On payoff heterogeneity in games with strategic complementarities

Payoff heterogeneity weakens positive feedback in binary choice models intwo ways. First, heterogeneity drives individuals to corners where theyare unaffected by strategic complementarities. Second, aggregate behaviouris smoother than individual behaviour when individuals are heterogeneous.However, this smoothing does not necessarily eliminate positive feedbackor guarantee a unique equilibrium. In games with an unbounded, continuouschoice space, heterogeneity may either weaken or strengthen positive feedback,depending on a simple convexity/concavity condition. We conclude that positivefeedback phenomena derived in representative agent models will often be robustto heterogeneity.

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, November 2007

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program - Nov 2007

Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

Economic growth and investment in the Arab world

This paper analyses the economic growth performance in the Arab world overthe last forty years. The Arab world has managed to reduce povertyperformance despite its relatively disappointing growth performance. Werelate this poor performance of both oil and non-oil producers toinvestment. Contrary to widespread belief, we do not find evidence that lowquantity of investment is the main of low growth. The decline in theinvestment rate followed rather than preceded the reduction in the aggregategrowth rate. We conclude that the low quality of investment projects is thekey determinant of growth. The excessive reliance on public investment, thelow quality of financial institutions, the bad business environment (due topolitical and social instability and to excessive public intervention andoverregulation) and the low quality of human capital are importantdeterminants of systematically unproductive investment decisions and, thus,low economic growth.

Iowa Budget Report, Building on our Progress: Protecting our Priorities, 2009

*********** Some files are large and will take time to load. *********** Seven Files: 1)Report Cover, 2)Table of Contents, 3)Statewide Financial Summaries, 4)Department Budgets, 5)Capitol Projects, 6)Associated Financial Documents, 7)Budget Report. To Members of the 82nd General Assembly, As we begin the second year of our Administration, we are pleased to submit the Fiscal Year 2009 budget for the State of Iowa pursuant to Iowa Code Section 8.21 and our constitutional authority. This budget recognizes the progress that we began last year with improvements in education, economic development, energy independence, and health care; provides funding for new policy initiatives in these areas; and is based on fiscally sound budget practices. Building on last year’s accomplishments, our Fiscal Year 2009 General Fund budget proposes an additional $75 million for increasing teachers’ salaries as part of our goal to move Iowa closer to the national average. We lay the foundation for student achievement by recommending $32.1 million for pre-school education, and we also propose $177.5 million in total for community colleges and $726.2 million in total for Regents universities. To make our State more energy independent, our General Fund budget appropriates the second-year funding of $25 million for the new Iowa Power Fund. The newly established Office of Energy Independence will soon start making awards from the Power Fund. Apart from the budget, we will be making several proposals to implement the new State energy plan. We have pledged to expand the number of Iowans who have health-care coverage. As a result, we are recommending additional funding for enrollment growth in the State Children Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). These additional funds will help the State provide coverage for another 25 percent of children who are eligible but not yet enrolled in hawk-i and the Iowa Medicaid Program. To protect the safety of Iowans, we are recommending issuance of revenue bonds for approximately $260 million in net proceeds to build a new state penitentiary in Ft. Madison, renovate and expand the Women’s Correctional Institution at Mitchellville, upgrade kitchen facilities at the Rockwell City and Mt. Pleasant Correctional Institutions, and expand Community-Based Correctional Facilities in Ottumwa, Sioux City, Waterloo, and Des Moines. Additionally, we are including funding for developing a prototype program for providing parolees and low-risk offenders with mental health and drug abuse treatment and educational services to help them make a crime-free re-entry into our communities. As part of this Capitals Budget, we also propose using $20 million for the State’s matching share for building new facilities at the Iowa Veterans Home. Iowa Budget Report iv Fiscal Year 2009 Importantly, our budget continues to fully fund our State’s Reserve Funds to help buffer Iowa from any future economic downturn. We recommend reimbursing $78.2 million to the Property Tax Credit Fund as part of our multi-year proposal to correct bad budgeting practices and eventually restore $160.0 million to this Fund. To provide more transparency, we are transferring operational expenditures in the Rebuild Iowa Infrastructure Fund to the General Fund and expenditures from the Endowment for Healthy Iowans and Healthy Iowans Tobacco Trust Funds to the General Fund. We believe that Iowa has charted a new course of becoming energy independent, providing quality pre-school education, recognizing the importance of our teachers, and providing greater health coverage for children. Our Fiscal Year 2009 budget and policy priorities reflect our continuing faith in Iowa’s ability to be the best state in the nation. We look forward to working with you in a bi-partisan and all-inclusive manner to build on our progress and protect our priorities. Sincerely, Chester J. Culver Governor Patty Judge Lt. Governor

Financial intermediation and equity investment with costly monitoring

This paper studies the efficiency of equilibria in a productive OLG economy where the process of financial intermediation is characterized by costly state verification. Both competitive equilibria and Constrained Pareto Optimal allocations are characterized. It is shown that market outcomes can be socially inefficient, even when a weaker notion than Pareto optimality is considered.

Is lumpy investment really irrelevant for the business cycle?

New-Keynesian (NK) models can only account for the dynamic effects of monetary policy shocks if it is assumed that aggregate capital accumulation is much smoother than it would be the case under frictionless firm-level investment, as discussed in Woodford (2003, Ch. 5). We find that lumpy investment, when combined with price stickiness and market power of firms,can rationalize this assumption. Our main result is in stark contrast with the conclusions obtained by Thomas (2002) in the context of a real business cycle (RBC) model. We use our model to explain the economic mechanism behind this difference in the predictions of RBC and NK theory.

Short-term investment and equilibrium multiplicity

I study the effects of the heterogeneity of traders'horizon in the context of a 2-period NREE model whereall traders are risk averse. Owing to inventory effects,myopic trading behavior generates multiplicity ofequilibria. In particular, two distinct patterns arise.Along the first equilibrium, short term tradersanticipate higher second period price reaction toinformation arrival and, owing to risk aversion,scale back their trading intensity. This, in turn,reduces both risk sharing and information impoundinginto prices enforcing a high returns' volatility-lowprice informativeness equilibrium. In the second one,the opposite happens and a low volatility-high priceinformativeness equilibrium arises.

Strategic behavior and price discovery

The paper analyzes the effects of strategic behavior by an insider in a price discovery process, akin to an information tatonnement, in the presence of a competitive informed sector. Such processes are used in the preopening period of continuous trading systems in several exchanges. It is found that the insider manipulates the market using a contrarian strategy in order to neutralize the effect of the trades of competitive informed agents. Furthermore, consistently with the empirical evidence available, we find that information revelation accelerates close to the opening, that the market price does not converge to the fundamental value no matter how many rounds the tatonnement has, and that the expected trading volume displays a U-shaped pattern. We also find that a market with a larger competitive sector (smaller insider) has an improved informational efficiency and an increased trading volume. The insider provides a public good (a lower informativeness of the price) for the competitive informed sector.

Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty

This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consistent with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan (2004)).

Does foreign direct investment crowd out domestic entrepreneurship?

In analyzing firm entry and exit across Belgian manufacturing industries,this paper presents evidence that import competition and foreign directinvestment discourage entry and stimulate exit of domestic entrepreneurs.These results are in line with theoretical occupational choice modelsthat predict foreign direct investment would crowd out domesticentrepreneurs through their selections in product and labor markets.However, the empirical results also suggest that this crowding out effectmay be moderated or even reversed in the long-run due to the long termpositive effects of FDI on domestic entrpreneurship as a result oflearning, demonstration, networking and linkage effects between foreignand domestic firms.

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, January 2008

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, Februray 2008

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, March 2008

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program