O reforço da democracia local no âmbito da reforma da administração autárquica

Dissertação de mestrado em Direito das Autarquias Locais

Detection of the viable myocardium. A perfusion scintigraphic study, before and after coronary bypass surgery in myocardial infarction patients

OBJECTIVE: To compare single-photon-emission computed tomography (SPECT) imaging scans using 201Tl and 99mTc-MIBI in detection of viable myocardium, in regions compromised by infarction. METHODS: Thirty-two (59.3±9.8 years old and 87% male) myocardial infarction patients were studied. All had Q waves on the ECG and left ventricle ejection fraction of <50%. They underwent coronary and left ventricle angiographies and SPECT before (including 201Tl reinjection) and after coronary artery bypass surgery (CABG). Improvement in perfusion observed after surgery was considered the gold standard for myocardial viability. RESULTS: Among 102 studied regions of the heart, there were 40 (39.2%) areas of transient perfusion defects in the conventional protocol with 201Tl and 52 (51.0%) after reinjection. Therefore, 12/62 (19.4%) more viable regions were identified by reinjection. Using 99mTc-MIBI, only 14 (13.7%) regions with transient defects were identified, all of which were seen also in 201Tl protocols. After surgery, 49 of a total of 93 regions analyzed (52.7%) were viable. Sensitivity, specificity, accuracy, positive and negative prediction values were, respectively, 201Tl SPECT scans - 65.3%, 90.9%, 77.4%, 88.9% and 70.2%, reinjection protocol with 201Tl scans - 81.6%, 81.8%, 81.7%, 83.3% and 80.0%; 99mTc-MIBI SPECT scans - 20.4%, 90.9%, 53.8%, 71.4% and 50.6%. Logistic regression demonstrated that the reinjection protocol with 201Tl was the best predictor of viability (P<0.001). CONCLUSION: Our data suggest the election of 201Tl for viability studies, especially when using the reinjection protocol.

The electoral dynamics of human development

This paper analyses the impact of elections on the dynamics of human development in a panel of 82 countries over the period 1980-2013. The incidence of partisan and political support effects is also taken into account. A GMM estimator is employed in the empirical analysis and the results point out to the presence of an electoral cycle in the growth rate of human development. Majority governments also influence it, but no clear evidence is found regarding partisan effects. The electoral cycles have proved to be stronger in non-OECD countries, in countries with less frequent elections, with lower levels of income and human development, in presidential and non-plurality systems and in proportional representation regimes. They have also become more intense in this millennium.

A elite política parlamentar portuguesa: caracterização, cristalização e circulação (2005-2011)

Dissertação de Mestrado em Ciência Política

Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences

In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In particular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with Approval Voting on the dichotomous preference domain, (b) the Borda Count is the only strategy-proof scoring rule on the dichotomous preference domain, and (c) if at least three individuals participate in the election, then the dichotomous preference domain is the unique maximal rich domain under which the Borda Count is strategy-proof.

Does illegal immigration empower rightist parties?

The main goal of this paper is to analyze the political outcome in countries where the relevant issue in elections is the control of immigration. In particular we explore the consequences on the political outcome of the fact that parties are either ideological or opportunistic with respect to this issue. In order to do that we use a simple two-party political competition model in which the issues over which parties take positions are the level of border enforcement and the way it has to be ?nanced. We show that an ideological rather than a pure opportunistic behavior gives parties an advantage to win the election. In particular, in most of the cases we consider we ?nd that rightist parties have an advantage to win in countries where the relevant issue in election is illegal immigration. This result may help us to understand the recent success of anti-immigrant and rightist parties in several countries.

Self-selection consistent functions

This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society. The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location of multiple public facilities, or the election of representative committees. We define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society as a whole should be ratified by the group of agents who are directly concerned with this particular aspect. We investigate the possibility of designing envy-free allocation consistent rules, we also explore whether such rules may also respect the Condorcet criterion.

Stability and manipulation in representative democracies

This paper is devoted to the analysis of all constitutions equipped with electoral systems involving two step procedures. First, one candidate is elected in every jurisdiction by the electors in that jurisdiction, according to some aggregation procedure. Second, another aggregation procedure collects the names of the jurisdictional winners in order to designate the final winner. It appears that whenever individuals are allowed to change jurisdiction when casting their ballot, they are able to manipulate the result of the election except in very few cases. When imposing a paretian condition on every jurisdictions voting rule, it is shown that, in the case of any finite number of candidates, any two steps voting rule that is not manipulable by movement of the electors necessarily gives to every voter the power of overruling the unanimity on its own. A characterization of the set of these rules is next provided in the case of two candidates.

Of Coalition and Speed: Passage and Duration of Statutes in Uruguay's Parliament, 1985-2000

We report preliminary findings from analysis of a database under construction. The paper explores the legislative process in search for some of the alleged consequences of cabinet coalitions in a presidential system. Coalition effects should be less evident in the success of executive initiatives: strategic behavior hampers this intuitive measure of performance. Better measures, because less subject to strategic considerations, are the odds of passage of legislators' bills and the time proposals take to be approved. Thus measured, coalition effects are discernible. Analysis of the universe of proposals processed in the fragmented Uruguayan Parliament between 1985 and 2000 reveals that coalition, observed about half the period, swells success rates of coalition members by 60% on average (and by as much as 150% for those close to the president). Event history analysis shows that coalitions cut the wait for an executive bill by 3 months, 1/6th the average wait. The reverse effect is felt on the duration of legislators' bills.

The choice of banking firm: Are the interest rate a significant criteria?

The objective of the research is to know the factors that in Spain determine the choice of banking organization. The obtained results indicate that the dimension of the network of branches is the reason more valued. In spite of the increasing symmetry of the Spanish banking market, the preferences of the clients of the savings banks and those of the banks are not absolutely coincident, being the proximity - the main reason for election- much more valued by the former than by the latter. The existence of divergences in the preferences has also been detected according to the region and the typology of city of residence.

The Political Economy of Resource Rent Distribution

I model the link between political regime and level of diversification following a windfall of natural resource revenues. The explanatory variables I make use of are the political support functions embedded within each type of regime and the disparate levels of discretion, openness, transparency, and accountability of government. I show that a democratic government seeks to maximize the long-term consumption path of the representative consumer, in order to maximize its chances of re-election, while an authoritarian government, in the absence of any electoral mechanism of accountability, seeks to buy off and entrench a group of special interests loyal to the government and potent enough to ensure its short-term survival. Essentially the contrast in the approaches towards resource rent distribution comes down to a variation in political weights on aggregate welfare and rentierist special interests endogenized by distinct political support functions.

Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure investment: tactical or programmatic?

In this paper we analyze the effects of both tactical and programmatic politics on the inter-regional allocation of infrastructure investment. We use a panel of data for the Spanish electoral districts during the period 1964-2004 to estimate an equation where investment depends both on economic and political variables. The results show that tactical politics do matter since, after controlling for economic traits, the districts with more ‘Political power’ still receive more investment. These districts are those where the incumbents’ Vote margin of victory/ defeat in the past election is low, where the Marginal seat price is low, where there is Partisan alignment between the executives at the central and regional layers of government, and where there are Pivotal regional parties which are influential in the formation of the central executive. However, the results also show that programmatic politics matter, since inter-regional redistribution (measured as the elasticity of investment to per capita income) is shown to increase with the arrival of the Democracy and EU Funds, with Left governments, and to decrease the higher is the correlation between a measure of ‘Political power’ and per capita income.

Civil war and foreign influence

We study a symmetric information bargaining model of civil war where a third (foreign) party can affect the probabilities of winning the conflict and the size of the post conflict spoils. We show that the possible alliance with a third party makes peaceful agreements difficult to reach and might lead to new commitment problems that trigger war. Also, we argue that the foreign party is likely to induce persistent informational asymmetries which might explain long lasting civil wars. We explore both political and economic incentives for a third party to intervene. The explicit consideration of political incentives leads to two predictions that allow for identifying the influence of foreign intervention on civil war incidence. Both predictions are confirmed for the case of the U.S. as a potential intervening nation: (i) civil wars around the world are more likely under Republican governments and (ii) the probability of civil wars decreases with U.S. presidential approval rates.

El naturalismo científico en la obra de John Tyndall: Fragments of science

El análisis de los ensayos de John Tyndall, Fragments of Science, permite identificar la teoría atómica, el principio de conservación de la energía y el evolucionismo darwinista como los elementos constitutivos del andamiaje teórico del naturalismo científico. Así, en su ensayo “On the Study of Physics” se resumen sus brillantes facetas como educador y divulgador científico, desarrolladas fundamentalmente en el seno de la Royal Institution. En la lectura “On Force”, Tyndall da por finalizada la controversia Joule- Mayer sobre la primacía del descubrimiento del principio de conservación de la energía, a la vez que plantea algunas de las claves de la lucha por el liderazgo en el seno de la comunidad científica. El discurso presidencial ante la British Association de 1874 en Belfast ejemplifica el coraje de Tyndall en su empeño por demarcar los territorios de la ciencia y la religión, a la luz de los nuevos desafíos científicos. En el trasfondo subyacen los procesos de secularización de la sociedad y de profesionalización de una comunidad científica heterogénea. El compromiso cívico que Tyndall demuestra en “The Belfast Address” es digno corolario de una vida y obra que permite situarlo como paradigma de lo que, en la terminología de Turner, se ha dado en denominar científico público.

L'impacte dels sistemes multinivell en els sistemes de partits

Imaginemos que un observador quiere analizar el sistema político de los países de Europa Occidental. Si compara el sistema de partidos que hay a nivel nacional con los presentes en cada uno de los distritos de esta elección, apreciará notables diferencias entre países. Por ejemplo, si repara en Alemania, verá como los mismos cinco partidos presentes en el Bundestag compiten también en todos los distritos. Si por otra parte se fija en España, comprobará como en las Elecciones Generales españolas algunos partidos se presentan en todas las circunscripciones pero otros sólo lo hacen en una o en un puñado de ellas. Por lo tanto, mientras que en el primer caso tenemos que el sistema político nacional se reproduce de manera idéntica en cada distrito, en el segundo hay diferencias entre los partidos a nivel nacional y los presentes en determinados distritos. ¿Por qué existen estas divergencias? ¿Qué es lo que explica que esta situación sea estática o que cambie a lo largo del tiempo? En este anexo presento una memoria para justificar los principales avances en la investigación doctoral durante el periodo en que he disfrutado de la beca FI.