Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions

We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders. To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders' complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the experiment. In the aggregate, behavior is consistent with the basic equilibrium predictions for risk neutral or homogenous risk averse bidders (extent of bid shading, average seller's revenues and deviations from equilibrium). However, when we look at the extent of best reply behavior and the shape of bid functions, we find that individual behavior is not in line with the received equilibrium models, although it exhibits strategic sophistication.

Is bundling anticompetitive?

I analyze the implications of bundling on price competition in a market for complementary products. Using a model of imperfect competition with product differentiation, I identify the incentives to bundle for two types of demand functions and study how they change with the size of the bundle. With an inelastic demand, bundling creates an advantage over uncoordinated rivals who cannot improve by bundling. I show that this no longer holds with an elastic demand. The incentives to bundle are stronger and the market outcome is symmetric bundling, the most competitive one. Profits are lowest and consumer surplus is maximized.

Bidding at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: a laboratory analysis

We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). Although we observe a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain and an important overbidding, the data qualitatively support our price trend predictions and the risk neutral Nash equilibrium model of bidding for the last stage of a sequence, whether supply is certain or not. Our study shows that behavior in these markets changes significantly with the presence of an uncertain supply, and that it can be explained by assuming that bidders formulate pessimistic beliefs about the occurrence of another stage.

Price competition under cost uncertainty: A laboratory analysis

We study the relation between the number of firms and price-cost margins under price competition with uncertainty about competitors' costs. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. In line with the theoretical prediction, market prices decrease with the number of firms, but on average stay above marginal costs. Pricing is less aggressive in duopolies than in triopolies and tetrapolies. However, independently from the number of firms, pricing is more aggressive than in the theoretical equilibrium. Both the absolute and the relative surpluses increase with the number of firms. Total surplus is close to the equilibrium level, since enhanced consumer surplus through lower prices is counteracted by occasional displacements of the most efficient firm in production.

Can genetic algorithms explain experimental anomalies? An application to common property resources

It is common to find in experimental data persistent oscillations in the aggregate outcomes and high levels of heterogeneity in individual behavior. Furthermore, it is not unusual to find significant deviations from aggregate Nash equilibrium predictions. In this paper, we employ an evolutionary model with boundedly rational agents to explain these findings. We use data from common property resource experiments (Casari and Plott, 2003). Instead of positing individual-specific utility functions, we model decision makers as selfish and identical. Agent interaction is simulated using an individual learning genetic algorithm, where agents have constraints in their working memory, a limited ability to maximize, and experiment with new strategies. We show that the model replicates most of the patterns that can be found in common property resource experiments.

Structural inferences from first-price auction experiments

We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction experiments. We identify conditions to test the Nash equilibrium models for homogenous and for heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion when bidders private valuations are independent and uniformly drawn. The outcomes of our study indicate that behavior may have been affected by the procedure used to conduct the experiments and that the usual Nash equilibrium model for heterogeneous constant relative risk averse bidders does not consistently explain the observed overbidding. From an empirical standpoint, our analysis shows the possible drawbacks of overlooking the homogeneity hypothesis when testing symmetric equilibrium models of bidding and it puts in perspective the sensitivity of structural inferences to the available information.

Generalized property R and the Schoenflies Conjecture

There is a relation between the generalized Property R Conjecture and the Schoenflies Conjecture that suggests a new line of attack on the latter. The new approach gives a quick proof of the genus 2 Schoenflies Conjecture and suffices to prove the genus 3 case, even in the absence of new progress on the generalized Property R Conjecture.

Limitations and biases of conventional analysis of climate change. Towards an analysis coherent with sustainable development

This paper shows the numerous problems of conventional economic analysis in the evaluation of climate change mitigation policies. The article points out the many limitations, omissions, and the arbitrariness that have characterized most evaluation models applied up until now. These shortcomings, in an almost overwhelming way, have biased the result towards the recommendation of a lower aggressiveness of emission mitigation policies. Consequently, this paper questions whether these results provide an appropriate answer to the problem. Finally, various points that an analysis coherent with sustainable development should take into account are presented.

Real rank zero algebras have the corona factorization property

The purpose of this short note is to prove that a stable separable C*-algebra with real rank zero has the so-called corona factorization property, that is, all the full multiplier projections are properly in finite. Enroute to our result, we consider conditions under which a real rank zero C*-algebra admits an injection of the compact operators (a question already considered in [21]).

Globalization and Europeanization: Analysing Change

The main motivation for exploring the relationship between globalization and Europeanization is the understanding of the importance of exogenous factors for policy change at the domestic level. Can we distinguish the impact of Europeanization to that of globalization? What is the relationship between globalization and Europeanization and what can we learn about the impact of the two phenomena upon political institutions, public policies, identities and values of EU member-states? Can we distinguish the traces of globalization to those of Europeanization upon the domestic level? The paper draws upon International Relations and International Political Economy theories of globalization as well as upon the Europeanization literature. Both phenomena are multi-dimensional and in order to assess their impact and their relationship three dimensions are explored: political institutions, public policies and values and identities. It is concluded that the two phenomena are interwoven and that there is no antithetical relationship between them. Their core is similar, based on the values of neo-liberalism, representative democracy and open market economy.

Thickening of phase change materials (PCM) to avoid segregation

Estudi elaborat a partir d’una estada a Çukurova University, Turquia, al juliol del 2006. L’emmagatzematge d’energia tèrmica ha atret interès en aplicacions tèrmiques com l’aigua calenta, la calefacció i l’aire condicionat. Aquests sistemes són útils per corregir la no coincidència entre la oferta i la demanda d’energia. Principalment hi ha dos tipus de sistemes d’emmagatzematge d’energia tèrmica, emmagatzematge amb calor sensible i amb calor latent. L’emmagatzematge amb calor latent és particularment atractiu degut a la seva habilitat de donar una densitat d’emmagatzematge d’energia més alt i la seva característica d’emmagatzemar calor a una temperatura constant corresponent a la temperatura de transició de fase de la substància emmagatzemadora de calor. Les salts hidratades orgàniques tenen certes avantatges com a materials d’emmagatzematge de calor latent sobre els materials orgànics. En canvi, quan les salts hidratades s’utilitzen com a materials de canvi de fase (PCM) apareixen alguns problemes en les aplicacions d’emmagatzematge de calor latent. Aquests són el subrefredament de les salts hidratades quan es congelen degut a les seves dèbils propietats de nucleació, i la separació de fase que hi apareix degut a una fusió incongruent. En aquest estudi, s’estabilitza sal de Glauber (Na2SO4.10H2O) amb diferents concentracions de poliacrilamida i gelatina per prevenir la fusió incongruent. Per prevenir el subrefredament s’utilitza un agent nucleant amb una estructura cristal•lina semblant a la de la sal de Glauber. La capacitat d’emmagatzematge de calor de les mostres de PCM estabilitzades amb diferents concentracions de gels polimèrics es determinen amb DCS i amb el mètode T-history.

Equity and CO2 emissions distribution in climate change integrated assessment

Emissions distribution is a focus variable for the design of future international agreements to tackle global warming. This paper specifically analyses the future path of emissions distribution and its determinants in different scenarios. Whereas our analysis is driven by tools which are typically applied in the income distribution literature and which have recently been applied to the analysis of CO2 emissions distribution, a new methodological approach is that our study is driven by simulations run with a popular regionalised optimal growth climate change model over the 1995-2105 period. We find that the architecture of environmental policies, the implementation of flexible mechanisms and income concentration are key determinants of emissions distribution over time. In particular we find a robust positive relationship between measures of inequalities.

Effects of competition over quality-adjusted price indexes: an application to the Spanish automobile market

Using a newly constructed data set, we calculate quality-adjusted price indexes after estimating hedonic price regressions from 1988 to 2004 in the Spanish automobile market. The increasing competition was favoured by the removal of trade restrictions and the special plans for the renewal of the Spanish automobile fleet. We find that the increasing degree of competition during those years led to an overall drop in automobile prices by 20 percent which implied considerable consumer gains thanks to higher market efficiency. Additionally, our results indicate that loyalty relevance and discrepancies in automobile reliability declined during those years. This is captured.

Explaining Variation in Organizational Change: The Reform of Human Resource Management in the European Commission and the OECD

In this article we investigate the reforms of human resource management in the European Commission and the OECD by analyzing comparatively to what extent both organizations have adjusted their respective structures towards the ideal type of the so-called New Public Management (NPM). The empirical findings show that reforms towards NPM are more pronounced in the Commission than in the OECD. These findings are surprising for two reasons: First, it seems rather paradoxical that the OECD as central promoter of NPM at the international level lags behind the global trend when it comes to reforming its own structures. Second, this result is in contradiction with theoretical expectations, as they can be derived from theories of institutional isomorphism. To nevertheless account for the surprising results, it is necessary to modify and complement existing theories especially with regard to the scope conditions of their causal mechanisms.