol kinase activity and 14.55 g/L of total protein in the medium after 48 h of growth.

Influence of visual information on optimal obstacle crossing

Human motion seems to be guided by some optimal principles. In general, it is assumed that human walking is generated with minimal energy consumption. However, in the presence of disturbances during gait, there is a trade-off between stability (avoiding a fall) and energy-consumption. This work analyses the obstacle-crossing with the leading foot. It was hypothesized that energy-saving mechanisms during obstacle-crossing are modulated by the requirement to avoid a fall using the available sensory information, particularly, by vision. A total of fourteen subjects, seven with no visual impairment and seven blind, walked along a 5 meter flat pathway with an obstacle of 0.26 m height located at 3 m from the starting point. The seven subjects with normal vision crossed the obstacle successfully 30 times in two conditions: blindfolded and with normal vision. The seven blind subjects did the same 30 times. The motion of the leading limb was recorded by video at 60 Hz. There were markers placed on the subject's hip, knee, ankle, rear foot, and forefoot. The motion data were filtered with a fourth order Butterworth filter with a cut-off frequency of 4 Hz. The following variables were calculated: horizontal distance between the leading foot and the obstacle at toe-off prior to (DHPO) and after (DHOP) crossing, minimal vertical height from the foot to the obstacle (DVPO), average step velocity (VELOm). The segmental energies were also calculated and the work consumed by the leading limb during the crossing obstacle was computed for each trial. A statistical analysis repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on these dependent variables revealing significant differences between the vision and non-vision conditions in healthy subjects. In addition, there were no significant differences between the blind and people with vision blindfolded. These results indicate that vision is crucial to determine the optimal trade-off between energy consumption and avoiding a trip during obstacle crossing.

A modified Primal-Dual Logarithmic-Barrier Method for solving the Optimal Power Flow problem with discrete and continuous control variables

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Optimal reactive power flow via the modified barrier Lagrangian function approach

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

Optimal attitude corrections for cylindrical spacecraft

A first order analytical model for optimal small amplitude attitude maneuvers of spacecraft with cylindrical symmetry in an elliptical orbits is presented. The optimization problem is formulated as a Mayer problem with the control torques provided by a power limited propulsion system. The state is defined by Seffet-Andoyer's variables and the control by the components of the propulsive torques. The Pontryagin Maximum Principle is applied to the problem and the optimal torques are given explicitly in Serret-Andoyer's variables and their adjoints. For small amplitude attitude maneuvers, the optimal Hamiltonian function is linearized around a reference attitude. A complete first order analytical solution is obtained by simple quadrature and is expressed through a linear algebraic system involving the initial values of the adjoint variables. A numerical solution is obtained by taking the Euler angles formulation of the problem, solving the two-point boundary problem through the shooting method, and, then, determining the Serret-Andoyer variables through Serret-Andoyer transformation. Numerical results show that the first order solution provides a good approximation to the optimal control law and also that is possible to establish an optimal control law for the artificial satellite's attitude. (C) 2003 COSPAR. Published by Elsevier B.V. Ltd. All rights reserved.