STRATEGIES TO SURPASS THE VULNERABILITY OF THE SMALL ISLAND STATES WITH FEW RESOURCES: THE CASE OF CAPE VERDE

The problem of small Island Developing States (SIDS) is quite recent, end of the 80s and 90s, still looking for a theoretical consolidation. SIDS, as small states in development, formed by one or several islands geographically dispersed, present reduced population, market, territory, natural resources, including drinkable water, and, in great number of the cases, low level of economic activity, factors that together, hinder the gathering of scale economies. To these diseconomies they come to join the more elevated costs in transports and communications which, allies to lower productivities, to a smaller quality and diversification of its productions, which difficult its integration in the world economy. In some SIDS these factors are not dissociating of the few investments in infrastructures, in the formation of human resources and in productive investments, just as it happens in most of the developing countries. In ecological terms, many of them with shortage of natural resources, but integrating important ecosystems in national and world terms, but with great fragility relatively to the pollution action, of excessive fishing, of uncontrolled development of tourism, factors that, conjugated and associated to the stove effect, condition the climate and the slope of the medium level of the sea water and therefore could put in cause the own survival of some of them. The drive to the awareness of the international community towards its problems summed up with the accomplishment by the United Nations in the Barbados’s Conference, 1994 where the right to the development was emphasized, through the going up the appropriate strategies and the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of the SIDS. The orientation of the regional and international cooperation in that sense, sharing technology (namely clean technology and control and administration environmental technology), information and creation of capacity-building, supplying means, including financial resources, creating non discriminatory and just trade rules, it would drive to the establishment of a world system economically more equal, in which the production, the consumption, the pollution levels, the demographic politics were guided towards the sustainability. It constituted an important step for the recognition for the international community on the specificities of those states and it allowed the definition of a group of norms and politics to implement at the national, regional and international level and it was important that they continued in the sense of the sustainable development. But this Conference had in its origin previous summits: the Summit of Rio de Janeiro about Environment and Development, accomplished in 1992, which left an important document - the Agenda 21, in the Conference of Stockholm at 1972 and even in the Conference of Ramsar, 1971 about “Wetlands.” CENTRO DE ESTUDOS AFRICANOS Occasional Papers © CEA - Centro de Estudos Africanos 4 Later, the Valletta Declaration, Malta, 1998, the Forum of Small States, 2002, get the international community's attention for the problems of SIDS again, in the sense that they act to increase its resilience. If the definition of “vulnerability” was the inability of the countries to resist economical, ecological and socially to the external shocks and “resilience” as the potential for them to absorb and minimize the impact of those shocks, presenting a structure that allows them to be little affected by them, a part of the available studies, dated of the 90s, indicate that the SIDS are more vulnerable than the other developing countries. The vulnerability of SIDS results from the fact the they present an assemblage of characteristics that turns them less capable of resisting or they advance strategies that allow a larger resilience to the external shocks, either anthropogenic (economical, financial, environmental) or even natural, connected with the vicissitudes of the nature. If these vulnerability factors were grouped with the expansion of the economic capitalist system at world level, the economic and financial globalisation, the incessant search of growing profits on the part of the multinational enterprises, the technological accelerated evolution drives to a situation of disfavour of the more poor. The creation of the resilience to the external shocks, to the process of globalisation, demands from SIDS and of many other developing countries the endogen definition of strategies and solid but flexible programs of integrated development. These must be assumed by the instituted power, but also by the other stakeholders, including companies and organizations of the civil society and for the population in general. But that demands strong investment in the formation of human resources, in infrastructures, in investigation centres; it demands the creation capacity not only to produce, but also to produce differently and do international marketing. It demands institutional capacity. Cape Verde is on its way to this stage.

The capital gains from trade are not enough: Evidence from the environmental accounts of Venezuela and Mexico

In principle, a country can not endure negative genuine savings for longperiods of time without experiencing declining consumption. Nevertheless,theoreticians envisage two alternatives to explain how an exporter ofnon-renewable natural resources could experience permanent negativegenuine savings and still ensure sustainability. The first one allegesthat the capital gains arising from the expected improvement in theterms of trade would suffice to compensate for the negative savings ofthe resource exporter. The second alternative points at technologicalchange as a way to avoid economic collapse. This paper uses the dataof Venezuela and Mexico to empirically test the first of these twohypotheses. The results presented here prove that the terms oftrade do not suffice to compensate the depletion of oil reservesin these two open economies.

Cooperative games in strategic form

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the proposer commitment procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to threats. We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.

The contribution of schooling in development accounting: Results from a nonparametric upper bound

How much would output increase if underdeveloped economies were toincrease their levels of schooling? We contribute to the development accounting literature by describing a non-parametric upper bound on theincrease in output that can be generated by more schooling. The advantage of our approach is that the upper bound is valid for any number ofschooling levels with arbitrary patterns of substitution/complementarity.Another advantage is that the upper bound is robust to certain forms ofendogenous technology response to changes in schooling. We also quantify the upper bound for all economies with the necessary data, compareour results with the standard development accounting approach, andprovide an update on the results using the standard approach for a largesample of countries.

Productivity and the welfare of nations

We show that the welfare of a representative consumer can be related to observable aggregatedata. To a first order, the change in welfare is summarized by (the present value of) the Solowproductivity residual and by the growth rate of the capital stock per capita. We also show thatproductivity and the capital stock suffice to calculate differences in welfare across countries, withboth variables computed as log level deviations from a reference country. These results hold forarbitrary production technology, regardless of the degree of product market competition, and applyto open economies as well if TFP is constructed using absorption rather than GDP as the measureof output. They require that TFP be constructed using prices and quantities as perceived byconsumers. Thus, factor shares need to be calculated using after-tax wages and rental rates, andwill typically sum to less than one. We apply these results to calculate welfare gaps and growthrates in a sample of developed countries for which high-quality TFP and capital data are available.We find that under realistic scenarios the United Kingdom and Spain had the highest growth ratesof welfare over our sample period of 1985-2005, but the United States had the highest level ofwelfare.

Predestination and the Protestant ethic

This paper shows an equivalence result between the utility functions of secularagents who abide by a moral obligation to accumulate wealth and those of religiousagents who believe that salvation is immutable and preordained by God. Thisresult formalizes Weber's renowned thesis on the connection between the worldlyasceticism of Protestants and the religious premises of Calvinism. Furthermore,ongoing economies are often modeled with preference relations such as "Keeping upwith the Joneses" which are not associated with religion. Our results relate thesesecular economies of today and economies of the past shaped by religious ideas.

Consistency and the Walrasian allocations correspondence

We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence, in classesof exchange economies with smooth and convex preferences, by means of consistency requirements and other axioms. We present three characterizationresults; all of which require consistency, converse consistency and standard axioms. Two characterizations hold also on domains with a finite number ofpotential agents, one of them requires envy freeness (with respect to trades) and the other--core selection; a third characterization, that requires coreselection, applies only to a variable number of agents domain, but is validalso when the domain includes only a small variety of preferences.

The electric revolution in Latin America

Latin America participated in the electric revolution which profoundly transformed the most developed Western economies between 1880 and 1930. The electrification of Latin America began relatively soon after these economies, but it was incapable of keeping up with them. Public electric lighting was introduced early in the big Latin American cities, where electric trams started running at almost the same time as in Europe, and electricity spread rapidly in the mining sector. In the most advanced countries or areas in the region, the manufacturing industry substituted the steam engine with the electric motor, following the example of industry in the United States and Europe. Nevertheless, towards 1930 electricity consumption per inhabitant for Latin America was far below that of the more advanced economies, and only the Latin American countries which lead the process of electrification had reached levels of electric consumption that were similar to those of the late industrialised European countries. One of the most striking features of the electric revolution in Latin America is rooted precisely in the enormous national differences. These differences are indicative of the great economic inequalities existing in the heart of the region and these nations highly diverse capacity for economic modernisation.

Recontracting and competition

We characterize the set of Walrasian allocations of an economy as theset of allocations which can be supported by abstract equilibria that satisfy a recontracting condition which reflects the idea that agents can freely trade with each other. An alternative (and weaker) recontracting condition characterizesthe core. The results are extended to production economies by extending thedefinition of the recontracting condition to include the possibility of agentsto recontract with firms. However, no optimization requirement is imposed onfirms. In pure exchange economies, an abstract equilibrium is a feasible allocation and a list of choice sets, one for each agent, that satisfy thefollowing conditions: an agent's choice set is a subset of the commodity space that includes his endowment; and each agent's equilibrium bundle isa maximal element in his choice set, with respect to his preferences. Therecontracting condition requires that any agent can buy bundles from any other agent's choice set by offering the other agent a bundle he prefers tohis equilibrium bundle.

Aggregate fluctuations and the network structure of intersectoral trade

This paper analyzes the flow of intermediate inputs across sectors by adopting a network perspective on sectoral interactions. I apply these tools to show how fluctuationsin aggregate economic activity can be obtained from independent shocks to individualsectors. First, I characterize the network structure of input trade in the U.S. On thedemand side, a typical sector relies on a small number of key inputs and sectors arehomogeneous in this respect. However, in their role as input-suppliers sectors do differ:many specialized input suppliers coexist alongside general purpose sectors functioningas hubs to the economy. I then develop a model of intersectoral linkages that can reproduce these connectivity features. In a standard multisector setup, I use this modelto provide analytical expressions linking aggregate volatility to the network structureof input trade. I show that the presence of sectoral hubs - by coupling productiondecisions across sectors - leads to fluctuations in aggregates.

Quasi-integration in less-than-truckload trucking

This work studies the organization of less-than-truckload trucking from a contractual point of view. We show that the huge number of owner-operators working in the industry hides a much less fragmented reality. Most of those owner-operators are quasi-integrated in higher organizational structures. This hybrid form is generally more efficient than vertical integration because, in the Spanish institutional environment, it lessens serious moral hazard problems, related mainly to the use of the vehicles, and makes it possible to reach economies of scale and density. Empirical evidence suggests that what leads organizations to vertically integrate is not the presence of such economies but hold-up problems, related to the existence of specific assets. Finally, an international comparison hints that institutional constraints are able to explain differences in the evolution of vertical integration across countries.

Adaptive learning in models with lagged variables

In this work I study the stability of the dynamics generated by adaptivelearning processes in intertemporal economies with lagged variables. Iprove that determinacy of the steady state is a necessary condition for the convergence of the learning dynamics and I show that the reciprocal is not true characterizing the economies where convergence holds. In the case of existence of cycles I show that there is not, in general, a relationship between determinacy and convergence of the learning process to the cycle. I also analyze the expectational stability of these equilibria.

The optimum quantity of money: Theory and evidence

In this paper we propose a simple and general model for computing the Ramsey optimal inflation tax, which includes several models from the previous literature as special cases. We show that it cannot be claimed that the Friedman rule is always optimal (or always non--optimal) on theoretical grounds. The Friedman rule is optimal or not, depending on conditions related to the shape of various relevant functions. One contribution of this paper is to relate these conditions to {\it measurable} variables such as the interest rate or the consumption elasticity of money demand. We find that it tends to be optimal to tax money when there are economies of scale in the demand for money (the scale elasticity is smaller than one) and/or when money is required for the payment of consumption or wage taxes. We find that it tends to be optimal to tax money more heavily when the interest elasticity of money demand is small. We present empirical evidence on the parameters that determine the optimal inflation tax. Calibrating the model to a variety of empirical studies yields a optimal nominal interest rate of less than 1\%/year, although that finding is sensitive to the calibration.

Crises and growth: A re-evaluation

We address the question of whether growth and welfare can be higher in crisis prone economies. First, we show that there is a robust empirical link between per-capita GDP growth and negative skewness of credit growth across countries with active financial markets. That is, countries that have experienced occasional crises have grown on average faster than countries with smooth credit conditions. We then present a two-sector endogenous growth model in which financial crises can occur, and analyze the relationship between financial fragility and growth. The underlying credit market imperfections generateborrowing constraints, bottlenecks and low growth. We show that under certain conditions endogenous real exchange rate risk arises and firms find it optimal to take on credit risk in the form of currency mismatch. Along such a risky path average growth is higher, but self-fulfilling crises occur occasionally. Furthermore, we establish conditions under which the adoption of credit risk is welfare improving and brings the allocation nearer to the Pareto optimal level. The design of the model is motivated by several features of recent crises: credit risk in the form of foreign currency denominated debt; costly crises that generate firesales and widespread bankruptcies; and asymmetric sectorial responses, wherethe nontradables sector falls more than the tradables sector in the wake of crises.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.