Open Sea

Combined media on paper. 42" x 87"

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analysed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. JEL classification numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot competition, Contract delegation, Moral hazard, Entry, Market size, Wage cost.

Entry and market selection of firms: a laboratory study

We study competition in experimental markets in which two incumbents face entry by three other firms. Our treatments vary with respect to three factors: sequential vs. block or simultaneous entry, the cost functions of entrants and the amount of time during which incumbents are protected from entry. Before entry incumbents are able to collude in all cases. When all firms' costs are the same entry always leads consumer surplus and profits to their equilibrium levels. When entrants are more efficient than incumbents, entry leads consumer surplus to equilibrium. However, total profits remain below equilibrium, due to the fact that the inefficient incumbents produce too much and efficient entrants produce too little. Market behavior is satisfactory from the consumers' standpoint, but does not yield adequate signals to other potential entrants. These results are not affected by whether entry is simultaneous or sequential. The length of the incumbency phase does have some subtle effects.

Why did London become the main money market? Monetary Policy, Arbitrage and European Money Market Integration in 18th century

How did the leading capital market start to attract international bullion? Why did London become the main money market? Monetary regulations, including the charges for minting money and the restrictions on bullion exchange, have played the key role in defining the direction of the flow of international bullion. Countries that abolished minting charges and permitted the free movement of bullion were able to attract international bullion, and countries that applied minting taxes suffered an outflow of bullion. In these cases monetary authorities tried to limit bullion movement through prohibitions on domestic bullion exchange at a free price, and tariffs and quantitative restrictions on bullion exports. The paper illustrates the logic of international monetary flow in the 18th century, using empirical evidence for England, France and Spain. The first section defines and measures monetary policy, and the second section introduces minting charges into the arbitrage equation in order to explain the logic of bullion flow between the pairs of nations England-France, England-Spain and France-Spain. The conclusion emphasises the importance of monetary policy in the creation of leading money markets.

Effects of competition over quality-adjusted price indexes: an application to the Spanish automobile market

Using a newly constructed data set, we calculate quality-adjusted price indexes after estimating hedonic price regressions from 1988 to 2004 in the Spanish automobile market. The increasing competition was favoured by the removal of trade restrictions and the special plans for the renewal of the Spanish automobile fleet. We find that the increasing degree of competition during those years led to an overall drop in automobile prices by 20 percent which implied considerable consumer gains thanks to higher market efficiency. Additionally, our results indicate that loyalty relevance and discrepancies in automobile reliability declined during those years. This is captured.

North-South trade and directed technical change

In a world where poor countries provide weak protection for intellectual property rights (IPRs), market integration shifts technical change in favor of rich nations. Through this channel, free trade may amplify international income differences. At the same time, integration with countries where IPRs are weakly protected can slow down the world growth rate. An important implication of these results is that protection of intellectual property is most beneficial in open countries. This prediction, which is novel in the literature, is consistent with evidence from a panel of 53 countries observed in the years 1965-1990. The paper also provides empirical support for the mechanism linking North-South trade to the direction of technical change: an increase in import penetration from low-wage, low-IPRs, countries is followed by a sharp fall in R&D investment in a panel of US manufacturing sectors.

Stock market volatility and learning

Introducing bounded rationality in a standard consumption-based asset pricing model with time separable preferences strongly improves empirical performance. Learning causes momentum and mean reversion of returns and thereby excess volatility, persistence of price-dividend ratios, long-horizon return predictability and a risk premium, as in the habit model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), but for lower risk aversion. This is obtained, even though our learning scheme introduces just one free parameter and we only consider learning schemes that imply small deviations from full rationality. The findings are robust to the learning rule used and other model features. What is key is that agents forecast future stock prices using past information on prices.

Market effects of foreign exchange coordinated intervention

In this article we develop a theoretical microstructure model of coordinated central bank intervention based on asymmetric information. We study the economic implications of coordination on some measures of market quality and show that the model predicts higher volatility and more significant exchange rate changes when central banks coordinate compared to when they intervene unilaterally. Both these predictions are in line with empirical evidence. Keywords: coordinated foreign exchange intervention, market microstructure. JEL Classification: D82, E58, F31, G14

Estudio previo a la implantación de un ERP en una empresa transitaria

Aquest projecte tracta de l'estudi previ que cal fer en una empresa abans d'aventurar-se a la implantació d'un sistema ERP. Ens centrarem en una PIME que té com a activitat bàsica la importació-exportació de mercaderies a o des de les Illes Canàries. L'estudi s'ha centrat en tres sistemes ERPs que es troben en el mercat actualment. La selecció té com a objetiu exposar els productes dels dos principals fabricants, SAP i Microsoft Navision. En contrapartida, ens ha semblat molt interessant incloure com a tercer sistema estudiat Open Bravo, un ERP basat en software lliure.

Applying RADIC in Open MPI: the methodology used to implement RADIC over a Message Passing Library

Fault tolerance has become a major issue for computer and software engineers because the occurrence of faults increases the cost of using a parallel computer. RADIC is the fault tolerance architecture for message passing systems which is transparent, decentralized, flexible and scalable. This master thesis presents the methodology used to implement the RADIC architecture over Open MPI, a well-know large-used message passing library. This implementation kept the RADIC architecture characteristics. In order to validate the implementation we have executed a synthetic ping program, besides, to evaluate the implementation performance we have used the NAS Parallel Benchmarks. The results prove that the RADIC architecture performance depends on the communication pattern of the parallel application which is running. Furthermore, our implementation proves that the RADIC architecture could be implemented over an existent message passing library.

Privatization and competition in the delivery of local services: An empirical examination of the dual market hypothesis

This paper empirically analyses the hypothesis of the existence of a dual market for contracts in local services. Large firms that operate on a national basis control the contracts for delivery in the most populated and/or urban municipalities, whereas small firms that operate at a local level have the contracts in the least populated and/or rural municipalities. The dual market implies the high concentration and dominance of major firms in large municipalities, and local monopolies in the smaller ones. This market structure is harmful to competition for the market as the effective number of competitors is low across all municipalities. Thus, it damages the likelihood of obtaining cost savings from privatization.