Mûlgāvañtrī:pīr:emām:shāhānī

Publication data missing.

Behcet ül-fetava maan-nükul

[Abdullah Yenişehirli].

al- Majallah: wa-hiya taḥtawī ʻalá al-qawānīn al-sharʻīyah wa-al-aḥkām al-ʹadlīyah al-muṭābiqah lil-kutub al-fiqhīyah

ḥarrarathā lajnah muʼallafah min al-ʹulamāʼ al-muḥaqqiqīn wa-al-fuqahāʼ al-mudaqqiqīn wa-baʻda an waqaʻat ladá al-Bāb al-ʻĀlī mawqiʻ al-istiḥsān taʻallaqat al-irādah al-sanīyah bi-an takūna dustūr lil-ʻamal bihā.

Tarjamah-ʹi Tārīkh-i Yangī Dunyā : manuscript, 18th cent

Title supplied by the cataloger.

Ibn Marwan e a fitna: islamismo e feudalismo no Gharb al-Andalus

Esta tese tem como objectivo, de um modo geral, analisar o impacto social, político e até mesmo civilizacional, que levaria ao clima de guerra civil que assolou a Península Ibérica muçulmana no século IX. De um modo mais restrito, analisaremos estes acontecimentos a partir de um dos seus personagens principais, ‘Abd ar-Rahman Ibn Marwan al-Jilliqi, a figura-chave desta dissertação. Como referência, temos o estudo de Manuel Acién Almansa sobre a mesma temática, Entre el Feudalismo y Islam; ‘Umar ibn Hafsun en las Fuentes y Historiografia, partindo de um outro personagem central da fitna: ‘Umar ibn Hafsun. Para além da obra de M. Acién, também consideramos o estudo de Jesus Lorenzo Jimenez, La Dawla de los Banu Qasi, uma dawla de grande protagonismo em toda a fitna. A proposta será analisar o caso de Ibn Marwan à luz dos mesmos problemas elencados por estes dois académicos, mas tendo como cenário o Gharb. Estabelecemos assim um ponto de partida para problematizar dentro da questão social ocidental e oriental, a que pertinentemente M. Acién acrescenta uma outra: a islâmica.

O imaginário das ilhas atlânticas no universo medieval islâmico-cristão

O pensamento cultural medieval aparece-nos como herdeiro da Antiguidade Clássica, da sua filosofia, ciência, arte e mitos. Todos estes conceitos traduzem-se com facilidade para as elites intelectuais cristãs e muçulmanas, que os conservam e integram em elementos da sua própria cultura. A ideia do mar, em especial o mar dito ‘aberto’ como o Oceano Atlântico, é marcada pelo maravilhoso. Em plena Idade Média o Oceano Atlântico surge como território de Caos, envolto em mistério. O Oceano Atlântico é local das mais variadas manifestações do fantástico. Desta forma, as ilhas atlânticas, contidas neste vasto oceano, são elas próprias impregnadas de um carácter maravilhoso. Tentaremos, ao longo desta dissertação de mestrado, abordar a questão das ilhas atlânticas e das suas características a nível de imaginário. Este exercício será feito, sempre que possível, fazendo o cruzamento de fontes de origem islâmica e de origem cristã. Desta maneira, surgirá uma imagem comum em relação ao imaginário do Oceano Atlântico e, em especial, das ilhas neste contidas. O objetivo principal deste trabalho é verdadeiramente demonstrar pontos de aproximação entre relatos e mapas, de origem cristã e islâmica, ligados a ilhas fantásticas e, ao mesmo tempo, reais. Veremos que as duas categorias, do real e do imaginário, sobrepõem-se diversas vezes, sendo que não se conseguem muitas vezes distinguir a nível das fontes. Desta forma, relatos de navegações atlânticas como a de São Brandão (de origem celto-cristã) ou a dos Aventureiros de Lisboa (originária no al-Andalus,) são reveladoras das atitudes e ideias na Idade Média em relação ao Atlântico e às suas ilhas.

La modernisation de Tunis : un urbanisme et une architecture d’État au miroir d’une anthologie de la percée dans la médina (1881-1987)

Cette thèse traite de quelques moments clés dans l’histoire urbaine et architecturale moderne de la ville de Tunis. Elle les aborde conjointement à la problématique du percement de son noyau historique : la médina, née d’un projet de modernisation urbaine lancé par les beys de Tunis à la fin du XIXe siècle, poursuivi par le protectorat français de 1881 à 1956, puis par le gouvernement indépendant de 1956 à 1987. Partant, la recherche est répartie sur trois temps avec, au centre, le projet de la percée dite de la Casbah adopté par le Président Bourguiba à la fin de 1959. Pour plusieurs raisons, ce moment est cité rapidement dans la littérature malgré son importance dans la compréhension du visage actuel de la capitale tunisienne. Pour le saisir, on a dû retourner aux premières tentatives de percement de la médina de Tunis par le colonisateur français en 1887. Puis, on s’est progressivement approché de l’ancêtre direct de la percée bourguibienne paru sur le Plan directeur de Tunis en 1948. De ce premier temps, on a mis en valeur les stratégies coloniales dans leur gestion du territoire et leur rapport au processus de valorisation/dévalorisation du patrimoine issu de la civilisation arabo-islamique. Le second temps, qui correspond au plan de décolonisation mené par l’État indépendant dès 1955, est marqué par le lancement d’un « concours international ouvert pour une étude d’aménagement de la ville de Tunis » organisé par le Secrétariat d’État aux travaux publics en collaboration avec l’Union internationale des architectes. L’étude de cet événement et du colloque qui l’a suivi a ôté le voile sur ses raisons d’être politico-économiques que dissimulaient les usuels soucis de l’hygiène, de la circulation et de l’embellissement du Grand Tunis. Pour appuyer davantage ces constats, un troisième et dernier temps a été dédié au chantier de Tunis au lendemain du concours. L’accent mis sur les lieux symboliques du pouvoir et le désir obsessif des autorités à se les approprier ont réduit ce chantier à une redistribution concertée des symboles de la souveraineté nationale dans le but de centraliser et de personnifier le pouvoir en place. Le présent travail se situe dans le cadre des études postcoloniales et projette un regard critique sur la décolonisation en rapport avec ce qu’on a taxé d’urbanisme d’État. Propulsé par une certaine perception de la modernité, cet urbanisme est indissociable d’une instrumentalisation politique qui met l’accent sur les questions identitaires et patrimoniales, insiste sur la rupture avec le passé et tend à écarter l’opinion publique des questions inhérentes à l’aménagement du territoire et à la sauvegarde de la mémoire collective. En procédant par une analyse contextuelle de faits historiques et une lecture typomorphologique de la percée de la Casbah, cette recherche attire l’attention sur l’ampleur de certaines décisions gouvernementales concernant l’aménagement de l’espace urbain et la conservation de l’héritage architectural à court, moyen et long termes. Elle renseigne aussi sur le rôle des collectivités, de l’élite et des professionnels dans la canalisation de ces décisions pour ou contre leur droit à la ville.

State-building in Iraq since 2003: the Challenges and Lessons. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 12/2014

Introduction. In 2003, Iraq was invaded by the US coalition forces that ousted Saddam Hussein’s regime from power before occupying the whole country. The intension, declared by the then American George W. Bush, was to ‘build a decent and democratic society at the centre of the Middle East’ that ‘will become a place of progress and peace.’1 In 2014, three years after the withdrawal of the last American soldier, however, it is difficult to overestimate or exaggerate what is at stake. National unity and territorial integrity have never been so seriously threatened since the country is experiencing the internal fighting in its modern history. Many parts of Iraq, including the northern oil city of Kirkuk, long claimed as an integral part of the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan, are out of the control of the central government. Large areas in the north including the strategic city of Mosul were seized by the fighters of the Islamic State, an Al-Qaeda offshoot, formerly known as ISIS, who threatened to invade the Kurdistan region before being attacked by airstrikes by the US. They proclaimed a caliphate on both sides of the border with Syria, where they also control vast territory.

The crisis in Iraq and the twists and turns of Turkish Middle East policy. OSW Commentary No. 142, 29.07.2014

The spectacular offensive by Islamic radicals in Iraq this June has led the country to the verge of collapse, and is another scene of the deep crisis in the Middle East, in which Turkey is entangled. The immediate consequence of this is a severe crisis of prestige after the kidnapping by terrorists of Turkish diplomats and Ankara’s inability to resolve the situation; in the long term consequences include escalation of the Kurdish problem, and a further increase in threats to the security of Turkey itself as well as the fundamental principles of its foreign policy. Both Ankara’s options and its political will to actively respond to the crisis are extremely limited. Yet again in recent years, the current crisis, the broader situation in the Middle East, and finally the position of Turkey in the region elude unambiguous assessments and forecasts – these are prevented by the scale and growth of the reappraisals and tensions in the region. The only undoubted fact is that Turkey is strategically and irreversibly entangled in the Middle East’s problems, which are an important factor affecting the transformation of the state which the ruling AKP is implementing; and in the near future, this state of affairs will only deepen.

Ever further from Moscow. Russia's stance on Central Asia. OSW Study 48/2014

The post-Soviet countries of Central Asia are important for Moscow as a potential source of danger; as a site of its relationships with China, the West and the Islamic world; and not least as a space covered by Russia’s integration initiatives. Since the collapse of the USSR, Russian influence in this region has undergone a far-reaching erosion. The Kremlin’s consistent actions to build up the Eurasian Union, as well as the threat of destabilisation in region after the ISAF operation in Afghanistan winds up in 2014, have slowed down this process, although it is unlikely to be reversed. The current ‘state of possession’ (i.e. the instruments and assets which Russia possesses) still ensures Moscow a minimum level of control over the region, which means that the activity of other global players is limited. This situation may change in tandem with a rise in their ambitions, especially with the possible involvement of China in the field of ‘hard’ security.

No change in the Russian Caucasus. The Winter Olympics amid a local war. OSW Study 47/2014

The North Caucasus has been the most unstable region of the Russian Federation since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Considering the scale of violence, the conflict in the region should be regarded as a local civil war between the Salafi Islamic armed underground and the secular authorities of the North Caucasus republics, supported by the security services. The Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, who has made himself de facto independent from Moscow, holds a particularly strong position in the region and his ambition is to gain control of the neighbouring territories. The Russian leadership, which sees the security of the Winter Olympics in Sochi as its top priority, is facing a strategic choice between trying to integrate the North Caucasus with the rest of the federation, or isolating the region and accepting the existence of an informal "internal abroad” within Russia. The cultural processes taking place in the region, including Islamisation, de-modernisation and de-Russification, have been driving the North Caucasus ever further away from the rest of Russia, strengthening a mutual sense of foreignness.

Chechnya: Between a Caucasian Jihad and ‘hidden’ separatism. OSW Point of View, January 2007

1. Even though Chechnya remains the most unstable republic in the Russian North Caucasus, the open armed conflict known as the Second Chechen War, which broke out in the autumn of 1999, is gradually dying down. 2. Several years ago, the conflict in Chechnya could have been characterised as a war between Chechen separatists and the government of the Russian Federation. However, the nature of the conflict has changed significantly over the last four or five years. 3. Even though the intensity of fighting in Chechnya has abated in recent years, the conflict has spilt over to the other Caucasus republics such as Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. As a result, this is presently not so much a Chechen conflict as a regional clash between the authorities and the Caucasian (including Chechen) Islamists. 4. The Chechen militants are weaker now, and the conflict has changed from a struggle for national liberation into a fight for the Islamic cause; but this does not mean that Russia has ultimately solved the problem of Chechen separatism.

"Creeping" civil war in the North Caucasus. OSW Commentary No. 50, 2011-03-15

Over the last year, the situation in Russia’s North Caucasus has become further destabilised. Attacks and armed clashes happen daily, and destabilisation is spreading to an increasingly large area. The extent of violence in the region is so great that it can already be stated that a de facto civil war is taking place, the warring parties being the Islamic armed underground movement which operates under the banner of the so-called Emirate of the North Caucasus, and the secular governments of the individual republics, who are supported by local and federal branches of the Russian Federation’s Interior Ministry and Federal Security Service. Moscow has no idea how to successfully tackle the Caucasus rebellion. Force has proved to be costly and unproductive, while the attempts made since early 2010 to integrate the region with the rest of Russia by implementing development programmes have not brought the desired results, because of widespread corruption and faint interest from businessmen who are afraid to invest in such an unsafe region. A growing problem for Moscow, particularly for the prestige of the state, is attacks by militants on areas near Sochi, where the 2014 Winter Olympics is to take place. It must be assumed that over the next 3 years before the Olympics, Moscow’s priority in the region will be to ensure the safety of Olympic preparations, and then the games themselves. It cannot be ruled out that the North Caucasus Federal District with its ‘troubled republics’ will be surrounded by a kind of cordon sanitaire (Sochi is situated in the neighbouring Southern Federal District). This could in turn strengthen these republics’ isolation, maintain the state of permanent instability, and postpone the prospects of solving the region’s acute economic and social problems.

Kazakhstan: the regional success story; Tajikistan: a trial period; Uzbekistan: the major source of instability in Central Asia? OSW Study 15/2004

Kazakhstan: Kazakhstan can boast economic development like no other country in Central Asia. In contrast to other countries of the region, which have rich natural resources, Kazakhstan has managed to use its economic potential in a way that yields concrete benefits now and, at the same time, creates prospects for further sustainable economic growth. Tajikistan: Tajikistan in its present state has been built on the civil war experiences and provisions of the peace accords signed in 1997. These have had a great impact on the present form of the state, its political scene and power mechanisms. President Emomali Rakhmonov is the central figure in the state. The political system, which he has cocreated, is based on - unique in this region - political pluralism (the existence of the Islamic party), decentralisation (far-going independence of the regions and relatively limited potential of the central structures) and compromise as the basic way of resolving conflicts. Such a system has so far guaranteed stabilisation and normalisation of the country. Uzbekistan: With its geographic location, potential, ambitions and political priorities, Uzbekistan could play a leading role in Central Asia. The international community has perceived the country as the pillar of stability in the region. This perception was further reinforced after 11th September 2001 and was certainly among the factors that inspired the United States to start closer political and military cooperation with Tashkent. The administration in Washington had expected that closer contacts might galvanise political, economic and social change in Uzbekistan, thus reinforcing positive trends in other countries of the region as well. But the relations between Washington and Tashkent are in crisis (which the United States will certainly try to overcome), and we have seen rapprochement between Uzbekistan and Russia and China.

Russia's policy in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. OSW Study 23/2006

The Southern Caucasus and Central Asia are priority areas for the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Russia mainly sees its influence in both regions as an important factor determining its international stature, and as a precondition for reinforcing its position as a world power. The Caucasus and Central Asia are also important for Russia from the points of view of economy, especially because of those area's natural resource wealth, and security, as both regions generate serious potential threats to the Russian Federation, including Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, the drugs trade and illegal migration.