Organisational structure, communication and group ethics

This paper investigates experimentally how organisational decision processes affect the moral motivations of actors inside a firm that must forego profits to reduce harming a third party. In a "vertical" treatment, one insider unilaterally sets the harm-reduction strategy; the other can only accept or quit. In a "horizontal" treatment, the insiders decide by consensus. Our 2-by-2 design also controls for communication effects. In our data, communication makes vertical firms more ethical; voice appears to mitigate "responsibility-alleviation" in that subordinates with voice feel responsible for what their firms do. Vertical firms are then more ethical than the horizontal firms for which our bargaining data reveal a dynamic form of responsibility-alleviation and our chat data indicate a strong "insider-outsider" effect.

Communication, cultural identities and the Olympic Games: the Barcelona’92 experience

This document includes the results of the research undertaken by the author on the media planning and coverage of the Barcelona'92 and its cultural implications.

Olympic cities and communication

Article published in Greek in the special issue "The Olympic Games: the mega sports and media event" of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens journal Communication Issues (2004, no.1), discussing the need for establishing a communication model for city-games relations.

Heritability, determinants and reference values of renal length: a family-based population study.

OBJECTIVES: In this population-based study, reference values were generated for renal length, and the heritability and factors associated with kidney length were assessed. METHODS: Anthropometric parameters and renal ultrasound measurements were assessed in randomly selected nuclear families of European ancestry (Switzerland). The adjusted narrow sense heritability of kidney size parameters was estimated by maximum likelihood assuming multivariate normality after power transformation. Gender-specific reference centiles were generated for renal length according to body height in the subset of non-diabetic non-obese participants with normal renal function. RESULTS: We included 374 men and 419 women (mean ± SD, age 47 ± 18 and 48 ± 17 years, BMI 26.2 ± 4 and 24.5 ± 5 kg/m(2), respectively) from 205 families. Renal length was 11.4 ± 0.8 cm in men and 10.7 ± 0.8 cm in women; there was no difference between right and left renal length. Body height, weight and estimated glomerular filtration rate (eGFR) were positively associated with renal length, kidney function negatively, age quadratically, whereas gender and hypertension were not. The adjusted heritability estimates of renal length and volume were 47.3 ± 8.5 % and 45.5 ± 8.8 %, respectively (P < 0.001). CONCLUSION: The significant heritability of renal length and volume highlights the familial aggregation of this trait, independently of age and body size. Population-based references for renal length provide a useful guide for clinicians. KEY POINTS: • Renal length and volume are heritable traits, independent of age and size. • Based on a European population, gender-specific reference values/percentiles are provided for renal length. • Renal length correlates positively with body length and weight. • There was no difference between right and left renal lengths in this study. • This negates general teaching that the left kidney is larger and longer.

Olympic education experiences: the sponsorship in the promotion of Olympic values

This text was presented at the 16th International Seminar on Olympic Studies for Postgraduate Students that was organised by the International Olympic Academy in Ancient Olympia, from 1st to 30th July 2008. First here are reported, fundamental concepts on Olympics such as the Olympic values and the educational mandate of Pierre de Coubertin, the Olympic brand and symbols, the sponsorship and the Olympic partner programme. Then there is a chapter regarding the Top sponsors educational initiatives on Olympic values, and specially, describing the Olympic sponsors involvement in education and Top sponsors educational activities. And finally, the author analyses the sponsorship role in the promotion of Olympic Values Education, providing conclusions, comments on future and perspectives and some recommendations.

The new role of the mass media in the construction of sport and Olympic values

This paper was presented in the International Symposium on Toward the Creation of New-Sport Cultures, undertaken in Osaka, Japan, in January 28, 1996. The main purpose is to make an interpretation of the cultural values of sport and Olympism in contemporary society, considering the enormous influence that the media have on them.

Earnings management and cultural values

Using theory and empirical data from social psychology to measure for cultural differences between countries, we study the effect of individualism as defined by Hofstede (1980) and egalitarianism as defined by Schwartz (1994, 1999, 2004) on earnings management. We find a significant influence of both cultural measures. In line with Licht et al. (2004), who argue that individualistic societies may be less susceptible to corruption, we find that countries scoring high on individualism tend to have lower levels of earnings management. In addition, we find that egalitarianism, defined as a society's cultural orientation with respect to intolerance for abuses of market and political power, is negatively related with earnings management. Our results are robust to different specifications and controls. The main message of this paper is that besides formal institutions, cultural differences are relevant to explain earnings management behaviour. We think that our work adds to the understanding of the importance of cultural values in managerial behaviour across countries contributing to the literature on earnings management and law and institutions.

Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities

We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. We show that with this definition and equal sharing of these dividends the averaged sum of dividends for each player, over all the coalitions that contain the player, coincides with the corresponding average value of the player. We then construct weighted Shapley values by departing from equal division of dividends and finally, for each such value, provide a bidding mechanism implementing it.

Communication for Public Goods

This paper studies information transmission between multiple agents with di¤erent preferences and a welfare maximizing decision maker who chooses the quality or quantity of a public good (e.g. provision of public health service; carbon emissions policy; pace of lectures in a classroom) that is consumed by all of them. Communication in such circumstances suffers from the agents' incentive to "exaggerate" their preferences relative to the average of the other agents, since the decision maker's reaction to each agent's message is weaker than in one-to-one communication. As the number of agents becomes larger the quality of information transmission diminishes. The use of binary messages (e.g. "yes" or "no") is shown to be a robust mode of communication when the main source of informational distortion is exaggeration.

The Good, the Bad and the Populist: A Model of Political Agency with Emotional Voters

This paper attempts to extend existing models of political agency to an environment in which voting may be divided between informed and instrumental, informed and ‘expressive’ (Brennan and Lomasky (1993)) and uninformed due to ‘rational irrationality’ (Caplan (2007)). It constructs a model where politicians may be good, bad or populist. Populists are more willing than good politicians to pander to voters who may choose inferior policies in a large-group electoral setting because their vote is insignificant compared with those that voters would choose were their vote decisive in determining the electoral outcome. Bad politicians would ideally like to extract tax revenue for their own ends. Initially we assume the existence of only good and populist politicians. The paper investigates the incentives for good politicians to pool with or separate from populists and focuses on three key issues – (1) how far the majority of voter’s preferences are from those held by the better informed incumbent politician (2) the extent to which the population exhibits rational irrationality and expressiveness (jointly labelled as emotional) and (3) the cost involved in persuading uninformed voters to change their views in terms of composing messages and spreading them. This paper goes on to consider how the inclusion of bad politicians may affect the behaviour of good politicians and suggests that a small amount of potential corruption may be socially useful. It is also argued that where bad politicians have an incentive to mimic the behaviour of good and populist politicians, the latter types of politician may have an incentive to separate from bad politicians by investing in costly public education signals. The paper also discusses the implications of the model for whether fiscal restraints should be soft or hard.

Les débuts de la communication à trois. Interactions visuelles triadiques entre père, mère et bébé

Plusieurs auteurs ont montré que les échanges visuels entre des mères dépressives ou psychotiques et leur bébé présentent de multiples perturbations : dans cet article, les auteurs proposent une étude exploratoire portant sur les échanges visuels père-mère- bébé (9-18 semaines) dans deux groupes de familles, un groupe suivi pour des difficultés du post-partum et un groupe témoin. Les observations sont réalisées dans le cadre d'un jeu à trois structuré selon diverses modalités d'interaction (un parent joue avec l'enfant en présence de l'autre parent / les deux parents jouent conjointement avec le bébé). Les variables retenues concernent d'une part le niveau d'attention visuelle conjointe des partenaires, d'autre part l'évolution de cette attention visuelle au cours du jeu. Les résultats révèlent que les échanges visuels sont plus intenses dans les familles fonctionnelles, ce qui semble indiquer que l'engagement visuel triadique établi par les partenaires peut être représentatif du fonctionnement de la triade à un moment donné de son développement. D'autre part, l'analyse de l'évolution de l'engagement visuel au travers des différents contextes de jeu amène les auteurs à proposer l'hypothèse d'une « alliance triadique » établie conjointement par les trois partenaires et formant la matrice de leurs échanges dyadiques et triadiques. De façon plus générale, les auteurs supposent que l'établissement de cette alliance joue un rôle déterminant pour le développement et l'autonomisa- tion du bébé au sein de sa famille. Disorders in the visual interaction between depressive or psychotic mothers and their baby have been widely described : in this paper, the authors propose an exploratory study of father-mother-infant visual interaction (infants are 9-18 weeks old) in two groups of families, voluntary families and families in therapy for post-par turn disorders. The observations are gathered during a three-partner play, involving different kinds of triadic interaction (one parent plays with the infant, the other parent being « only present » / both parents play together with the child). The analyses have focused on the amount of visual attention shared by the partners and on the evolution of visual interaction during the game. Results show that triadic interaction is more intense in functional triads, which means that shared visual attention may be representative of the more general functioning of the family at a definite stage of its development. Furthermore, considering the sequential organization of visual interaction throughout the game led the authors to the construct of a « triadic alliance », jointly established by the three partners and providing a matrix for their dyadic and triadic interaction. On a more general level, such an alliance could play an important role for the development and the autonomy of the baby within his j her family.

Confidence and Competence in Communication

This paper studies information transmission between an uninformed decision maker (receiver) and an informed player (sender) who have asymmetric beliefs ("con fidence") on the sender s ability ("competence") to observe the state of nature. We fi nd that even when the material payoffs of are perfectly aligned, the sender s over- and underconfi dence on his information give rise to information loss in communication, although they do not by themselves completely eliminate information transmission in equilibrium. However, an underconfi dent sender may prefer no communication to informative communication. We also show that when the sender is biased, overconfi dence can lead to more information transmission and welfare improvement.