The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement

This paper extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime.We model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion. Depending on the principal's information set, threats may or may not be credible. As long as threats are credible, the principal is able to fully extract rents.In that case, the results obtained by applying standard theory of optimal law enforcement are robust: we argue for a tougher policy. However, when threats are not credible, the principal is not able to fully extract rents and there is violence. Moreover, we show that it is not necessarily true that a tougher law enforcement policy should be chosen when in presence of organized crime.

Iowa Law Enforcement Academy Performance Plan, FY 2009

Agency Performance Plan, Iowa Law Enforcement Academy

Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.

Effects of employment protection and product market regulations on the Italian labor market

Labor market regulations have often being blamed for high and persistentunemployment in Europe, but evidence on their impact remains mixed. Morerecently, attention has turned to the impact of product market regulationson employment growth. This paper analyzes how labor and product marketregulations interact to affect turnover and employment. We present a matchingmodel which illustrates how barriers to entry in the product market mitigatethe impact of labor market deregulation. We, then, use the Italian SocialSecurity employer-employee panel to study the interaction between barriersto entry and dismissal costs. We exploit the fact that costs for unjustdismissals in Italy increased for firms below 15 employees relative to biggerfirms after 1990. We find that the increase in dismissal costs after 1990decreased accessions and separations in small relative to big firms,especially for women. Moreover, consistent with our model, we find evidencethat the increase in dismissal costs had smaller effects on turnover for womenin sectors faced with strict product market regulations.

Iowa Law Enforcement Academy, Strategic Plan, 2007

This report outlines the strategic plan for Iowa Law Enforcement Academy, goals and mission.

Firms vs. insiders as traders of last resort

We explore the role of corporate insiders vs. firms as traders of last resort. We develop a simple model of insider trading in which insiders provide price support, as well as liquidity, in security markets. Consistent with the model predictions we find that in the US markets insiders trading activities have a clear impact on return distributions. Furthermore, we provide empirical evidence on insiders transactions and firm transactions affecting returns in a different manner. In particular, while insiders transactions (both purchases and sales) have a strong impact on skewness in the short run and to a lesser extent in short run volatility, company repurchases only have a clear impact on volatility, both in the short and the long run. We provide explanations for this asymmetry.

Fick's law adapted to cationic diffusion in a semi-infinite solid: application to spinel megacrystals

In alkaline lavas, the chemical zoning of megacrystals of spinel is due to the cationic exchange between the latter and the host lava. The application of Fick's law to cationic diffusion profiles allows to calculate the time these crystals have stayed in the lava. Those which are in a chemical equilibrium were in contact with the lava during 20 to 30 days, whereas megacrystals lacking this equilibrium were in contact only for 3 or 4 days. The duration of the rise of an ultrabasic nodule in the volcanic chimney was calculated by applying Stokes' law.

Complementarity between technology make and buy in innovation strategies: Evidence from Belgiam manufacturing firms

This paper characterizes the innovation strategy of manufacturing firms andexamines the relation between the innovation strategy and importantindustry-, firm- and innovation-specific characteristics using Belgiandata from the Eurostat Community Innovation Survey. In addition to importantsize effects explaining innovation, we find that high perceived risks andcosts and low appropriability of innovations do not discourage innovation,but rather determine how the innovation sourcing strategy is chosen. Withrespect to the determinants of the decision of the innovative firm toproduce technology itself (Make) or to source technology externally (Buy),we find that small firms are more likely restrict their innovation strategyto an exclusive make or buy strategy, while large firms are more likely tocombine both internal and external knowledge acquisition in their innovationstrategy. An interesting result that highlights the complementary nature ofthe Make and Buy decisions, is that, controlled for firm size, companies forwhich internal information is an important source for innovation are morelikely to combine internal and external sources of technology. We find thisto be evidence of the fact that in-house R&D generates the necessaryabsorptive capacity to profit from external knowledge acquisition. Also theeffectiveness of different mechanisms to appropriate the benefits ofinnovations and the internal organizational resistance against change areimportant determinants of the firm's technology sourcing strategy.

Trade liberalization in Uruguay: Domestic and foreign firms

The reallocation of resources is one of the main impacts of tradeliberalization processes. In the case of manufacturing industries resourceswill be reallocated from import--competing sectors to export--orientedsectors. This paper studies the effects that a more open economic environmenthas had on the entry conditions for foreign and domestic firms in Uruguayanmanufacturing industries. We find significant differences in the behaviorof foreign and domestic firms, both when they are incumbents or when theyact as potential entrants. In general, foreign firms seem to be moresuccessful in applying entry deterring strategies, due to advantages inforeign markets, deeper financial resources or better technological capabilities.They also appear to be more responsive to entry conditions when theyface the prospects of entering a given industry.

Dynamic optimal law enforcement with learning

We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency's current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of detecting and convicting. The agency accumulates data and information (on criminals, on opportunities of crime) enhancing the ability to apprehend in the future at a lower marginal cost.We focus on the impact of enforcement learning on optimal stationary compliance rules. In particular, we show that the optimal stationary fine could be less-than-maximal and the optimal stationary probability of detection could be higher-than-otherwise.

Optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information

In this paper, we focus on the problem created by asymmetric informationabout the enforcer's (agent's) costs associated to enforcement expenditure. This adverse selection problem affects optimal law enforcement because a low cost enforcer may conceal its information by imitating a high cost enforcer, and must then be given a compensation to be induced to reveal its true costs. The government faces a trade-off between minimizing the enforcer's compensation and maximizing the net surplus of harmful acts. As a consequence, the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced leading to more offenses being committed. We show that asymmetry of information does not affect law enforcement as long as raising public funds is costless. The consideration of costly raising of public funds permits to establish the positive correlation between asymmetry of information between government and enforcers andthe crime rate.

Audit report on the Webster County Metropolitan Law Enforcement Telecommunications Board for the year ended June 30, 2008

Audit report on the Webster County Metropolitan Law Enforcement Telecommunications Board for the year ended June 30, 2008

Report on the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy for the year ended June 30, 2008

Report on the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy for the year ended June 30, 2008