An Incomplete Narrative: Prosecuting Sexual Violence Crimes at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia

This article explores the feminist critique that progress in the classification of sexual violence crimes within international criminal law has not been matched by sufficient legal enforcement. It takes the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) as a case study, exploring the various myths, investigative failures and procedural developments that have hindered the ECCC’s effective investigation of sexual violence. The article argues that while there is a need to adopt a nuanced perspective of the many gender inequalities facing women, it remains crucial that sexual violence is adequately investigated and prosecuted, due to the normative value of such prosecutions. It concludes with some suggestions as to how the ECCC can improve accountability for such crimes, but also highlights lessons that future courts can learn from the ECCC’s failures.

Identifying the Impact of Incomplete Datasets on Process Cycle Time Prediction in an Aerospace Assembly Line

Supply Chain Simulation (SCS) is applied to acquire information to support outsourcing decisions but obtaining enough detail in key parameters can often be a barrier to making well informed decisions.
One aspect of SCS that has been relatively unexplored is the impact of inaccurate data around delays within the SC. The impact of the magnitude and variability of process cycle time on typical performance indicators in a SC context is studied.
System cycle time, WIP levels and throughput are more sensitive to the magnitude of deterministic deviations in process cycle time than variable deviations. Manufacturing costs are not very sensitive to these deviations.
Future opportunities include investigating the impact of process failure or product defects, including logistics and transportation between SC members and using alternative costing methodologies.

Asphalt cement concrete pavement recycling, Cass and Montgomery Counties : final report for Iowa DOT project HR-1018, Federal Highway Administration demonstration project no. 39, contract no. DOT-FH-15-336, 1986

This demonstration project consisted of three adjacent highway resurfacing projects using asphalt cement concrete removed from an Interstate highway which had become severely rutted.

Inflaton dark matter from incomplete decay

We show that the decay of the inflaton field may be incomplete, while nevertheless successfully reheating the Universe and leaving a stable remnant that accounts for the present dark matter abundance. We note, in particular, that since the mass of the inflaton decay products is field dependent, one can construct models, endowed with an appropriate discrete symmetry, where inflaton decay is kinematically forbidden at late times and only occurs during the initial stages of field oscillations after inflation. We show that this is sufficient to ensure the transition to a radiation-dominated era and that inflaton particles typically thermalize in the process. They eventually decouple and freeze out, yielding a thermal dark matter relic. We discuss possible implementations of this generic mechanism within consistent cosmological and particle physics scenarios, for both single-field and hybrid inflation.

Effects of incomplete combustion on atmospheric chemistry: Black carbon climate forcing and global carbon monoxide emissions

This thesis is actually the composition of two separate studies aimed at further understanding the role of incomplete combustion products on atmospheric chemistry. The first explores the sensitivity of black carbon (BC) forcing to aerosol vertical location since BC has an increased forcing per unit mass when it is located above reflective clouds. We used a column radiative transfer model to produce globally-averaged values of normalized direct radiative forcing (NDRF) for BC over and under different types of clouds. We developed a simple column-weighting scheme based on the mass fractions of BC that are over and under clouds in measured vertical profiles. The resulting NDRF is in good agreement with global 3-D model estimates, supporting the column-weighted model as a tool for exploring uncertainties due to diversity in vertical distribution. BC above low clouds accounts for about 20% of the global burden but 50% of the forcing. We estimate maximum-minimum spread in NDRF due to modeled profiles as about 40% and uncertainty as about 25%. Models overestimate BC in the upper troposphere compared with measurements; modeled NDRF might need to be reduced by about 15%. Redistributing BC within the lowest 4 km of the atmosphere affects modeled NDRF by only about 5% and cannot account for very high forcing estimates. The second study estimated global year 2000 carbon monoxide (CO) emissions using a traditional bottom-up inventory. We applied literature-derived emission factors to a variety of fuel and technology combinations. Combining these with regional fuel use and production data we produced CO emissions estimates that were separable by sector, fuel type, technology, and region. We estimated year 2000 stationary source emissions of 685.9 Tg/yr and 885 Tg/yr if we included adopted mobile sources from EDGAR v3.2FT2000. Open/biomass burning contributed most significantly to global CO burden, while the residential sector, primarily in Asia and Africa, were the largest contributors with respect to contained combustion sources. Industry production in Asia, including brick, cement, iron and steel-making, also contributed significantly to CO emissions. Our estimates of biofuel emissions are lower than most previously published bottom-up estimates while our other fuel emissions are generally in good agreement. Our values are also universally lower than recently estimated CO emissions from models using top-down methods.

Privity of Contract and Third Party Rights in European Construction Projects

Privity of contract has lately been criticized in several European jurisdictions, particu-larly due to the onerous consequences it gives rise to in arrangements typical for the modern exchange such as chains of contracts. Privity of contract is a classical premise of contract law, which prohibits a third party to acquire or enforce rights under a contract to which he is not a party. Such a premise is usually seen to be manifested in the doctrine of privity of contract developed under common law, however, the jurisdictions of continental Europe do recognize a corresponding starting point in contract law. One of the traditional industry sectors affected by this premise is the construction industry. A typical large construction project includes a contractual chain comprised of an employer, a main contractor and a subcontractor. The employer is usually dependent on the subcontractor's performance, however, no contractual nexus exists between the two. Accordingly, the employer might want to circumvent the privity of contract in order to reach the subcontractor and to mitigate any risks imposed by such a chain of contracts. From this starting point, the study endeavors to examine the concept of privity of con-tract in European jurisdictions and particularly the methods used to circumvent the rule in the construction industry practice. For this purpose, the study employs both a com-parative and a legal dogmatic method. The principal aim is to discover general principles not just from a theoretical perspective, but from a practical angle as well. Consequently, a considerable amount of legal praxis as well as international industry forms have been used as references. The most important include inter alia the model forms produced by FIDIC as well as Olli Norros' doctoral thesis "Vastuu sopimusketjussa". According to the conclusions of this study, the four principal ways to circumvent privity of contract in European construction projects include liability in a chain of contracts, collateral contracts, assignment of rights as well as security instruments. The contempo-rary European jurisdictions recognize these concepts and the references suggest that they are an integral part of the current market practice. Despite the fact that such means of circumventing privity of contract raise a number of legal questions and affect the risk position of particularly a subcontractor considerably, it seems that the impairment of the premise of privity of contract is an increasing trend in the construction industry.

Incomplete information games of conflict and collective action

My thesis consists of three essays that investigate strategic interactions between individuals engaging in risky collective action in uncertain environments. The first essay analyzes a broad class of incomplete information coordination games with a wide range of applications in economics and politics. The second essay draws from the general model developed in the first essay to study decisions by individuals of whether to engage in protest/revolution/coup/strike. The final essay explicitly integrates state response to the analysis. The first essay, Coordination Games with Strategic Delegation of Pivotality, exhaustively analyzes a class of binary action, two-player coordination games in which players receive stochastic payoffs only if both players take a ``stochastic-coordination action''. Players receive conditionally-independent noisy private signals about the normally distributed stochastic payoffs. With this structure, each player can exploit the information contained in the other player's action only when he takes the “pivotalizing action”. This feature has two consequences: (1) When the fear of miscoordination is not too large, in order to utilize the other player's information, each player takes the “pivotalizing action” more often than he would based solely on his private information, and (2) best responses feature both strategic complementarities and strategic substitutes, implying that the game is not supermodular nor a typical global game. This class of games has applications in a wide range of economic and political phenomena, including war and peace, protest/revolution/coup/ strike, interest groups lobbying, international trade, and adoption of a new technology. My second essay, Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs, studies the decision problem of citizens who must decide whether to submit to the status quo or mount a revolution. If they coordinate, they can overthrow the status quo. Otherwise, the status quo is preserved and participants in a failed revolution are punished. Citizens face two types of uncertainty. (a) non-strategic: they are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution, (b) strategic: they are uncertain about each other's assessments of the relative payoff. I draw on the existing literature and historical evidence to argue that the uncertainty in the payoffs of status quo and revolution is intrinsic in politics. Several counter-intuitive findings emerge: (1) Better communication between citizens can lower the likelihood of revolution. In fact, when the punishment for failed protest is not too harsh and citizens' private knowledge is accurate, then further communication reduces incentives to revolt. (2) Increasing strategic uncertainty can increase the likelihood of revolution attempts, and even the likelihood of successful revolution. In particular, revolt may be more likely when citizens privately obtain information than when they receive information from a common media source. (3) Two dilemmas arise concerning the intensity and frequency of punishment (repression), and the frequency of protest. Punishment Dilemma 1: harsher punishments may increase the probability that punishment is materialized. That is, as the state increases the punishment for dissent, it might also have to punish more dissidents. It is only when the punishment is sufficiently harsh, that harsher punishment reduces the frequency of its application. Punishment Dilemma 1 leads to Punishment Dilemma 2: the frequencies of repression and protest can be positively or negatively correlated depending on the intensity of repression. My third essay, The Repression Puzzle, investigates the relationship between the intensity of grievances and the likelihood of repression. First, I make the observation that the occurrence of state repression is a puzzle. If repression is to succeed, dissidents should not rebel. If it is to fail, the state should concede in order to save the costs of unsuccessful repression. I then propose an explanation for the “repression puzzle” that hinges on information asymmetries between the state and dissidents about the costs of repression to the state, and hence the likelihood of its application by the state. I present a formal model that combines the insights of grievance-based and political process theories to investigate the consequences of this information asymmetry for the dissidents' contentious actions and for the relationship between the magnitude of grievances (formulated here as the extent of inequality) and the likelihood of repression. The main contribution of the paper is to show that this relationship is non-monotone. That is, as the magnitude of grievances increases, the likelihood of repression might decrease. I investigate the relationship between inequality and the likelihood of repression in all country-years from 1981 to 1999. To mitigate specification problem, I estimate the probability of repression using a generalized additive model with thin-plate splines (GAM-TPS). This technique allows for flexible relationship between inequality, the proxy for the costs of repression and revolutions (income per capita), and the likelihood of repression. The empirical evidence support my prediction that the relationship between the magnitude of grievances and the likelihood of repression is non-monotone.

Auctioning versus grandfathering in cap-and-trade systems with market power and incomplete information

We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and firms have private information on their own abatement technologies. Based on real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit, multi-bid uniform auction. At the auction, each firm anticipates its role in the secondary market, either as a leader or a follower. This role affects each firms’ valuation of the permits (which are not common across firms) as well as their bidding strategies and it precludes the auction from generating a cost-effective allocation of permits, as it occurs in simpler auction models. Auctioning tends to be more cost-effective than grandfathering when the firms’ abatement cost functions are sufficiently different from one another, especially if the follower has lower abatement costs than the leader and the dispersion of the marginal costs is large enough.

Essays on Matching Markets and Their Equilibria

Matching theory and matching markets are a core component of modern economic theory and market design. This dissertation presents three original contributions to this area. The first essay constructs a matching mechanism in an incomplete information matching market in which the positive assortative match is the unique efficient and unique stable match. The mechanism asks each agent in the matching market to reveal her privately known type. Through its novel payment rule, truthful revelation forms an ex post Nash equilibrium in this setting. This mechanism works in one-, two- and many-sided matching markets, thus offering the first mechanism to unify these matching markets under a single mechanism design framework. The second essay confronts a problem of matching in an environment in which no efficient and incentive compatible matching mechanism exists due to matching externalities. I develop a two-stage matching game in which a contracting stage facilitates subsequent conditionally efficient and incentive compatible Vickrey auction stage. Infinite repetition of this two-stage matching game enforces the contract in every period. This mechanism produces inequitably distributed social improvement: parties to the contract receive all of the gains and then some. The final essay demonstrates the existence of prices which stably and efficiently partition a single set of agents into firms and workers, and match those two sets to each other. This pricing system extends Kelso and Crawford's general equilibrium results in a labor market matching model and links one- and two-sided matching markets as well.

A study of employee affective organisational commitment and retention in Pakistan:the roles of psychological contract breach and norms of reciprocity

Social exchange theory and notions of reciprocity have long been assumed to explain the relationship between psychological contract breach and important employee outcomes. To date, however, there has been no explicit testing of these assumptions. This research, therefore, explores the mediating role of negative, generalized, and balanced reciprocity, in the relationships between psychological contract breach and employees’ affective organizational commitment and turnover intentions. A survey of 247 Pakistani employees of a large public university was analyzed using structural equation modeling and bootstrapping techniques, and provided excellent support for our model. As predicted, psychological contract breach was positively related to negative reciprocity norms and negatively related to generalized and balanced reciprocity norms. Negative and generalized (but not balanced) reciprocity were negatively and positively (respectively) related to employees’ affective organizational commitment and fully mediated the relationship between psychological contract breach and affective organizational commitment. Moreover, affective organizational commitment fully mediated the relationship between generalized and negative reciprocity and employees’ turnover intentions. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.

Review of Program Integrity Operations At Six Managed Care Organizations Delivering Medicaid Services under a Contract with the South Carolina Department of Health & Human Services

The State contracted with six managed care organizations to deliver Medicaid managed care at an annual cost of $2.7 billion, representing 10% of the State’s annual budget, to 750,000 Medicaid beneficiaries in South Carolina. This review’s scope and objectives were: Test the six MCOs’ compliance and effective execution of the SCDHHS’s managed care contract “Section 11 - Program Integrity” focusing on the operational components of pre-payment review and post-payment review. Identify opportunities to improve SCDHHS’s biennial managed care contract, contract monitoring, and MCO compliance and effective execution of the contract.

An Analysis of the Early Prediction of Highway Construction Project Completion using the Contract Status Report

History has shown that projects move in and out of poor status through the life of the project. Predicting the success or failure of a project to complete on time because of its recent history on the contract status report could provide our project managers another tool for monitoring contract progress. In many instances, poor contract progress results in the loss of contract time and late completion of projects. This research evaluates the combinations of work type, point in time physical work begins, recent poor status, and contract bid amount as indicators of late project completion.