Reconstructing the Timing and Dispersion Routes of HIV-1 Subtype B Epidemics in The Caribbean and Central America: A Phylogenetic Story.

The Caribbean and Central America are among the regions with highest HIV-1B prevalence worldwide. Despite of this high virus burden, little is known about the timing and the migration patterns of HIV-1B in these regions. Migration is one of the major processes shaping the genetic structure of virus populations. Thus, reconstruction of epidemiological network may contribute to understand HIV-1B evolution and reduce virus prevalence. We have investigated the spatio-temporal dynamics of the HIV-1B epidemic in The Caribbean and Central America using 1,610 HIV-1B partial pol sequences from 13 Caribbean and 5 Central American countries. Timing of HIV-1B introduction and virus evolutionary rates, as well as the spatial genetic structure of the HIV-1B populations and the virus migration patterns were inferred. Results revealed that in The Caribbean and Central America most of the HIV-1B variability was generated since the 80 s. At odds with previous data suggesting that Haiti was the origin of the epidemic in The Caribbean, our reconstruction indicated that the virus could have been disseminated from Puerto Rico and Antigua. These two countries connected two distinguishable migration areas corresponding to the (mainly Spanish-colonized) Easter and (mainly British-colonized) Western islands, which indicates that virus migration patterns are determined by geographical barriers and by the movement of human populations among culturally related countries. Similar factors shaped the migration of HIV-1B in Central America. The HIV-1B population was significantly structured according to the country of origin, and the genetic diversity in each country was associated with the virus prevalence in both regions, which suggests that virus populations evolve mainly through genetic drift. Thus, our work contributes to the understanding of HIV-1B evolution and dispersion pattern in the Americas, and its relationship with the geography of the area and the movements of human populations.

Tough love for sinners in the eurozone banking union. CEPS Commentary, 1 July 2013

The ministers of finance and the economy of the eurozone have now agreed on the main features of a new ESM instrument for the direct recapitalisation of euro area banks (Eurogroup, 2013) and on a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions (Council of the European Union, 2013). However, as Stefano Micossi explains in this Commentary, the text that has come out of the frantic late-night negotiations in the Ecofin Council seems to leave unwelcome uncertainty as to the real scope of the new rules in the different national jurisdictions, while the lack of depositor preference in the bail-in pecking order may result in destabilisation. The proposed system appears not only highly intrusive but it also places a considerable burden of aid to the failing institution on the member state, raising doubts about its ability to “break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns”.

The Impact of Banking Structural Reform on Household Retail Finance. ECRI Commentary No. 13, 7 October 2014

There are two main objectives behind the EC proposal on banking structural reform: the financial stability objective and the economic efficiency objective. If it is implemented, the reform should reinforce the stability and economic efficiency of household retail activities through lower contagion, better resolvability in the event of failure, more harmonised supervisory practices across the EU and more resilient household demand for retail loans. However, it could also trigger counterproductive effects that could partly undermine the expected benefits. These potential negative effects are not appropriately assessed in the impact study of the proposal published in January 2014 and will require further consideration in the coming months. In particular, the stability of household retail finance could be strengthened by placing more emphasis on bankruptcy risks of retail banks; the transfer of existing systemic activities towards less regulated and supervised markets and reputational risk. A better analysis of the borrowing costs for households (impacted by the potential decreasing diversification of the funding base of banks and scarcer liquidity) and implementation costs could help regulators to achieve the objective of efficient household activities.

Eurosystem collateral policy and framework: Was it unduly changed? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/14, 17 November 2014

All Eurosystem credit operations, including the important open market operations, need to be based on adequate collateral. Liquidity is provided to banks against collateral at market prices subject to a haircut. The Eurosystem adapted its collateral framework during the crisis to accept lower-rated assets as collateral. Higher haircuts are applied to insure against liquidity risk as well as the greater volatility of prices of lower-rated assets. The adaptation of the collateral framework was necessary to provide sufficient liquidity to banks in the euro area periphery in particular. In crisis countries, special emergency liquidity assistance was provided. More than 80 percent of the European Central Bank’s liquidity (Main Refinancing Operations and Long Term Refinancing Operations) is provided to banks in five countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). The changes in the collateral framework were necessary for the ECB to fulfil its treaty-based mandate of providing liquidity to solvent banks and safeguarding financial stability. The ECB did not take on board excessive risks.

Strengthening the euro area. CHALLENGE EUROPE Issue 22. Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU's new leadership, September 2014

Since 2007, a series of acute crises have threatened the very existence of the euro area. The financial crisis which spilled into the currency union in 2007 was followed by an unexpectedly strong downturn of the real economy. As of 2010, the euro area was confronted with a severe sovereign debt and banking crisis. Despite these troublesome developments, the euro area has proven to have a considerable degree of resilience. In each phase, governance weaknesses were revealed – and national governments together with the EU institutions have designed an impressive series of policy responses in crisis management and institutional innovation. The euro area today is completed by a banking union with a Single Supervisory and a Single Resolution Mechanism. National budgetary and economic policies are more closely overseen and coordinated. With the European Stability Mechanism, the euro area now has a permanent tool in place to manage sovereign liquidity crises and instabilities in the banking sector. Most importantly, the euro area's only true federal institution, the European Central Bank (ECB), has become its most effective crisis manager: with the announcement of its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme, the ECB finally managed to calm the self fulfilling crisis in 2012. Meanwhile, the announcement of credit easing and quasi-quantitative easing in September 2014 is a move towards reducing financial fragmentation and countering deflation. The euro area in 2014 is hence a lot different from the one in 2007. And yet, further challenges need to be overcome. Prevailing stagnation, fragmentation and problems of legitimacy require a rethink of policies and further governance reform.

The Relevance of International Spillovers and Asymmetric Effects in the Taylor Rule. CEPS Working Document No. 403, February 2015

Deviations of policy interest rates from the levels implied by the Taylor rule have been persistent before the financial crisis and increased especially after the turn of the century. Compared to the Taylor benchmark, policy rates were often too low. This paper provides evidence that both international spillovers, for instance international dependencies in the interest rate-setting of central banks, and nonlinear reaction patterns can offer a more realistic specification of the Taylor rule in the main industrial countries. The inclusion of international spillovers and, even more, nonlinear dynamics improves the explanatory power of standard Taylor reaction functions. Deviations from Taylor rates tend to be smaller and their negative trend can be eliminated.

Living (dangerously) without a fiscal union. Bruegel Working Paper 2015/03

The euro area’s political contract requires member nations to rely principally on their own resources when confronted with severe economic distress. Since monetary policy is the same for all, national fiscal austerity is the default response to counter national fiscal stress. Moreover, the monetary policy was itself stodgy in countering the crisis, and banking-sector problems were allowed to fester. And it was considered inappropriate to impose losses on private sector creditors. Thus, the nature of the incomplete monetary union and the self-imposed taboos led deep and persistent fiscal austerity to become the norm. As a consequence, growth was hurt, which undermined the primary objective of lowering the debt burden. To prevent a meltdown, distressed nations were given official loans to repay private creditors. But the stress and instability continued and soon it became necessary to ease the repayment terms on official loans. When even that proved insufficient, the German-inspired fiscal austerity was combined with the deep pockets of the European Central Bank. The ECB’s safety net for insolvent or near-insolvent banks and sovereigns, in effect, substituted for the absent fiscal union and drew the central bank into the political process.

The Great Financial Plumbing: From Northern Rock to Banking Union. CEPS Paperback, 19 October 2015

The financial and economic crises have led to an enormous plumbing exercise, involving a fundamental re-design of the global and European regulatory and supervisory system. This book systematically assesses the big items on the G-20 and EU agendas and the effectiveness with which they have been implemented in the EU. Its publication coincides with the demand by European Commissioner Jonathan Hill, in the context of the Capital Markets Union, for a 'comprehensive review' of the impact and coherence of EU legislation in the area of financial services. Karel Lannoo argues in the book that much has been done by European policy-makers to make the financial system safer and to prevent banking crises of the magnitude that erupted in 2008 and 2011, but that the new framework puts an enormous burden on banks and supervisors to implement and enforce it correctly. With the huge amount of secondary or 'level-2' legislation in place, this process has spiralled out of control, and as member states always find new ways of ‘gold-plating’ EU rules, the EU always finds further reasons to achieve a 'single rulebook'. This process has to be brought to a halt, and mutual recognition, a basic single-market principle, reinforced. The new framework also brings huge advantages, which should offer benefits to all parties. Banking Union is a huge step forward, which introduces 'one-stop shopping' for banks in the eurozone, another basic single market principle, and a true single supervisor. The clarity of the new resolution framework should, if correctly applied, trigger early intervention and bring an end to forbearance, thereby enforcing market discipline in the banking sector. It should also avoid reliance on taxpayers' money to bail-out banks in trouble, which totalled 14% of EU GDP during the crisis.

Firmer foundations for a stronger European Banking Union. Bruegel Working Paper 2015/13, November 2015

The move to European Banking Union involving the supervision and resolution of banks at euro-area level was stimulated by the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area in 2012. However, the long-term objective of Banking Union is dealing with intensified cross-border banking.The share of the assets of national banking systems that come from other EU countries was rising before the financial and economic crisis of 2007, but went into decline thereafter in the context of a general retrenchment of international banking. Most recent data, however, suggests the decline has been halted. About 14 percent of the assets of banks in Banking Union come from other EU countries, while about a quarter of the assets of the top 25 banks in the Banking Union are held in other EU countries.While a crisis-prevention framework for the euro area has largely been completed, the crisis-management framework remains incomplete, potentially creating instability. There is no governance mechanism to resolve disputes between different levels of crisis-management agencies, and incentives to promote optimum oversight are lacking. Most importantly, risk-sharing mechanisms do not adequately address the sovereign-bank loop, with a lack of clarity about the divide between bail-in and bail-out.To complete Banking Union, the lender-of-last-resort and deposit insurance functions should move to the euro-area level, breaking the sovereign-bank loop. A fully-fledged single deposit insurance (and resolution) fund should be favoured over a reinsurance scheme for reasons of cost and simplicity.

The Challenges of the EU Banking Union - will it succeed in dealing with the next financial crisis? Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings 36/2015

The EU Banking Union combines micro- and macro-prudential regulation. It aims at breaking the “doom loop” between banks and sovereign debt, promoting financial stability and mitigating the next financial shock to the real EU economy, at the lowest possible cost to the financial institutions and to the taxpayers. Success, or failure, is determined by how the banking union copes with the challenges to its two main pillars, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Under the SSM, in its new supervisory role, the ECB may be subject to conflicts between the objectives of price and financial stability, and the single-supervisor role may be sub-optimal. Two regulators might have been preferable and more focus on ECB accountability will now be required. The shock-absorbing Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is part of the SRM, may not have the capacity to deal with a crisis of the size of the one of 2008. Especially as the nature and severity of a future financial crisis cannot be forecasted. The design of the banking union is not the result of theoretical studies, but a political compromise to deal with an acute crisis. The theoretical studies that are included in this paper are not supportive of the banking union in its current form. Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the EU Banking Union may succeed, as ECB supervision of the 123 systemically important banks should contain potential demands on the SRM. In the event of a crisis that is too severe for the banking union to absorb with its current capability, the crucial assumption is that there is political will to rapidly provide new resources. The same applies, if a major financial crisis develops before the banking union is fully operational.

The Challenges of the EU Banking Union - will it succeed in dealing with the next financial crisis? Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefings 36/2015

The EU Banking Union combines micro- and macro-prudential regulation. It aims at breaking the “doom loop” between banks and sovereign debt, promoting financial stability and mitigating the next financial shock to the real EU economy, at the lowest possible cost to the financial institutions and to the taxpayers. Success, or failure, is determined by how the banking union copes with the challenges to its two main pillars, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Under the SSM, in its new supervisory role, the ECB may be subject to conflicts between the objectives of price and financial stability, and the single-supervisor role may be sub-optimal. Two regulators might have been preferable and more focus on ECB accountability will now be required. The shock-absorbing Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is part of the SRM, may not have the capacity to deal with a crisis of the size of the one of 2008. Especially as the nature and severity of a future financial crisis cannot be forecasted. The design of the banking union is not the result of theoretical studies, but a political compromise to deal with an acute crisis. The theoretical studies that are included in this paper are not supportive of the banking union in its current form. Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the EU Banking Union may succeed, as ECB supervision of the 123 systemically important banks should contain potential demands on the SRM. In the event of a crisis that is too severe for the banking union to absorb with its current capability, the crucial assumption is that there is political will to rapidly provide new resources. The same applies, if a major financial crisis develops before the banking union is fully operational.

Elemental and stable isotopic composition of fine fraction samples of ODP Site 115-709 (Table 1)

Stable isotopic and minor element compositions were measured on the fine fraction of pelagic carbonate sediments from Ocean Drilling Program Site 709 in the central Indian Ocean. This section ranges in age from 47 Ma to the present. The observed compositional variations are the result of either paleoceanographic changes (past oceanic chemical or temperature variations) or diagenetic changes. The CaCO3 record is little affected by diagenesis. From previous work, carbonate content is known to be determined by the interplay of biological productivity, water column dissolution, and dilution. The carbon isotopic record is generally similar to previously published curves. A good correlation was observed between sea-level high stands and high 13C/12C ratios. This supports Shackleton's hypothesis that as the proportion of organic carbon buried in marine sediments becomes larger, oceanic-dissolved inorganic carbon becomes isotopically heavier. This proportion appears to be higher when sea level is higher and organic carbon is buried in more extensive shallow-shelf sediments. The strontium content and oxygen isotopic composition of carbonate sediments are much more affected by burial diagenesis. Low strontium concentrations are invariably associated with high values of d18O, probably indicating zones of greater carbonate recrystallization. Nevertheless, there is an inverse correlation between strontium concentration and sea level that is thought to be a result of high-strontium aragonitic sedimentation on shallow banks and shelves during high stands. Iron and manganese concentrations and, to a lesser extent, magnesium and strontium concentrations and carbon isotopic ratios are affected by early diagenetic reactions. These reactions are best observed in a slumped interval of sediments that occurs between 13.0 and 17.5 Ma. As a result of microbial reduction of manganese and iron oxides and dissolved sulfate, it is hypothesized that small amounts of mixed-metal carbonate cements are precipitated. These have low carbon isotopic ratios and high concentrations of metals.

Records of the Department of State relating to political relations between the United States and Central America, 1911-1929 [microform].

Accompanying guide has date: 1969.

Annual Report, Relative to Banks

Title varies: -1851, 1854- The Annual Statements of the Several Banks of the State of New Jersey; 1852-1853, Report of the Bank Commissioners of New Jersey; -1867, Annual Reports of the Banks of the State of New Jersey; 1864-1866, Annual Statements of the Bank [etc]; -1890, Annual Statements of the Banks and Savings Institutions [etc]; 1891-1894, 1897-1989, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance, relative to Savings Banks, Discount Banks and Trust Companies (1897-1898 include also deposit banks); 1895, Report of the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance; 1899-1950, Annual Report [etc] relative to Savings Banks, Trust Companies, and State Banks of Discount and Deposit. (varies slightly)

Essays on Personal Bankruptcy Law and Small Business Financing

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06